JWE
Posts: 6580
Joined: 7/19/2005 Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Nikademus I'm still hoping someday to get some opposing viewpoints.... Not really an opposing viewpoint perhaps a different perspective? It takes a while to make a weapon system, especially a naval one, so the ones you get are the ones you thought up a few years previously. The prospect of death (i.e, actual warfare) does tend to concentrate the mind, so what “is” becomes hostage to “what ought to be”. Unfortunately, the objective organizations, tactics, equipment of “what ought to be” runs into the subjective obstructions of those most concerned with “what is”. Since “is” has way more rank, influence, and access than “ought” (generally by being part of the system longer), then “is” tends to remain on the playing field a bit longer than it should. Thus, perhaps, the coordination thing (basically, “Dude, I don’t give a crap what you want, I’m gonna use “MY” planes the way “I” want; and I got 2 more stars than you do, so bite me.”). Thus, also, the cruiser thing. Pre-war, the Brits thought of cruisers as performing functions that supported their national (imperial) imperatives. So, lots more smaller ones that could do some duty in lots more places. Could they have built a gnarly, nasty, witch? Sure. But why, and to what purpose? They did what they did to support what they had. Germany, having nothing, could do whatever, since they had nothing to do whatever with. It’s an interesting sociological proposition to think about since the US had the national/technical means to do anything, but had such a small military establishment that there weren’t enough “this is how it is” idiots to overcome the tidal wave of practical application. Similarly with the Russians; they were sundered from contemporary Western military thought and did what they did for their own purposes. Shoot, howdy, this discussion could be fun.
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