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All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >>

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- 10/1/2002 4:15:46 AM

jjjanos

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The war that the IJE started was due to a gross miscalculation of the US industrial might and our willingness to see the war to an end given the attack on Pearl Harbor. Given the attack on Pearl, the US was not goint to accept anything other than total victory or total victory while allowing the Emperor to remain on the Throne.

That statement defines the victory conditions for the game. The IJE player is NOT going to win the war. He might win the game. When starting the Grand Campaign, IJE players must recognize that, unless they have inflicted huge casualties without proportional losses, they will be on the defensive starting in 1943. If they cannot accept that, then do not play the IJE in a Grand Campaign.

As for victory in a game, designers can schedule their victory conditions on the likely impact on the post war situation. Thus, a IJE player is not trying to win the war... he is trying to win the game by causing the western allies to lose the peace.

The minor contributions of the Soviets gave them the rest of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The Soviets landed troops in Japan after the armistice in an attempt to claim an occupation zone. MacArthur booted them out, I believe without asking for permission. A more substantial contribution by the Soviets - as in armor spearheads in Southern China, etc. not only would have resulted in a quicker Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, but would have built great international pressure to grant an occupation zone in Japan. Such pressure would have impacted the post-war situation.

A land invasion of Japan would have had significant impacts on the willingness of the US to get involved in cold war hot spots. Approx. 55K killed in Vietnam constrained our willingness to get involved in conflict for decades. One million plus casualties invading Japan would have had the same impact.

In addition, the European Powers did undertake campaigns for political, i.e. colonial, reasons. The liberation of Burma contributed nothing to the defeat of Japan. By Feb. 1945, the start of the liberation, Leyte and Samar were "clean." Mindoro had been invaded. A breakout had occured on Luzon. Iwo Jima would be invaded in mid-February. The recapture of Burma did nothing to further the subsequent campaigns. The IJA troops in Burma were not going to get back to Japan to fight in the last campaigns.

Commonwealth troops were planning landing in Malay - I do not recall if these were done before the end of the war. These campaigns would have added nada to the defeat of Japan.

These campaigns, however, would have restored some of the prestige that was lost as a result of the defeat of the Europeans by Asians. By both showing that the Europeans were willing to take casualties to "free" their subjects and to restore the appearance of European power.

The only way that I can see to balance the need to conquer Japan before the Soviets muck up the post-war situation, limit heavy casualties and encourage an Allied player to consider the political constraints he should face is to award VPS is the method I discussed earlier.

To win the game, you need to win the peace.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 31

- 10/1/2002 4:57:52 AM

Nikademus

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(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 32

- 10/1/2002 6:05:50 AM

Jeremy Pritchard

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From: Ontario Canada
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I really disagree on the US pulling out if casualties were excessive.

WWI: 100 000 casualties over 1 year.
WWII: 250 000 casualties over 3 years.
Korean War: 50 000 casualties over 3 years.
Vietnam War: 50 000 casualties over 9 years.

The concept that the US will pull out of the war because of heavy casualties is not based in fact. The only war in the 20th Century that they have fought that resulted in a defeat because of war weariness was the Vietnam war. This was NOT because of the casualty rates (as it had the absolute lowest casualty rate of any American war to that date), but rather due to the media influencing the public to what war actually is (not hidden away by John Wayne propaganda), along with the fact that there was no real reason for the US to be in Vietnam, along with the duration of a 9 year war.

Saying that the US would fold in WWII due to high military casualty rates is just like saying it would fold to terrorism had the US experienced very high casualty rates in Afghanistan. We all know that the driving force behind the US in these circumstances basically destroys any validity in the public eye of opposition to the war. After Pearl Harbour virtually all of the isolationists either disappeared or converted to war hawks.

Realistically, it is impossible for Japan to gain a positive kill ratio primarily due to the following factors.

#1. They are outnumbered as of late 1942.

#2. Virtually every piece of equipment used by the US surpasses the quality of the Japanese by early 1943.

#3. The Japanese had prepared for a short war, hoping for a US collapse (just like Hitler hoped for one in Russia).

The US submarine program alone caused more IJN shipping losses (military and civilian) then all other Allied forces combined. Japan lost 2000 merchant vessels in WW2, the Allies lost about 1:10th of that in the Pacific. The Japanese premise was that the US would get tired of fighting the war if it must fight to the death for every island. This actually did not require that US casualties be higher then Japanese casualties, just that the US casualties be high enough to cause them to pull out due to pressure. However, that pressure NEVER EXISTED in the United States. There was reason enough to fight and win this war at ANY cost, and the propagandists made the population very pro-war and pro-government.

There is no historical basis for the US to experience problems faced in a different war, in a different time, under completely different situations to fit in the WW2 Pacific theatre.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 33

- 10/1/2002 6:19:11 AM

Jeremy Pritchard

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Ok, let me say this one more time as you guys are really confused to the difference of winning the war and winning a game.

To win the war, Japan must be defeated, or they must somehow gain an armistice. I really do not know how the Japanese can gain an armistice. Tell me a situation where the US would sue for peace. Please.

Winning in the game should not necessarily be total defeat or total victory, like winning the war must be. There must be marjins on how the game tells which side is the winner.

Will casualties do this?

No.

It won't do this because it is much easier for one side to inflict casualties on the other.

Will territory value do this?

No.

The most valuable territory is continually in the posession of one side.

The Japanese believed that the US would fold, but this was a false belief, so we should not use a false belief in a game meant to represent history. It would be like giving one side weapons what the other thought it was equipped with.

Each nation had a timeplan for scheduled invasions as well as requirements for troop replacement and reolcation after a campaign had ended.

EVERY war had these pressures of time nagging its commanders. I don't think there is a single military history book that does not say that the driving force behind military blunders and briliant actions is that commanders are pressed for time. In order to make up this time, they must do daring and dangerous things. Sometimes they succeede (MacArthur at Inchon), and sometimes they fail (Montgomery at Arnhem). Without any sort of VP mission, with some sort of time penalty or driving force, you will just end up with a calculated form of gameplay, with your only driving force being to kill your enemy. Killing your enemy is part of war, but is not the only thing in war. Achieving concrete goals is the driving force behind wars before Vietnam (where this current thought of kill ratios means you win the war began).

Why retake the Philippines? To cut off supply from the East Indies to Japan.

Will the US do this anyway? Yes.

So what is the point of playing when it comes down to the basic point that kill points and basic territory points will just lead to US victories in the game?

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 34

Why did Allies reinforce failure? - 10/1/2002 6:23:11 AM

wpurdom

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"The British defended Singapore knowing that it was almost ready to fall. Just like the US decided to send troops to the Philippines instead of pulling them out in 1941, fully knowing that they were not to be relieved. It was political, Churchill was determined that Singapore not fall as it would, and did, SEVERELY damage British reputation in the region. Not going back to the Philippines would have resulted in major relation problems between the Filipino's and Americans, resulting in possibly the loss of a post war Philippines being a major US military base."

I disagree entirely with this assessment about Singapore and partly about the Phillipines. With respect to Singapore, Churchill initially expected to win. He felt that the Japanese air power was a very limited, wasting asset and the presence of just a few modern aircraft would be decisive. Similarly he felt that the presence of a BB, BC and CV would have a major strategic impact in slowing down the Japanese advance and making amphibious landings questionable. On the ground, he had no reason to think he wouldn't have superiority to what Japanese logistics would allow to go up against him (numbers weren't the problem on the ground in Malaya). He was remembering the success of the British in the Mediterranean with a bold front against the Italians at long odds. Had Churchill understood the situation, he would have cut his losses in Singapore with perhaps a greater effort in Burma - the fall of Singapore was a great deal more politically disasterous due to the commitment made. Churchill didn't send the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to Singapore as a symbolic effort. In contrast, he was quite put out that the symbolic garrison in Hong Kong was not reduced per his wishes.
With respect to the Phillipines, the judgment must be more mixed. Originally the Phillipines was understood to be a write-off. Some protions of the U.S. military, particularly the Navy continued that judgment. But then the dazzlement of the assurances of MacArthur as to the readiness of the Phillipine army, a gross over-assessment of the value of the B-17, particularly in the anti-ship role, and MacArthur's own prestige led to an evaluation that the Phillipines could be held, particularly if was started after April 1942. The decision was quickly reversed after the war began and Eisenhower was placed in charge of assessing what could be done for the Phillipines. But consider, The Phiilipine Army greatly outnumbered the invading Japs; if the Phillipine Army formations had really been comparable to the Phillipine Scout formations as MacArthur's fantasy explanations were suggesting, the 12 or so light divisions available would have precluded a successful Japanese invasion until the collapse of the overall defense of the Allies around them would have allowed the Japs to finish them off.
Of course, once troops had already been deployed, political as well as military constraints probably prevented evacuation. I wonder what scale of evacuation from Singapore or the Phillipines would have really been feasible once the hopelessness of each situation actually penetrated. I suspect not much, and a partial evacuation would surely have lead to a rapid collapse of the bulk of forces left behind. Further, the theater commander could not make an assessment different from the Central government, but then who the hell are we, the players, in WitP anyway? (see below)

In some ways, the analysis of fantasy vs. reality is amusing. WitP will be a fantasy game, no matter how you look at it:
1. Who is the Allied player supposed to be, anyhow? You have a scope and freedom of maneuver not found short of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I don't know if it will be possible to put theatres on AI like in PW, but who did that for more than an ocassional experiment, anyway? The Japanese side is almost as bad, totally wiping out the lack of cooperation or even sharing of basic intelligence between the Army and the Navy. These structural rigidities were every bit as fundamental as many of the constraints we debate as to whether eliminating them makes the game ahistorical.
2. One day turns will exasperate the unreality of command power. Of course those who say 7 day turns with daily combat result cycles make the tactical maneuvers not have the "feel" of WWII maneuvers may be quite right, but in any event, it is quite clear that Nimitz, for instance, could not make the decision as to how long the CV's could stay off Guadalcanal and how long the unloading should be supported. With 1-day turns we will be commanding right down to the fleet level, with "perfect harmony." I'm not saying that this is bad for the game, just unrealistic.
3. Players have way too much information. Even the fleet CO doesn't know just what the morale and fatigue of all his pilots are, hell the pilots don't even have that information. Ditto for the land commander who doesn't have that immediate precise understanding of how much his troops have been hurt and Ghormley back in Noumea, not to mention Nimitz in Pearl and the Combined Chiefs in DC have a much foggier notion. The FOW as to the other side is nice, but the information about your own side is phenomenal and even without the other's sides information gives you a very good feel for precisely what is working and not in very great detail. Sometimes the people on the spot had no idea what was happening - was it a sub or a Long Lance or your own jettisoned torpedo that just hit (the DD helping the Hornet is an example). We may cover up the precise impact on the opponents, but we sure don't bring in the noise of a real situation.
We could go on and on along this vein and bring up many matters in the game mechanics we all anticipate that are just as "unrealistic" as alternate starts, an unconstrained strategy, production variations or the like. Which constraints you feel are essential to the game and which interfere with one's enjoyment of it are matters on which no one will agree. And as a group, we would generally prefer omnipotence and detail and abhor the frustrations of real war where friction interferes with all plans and all plans go out the window when friction and the enemy conspire unfairly.
All that being said, one point Jeremy said I definitely agree to. The design team needs to be true to their own vision of this much awaited fantasy game and not mingle fantasies that don't fit in with their visions. As the best trial lawyer in Georgia stated - "you have to have your on vision of the story you will be telling and do nothing that doesn't fit into that story. If you see an opportunity to go off your story, no matter how tempting it is, no matter how smart it makes you look, or how bad it makes the other side look, if it doesn't fit with your story, don't do it." To some extent they can accomodate matters through a decent (supported) editor, to some extent they can let other people have their dreams through scenarios or options, but if it detracts from their story, or just consumes too much of their energy on peripheral matters, the game will be the less for it.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 35

political victory - 10/1/2002 6:34:45 AM

wpurdom

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If we are going to be fancy about victory assessments, I would suggest some permanent VP's depending upon the situation in October 1942 (mid-term elections and the competing interest of North Africa), January 1944 (competition with the European front - last chance to divert forces between theaters) and October 1944 (presidential election) as well as overall success. Oil locations could have their own time schedule to reflect Japanese constraints unless they are otherwise built into the game logistics. This would give the Allies more incentive to fight early rather than just wait until they build strength, if you are worried about that. (I mainly fought against the AI and there you are aggressive early because its cheaper that way).
I use October rather than November for elections because of the need for lead time for political reaction to success or failure.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 36

- 10/1/2002 4:27:04 PM

Piiska

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I can see a condition where Japanese player would be able to get a peace treaty in such terms that it would be better off after the war than before it (my definition of Japanese victory): If American troops are not CLEARLY winning by the time the war in Europe starts to turn to race against communism -rather than Germany. (Sorry Aussies, Kiwis Poms & co for excluding your contribution to the war and focusing solely on U.S)

Historically U.S didn�t have to pull out from the Pacific because they were clearly starting to win after Guadalcanal. Losses were moderate, even small, and by 1944 it was obvious that Japan would fall sooner rather than later. In this historical reality, U.S had no concern that war effort in Pacific would severely hinder the winning of the peace. In such a situation there was no pressure to pull out, as the victory was behind the corner and U.S had clear visibility to there.

However, IF U.S had lost, for example, in Guadalcanal (as it can happen in the game), or botched the invasion of Truk, and suffered more significant losses in the progress; the political situation might have been different by 1944.

If by 1944 the Japanese player has managed to hold more ground than historically (can happen), still has operative forces left that could be considered a significant threat (can happen) or significant delay, and has caused more losses to U.S (also can happen) the political climate could be VERY different to what it was historically.

I know that even in this scenario U.S would eventually gain the unconditional surrender. No question about it. But historically speaking, miscalculations about the enemy�s capability to continue the war have happened before.

For example, Soviet Union during the WW II made a peace treaty twice with Finland (1940 and 1944), due to heavy losses they suffered in relation what they had achieved; and both times our troops very at the very verge of collapse.

Both times our troops would not have been able to carry on the war for more than few months maximum � according to some estimates not even two weeks. However, Russians didn�t know how bleak our military�s state was.

They only knew that they were running out of time (politically) and had taken severe losses, thus signing a peace treaty that granted them the formal victory, but not the victory they wanted.

In this case Finns won. In spite of losing significant land areas, we achieved our main goal that was to maintain our independency (-victory, possibly only a marginal). While Soviet won some land and political influence, its ultimate goal remained unfulfilled as it was not able to carry out the total conquest of Finland (marginal defeat, possibly defeat).

I bet you a hay penny that Russians were/are way less sensitive about loss of material and life than Americans are, and if they pull out of a campaign against country size of Finland, think about U.S in a theatre size of pacific against much larger armed force than the meager (but brave :D) forces Finland had against Soviet Union.

Similar situation could happen in Pacific. Japan surrenders eventually, but it can happen in such a manner that it keeps the areas that are not important for the Allies. At least the areas that are not so important, that allied would have a desire to risk losses and prolonged war to get them in the context of upcoming cold war.

I really want to stress, that as long as U.S has a perceived CLEAR victory in a short time frame it would never make a peace treaty. However, IF the Japanese player 1944 still poses a CREDIBLE threat to U.S war machine, the political sentiments might favor preparation to 3rd world war, rather than trying to fight over �less significant� Pacific area.

In this case Japan might be able to lose the war and surrender, but conditionally, so that it maintains some of the land gains it sought when starting the war. This way Japan is better of after the war and this would grant it a victory.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 37

- 10/1/2002 10:26:47 PM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]I really disagree on the US pulling out if casualties were excessive. [/QUOTE]

I have to agree with you on that Jeremy. To your list you can add the War of the Rebellion. The putative CSA basically played the same hand that the IJE attempted to play -- "A series of defeats and casualty fatigue *ought* to force the enemy into an armistace." Japan *could* have known that U.S. battle fatigue was a hopelessly unattainable fantasy from the start.

[QUOTE] However, IF the Japanese player 1944 still poses a CREDIBLE threat to U.S war machine, the political sentiments might favor preparation to 3rd world war, rather than trying to fight over �less significant� Pacific area. [/QUOTE]

Maybe, but I really doubt it. Unless you posit that there are abslutely no circumstances that can be reasonably portrayed as an Allied victory of one kind or another, *and* if you can hide (as the Japanese player) the POW war crimes, then you might get an armistice. Again, the War of the Rebellion provides a good political model, IMO.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 38

- 10/1/2002 11:50:40 PM

Jeremy Pritchard

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Actually, in the United States Civil War is probably more likely that the CSA would get something other then Unconditional Surrender then the Japanese. Had McClelland been elected as Democrat leader in the north, he might have offered an armistice should Grant not have been as successful. However, this is a big might, but WAY more possible then the US offering peace in WW2 without total victory.

I think that the difference between the USCW and WW2 is primarily because of the reasons for war. The reasons for WW2 are actually stronger then the USCW. Why fight to force another group of people to remain as a part of your nation? Or, why fight to gain the freedom for people in this nation that separated? Realistically, the USCW was a war over idealism and morality, where WW2 was a war more out of vengeance (against the Pearl Harbour attack), while the war against Hitler was more out of idealism and morality.

Realistically too, nations tend not to fight harder due to ill treatment of their soldiers in enemy POW's. One could argue that the North and South's treatment of their POW's in the USCW was as harsh as the Japanese treatment of POW's. However, the driving force behind winning these wars was not to avenge POW suffering, but to win political goals.

Still, I do not believe that the US would necessarily sue for anything other then total unconditional surrender. HOWEVER, should the Pearl Harbour attack not take place, the existence of an isolationist movement would be a powerful force against a long and bloody US involvement in the Pacific, as there would be no single incident to unite the US population.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 39

- 10/1/2002 11:54:10 PM

TIMJOT

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[QUOTE]I really do not know how the Japanese can gain an armistice. Tell me as situation where the US would sue for peace. Please.[/QUOTE]

I really can think of only one slightly possible situation where Japan might have been able to gain an armistice in a war with the USA. That is by not going to war with the US. What I mean by that,is for Japan not attack the US and instead just attack the colonial powers. The US would have two options. One; draw a line in the eastern pacific and give as much aid to the UK and Dutch as possible without actually going to war. Or two declare war on Japan even though the US hasnt been attacked. In the former its doubtful any amount of aid available in 41/42 could have stopped Japan from conquereing SE Asia.

In the latter, even if FDR could somehow finagle a DOW, it is very doubtful that it would have full public support given the sentiments of the time. Certainly no where near the indignation and national uproar in the aftermath of PH. In this situation where portions of the public might see this war as strictly a war of colonialism or merely a matter of one colonial power supplanting another colonial power. Then yes, its possible that major defeats accompanying ever growing casualties, might have brought the US to the negotiating table.

Korea and Vietnam come to mind as examples of unpopular wars that ended up in armistices. Mainly because large portions of the population simply did not understand why the wars were being fought or believed were not neccessary in defending America.

In fact the only other two *major* wars that I can think of, that the US got involved in without being directly attacked; the War of 1812 and Persian Gulf ended in armistices. I discount WW1 because the sinking of US ships was considered by most as acts of war and even that ended in an armistice (albeit not a favorable one).

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 40

- 10/1/2002 11:59:27 PM

TIMJOT

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Sorry Jeremy, I didnt see your last post. It seems we are in agreement.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 41

- 10/2/2002 12:12:44 AM

byron13

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
[B]

That's the problem. When it comes down to casualty points determining the victor of the game, it will undoubtedly result in players being more cautious in their attacks, waiting, as the US, until they have overwhelming numbers and quality to smash the Japanese. The Japanese will also have no reason in risking their ships in order to sink an equal or more of their opponent, as once their ships are gone, the replacements have no way in catching up. [/B][/QUOTE]

I'm just kicking a dead horse - as are we all - but I'm going to respond more time and bail from this thread.

I trust you're not lumping me in with those you accuse of not understanding the difference between winning the war and winning the game. The U.S. will certainly win the war but, as you and I have both suggested, to win the game they must surpass the job done historically. I believe this is quantified by a balance of losses on one's on side and time.

I believe these are historical incentives. Why would the U.S. not "be more cautious in [its] attacks, waiting . . . until they have overwhelming numbers and quality to smash the Japanese?" If they wait too long, they will not win the war until well after August 1945. The benefit of fewer casualties may be setoff by winning the war in a longer time - thus possibly losing the game.

Why would the Japanese risk their ships against a superior opponent? Historically, I don't believe they did after the Solomon campaign. They husbanded their surface fleet and few carriers until the Battle of the Phillipine Sea (I believe that's the right battle). Was that the right choice? Dunno. Would it be the right choice in a game? Dunno. If you don't fight, the Allies win the war sooner, which is a sure way to win the game. As in the real war, you have to pick your spots as the Japanese: sacrifice some ships here to extend the war for another month, a division there for three weeks.

I understand what you are trying to do Jeremy. I don't disagree with what you're doing. I only disagree with what I perceive to be the pervasiveness of your "missions." Even without the missions, I would still defend Singapore and the Philippines out of a sense of history, and I personally don't game the game and do wildly ahistorical things as an allowable cheat within the game's programming. You wish to force - or strongly encourage - a player to pursue political objectives that are not reflected in a pure losses and time victory determination. So long as they are limited, e.g., Singapore, Philippines, maybe Ceylon/India/Australia, and some few objectives for the Japanese, I would not object. But most of the important objectives have their own tangible value, and a player will likely fight retain them because it is cheaper and more time efficient to hold them than to retake them later. Or, in slowing the Japanese now and at this place, the tide turns sooner with the Japanese owning less real estate and allowing the Allies to win the war (and the game) that much sooner. Or, in losing India or Australia, the Allies lose a valuable source of combat capability that would speed the end of the war (and win the game). There are natural incentives to taking losses and disputing territory without assigning victory points to that territory. Again, I just don't want to be forced to fight for Midway or New Guinea if that doesn't fit into my plan.

With that, I bail and bid you all adieu.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 42

- 10/2/2002 3:35:33 AM

TIMJOT

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I think I have to come down on the side of Byron on this one. How big a problem is this anyway? I mean is any allied player worth his salt really going to just pull out his forces and wait 100 7day turns or 700 1day turn:eek: before he makes his move? Yeah its a sure fire way to win the game, but IMO I dont think most of us play these games simply to win. We play them to win well. I for one would not consider defeating a Japanese player by Aug 45 a win. Not to mention how boreing that would be.

Regarding specifics. There is, as was historically plenty of reasons for an allied player to try to hold on to Singapore. If you hold the Malaya barrier, Japan runs out of oil and you win the war in by 43 instead of 45.

If the game is modeled correctly. It should be hard but not impossible to hold the Malaya barrier in 42. Historically if the allies had been able to hold the Japanese even just to their own original time tables, there was enough reinforcements in the pipeline to possiblely make a difference.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 43

- 10/2/2002 3:40:47 AM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE] Had McClelland been elected as Democrat leader in the north, he might have offered an armistice should Grant not have been as successful. However, this is a big might, but WAY more possible then the US offering peace in WW2 without total victory. [/QUOTE]

Mmm. Except that McClellan's election platform was pro-war, greatly annoying the (Copperhead-like) radical elements of the Democratic Party. Still, who can say what Little Mac would have done once in office. He lost his nerve on the battlefield constantly.

The parallel invites further discussion IMO. If one were to posit a sea change in public sentiment in the 1944 election, were there in fact any potential candidates in the wings that one might reasonably construe to have advocated peace, despite PH, because of the losses all around?

[QUOTE] I think that the difference between the USCW and WW2 is primarily because of the reasons for war. The reasons for WW2 are actually stronger then the USCW. Why fight to force another group of people to remain as a part of your nation? Or, why fight to gain the freedom for people in this nation that separated? Realistically, the USCW was a war over idealism and morality, where WW2 was a war more out of vengeance (against the Pearl Harbour attack), while the war against Hitler was more out of idealism and morality. [/QUOTE]

Oh, I think there was a huge chunk of Idealism and Morality in WW2, and a huge chunk of Vengeance in the ACW. Fort Sumter was treated as a fundamental betrayal of the most egregious sort. Perhaps not as blood-boiling as PH but only because the Rebels weren't Japanese. Certainly Sherman's boys took extra pleasure in ravaging South Carolina *because* it was the head of the snake, so to speak.

[QUOTE]Realistically too, nations tend not to fight harder due to ill treatment of their soldiers in enemy POW's. One could argue that the North and South's treatment of their POW's in the USCW was as harsh as the Japanese treatment of POW's. However, the driving force behind winning these wars was not to avenge POW suffering, but to win political goals. [/QUOTE]

Mm. Sure the driving force was political and ideological. But in both WW2 and the Rebellion, treatment of prisoners became a strong contributing secondary issue well before the last shots were fired. Andersonville certainly motivated Sherman's folks after some Andersonville escapees made it to his lines during the march through Gerogia. Similarly, Japanese conduct towards prisoners on the combat lines (and their duplicity in false surrenders) motivated US troops in WW2. Then there was one famous PI raid early in the invasion of Luzon dedicated to the liberation of an Allied POW camp (Er, the phrasing is awkward, Allied prisoners of the Japanese) because the ill-treatment of prisoners was known from several sources. The fear was that the PI POWs would be executed, and that fear it had a deterministic local effect on strategy and tactics.

[QUOTE] Korea and Vietnam come to mind as examples of unpopular wars that ended up in armistices. Mainly because large portions of the population simply did not understand why the wars were being fought or believed were not neccessary in defending America. [/QUOTE]

Mmm. But, the Korean armistice was not signed because of US public pressure or even Allied losses. It was signed because the US and China did not really want to get into an escalated war. Viet Nam you can have as an unchallenged example.

[QUOTE] In fact the only other two *major* wars that I can think of, that the US got involved in without being directly attacked; the War of 1812 and Persian Gulf ended in armistices. I discount WW1 because the sinking of US ships was considered by most as acts of war and even that ended in an armistice (albeit not a favorable one). [/QUOTE]

Add to those the Mexican War. Actually a very unpopular war because the Federal income tax was instituted (IRIC) to pay for it, and because no one thought it worth fighting over a chunk of the lower Rio Grande, and because many of the well-informed pundits and political leaders in Washington and in Europe expected the US to get its arse kicked. Ended of course in a huge US victory and territorial expansion. Mmm. One could argue that the Plains Wars were publicly unpopular wars that the Feds "won." (Here's hoping the current N.A. lawsuit over Interior Dept oversight of trust land swiped by the Feds under the auspices of the Dawes Act proves ultimately to be a win for the Native Americans.)

Let's see: Grenada. Not much of a war as they come, but an "unprovoked" one. Not too popular at the time on campus but I thought it a good idea. Successful conclusion from the US POV.

Operation "Get Noriega." FWIW Not much of a war, though. Another successful outcome.

The protracted PI campaign post the Spanish-American War. Ended in a US victory but more or less off the public's radar.

The post revolution invasion of the USSR you can count both as an unprovoked war and a failure. The American C/O having the sense not to commit his troops as allies of the White Russians and to get the US out without fighting. Again, pretty much off the public radar.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 44

- 10/2/2002 4:27:01 AM

TIMJOT

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I forgot about the Mexican war. Although technically that was started because of a supposedly unprovoked skirmish on the rio grande. So far as the public knew we were attacked. It was pretty popular war though. All that manifest destiny stuff and there was no shortage of volunteers. It was only after the war people started to have a bad taste in there mouths.

Your wrong about the Korean war, once the war became a stalemate and the calsualties started to pile up, the discontent at home had a lot to due with the decision to negotiate. Eisenhower made solving the Korean *problem* election campaign issue.

The Indian wars on a whole were all very popular and almost always framed as retaliation of supposedly Indian aggression.

The Philipine insurection was just that an insurection. Where the philipinoes rose up and attacked there new white masters. It didnt so much end as it just pettered out and as you said it was really bellow the radar screens of most 19 century Americans.

I did say *major wars*. Niether Grenada or Panama can really be considered war. One was more or less a giant narco bust and the other was an exercised veiled as a rescue mission. Even so if either had bogged down with escalating casualties than you better believe the out cry to get out would have been loud and clear. Just look at Somalia.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 45

- 10/2/2002 4:53:17 AM

mdiehl

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Yeah, you're right about the Mex War. The general populace followed the media, so I guess you'd call it a popular war. It did generate a very vocal and rather impressive anti-war opposition movement, though.

I can't agree on the general statement about the various campaigns against the tribes. Generally the earlier ones were more popular than the later ones, but the public sentiment gauge on these varies in time, place and by cause. Not very on-topic. The only reason why I brought them in is that many viewed them as naked territorial ambition *at the time.* Yet they were concluded to the political satisfaction of the US.

I'll agree to diasagree on Korea. True US public sentiment began to run against, but the level of opposition was not sufficient, IMO, to say that it was more important than avoiding the risk of an escalating war with China. Sans that risk, the war would have ended with a unified Korea, public sentiment about casualties or no.

The others were minor actions I agree. I know you said major. I was just rounding out the list by looking at the ones that the pub commonly know about.

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Post #: 46

Mexican and Philippine wars - 10/2/2002 6:10:03 AM

wpurdom

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From: Decatur, GA, USA
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�I forgot about the Mexican war. Although technically that was started because of a supposedly unprovoked skirmish on the rio grande. So far as the public knew we were attacked. It was pretty popular war though. All that manifest destiny stuff and there was no shortage of volunteers. It was only after the war people started to have a bad taste in there mouths.�

Shock! For once I find myself agreeing with mdiehl, except for his response being a little too accommodating. The Mexican War was at least as unpopular as Vietnam before Tet or the War of 1812 before 1814. Most Northern Whigs and Van Buren Democrats viewed the war as part of a slave-holding conspiracy. A majority of the populace in the previous election had voted for candidates opposing expansion. Although volunteers were plentiful they were primarily from the South with a moderate Western addition. Abraham Lincoln first enters national politics as an extremely bitter opponent of this war, decrying its immorality in the strongest terms. The commanding general, Scott, although approving of defending rights up to the Rio Grande and chastising the Mexicans for their resort to arms over the disputed area, thought war aims involving the conquest of California as immoral - he was at least as disapproving of his government as Howe in the Revolution. As with Dems in Vietnam or the Gulf War, there was some support for the war among Whigs and the Whigs wanted to be cautious about appearing disloyal or betraying the troops. The Whig national party leadership was confidently awaiting bad news from the front when they were overtaken by events - unbounded success brought about principally by the brilliance of General Scott�s campaign.
As for the Philippine �insurrection�, viewing the war in that fashion is accepting ideological terminology. The Filipinos had a de facto army and government in place upon the Spanish surrender, prior to U.S. forces expanding beyond the immediate vicinity Manila. Like the Dutch in Indonesia, and the French in Indochina after WWII, the U.S. was faced with the necessity of conquering the native government to establish its own. I don�t have the casualty figures for the campaign at my fingertips, but I believe you will find they are up there in U.S. major wars, ahead of the Spanish-American War. Nor was the fight on the periphery of the American consciousness but in fact was one of the principle issues of Bryan�s 1900 Presidential campaign.

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Post #: 47

Re: Mexican and Philippine wars - 10/2/2002 8:06:33 AM

TIMJOT

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Joined: 4/30/2001
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by wpurdom
[B]�I forgot about the Mexican war. Although technically that was started because of a supposedly unprovoked skirmish on the rio grande. So far as the public knew we were attacked. It was pretty popular war though. All that manifest destiny stuff and there was no shortage of volunteers. It was only after the war people started to have a bad taste in there mouths.�

Shock! For once I find myself agreeing with mdiehl, except for his response being a little too accommodating. The Mexican War was at least as unpopular as Vietnam before Tet or the War of 1812 before 1814. Most Northern Whigs and Van Buren Democrats viewed the war as part of a slave-holding conspiracy. A majority of the populace in the previous election had voted for candidates opposing expansion. Although volunteers were plentiful they were primarily from the South with a moderate Western addition. Abraham Lincoln first enters national politics as an extremely bitter opponent of this war, decrying its immorality in the strongest terms. The commanding general, Scott, although approving of defending rights up to the Rio Grande and chastising the Mexicans for their resort to arms over the disputed area, thought war aims involving the conquest of California as immoral - he was at least as disapproving of his government as Howe in the Revolution. As with Dems in Vietnam or the Gulf War, there was some support for the war among Whigs and the Whigs wanted to be cautious about appearing disloyal or betraying the troops. The Whig national party leadership was confidently awaiting bad news from the front when they were overtaken by events - unbounded success brought about principally by the brilliance of General Scott�s campaign.
As for the Philippine �insurrection�, viewing the war in that fashion is accepting ideological terminology. The Filipinos had a de facto army and government in place upon the Spanish surrender, prior to U.S. forces expanding beyond the immediate vicinity Manila. Like the Dutch in Indonesia, and the French in Indochina after WWII, the U.S. was faced with the necessity of conquering the native government to establish its own. I don�t have the casualty figures for the campaign at my fingertips, but I believe you will find they are up there in U.S. major wars, ahead of the Spanish-American War. Nor was the fight on the periphery of the American consciousness but in fact was one of the principle issues of Bryan�s 1900 Presidential campaign. [/B][/QUOTE]

Regarding the Mexican war, sure there was opposition particularly with the *minority* political opposition, northeastern educated elite's and abolitionist, but I dont think the rank and file americans were against getting there hands on California,New Mexico, Arizona ect.... There were no shortage of volunteers to fight and the hero worship of Gen Taylor (won him the presidency) and Scott (could have been president) is evident of that.

At any rate this demonstrates my point. The opposition saw through Polks charade of a supposed Mexican attack. They correctly saw the war as a war of aggression. Im am sure that had the war entailed defeat after defeat with high casualties then the opposition would have grown and probably forced Polk to end the war. My point exactly

Regarding the Philipine insurection. Im sure your correct that there were more calsualities than the Spanish/American war, but it was more like a small bleeding wound than a massive trauma. It was the source of much political fodder back in Washington, but how much an issue was it to the vast majority? Evidently not much since Bryan was soundly defeated. So how unpopular was it?. Manifest destiny was at its peek in the later part of the 19century and in any case it wasnt a declared war at all. In fact it seems that most americans were all too willing to convince themselves we were doing the Philipinos a favor (civilizing them) much like our own american indians. On the other hand if the insurrection hadnt petered out and casualties continued to mount coupled with major defeats then of course public opposition would have grown enough to force the US to give up on the *Philipine expirement* that was at most only half hearted in the first place.

So in summary where do we disagree? You said your self that that the Mex war was not fully supported and that the opposition was eagerly waiting for defeats that never happened. Had the defeats occured than Polk is probably forced to quit the war.

So what happens if America having not been attacked, declares war in defence of the Euro-colonies in Asia. Would there not have been some opposition? Would this opposition have grown if faced with defeat after defeat and mounting casualties? Could this have forced the US to the negotiating table. I say its a definite possibilty.

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Post #: 48

- 10/2/2002 9:38:47 PM

jjjanos

Posts: 52
Joined: 4/11/2002
From: Wheaton, MD
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]

I have to agree with you on that Jeremy. To your list you can add the War of the Rebellion. The putative CSA basically played the same hand that the IJE attempted to play -- "A series of defeats and casualty fatigue *ought* to force the enemy into an armistace." Japan *could* have known that U.S. battle fatigue was a hopelessly unattainable fantasy from the start.[/B][/QUOTE]

The election of 1864 is what nailed the coffin in the Confederacy. Lincoln's victory ensured that there would the war would be waged at least 2 more years -- till the mid-term elections -- and probably at least 4 more years.

That beng said, the victory by Lincoln was a near thing. During Spring or Summer 1864, Lincoln himself was certain that he would lose the election. Three "victories" threw support to Hawks -- Mobil Bay, Siege of Petersburg and Fall of Atlanta. The strategy almost worked.

(in reply to Jeremy Pritchard)

Post #: 49