Canoerebel
Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002 From: Northwestern Georgia, USA Status: offline
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By throwing everything at the Allies in the DEI, Japan can certainly wreak some havoc and slow the Allied advance to a crawl. It's still 1942 and the Allies need some time to marshal the forces that could go head-to-head with the full might of the Japanese military. I'm aware that it is still within Steve's power to control stymie the Allied advance for quite some time. Why, then, am I looking to November 1 as a date important enough to approach Steve about continuing the game? Several reasons: 1. The Allied bases in the Kuriles are potentially lethal to Japan. Right now, those bases are vulnerable, exposed, and relatively weakly garrisoned. Steve has had it within his power to counterinvade and take these islands ever since the invasions took place in March 1942. If he fails to act by November 1, winter sets in. Under cover of adverse winter weather, the Allies will almost certainly be able to reinforce strongly, bringing in tons of supply, and building forts, airfield and port to maximum levels. Steve won't be able to counterinvade by the time winter ends. That leaves a dagger at his throat, forcing him to commit alot more ships, planes and men to defend Hokkaido and Sikhalin Island lest the Allies pull a GreyJoy. Put it this way - he's spent seven months with carriers, battleships, cruisers, and lots of aircraft committed to a region that he really shouldn't have had to defend in strength at all. It's a peril and committment that's just totally unnecessary. 2. While Steve can stymie Allied expansion in the DEI for quite some time by fully committing forces, he can no longer take the eastern Sumatra bases. Even Billiton Island and the two Bangka Island bases are almost beyond his reach now. Ketapang and Pontianak will be too strong within two weeks. And Singkawang will probably fall within a month if he continues to hold to his current course. If the Allies can take the latter base and then build out the airfields at Sing, Keta, and Ponti, the game ends. Western Sumatra, Burma, Singapore, Miri, Brunei, Balikpan, Batavia fall within easy range of Allied bombers, Japanese shipping is vulnerable, and the already low sources of oil become even more meager. 3. There has been a consistent pattern of neglect: failure to seize key unoccupied bases all over the place, but especially in the DEI (thus allowing the Allies to easily occupy and build Ndeni, Milne Bay, Pontianak, Ketapang, Billiton, Toboali, and Muntok, with other bases to follow); getting multiple divisions truly cut off and isolated in Sumatra and Burma; and allowing ten divisions to be mauled piecemeal, one or two at a time, in China over the course of six months. Steve is a good sport and I think he's certainly capable of playing the game well. I just think the overall pattern shows that his heart and mind aren't in this game. A failure to invade the Kuriles in the next seven days would be proof positive in my book.
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