squatter
Posts: 1033
Joined: 6/24/2006 Status: offline
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I think that the issue is also about gameplay. Currently, I'm undecided about the wisdom/benefits as the Axis player of attempting to capture large swathes of the Soviet Union in 41/42. As a tester has pointed out, capturing resource production centres has zero impact on the Axis war effort, as the axis owns enough resources at the beginning of the game to power its industry at maximum throughout the entire war. And currently, the manpower of captured territory does not help either. Other testers have posted that the capture of oil production in the Caucuses will take a long time to impact on Axis production, if at all. So essentially, the only thing in capturing Soviet resources for the Axis is to deny them to the enemy. We shall see how much the Axis player would have to capture to have a significant impact on Soviet strength. Under these conditions, it would appear that the game is almost exclusively decided by whether or not the Axis can destroy enough of the Soviet army in 41/42, not by how much of the Soviet Union he can conquer. How does this pan out regarding encouraging historical actions such as an invasion of the Caucuses? This is a strategy I have adopted in my current PBEM where in Aug 1942 I control Stalingrad and am at the gates of Grozny. But I'm yet to see if this was just complete folly given that my opponent can basically give up most of this ground slowly, while his strength grows in the central sector. If however, the manpower of this region was enlisting to help in the fight, the captured resources were assisting in the war effort, and the captured oil production also, then this would cast a different light on a caucuses strategy. So adding in things like captured hiwi manpower - regardless of exactly how historically accurate the figures are (which I think we all agree is impossible to precisely measure - not in itself a reason to exclude altogether, however) - would give the Axis player a second viable strategy other than 'kill the soviets in 41/42, or lose'. I fear that under current circumstances a strategy of 'defend Moscow and Leningrad, let everything else go' could become the only sensible one for Soviet players, and one which might prove almost undefeatable by the Axis.
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