comte
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From: Be'eri, Hadarom, Israel
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Historical Background
New elements in the war's equation modified its shape in
the summer of 1965. Concerned by the continuing inability
of the South Vietnamese to handle the Communist
threat, a threat punctuated by Viet Cong successes in
May and June, the Johnson administration committed two
Army divisions and promised more as needed. With that
commitment, and a matching enemy escalation, the conflict
broadened out, forcing General Westmoreland to
search for a new approach to operations that he hoped
would bring the allies eventual victory.
In May the Viet Cong launched offensives in two areas of
South Vietnam, breaking a two-months lull in operations.
In III Corps the Viet Cong opened their Dong Xoai campaign,
seeking "to annihilate a large portion of the puppet
main-force [South Vietnamese] Army, intensify guerrilla
warfare, assist the masses in destroying strategic
hamlets, expand the liberated areas and connect the
eastern Nam Bo [III Corps] bases with the southern part
of the Central Highlands." The offensive began on the
eleventh north of Saigon, with an attack on the capital of
Phuoc Long Province, Song Be, by up to four Viet Cong
battalions. Overrunning most of the town, the attackers
held their ground until the next day. When the South
Vietnamese dispatched two relief forces, both were
ambushed. On the twenty-ninth the offensive expanded
into southern I Corps. A Viet Cong force, probably in
regimental strength, attacked a South Vietnamese Army
company on a road-clearing operation near the hamlet of
Ba Gia, west of Quang Ngai City. The battalion commander
committed his other two companies, but the Viet
Cong ambushed both as they neared the battle site. The
following day three more battalions entered the fray, and
all took a beating. At the end of the fighting it was clear
that the South Vietnamese had suffered a major defeat,
losing 107 killed, 123 wounded and 367 missing, as well
as 384 individual weapons. The enemy had used a favorite
tactic: attacking and pinning down a South Vietnamese
element, and then ambushing the inevitable
relief force.
American officials feared the worst. The South Vietnamese
seemed whipped. As General Larsen recalled,
"We had to do something and very fast." An analysis prepared
on 5 June by the U.S. Embassy's Mission Intelligence
Committee and transmitted to Washington in
Ambassador Taylor's name, with General Westmoreland's
concurrence, reached a similar conclusion. The growing
American military commitment had persuaded the enemy
to commit more troops of his own. Although suffering
heavy losses, the Communists remained capable of continuing
their attacks, and soon U.S. Combat troops would
have to move out of their enclaves and go into battle.
Two days later, on 7 June, General Westmoreland
informed Admiral Sharp and the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, that the Viet
Cong main forces and the increasing number of North
Vietnamese units in the South could mount regimental-size
operations in all of the corps tactical zones and battalion-
size ones in all of the provinces. Furthermore, he
believed that in the near future the enemy would initiate
attacks in several strategic areas. The South Vietnamese
Army, with it's high desertion rates and higher than
expected losses in recent battles, might not be able to
hold. Therefore, the United States had very few options if
it wanted to reverse the trend. "I see no course of action
open," wrote Westmoreland, "except to reinforce our
effort in SVN [South Vietnam] with additional U.S. or
third country forces as rapidly as practicable during the
critical weeks ahead." As his only recourse, he requested
the commitment of additional maneuver elements.
Counting these units plus the brigades already in country
or on the way, the number of U.S. or third-country (Australian
and South Korean) battalions would total fortyfour,
and the U.S. expeditionary forces would increase to
some 175,000 officers and enlisted men by the end of
1965. The maneuver elements would establish "a substantial
and hard hitting offensive capability on the
ground to convince the V.C. that they cannot win." Planning
also had to begin for the deployment of even
greater forces, if and when required, to defeat the Communists.
Another major South Vietnamese setback soon punctuated
the need for American troops. Shortly after General
Westmoreland made his request, the South Vietnamese
at Dong Xoai suffered their worst defeat since 1964.
When the fighting ended on 12 June, they had lost 416
killed, 174 wounded and 233 missing. For a time, the
173d Airborne Brigade was poised to intervene, but the
enemy's withdrawal eliminated the need. MACV termed
the engagement "a tactical and psychological victory for
the VC."
Given the almost certain likelihood that incidents like
Dong Xoai would recur, Westmoreland sought confirmation
of his authority to commit his troops for offensive
operations. On 13 June Admiral Sharp informed him that
he could use his troops in support of South Vietnamese
forces facing aggressive attack when other reserves were
unavailable and when the military situation warranted it.
Less than two weeks later, in an even clearer message
approved by the Department of Defense, Secretary of
State Dean Rusk added unequivocally that Westmoreland
could commit U.S. Troops to combat "independently or in
conjunction with GVN [Government of Vietnam] forces in
any situation in which the use of such troops is requested
by an appropriate GVN commander and when, in COMUSMACV's
judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen
the relative position of GVN forces." The formula gave
Westmoreland as free a hand in managing his troops as
he was ever likely to receive.
Meanwhile, on 11 June the Chiefs of Staff had seconded
Westmoreland's reinforcement request by calling for
additional troops, particularly the men of the 1st Cavalry
Division. President Johnson, however, temporized. On the
nineteenth he approved preparatory steps necessary for
major deployments, but he held back on sending the
troops themselves. Frustrated, General Wheeler on the
twenty-fifth asserted that "we need more troops [in Vietnam]....
Everything else aside, this is the heart of the
problem." As the president deliberated, discussion among
the administration began to shift from what was necessary
to prevent a South Vietnamese collapse to what
would be required to win the struggle. Four days later, at
Johnson's request, Secretary of Defense McNamara
asked Westmoreland to specify the forces that would be
necessary beyond the forty-four battalions to convince
the enemy he could not prevail. In response, the General
recommended twenty-four more battalions plus the support
and air units necessary to sustain them, an additional
100,000 men. Under the plan he developed, the
forty-four battalions would arrive as soon as possible to
contain the Communist offensive and to prevent a South
Vietnamese collapse. The second wave of troops would
reach Vietnam in 1966 to consolidate earlier gains by
attacking the enemy's main forces in their strongholds
and by assisting with the pacification of politically important
areas.
Throughout the month of July senior officials in the Johnson's
administration pondered the additional deployments.
The Saigon-Honolulu-Washington cable traffic
hummed during these weeks, and McNamara made yet
another trip to Saigon for consultation with Westmoreland
and Taylor. After McNamara returned, President
Johnson and his most senior security advisers met several
times to arrive at a decision on Vietnam. On the
twenty-seventh Johnson approved Westmoreland's original
request of forty-four battalions, but with two significant
reservations: He declined to declare a national
emergency, and he postponed any decision on calling up
reservists for service in Southeast Asia.
President Johnson announced the decision the next day,
28 July, at a news conference. After highlighting the
importance of convincing "the Communists that we cannot
be defeated by force of arms" and also his request
that Westmoreland specify what more was needed to
curb the North, he added that he intended to meet the
general's requirements. By ordering the 1st Cavalry Division
and other units to Vietnam, he continued, American
fighting strength in the theater would rise from 75,000 to
125,000 men, but additional forces would be necessary
later and would be sent as requested. Realizing the significance
of the president's statement, a reporter asked if
the existing policy of relying on the South Vietnamese to
carry out offensive operations while American forces protected
American installations and were available only as
an emergency backup had changed. Johnson responded
that the decision "does not imply any change of objective."
But it did, and dramatically so. In the words of one
historian, the president's decree became "the closest
thing to a formal declaration for war in Vietnam."
(Taken from Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide,
May 1965 to October 1966 by John M. Carland, Center
for Military History, Washington, D.C., 2000)
 Attachment (1)
_____________________________
But when Territories are acquired in regions where there are differences in language, customs, and laws then great good fortune and much hard work are required to hold them.
-Machiavelli, Il Principe, Book III-
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