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- 8/20/2002 9:28:19 AM   
ReDDoN45

 

Posts: 135
Joined: 2/25/2002
Status: offline 		there are afr more stories about US torpedo problems. One is certainly the most iimpressive. A gato class sub found a Tanker near Truk, shot a spread of torps over 4500 yds. and impressively hit with one torp, which even exploded! The tanker lay DiW, but since it had deck guns the commander of the sub closed submerged to deliver the tanker the final shot. the commander steared the sub in the optimal position, as he had learned - 90 degrees of one side of the ship 850 yds. away. He fired a torp - no explosion. He checked settings of TDC, depth,..... he fired another torp .... no explosion.... he checked again..... he fired two more torps.... no explosion......... he checked last time and fired all remaining torps... no explosion. It was an unbelievable story, but true!

The US tors had four main problems, which one after one was solved like in the German Navy:

Torps running deeper than assigned depth - thex just ran not level... fixed in 43

Torpedoes exploding too easrly - fixed in 43/44 - had to do with the magnet fuse - US went back to contact fuse

Torpedoes exploding not when hitting the target - fixed in 43 - had to do with the bolt which dashes on the warhead to make it explode

Torpdeoes tunning in circles - awful problem - eventually corrected 43/44

As everyopne can see, US torps had plenty of problems, and seeing one of them actually explode when hitting a target is more a surprise, than when it doesnīt

Those who played SH-1, once again know what I am talking about!

Concerning experience in China. I didnīt meant general doctrine experience or experience the IJN or IJAAF has learned of it (i though I made that clear enough), I talked about actual pilot experience - every combat experience is good. And thatīs what the values of the sigle pilots should represent in UV. Same for ground units. Japs had propably the best infantry (1 by 1) of the world, but had lack of auto weapons, poor command and control and crappy doctrine.

You mix up two thinks in regards of experience. Another example: In winter 42/43 there was a battle on the Eastern Front in the Rzhev salient, dubbed by the Russians "Operation Mars". It was the real big Sovjet winter offensive of 42/43 , not hte Stalingrad offensive. Here the Germans also had a slaient the sovjets wanted to cut off. They made a picer attack on the Flanks, but failed completely in a very hige disaster, sicne the commander (Model) built up deep defenses and fall back from one line to the next. The Russians were slaughtered!

The result: The German soldiers fighting in this battle definetely enheanced their (1) "combat experience".

But the German High Command didnīt learn from this lesson. Rather than applieng clever deep defenses and falling back from one line to the next to fututre battles, Hitler ordered more and more "stand and die".
The Sovjets learned from it. The applied same tactic in the Kursk salient.

There are plenty of such examples (also the air supply of Cholm and Demyansk in 41/42, which worked and made some foolish people in the German army think they could air supply an entire army - the 6th - in Stalingraf, one winter later)

Here the Japs failed, they didnīt learn any "lessons". But this doensīt have much to do withactual "combat experience".

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 61
- 8/20/2002 9:42:03 AM   
ReDDoN45

 

Posts: 135
Joined: 2/25/2002
Status: offline 		BTW, concerning overshooting in energy fighting. This is the aim of energy fighting :D . Just before you overshoot the target you have to damage/kill it.

You dive down - get close - shoot - climb up with your surplus speed again - of course you overshoot then, and this doesnīt bring the Wildcat into a good positoon, because the other pilto uses itīs surplus speed to either zoom climb up again or make a loop. Since most jap fighters had a weak armament the actually had to do this several times, since itīs too hard to kill a plane in one run (you have actually only about 3/4 - 1 sec of shooting time). SInce jap pilots didnīt like that they became more focused on staying behind the enemy and kill him that way (in a dogfight). Such mass dogfights allways are dangerous to every plane, even the more maneuvrable, since even when the Zero can master the one plane plane ahead of itīs nose and shoot him up more and more, there suddenly may head a Wildcat on him from 10 o clock. You are never secure in such dogfights. From everywhere you can suddenly get shot on.... Since Wildcats are more duable and have heavier, also for deflection shooting better suited armament this actually gives them almost an advantege in such mass dogfights. Azero needs only a few hits to go down. YOu also see this in UV happen. P-40īs and F4Fs often fly slashing attacks. When you check multiplayer flying in simulations like IL-2 you often see 90% of the pilots trying to outturn the pilots and search decsion in a dogfight, rather than energy fighting - itīs a natural instinct - especially for unexperienced or meager experienced pilots. More experienced learned to do it a saver way.

Compare Erich Hartmannīs learnign curve for that. Beginning as a wild dogfighter he changed tactics to become the most deadliest bouncer, ever. Concernign dogfigthing he said: Itīs stupid - far to risky - so why should I risk somehting when there is a better and save way to kill an enemy.

Jap planes thoguh had their emphasis on maneuvrability, climb rate and acceleration and lacked speed, armament and armor. No good combination for Boom and Zoom tactics. Thatīs why they didnīt likt ot employ them until 44.... like the Ki-44 Tojo - not like by itīs piltots - but excellent boom and zoom aircraft. Propably the most "American" plane in the Japanese AF.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 62
- 8/20/2002 11:21:36 AM   
CynicAl


Posts: 327
Joined: 7/27/2001
From: Brave New World
Status: offline 		There's a saying in Japanese which goes, if I can avoid mangling it too badly, "Beware of the man who claims to have twenty years' experience, but in fact only has one years' experience, which he has repeated twenty times."

I don't think I am confusing two different things - I quite clearly understand the distinction you're drawing, and recognize its validity. But what I'm saying is that war experience in China didn't do the Japanese much good at any level. The basic question is: why is combat experience a good thing? The answer is: there's only one good thing about it - it teaches you things you need to know to survive more combat.

In the example you cited of the German troops on the Eastern Front, they did indeed gain valuable experience. They picked up a few new tricks to help them survive more combat against the Red Army. The grunts learned the right lessons, even if High Command didn't. In this case, you are correct to draw this distinction.

Japanese experience in China in the 1930's is a bit different, especially in the air. The Chinese Air Force was third-rate at best. For the A5M and Ki-27 pilots, China amounted to a prolonged live-fire exercise. Unfortunately for them, the conditions of the "exercise" (beating up on the small, poorly trained, poorly equipped Chinese air force) made very poor preparation for going up against a modern opponent (with comparable numbers of competent pilots flying adequate aircraft). Experience in China did not teach Japanese Japanese pilots the things that would keep them alive against serious opposition. The tips and tricks that individual pilots learned (and passed on to their juniors) to help them survive more combat in China in the 1930's did not serve them nearly as well in the Pacific in the 1940's. So even though I won't say you're wrong to make that distinction in this case, I don't think it's relevant because the same problems can be seen on both sides of the line you would draw.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 63
- 8/20/2002 12:27:08 PM   
ReDDoN45

 

Posts: 135
Joined: 2/25/2002
Status: offline 		chinese AF from late 38 on wanīt that poor equiped. I-15s, I-16s were far from being poor planes? ever tried to fight them in IL-2? Moreover I didnīt only say China experience. Heavy combat over Philipines, Malaya, Borneo, Java, Trincomalee, Burma. a 6 month campaign of no brake and continuos fighting. + Jap pilots had 4 year training programm! + every flying hour is good for a pilot to gain basix experience ----> thatīs what counts. Germany lost far too many pilots in 44/45 before they even had a chance of gaining a BIT experience.... like in game.... when they are above 55 exp. theyīve got a chance!

I donīt wanīt to put down your argument on the air war over China, as it was really no real preperation for the War with the US, in fact in some regards the war in CHina really teached the IJA and the IJAAF the WRONG lessons, but as a dedicated PC/online pilot I know how valuable every bit of flying experience is, regardless of where you get it.

US training was rather lax before the war, nor did they have any experience at all, but they were more foreseeing than the Axis and stepped up their pilot training and plane building programm early and much! A clever decsion ---> That also counts... as I really wonder why the people allways boter about the FEW really good pilots the Japs have - they canīt replace them. So what the heck. As soon as they lost some of them a flood of medium to good Allied pilots overcomes the jap AF. Itīs far more important what your replacements look like in a long war and here the ALlies had and have (in UV) the advantege!!!!!!!! So why complaining about those few jap 80+ pilots? Leave us this one advantege - please! :)

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 64
Regarding Mk. 14 torps. - 8/20/2002 6:20:26 PM   
RevRick


Posts: 2617
Joined: 9/16/2000
From: Thomasville, GA
Status: offline 		Someone correct me if I am wrong (which could be a distinct probability since my reading extends over almost 35 years now, and has been interspersed with other required reading) but wasn't the main problem with the USN Mk. 14 contact detonator that the firing pin was too light (made out of magnesium?) and at the 90 degree target angle would shear rather than cause the explosion - thus negating the perfect firing angle? That is coming from a long way back in memory - and I can't begin to recall where I read it - but I do remember that the explication was that the torpedo worked better when it came in at something less than 90 degrees. Again, this could be totally off the wall - and no, I am not confusing it with the old movie "Operation Pacific" with John Wayne and Ward Bond!

_____________________________

"Action springs not from thought, but from a readiness for responsibility.” ― Dietrich Bonhoeffer

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 65
- 8/20/2002 6:53:09 PM   
ReDDoN45

 

Posts: 135
Joined: 2/25/2002
Status: offline 		you are absolutely right! I just didnīt new the english words for that. THe Germans had the same problem! The torpedoes exploded far more often when hitting target at a steep (bad) angle. That was the main problem of the Mk.14 - but the other three werenīt unimportant, either.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 66
Re: Regarding Mk. 14 torps. - 9/5/2002 10:56:40 PM   
rtrapasso


Posts: 22653
Joined: 9/3/2002
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by RevRick
[B]Someone correct me if I am wrong (which could be a distinct probability since my reading extends over almost 35 years now, and has been interspersed with other required reading) but wasn't the main problem with the USN Mk. 14 contact detonator that the firing pin was too light (made out of magnesium?) and at the 90 degree target angle would shear rather than cause the explosion - thus negating the perfect firing angle? That is coming from a long way back in memory - and I can't begin to recall where I read it - but I do remember that the explication was that the torpedo worked better when it came in at something less than 90 degrees. Again, this could be totally off the wall - and no, I am not confusing it with the old movie "Operation Pacific" with John Wayne and Ward Bond! [/B][/QUOTE]

In Operation Pacific, which did use some historical content, they used a lightweight firing pin to fix the problem. In real life, they got a partial fix by using firing pins machined from the propellors of shot down Japanese aircraft! I am not sure what they are made of, but I the author sates that the pins were from "tough metal" and that the firing pins were "stronger and lighter". In Silent Victory, (p438) Clay Blair states that the guide rails for the firing pin were crushed, and the firing pin was intact enough to actually hit the fulminate cap, but the force from travelling up the bent guide lines was not enough to explode the detonator. I am not sure how a stronger detonator pin fixed this problem - it would seem that the fix would have been to strengthen the guide rails. At any rate, this was not the only solution pursued. At least one other expert went the route of the electrical detonator. The actual solution was not stated, except that "the new firing-pin mechanisms devised by Lockwood's torpedo experts worked fine". Lockwood informed BuOrd, and they redesigned the exploder mechanism - 21 months into the war. How the mechanism was redesigned was not stated. Of course, this did not address the other problems with the torpedo - but the deep running torpedo and magnetic exploder problems had both been addressed at this point. One other torpedo problem not mentioned by most authors is that occasionally the torpedo would leave the tube, and go straight down and explode under the sub. I am not sure if this was a systemic problem, or just a few isolated failures. This is not quite a circular run, but the results could be the same...

Bob T.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 67
- 9/5/2002 11:39:10 PM   
rtrapasso


Posts: 22653
Joined: 9/3/2002
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by FAdmiral
[B]In the Salvo Island scenario, the Jap ships coming down the
slot WERE sighted by American planes and reported the
sighting back to Noumea High Command (Ghormley). The
message was picked up by the communications at Guad
station but was not de-coded right away because it was
not addressed to them. Ghormley figuring they got the
message when he received it, did not forward it on to them.
This would happen again & again later on in the war too.....

JIM BERG, SR. [/B][/QUOTE]

The actual timing of how and when the warning (that the IJN forces were on the way) got to Guadalcanal has been hotly debated since the time of the battle. However, I have read several reports of survivors of the battle, and what *seems* clear is that the Allied crews new that the Japanese were coming, and they would arrive soon, probably that night. A recent issue of Naval History magazine did a large chunk devoted to the battle on the anniversary of the battle. The survivors stated they knew the Japanese were coming, but they attributed the knowledge to Coast Watchers reports. Several authors have attempted to dissect the message chain of how and when to messages were sent, to whom they were delivered, etc. Most (but not all) of these came to the same conclusion: that the warning was delivered in time, but somehow was lost or ignored in the local command structure. This is difficult to PROVE, however.

My personal theory is that the commanders and crew had been so sleep deprived that they were no longer thinking straight. Most of the invasion force did not have much (or maybe any) sleep for several days running. To test this theory, try playing UV for, say, 48 hours straight, with time limits on each move. In my experience, you will start to make MAJOR mistakes (even without time limits per move).

Bob T.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 68
- 9/6/2002 10:43:43 AM   
RUPD3658


Posts: 6922
Joined: 8/28/2002
From: East Brunswick, NJ
Status: offline 		I feel your pain. After a great carrier engagement in which I sunk 3 Jap CVs for only minor losses I pulled my fleet back into port while I contemplated what to do next. A Jap sub got into Luguna despite the heavy ASW patrols and sank 1 CV and 1 CVL while they were docked. I have since learned to disband in port to avoid this. The AI has it's sneaky moments.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 69
- 9/6/2002 12:39:44 PM   
XPav

 

Posts: 550
Joined: 7/10/2002
From: Northern California
Status: offline 		Its the port size that's the key. Subs cannot attack TFs docked at ports over size... 3? (Too lazy to check the manual).

_____________________________

I love it when a plan comes together.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 70
- 9/6/2002 10:10:32 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		Rtrapasso. Jim Berg Sr. Re: Savo and surprise

Richard Frank in "Guadalcanal" added the detail that (IDNR) Ghormly or Crutchley were thrown off by reports of two seaplane tenders in the IJN TF. Based on that report they calculated that the TF could not reach Tulagi/Savo that night.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 71
- 9/7/2002 2:35:33 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Rtrapasso. Jim Berg Sr. Re: Savo and surprise

Richard Frank in "Guadalcanal" added the detail that (IDNR) Ghormly or Crutchley were thrown off by reports of two seaplane tenders in the IJN TF. Based on that report they calculated that the TF could not reach Tulagi/Savo that night. [/B][/QUOTE]


IMHO, the whole TF sighting thing is a rather dubious excuse propogated by Savo apologist. Quite simply the assumptions made were unexcuseable. Even if AVs were sighted. Who is to say that they would not be detached and the rest of the TF speed to Lunga? Besides who is to say that for every TF sighted there may have been other TF that remain undescovered?

The fact is sightings or no sightings. The screening force was there to protect the transports regardless. There is no excuse for taking anything for granted. Rules of War "Expect the unexpected" Sun Tzu (spelling?)

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 72
- 9/7/2002 3:16:25 AM   
rtrapasso


Posts: 22653
Joined: 9/3/2002
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Rtrapasso. Jim Berg Sr. Re: Savo and surprise

Richard Frank in "Guadalcanal" added the detail that (IDNR) Ghormly or Crutchley were thrown off by reports of two seaplane tenders in the IJN TF. Based on that report they calculated that the TF could not reach Tulagi/Savo that night. [/B][/QUOTE]
The first sighting report was at 0739, the day before the battle, made by S-38 at St George's channel = 2 DD and three larger unknown ships proceeding at high speed SSE course.
One sighting report made by the RAAF Hudsons, said they had spotted "three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders or gunboats." It was high-command misinterpretation that decided: "obviously, they have
to be seaplane tenders." The message was repeated several times, not acknowledged, so the crew returned to Fall River and made the sighting report. The JAPANESE on the Chokai had picked up the report from the Hudson (and recorded it), but the Fall River radio room was off the air due to an airraid.
Even so, the verbal report (by FO Stutt)was delayed in transmission about 2 hours at Fall River, and 3 hours at MacArthur's HQ in Brisbane. Ghormley got the message at 1837 (sighting at about 1035)
But this was not the only sighting: FO Willman in another Hudson reported 2 CAs, 2CLs, 1 small unknown type. - spotted at 1045. Again, the report was made, and KNOWN TO HAVE REACHED the flagship CA Australia by 2130 - over 4 hours before the engagement. In Admiral Turner's papers, he had made a note that they had received a direct report from the plane - his staff had been guarding the seachplane frequency. So, even if delayed, the Allies had AT LEAST 4 hours (and probably many more) to get there house straight. Crutchley testified at "Report of Proceedings" that he had been alerted to the precense of a force of enemy ships of Choiseul during the afternoon. Later, he was to contradict this. However, Riefkohl, commander of the Vincennes also testified that he a a report of IJN force of Kieta "in the afternoon". Greenman of the Astoria he had received information of 3CAs 3DD and gunboat during the day, and that it had been passed on by a Coastwatcher. The point of this is: the local commanders knew the IJN was coming. Bode had a similar report and said his navigation officer told him not to worry - they can't get here soon. His navigation officer said he had told him they could arrive any time after midnight. The radio communications officer of the Quincy said they knew the compositon of the force, speed, course, and position by 1600 hours. So, this is confusing as to time and manner the messages were received. But, even if they had "only" 4 hours notice, shouldn't that have been enough to give warning?

Of course, if the communications hadn't been so fouled up, Fletcher was still around in the morning, and could have bombed the Japanese force and probably would have aborted the whole surface battle.

Now, suppose you have three separate warnings come in - one of them says MAYBE there are some seaplane carriers in the TF at one time. The admirals KNEW that the plane crews were horrible at ship ID - they had just had one of their CAs bombed by friendly forces a few weeks before (who swore up and down they had sunk a Japanese ship - until the aerial photography proved it was Australia, and it was pretty obvious she wasn't Japanese, nor sunk). If you had such a
sighting report in UV, would you have said - "no, it couldn't possibly be that they might attack me..." unless maybe you were without sleep for a couple of days. Which is what was happening to the Allies (including their commanders) at what was about to become known as Ironbottom sound. And again, many, if not most of the survivors said they knew the IJN was coming - and despite this, when the Japanese showed up, the Allied commanders refused to believe it. Aircraft were spotted coming in, dropping flares - and no action was taken. Even when the Japanese opened fire on the Allies, the cruiser captains refused to believe they were hostile, and actually ordered their men to cease fire in several instances. The only good explanation I can come up with is poor judgement from lack of sleep.

Bob T.

(in reply to Gabby)
Post #: 73
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