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- 11/5/2002 10:12:24 AM   
msvknight

 

Posts: 85
Joined: 6/9/2001
From: Adelaide, Australia
Status: offline 		In Spain that is......:)

(Michael stands up and waits for the custard pies to hit)

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 61
- 11/5/2002 3:05:49 PM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		Posted by Mdiehl
[QUOTE]I disagree with the premise. You've read at least one of Lundstrom's books. Please read it again. Look at all the instances where two or three USN or IJN pilots made siultaneous approaches on a single plane, each claiming the kill. (Never mind the instances where they all claimed a kill when in fact the target escaped!!!) [/QUOTE]

I havent read Lundstrom's books, only relevant extracts quoted in other articles. The one on one premise is based on an extract from "Fire in the Sky" by Bergerud and an email debate between the AVG's Erik Schilling and Lundstrom on both USAAF and USN/USMC air combat in the Pacific in '42. I agree that the allied pilots would be more likely to fight as a team but the longer a fight lasted, the more likely pilots would become seperated into individual combats.

The following is from Bergerud's "Fire in the Sky"
[QUOTE] Although no two air battles were the same in the South Pacific I believe they can be broken down into three major components: observation, unit maneuver prior to combat, and melee. Observation was influenced by mission type, pilot skill, and formation. Assuming the typical prebattle observation took place, formation maneuver was largely a matter of coordinating units to prepare for attack or defense. Both of these phases were greatly influenced by the type of mission that both sides were flying. When melee began, two factors immediately came into play. One was the tendency for an air engagement to go from high altitude to low. The other was for chaos to overwhelm order. A well-executed battle that began with trim formations in good battle position at altitudes above 20,000 feet often ended, even if things went well, with aircraft scattered across the sky at low levels and often alone. [/QUOTE]

Posted by Mdiehl
[QUOTE]At Coral Sea and Midway, in direct engagements between A6Ms and F4Fs, at ranges that (if any bias was introduced) favored the IJN, with comparable numbers of a/c engaged, lost more a/c than they shot down, against pilots who were, according to the myth, less well trained, flying inferior a/c, and (and this is partially true), less "experienced." At some point you have to confront the basic facts and ask yourself which of the assumptions of The Myth is not correct. [/QUOTE]

I have never seen any well-researched post-war analysis come up with a conclusion that overall, F4F's directly downed more A6M's than they lost in head to head encounters (at Coral Sea and Midway). If anything, the A6M did slightly better. What was your source?

In August '42, John Thatch, talking about Midway, reported to his superiors that the results of air combat between the F4F and the A6M's "has had an alarming effect on the morale of the fighter pilots in the Fleet at this time and on those who are going to be sent to the Fleet". What limited success had been achieved was "from the comparatively poor marksmanship on the part of the Japanese, stupid mistakes made by a few of their pilots and superior marksmanship and teamwork on the part of some of our pilots." Where is the equality or even the superiority of the F4F kill ratio shown in these comments?

Also note a despatch from Admiral Nimitz to Admiral King, 2 weeks after Midway :

ALL AIR COMBAT REPORTS BATTLE OF MIDWAY EMPHASIZE EXTREME AND APPARENTLY INCREASED SUPERIORITY PERFORMANCE OF 0 FIGHTERS X
ALTHOUGH THESE PLANES ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN OURS THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF ANY COMBAT SUCCESSES TO DATE BY NAVY FIGHTING PLANES HAS BEEN OWN EXPERT TACTICS OPPOSED TO FAULTY ENEMY
TACTICS X
OVERALL RESULTS HAVE BEEN BAD AND WILL BE SERIOUS
AND POTENTIALLY DECISIVE WITH IMPROVEMENT THAT MUST BE EXPECTED IN ENEMY TACTICS X

As it turned out, the US kept the lead in tactics but the above report was a result of analysis of their own combat reports (including inflated claims but with full knowledge of their own losses). Does that indicate F4F's were getting the better of A6M's?

Posted by Mdiehl
[QUOTE]As Jeremy and others have pointed out, the question is not (probably) one of linear relationships. 10,000 hours of training and flying familiarity is not necessarily better than 1,000 hours. So, the Japanese pilots were intensively trained, as were USN/USMC pilots. Both were sufficiently trained as to be quite knowledgable and familiar with the a/c that they flew, for the most part. There's nothing about Japanese air time or intensity of training that would necessarily make an IJN pilot better than a USMC/USN one. [/QUOTE]

I'm in complete agreement that 10000 hours flight training is not 10 times better than 1000 hours flight training but I cant agree that it wouldn't give the more experienced pilot an advantage. Common sense would dictate that. The actual difference between the two opponents was 1000 vs 300 IIRC. I see no reason why the 1000 hour Jap pilot would not be expected to be a better pilot (just not 3 times better).

[QUOTE]Quite so. The question is how great an improvement is combat experience relative to intensive training? Seems to me from the *many* accounts that I have read that most pilots in retrospect felt that particular dogfights were won or lost more or less before they began: initial conditions dominated the outcome. One can train pilots to recognize adverse initial conditions and to avoid engagements on those terms. In general, the pilots with the faster or more rugged planes (that allow them to disengage at will and that give them a slightly longer initial grace period by a few seconds when "bounced") are the ones that win. [/QUOTE]

Initial conditions dominating the result? Re-read Bergerud's quote.

Training pilots to recognize adverse conditions? You're over simplifying. They can be taught what to do and not to do but to expect pilots then trained to go out and do it like an experienced pilot is a bit much. According to Bergerud's book, "in any event what normally ensued after contact was an aerial chess match that did much to decide the outcome of the battle." Bergerud points out that aggressiveness was the common trait of the fighter pilot and would be a major determinant in engaging, often overiding correct tactical judgements. If even experienced pilots like P38 ace Bob Faurot were doing this, why do you feel newly trained pilots would both recognise and avoid those situations.

Regarding pilots in "boom and zoom" a/c, energy fighting was deadly when applied correctly but it depends on how well a pilot would use his planes strengths. As to ruggedness, I would think that it would help a pilot survive rather than win a battle. It is a good way of living to take on the lessons of combat.

[QUOTE]It's a matter of expectations. If you expect your opponent's machine to perform like the ones you've previously engaged, then tactics developed for use against a different machine may not work as well in the novel situation. Likewise if you expect the next pilot to fly the same way as the last one, and he does not (but instead follows a tactical doctrine that is a radical departure from anything you've met before), much of what you learned about dealing with enemy a/c and their tactics is out the window. It does not mean you've forgotten how to fly your A6M, it just means that the ways you deal with the novel situation may be radically different from your prior experiences. [/QUOTE]

I can only repeat that the Japanese were aware of energy fighting. They had used it themselves against the Russians. The JAAF began planning the Ki-44 Tojo after considering what they learnt in China and Mongolia. The use of energy fighting by the USAAF was not what gave the Japanese a problem as much as how superior designs like the P-40 were at it.

I think you're over emphasising the "shock" of encountering new aircraft and tactics. The Japanese could adjust like everyone else and often quickly. You mentioned Sakai's encounter with the B17. Shortly after that incident, they'd worked out to attack head on from a dive (sound familiar?). The fact that the A6M's performance rarely allowed them to do it does not avoid the fact that they worked out improved tactics.

In response to the rest of your arguements :

I'll summarise my view on training and experience.

Just because you encounter something new doesn't mean your back at the drawing board. Existing experience and training can be used to try new solutions.

Training can teach you the lessons of combat but it doesn't mean you've learn't them.

I don't have the same faith as you in the ability of a US pilot to come out of training and instinctively know to do the right thing. The advantage of US training was it lessened the tendency to do "stupid things" and increased the tendency to do the "right things" but never stopped new pilots making errors in combat.

You can teach someone correct tactics for as long as you want but in the end, the pilot will still have to make a judgement. I will always believe that trained pilots who have been in combat (regardless of where and who) will still tend to perform better than someone fresh out of training.

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 62
- 11/5/2002 4:10:40 PM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		In the Imperial Navy’s carrier fighter pilots, the US Navy faced aviators who to a surprising degree, reflected much of their own philosophy and tactics of air fighting. Today, the common opinion of the Zero pilots wrongly holds them as “individualistic” and “exhibitionistic”, with tactics that “never evolved beyond World War I style dogfighting.” This is a great disservice to the elite pilots of 1941-1942. Like their counterparts in the US Navy, they relied mainly on hit-and-run tactics, predicated around deflection shooting and teamwork, without merely trying to ride their opponent’s tails in a dogfight.

During operational training and squadron exercises, the Japanese flew many hours of formation practice and mock combat. Early on, the learned to act as part of a team within the three-plane Shotai or section,
flying formation, initiating attacks, and defending against them in concert with the rest of the shotai. In contrast, the US Navy put greater emphasis on individual gunnery training built around Individual Battle Practice (IBF), where the pilot flew the four classic gunnery approaches for the record and engaged in single combat with another fighter. In mock combat, the Japanese trained as formations, first matching three planes against three, then three vs. six, finally up to a nine plane chutai (division) battling around nine. In the months prior to Pearl Harbor, the carrier pilots trained intensely

Emphasis was placed on keeping formation during aerial combat and training was conducted
until the least skillful of the fighter pilots flying three planes to a formation could ably cope
with six enemy planes.

The basic tactical unit was the shotai of leader and two wingmen, and the Japanese flew two main types of formations. The first was the “route” or cruise formation, adopted in flight to and from the combat area.
It consisted of the standard Vee formation with two wingmen flying between 30 and 45 degrees off the leader’s two quarters The aircraft flew about at the same level with 50 meters of interval between leader and wingman. This was the same formation as flown by the US Navy before going over to the two-plane section.

When the fighter leaders anticipated action, they deployed their Zeros into much looser combat formations.
One variant put the shotai into left or right echelon, increasing the interval between planes to 100 or 200 meters. Often the two wingmen weaved raggedly in short S-turns to increase lookout behind.

Other times the shotai adopted a formation in principle the same as the US Navy’s A-B-C formation, increasing the interval in the Vee for one wingman to 200 meters and the other to 300 meters. The key difference between the Japanese shotai and the three plane Vees (or Vics as the RAF called them) was that the Zeros assumed loose formations before entering combat. That gave the Japanese room to react and follow their leader’s movements. This was a far cry from the constricted RAF Vics, used until after the Battle of Britain.

Shotai deployment for attack naturally depended on the tactical circumstances, but the Zeros liked to use firing passes in succession from above-rear or high side, depending on the opposition. The shotai formed from line-astern, well spaced out with intervals of 500 meters or more. Charging in one at a time, each Zero would roar within range, fire, then pull out underneath and ahead of the target in order to climb away out of reach. As one completed its run, another would be coming in keeping the target under constant attack. Experienced Japanese pilots seldom sat on the tail of an enemy fighter for an extended shot, unless the attacker was very sure another enemy fighter would not jump him. Sometimes the shotai leader brought his two wingmen up abreast of him and deployed well apart to bracket a single target and box it in.
Zeros then either alternated in making passes from the side, or if the leader did stay on the target’s tail, his two wingmen took great pains to watch his tail. At other times, a leader placed one wingman above the fight as top cover, while he and the other wingman dived in.

To function effectively, the shotai required three excellent pilots well trained in its arts. The prewar Japanese carrier pilots had practiced together, and the extreme maneuverability of their Zeros permitted the shotai to remain a coherent entity even through wild combat. They often achieved remarkable coordination with gunnery runs. The key factors were training and experience. In 1941-mid 1942, the pilots enjoyed excellent training and experience. If that was lacking, the shotai broke down in combat much more easily than the US Navy’s formations, which required far less effort to fly. In 1943 the lack of experienced pilots compelled the Imperial Navy to adopt the 2-2 formation of two plane buntai comprising a four plane shotai.
The theory was that only the shotai leader, in that case, had to be experienced.

Chutai or division formations likewise came in two varieties, route and combat. The cruise or route formations usually placed the three shotai Vees in echelon, one behind the other. In combat, a chutai often adopted an A-B-C type deployment, it’s componential shotai at different heights and intervals to facilitate lookout astern. Japanese training exercises envisioned the chutai leader as manipulating his nine planes in battle, such as sending one shotai on each side of a target in order to bracket or retaining one shotai above as top cover. Many times a chutai formed into one long “string” to execute successive gunnery runs, such as happened on 4 June at Midway. Usually combat was such that each shotai was on its own after the chutai leader made his initial deployment.

In common with the US Navy, the Imperial Navy taught its pilots deflection shooting, but the Japanese did not utilize the technique to its greatest advantage. They used reflector gunsights, but the Zero fighter itself lacked sufficient visibility over the nose to see the proper lead for full deflection attacks against speedy targets. Some pilots cranked up their seats (Sakai mentions this too), putting their heads just beneath the cockpit canopy order to sight along the top of the engine cowling, sufficient to make a nearly full deflection shot in a steep overhead attack, but their shooting was less certain and the pilot certainly less comfortable than in an F4F Wildcat. Japanese high side attacks generally saw the pilots shooting at half deflection and less, rather than full deflection as with the US Navy. The measure of experienced Japanese was their ability to estimate deflection angles and ranges with or without the sights. The veterans honed their shooting eyes and improved their deflection shooting considerably. Problems included the slow-firing, low velocity cannons, and the fact that at higher speeds the Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero was not a good gunnery platform. Rapid acceleration in dives caused a deterioration of control due to stiff ailerons. The point of aim tended to wander, and the pilots could not use the ailerons to roll or corkscrew in to match target maneuvers in an overhead run. In addition, too abrupt a recovery, such as pulling into a steep climb close to the target, lost speed quickly and set up the Zero for a counter-shot if the target could bring it’s guns to bear.

Defensively, the Zero pilots depended on mutual lookout and support between aircraft in a shotai or chutai.
The standard defensive maneuver to counter an attack from above and behind was to pull into a tight, climbing turn, usually to the left. This offered an attacker a full deflection shot and started the Zero climbing away. While the individual under attack made his counter, the other Zeros in his shotai climbed to attack the enemy from other directions. If a Zero pilot found an opponent close on his tail and knew his mount was more maneuverable than the enemy’s he often pulled into a loop and ended up right on the attacker’s tail. A variant of this maneuver, was to pull up sharply, stall, let the enemy go by and jump on his tail. At this time the Japanese were not averse to turning into attackers for head-on runs. They were confident in starting a scissors because they knew they could turn inside their opponents and work their way onto the other’s tail.

In general, the Imperial Navy’s fighter pilots used excellent tactics, based on the advanced concepts of hit-and-run attacks and deflection shooting. Ironically, these commendable tactics sometimes lacked suitability for the aircraft they flew. The Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero was a consummate dogfighting machine, but not so good as a hit-and-run fighter. As hit-and-run tactics depended heavily on high-speed control, this was a great drawback. The later versions, A6M3 and A6M5 with their shorter wing spans, were far better in this regard. The second area where the Zero was deficient was as a gunnery airplane. Because of the somewhat reduced visibility over the nose (when compared to the Grumman F4F Wildcat), full deflection shots were difficult to make. The F4F pilots were not the only ones learning the facts of war in the Pacific and making adjustments. The Americans happened to make them faster.

****

The above is a reprint of Apendix 5: Japanese Combat Methods, John Lundstrom "The First Team" (combat from December 1941 - June 1942)

Apparantly Mr Lundstrom has a far better opinion of Japanese training, experience and ability than others who rely on him as a primary source.

As for the "wargame" to which all this debate ranges over....the technical aspects mentioned above are well modeled.

A6M2: speed 332 (cruise: 207) Mnv: 35 Dur:22 armor:0

weapons 20mm type 99 Effect:4, pen 3, range:2500, Accuracy: 16
7.7mm Type 97 Effect:2, pen 1, range: 1500, Accuracy 24



F4F4: speed 318 (cruise: 155) Mnv: 32 Dur: 29 armor: 1

P-40E speed 364 (cruise 290) Mnv 31 Dur 29 armor:1

weapons (F4F/P40)

6 x .50 Browning Eff: 3 Pen 2 Range 2000 Accuracy 26!


It has also been suggested that the UV model is "crappy" because it doesn't reproduce the "expected" losses (regardless of how the battles are fought it would seem)

However, its kind of ironic that in all this raging debate, noone, at least outside the AAR boards has posted actual figures.

It was with interest then that last night i took a look at my own accumulated figures for my current campaign (played as Allied)

approx losses as of 12/1/42 (from earliest start in 5/42)

A6M2 : 644
A6M3 : 202

F4F3 : 1
F4F4 : 337

P40E : 50

G4M : 251
B25 : 31
B26 : 35


As with real life, such numbers by themselves mean little without considerable qualification, so i will relate.

Fog of war was on....as such obviously these figures are approximate but the key point here is that the figures will be universally inflated upward to reflect the overclaims common on both sides of the war (fortunately for the players, the Japanese side does not get a stronger dose leading to ridiculous sums)

Losses shown include operational and accidental losses as well as actual combat kills which, as historical comprise a far smaller # in total (for fighters they also include planes that went down with carriers)

However even factoring in all of the above, and accounting for overclaims (i checked both sides too, the estimates are identical for both sides when FOW is turned on) its clear that the Japanese suffered more heavily in fighters and bombers. Though not as extreme in the last game (since i played Japanese), it is interesting to note that losses were similarily close even when the IJN was in victory.

I find the Zero losses interesting to say the least because, like Jeremy, i too showed some initial concern at the Dur rating for the Zero (and the Betty, which is why i list the losses here) At first (and 2nd glance) the rating does seem too high, being only 7 points below the F4F and P40. However, if these results are any indicator, we must take note of the value of the "armor" rating of a plane as well as the gun ratings of the weapons used against Allied planes (and the effect of Allied weapons against Japanese planes)

Dur is indeed important but unlike PacWar, we have that armor rating as well, and the weapons have far more specific modeling vs the singular "cannon" rating of Pacwar. Coupled with the Japanese often fighting over enemy territory at long range, the results seem very much in line with historical occurances. (and i tend to play conservatively with reletively few radical or "gamey" tactics....i dont shuffle and create ahistorical loadouts for carriers for example)

In short....i think Matrix has done a bangup job with the air model.
and there is no need for radical EXP alterations to make American units more productive. Even the G4M, which looks even more suspicious than the Zero with it's 36 dur rating (but 0 armor) vs the 42 and 44 rating of the B-25 and 26. Here the results are a little deceptive as the B-25 and 26's very very rarely encounted enemy fighters (the AI never made an agressive bid for New Gunieau in my current game, hence most Zeros came from Rabaul, outside of medium bomber range) Still, even cut in half, thats over 100 G4M's lost in 6 month period.....little suprise that as of 12/1 there is only one operational G4M group in the game (sitting at Truk with 20 operational)

Any doubts as to the attrition can be seen in the A6M groups who started with exp in the high 60's to 80's (land based) most are now in the mid 50's, with a far larger preportion of 50's (and some 40's) of fresh Japanese pilots with a sprinkling of "vets" in the 70's, a few rarer ones in the 80's.

combat has been hard over Port Morseby and Lunga for the Japanese.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 63
- 11/5/2002 4:20:09 PM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by Drongo
[
I have never seen any well-researched post-war analysis come up with a conclusion that overall, F4F's directly downed more A6M's than they lost in head to head encounters (at Coral Sea and Midway). If anything, the A6M did slightly better. What was your source?

[/quote]


I took a quick look at Lundstrom. Here's what i have so far for Coral Sea

Shoho battle

losses 1 A6M, 1 A5M 0 F4F

First abortive IJN strike at TF 17 (same day as Shoho attack)

2 F4F lost (not to Zeros, one to what may have been a B5N that blew up taking the Grumman with it, a 2nd F4F went MIA, fate unknown

Attack on Shokaku

losses in direct combat: 2 A6M, 3 F4F

Attack on Yorktown and Lexington

Amazingly, no Zeros and no F4F's went down as a direct kill though at least two A6M were badly shot up and several to a half dozen F4F's recieved minor to signifigant damage (creating the first testimonials to the Grumman Ironworks)

Zeros handled the SBD anti torp patrols very roughly shooting down half a dozen+ Many claims were made both by VF and VS/VB on Zeros but Lundstrom states clearly that all escorting Zeros survived the initial attack runs.

Of interest as well are their specific actions. As you have pointed out in the past Drongo, the true importance of fighters lies in their completing their missions, not racking up kills (though it is a great morale booster :) ) In the IJN attack phase the Zeros were very successful in tying up Grummans allowing the bombers in particular to do their jobs. Had the Japanese not suffered heavy torp bomber losses in an abortive late afternoon early evening attack which gave the VF's some easy kills they might have had enough numbers to set up proper anvil attacks which may have at least damaged Yorktown enough to cause her to miss Midway.

Midway was a very clear VF victory for the USN....primarily due to one man.....Jimmy Thach. This was the battle where he got to employ his beam defence for the first time, and he made the Japanese pay a heavy price for their first time in experiencing it. Ironically it was done with a three plane element. (it all started when an A6M bounced the #4 plane of the element and shot it down, forcing Thach to an emergency defensive deployment with the three planes)

I believe Thach flamed three planes alone while his wingmen got one or two more. All in all Lundstrom says that 11 Japanese Zeros went down during the battles over the four IJN carriers to only several F4F, the "exact" nature and number of the kills in combat is not completely known and Lundstrom is forced to "speculate" a bit. There were many claims by SBD pilots of Zero kills but Lundstrom discounts them mainly due to the Coral Sea action where SBD claims against Zeros proved largely false, so he basically says that he doubts that it was any different at Midway either so gives most of the credit of the kills to the VF's. After the three carriers were torched, the Japanese only had a handful of Zeros left and only 3 escorted the 18 plane counterattack against the Yorktown.....(and suffered for it) Its too late in the evening for me to dig up the specifics but roughly it was a 3:1 loss ratio that day. I have little doubt though that had the Japanese been able to launch a proper strike that it would not have been quite as lopsided, but more like Coral Sea. Ironically Thach was little satisfied after the battle and damned the F4F4 because he said it was only good for pure defensive tactics vs a machine that could take the fight to the enemy or better escort bombers. (He like many other veteran pilots preferred the lighter F4F3)

Fire in the Sky is a great book too....i have been devouring it for the last week and a half. :)

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 64
- 11/5/2002 6:52:21 PM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		Thanks Nikademus,

I assume that was what Mdiehl was referring to. I've read extracts from Lundstrom's book referring to air combat but never actually found ones that had his estimated losses of air combats in the major battles. One day when I'm rich again, I'll definitely be interested in purchasing his books.

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 65
- 11/5/2002 10:47:12 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		Fire in the Sky is adequate but it does not take a close look at the combats in detail, relying instead on a few anecdotes. It does have a few treasures, though. There's the account of the P38 squadron attacking the Oscar. The Oscar thwarted all of the approach runs and got away. It does *nicely* illustrate the point that in a hopelessly outclassed a/c, the best a really great pilot can hope for is that his enemy will really screw up (so he can be shot down), or else that the Oscar veteran somehow manages to escape. It illustrates the point that in the hands of a merely level headed (not combat experienced or ace) pilot, an a/c with a great speed advantage holds all the cards, because the pilot can disengage at will, and can use his speed to set up conditions that favor his run.

The Lundstrom source I keep mentioning is his summary (roughly pp16-18 or thereabouts) in The First Team at Guadalcanal. Direct engagements through May 1942 between F4Fs and A6Ms resulted in the loss of 16 A6Ms to 10 F4Fs. The rest of ~@Guadalcanal looks at combats in and around Cactus. If you throw Midway and Coral Sea and the early raids together it is quite clear that the sum of the battles is either favorable to teh Allies or roughly 1:1. Anyone *ever* see that through May 1942 in PW? I don;t think so. From the AARs I read on UV, it seems like the best option for the USN CVs against a human player is to offer no resistence. If anyone wants to know what that is a *bad* thing for the Japanese player I'll mention why.

[QUOTE]I agree that the allied pilots would be more likely to fight as a team but the longer a fight lasted, the more likely pilots would become seperated into individual combats.[/QUOTE]

Agreed.

[QUOTE]In August '42, John Thatch...is the equality or even the superiority of the F4F kill ratio shown in these comments? [/QUOTE]

That analysis by Thach is not germane to my argument. Bear in mind that when Thach made that analysis, he was basing it on actual (we may presume) USN losses and "confirmed" kills on Japanese a/c, roughly inflated by 100%. If he had the details of the battles in his hands, he looked at the results and thought a 2:1 favorable loss ratio was inadequate. My point is that contemporary analyses judge performance against pre-war expectations that may well have been unrealistically optimistic. I will note, however, that in detail his analysis of Japanese pilot tactics that he had seen in person (and which we may presume to be reasonably reliable) substantiate that Japanese deflection shooting was poor.


[QUOTE]Also note a despatch from Admiral Nimitz to Admiral King, 2 weeks after Midway :

ALL AIR COMBAT REPORTS BATTLE OF MIDWAY EMPHASIZE EXTREME AND APPARENTLY INCREASED SUPERIORITY PERFORMANCE OF 0 FIGHTERS X
ALTHOUGH THESE PLANES ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN OURS THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF ANY COMBAT SUCCESSES TO DATE BY NAVY FIGHTING PLANES HAS BEEN OWN EXPERT TACTICS OPPOSED TO FAULTY ENEMY
TACTICS X
OVERALL RESULTS HAVE BEEN BAD AND WILL BE SERIOUS
AND POTENTIALLY DECISIVE WITH IMPROVEMENT THAT MUST BE EXPECTED IN ENEMY TACTICS X [/QUOTE]

Thank you. You could not have made the case easier. "Own EXPERT tactics opposed to faulty enemy tactics." Exactly one of the points I've made all along. The "Results have been bad" remark attends to expectations. The real results were actually worse than he knew at the time. The gist of his comment is "Geez, if the enemy actually adapts to our tactics the situation will deteriorate because the Zero is a superior, but flimsy, plane." In the end we all know how the tech track went.

[QUOTE]As it turned out, the US kept the lead in tactics but the above report was a result of analysis of their own combat reports (including inflated claims but with full knowledge of their own losses). Does that indicate F4F's were getting the better of A6M's? [/QUOTE]

Kept the lead in tactics and eventually fielded a/c that were substantially better than IJN a/c in virtually every aspect. I think I addressed the rest of that question in my previous paragraph.

[QUOTE]I see no reason why the 1000 hour Jap pilot would not be expected to be a better pilot (just not 3 times better). [/QUOTE]

Therein we have a quandry. What are your expectations and how do you judge any given model qua your expectations?

[QUOTE]Training pilots to recognize adverse conditions? You're over simplifying. They can be taught what to do and not to do but to expect pilots then trained to go out and do it like an experienced pilot is a bit much.[/QUOTE]

A pilot that has not been through advanced fighter combat training, agreed. One who has experienced advanced training will tend to fly very well. The USN and USAAF solution to putting new guys on the line (this is probably true of every combatant) was that section and squadron leaders were usually people who'd been in a combat before.

[QUOTE]According to Bergerud's book, "in any event what normally ensued after contact was an aerial chess match that did much to decide the outcome of the battle."[/QUOTE]

I think he's wrong. Certainly many pilots have noted that the battle is often won or lost before it began. Bergerud did not take a really close look at air combats in detail. He relied heavily on anecdotes. It was a fun read but frankly I was quite disappointed by the lack of in-depth analysis. I'm turning to group histories to sort out the business of USAAF losses over New Guinea primarily because Bergerud punted.

[QUOTE]As to ruggedness, I would think that it would help a pilot survive rather than win a battle.[/QUOTE]

A little of both I think. For one thing, an F4F or P40 in a head on run at an A6M is more likely to achieve significant damage faster than the A6M. If you're in a really adverse situation it gives you a chance of reacting to escape.

[QUOTE]I can only repeat that the Japanese were aware of energy fighting. They had used it themselves against the Russians. The JAAF began planning the Ki-44 Tojo after considering what they learnt in China and Mongolia. The use of energy fighting by the USAAF was not what gave the Japanese a problem as much as how superior designs like the P-40 were at it. [/QUOTE]

If this is the same thing as saying that you can't engage in energy tactics in an a/c that is essentially useless at same (the Oscar) or just bad at it (the A6M2-3 series), I won't disagree.

[QUOTE]Just because you encounter something new doesn't mean your back at the drawing board. Existing experience and training can be used to try new solutions.[/QUOTE]

Agreed. I've never said otherwise. I think the Japanese were considerably slower to react, however, although there were exceptions. Maybe it has to do with their consistent overstimation of kills by 400%.

[QUOTE]Training can teach you the lessons of combat but it doesn't mean you've learn't them.[/QUOTE]

The same may be said of air combat.

[QUOTE]I don't have the same faith as you in the ability of a US pilot to come out of training and instinctively know to do the right thing. The advantage of US training was it lessened the tendency to do "stupid things" and increased the tendency to do the "right things" but never stopped new pilots making errors in combat. [/QUOTE]

That's whatever. The tendency for USN pilots to do stupid things less frequently than well-trained IJN pilots apparently helped, according to the Thach quote you posted above. I never said USN pilots would instinctively know how to do the right thing, but it's splitting hairs, maybe, to make a distinction between instinct and just not screwing up as often.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 66
- 11/6/2002 3:08:54 AM   
wpurdom

 

Posts: 476
Joined: 10/27/2000
From: Decatur, GA, USA
Status: offline 		"The Lundstrom source I keep mentioning is his summary (roughly pp16-18 or thereabouts) in The First Team at Guadalcanal. Direct engagements through May 1942 between F4Fs and A6Ms resulted in the loss of 16 A6Ms to 10 F4Fs. The rest of ~@Guadalcanal looks at combats in and around Cactus. If you throw Midway and Coral Sea and the early raids together it is quite clear that the sum of the battles is either favorable to teh Allies or roughly 1:1. Anyone *ever* see that through May 1942 in PW? I don;t think so. From the AARs I read on UV, it seems like the best option for the USN CVs against a human player is to offer no resistence. If anyone wants to know what that is a *bad* thing for the Japanese player I'll mention why. "

Head-to-head fighter results are not the be-all and end-all of naval air combat. I have only played the AI, but the difficulty I perceive with handling the Jap CV's has to do not with inferiority in fighter results, but the fact that the Japs will sink you. mdiehl, have you had results with air-to-air combat over the fleets that you thought were actually disproportionate or are you going entirely for accounts from how hard it is to resist the super 6 CV task forces the Japs put together?
Whether that ability of the Japs to sink the US is a reasonable simulation can be and has been argued at great length. The short version of the question is whether (or what parts of) the Midway results were typical.
ALso, on a lesser note, the comparison of results has to include the fighter lost at Midway due to running out of gas. It's been a while since I read Lundstrom, but does he include those losses in his table results? F4F's had good results in interception roles but severe limitations in penetration-escort roles, particularly before July when external tanks were not being used. Much of the inability of the F4F's to stick with their bombers at Midway and other carrier battles was due to the severe range limitations.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 67
- 11/6/2002 4:27:57 AM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]If the opponent flies boom and zoom, there are mvr tactics that will not allow you to engage them. If your opponent flies boom and zoom and is better trained in deflection shooting (which tends to be a common situation faced by pilots closing at high speed), then the opponent will hit more on deflection than you will. If an opponent is highly trained in mutual support, as the Chinese *weren't,* then you will find the target of your affection attempting to disengage (which US a/c could do far more effectively than Japanese ones) while his support rips up your a/c.



The answer is a huge and resounding, "Yes it really hugely-well matters a huge freaking lot." For a guy who is fond of dropping Sakai's name, it's odd to me that you ask, since many IJN vets including the icon mention their consternation at the difference in tactics. [/B][/QUOTE]


Again you miss my point. My point being. The advantage IJN pilots got from *combat* in china was not tactical. As you point out ad nauseum, becuase tactics are determined by the opponent you are going up against. The advantage of combat expirence is quite simply EXPIRENCING COMBAT. Sorry but "bang, bang your dead" and being berated by your flight instructor is not quite the same as being in jepordy of having one's head blown off by a 20mm shell at any second. In short, No IJN pilots did not learn specific tactics to defeat an enemy using energy tactics and mutual support. The did learn how to fly in life and death siturations.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 68
- 11/6/2002 4:30:22 AM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Head-to-head fighter results are not the be-all and end-all of naval air combat. [/QUOTE]

Not of naval combat, but they are if you are evaluating the "realism" of the airplane-vs-airplane combat resolution mechanics and the assumptions of the relative abilities of the opponents to inflict or survive damage. I'm focused here exclusively on the subject of whether the Matrix products accurately model air combat between fighters. While the combat between CV-based groups could be assessed in this manner, there are other bugs in the Matrix software that make the CV combats harder to read. If, however, you look at how campaigns between land based aircraft play out, the ALlied fighter losses are disproportionately high in PW, and they seem to be disproportionately high in UV, judging by the AARs.

[QUOTE]I have only played the AI, but the difficulty I perceive with handling the Jap CV's has to do not with inferiority in fighter results, but the fact that the Japs will sink you. mdiehl, have you had results with air-to-air combat over the fleets that you thought were actually disproportionate or are you going entirely for accounts from how hard it is to resist the super 6 CV task forces the Japs put together?[/QUOTE]

This is a separate issue entirely. That the IJN player is capable of fielding a 60 plane cap is an error, even if combat does break down into smaller elements. Likewise, a 60 plane USN cap in 1942 or early 1943 would be an error PW had also a bug wherein the IJN ability to "cooordinate" airstrikes was treated as superior to the USN ability. That of course is also contravened by the historical USN air strike coordination, for example, at Buna/Lae (2 CVs, 90 a/c coordinated strike) in April (or was it early May? No matter.) and at Coral Sea (vs Shoho, mistakenly id'd as a CV group). That the Midway strike was not well coordinated seems to be the only point of justification for the flawed assumption.

[QUOTE]Whether that ability of the Japs to sink the US is a reasonable simulation can be and has been argued at great length. The short version of the question is whether (or what parts of) the Midway results were typical.[/QUOTE]

It is probably not too clever to be so focussed on Midway as Matrix seems to be. Coral Sea is rather more typical. Shokaku saved by a gnat's whisker. Lexington sunk by a gnat's whisker. Huge a/c losses on both sides (which in the long term favored the Allies). Midway is an example of how good planning (leading to the delivery of airstrikes at exactly the moment when the IJN CVs were most vulnerable) allowed USN success despite atypical strike coordination and other elements of luck so poor that the "luck" for the USN could hardly have been worse.

[QUOTE]Also on a lesser note, the comparison of results has to include the fighter lost at Midway due to running out of gas.[/QUOTE]

All the losses that I count as germane and documented by Lundstrom are a result of direct conflicts between A6Ms and F4Fs in which one or the other planes crashed, blew up or burned up directly as a consequence of the other plane's armament.

If you count crappy plane handling and coordination or pilots getting lost leading to a/c running out of fuel, then the IJN looks pretty lousy at Coral Sea and the USN looks pretty lousy at Midway. (In saying this, I mentally exclude IJN a/c that ran out of fuel at Midway because they had nowhere to land.)

[QUOTE] It's been a while since I read Lundstrom, but does he include those losses in his table results? F4F's had good results in interception roles but severe limitations in penetration-escort roles, particularly before July when external tanks were not being used. Much of the inability of the F4F's to stick with their bombers at Midway and other carrier battles was due to the severe range limitations. [/QUOTE]

The 16:10 (A6M:F4F) loss ratio through May is in The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, a sequel to The First Team. The figures are mentioned in the introduction in which allied and Japanese conflicts prior to the Guadalcanal campaign are discussed. There was no table for these that I immediately recall. A later table in the book (IIRC) examines the losses over Guadalcanal.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 69
- 11/6/2002 5:17:08 AM   
Jeremy Pritchard

 

Posts: 588
Joined: 9/27/2001
From: Ontario Canada
Status: offline 		I did say this before, but I don't think anyone listened.

PacWar air statistics are not necessarily wrong according to history (UV could be, I have not played the game, and thereby cannot make a judgement call).

PacWar lists DAMAGED AND DESTROYED (key word is AND) aircraft as losses, while historically, only DESTROYED aircraft were listed as losses.

Allied planes may be "destroyed" in equal or larger numbers then Japanese planes when you look at the end of turn screen, but that only shows how many planes were damaged AND destroyed, not just destroyed. Check out the squadrons on the field at the beginning of your turn, there will be few operational Allied planes, but an awful lot of damaged ones.

I have tested this independently (i.e., in a closed scenario) as well as in the game. Even the 80 experienced A6M groups suffer higher/equal DEATH attrition rates against the 60 experience P-40 groups at Clark Field. However, experience gained by the IJNAF manages to keep the group at 80, while the USAAC experience grows. Should Clark Field remain in full supply, I would be that eventually the P-40 experience will raise up to a point where it will surpass that of the A6M group, due to the following scenario that virtually always happens...

Allied planes are much higher in durability, therefore more planes will survive (also due to lower japanese cannon rates), but at the end of turn screen be listed as destroyed. However, Japanese planes tend to be of lower durability, and should they be listed as destroyed, they probably are (due to higher allied cannon rates).

So, if you should see losses as...

Japanese Aircraft 140
Allied Aircraft 180

Chances are...

Japanese aircraft destroyed 100
Japanese aircraft damaged 40

Allied aircraft destroyed 80
Allied aircraft damaged 100

So, the 1:1, with the advantage toward the Allies still exists, but is 'hidden' in the end of turn screen that merges all damaged and destroyed into one factor. However, damaged aircraft offer no experience penalty to the air group, and the Allies gain more experience then what they lose in pilots killed, but in most of the best situations the Japanese manage to break even, and only gain experience when they use their airgroups to bomb enemy LCU's or airbases free from enemy CAP.

I have tested this in PacWar using isolated bases, of equal supply, leaders and PP's vs equal numbers of aircraft and experience. Japanese may get more hits on allied aircraft, but they tend to score much fewer critical hits.

So, I would not say that PacWar's air combat system is messed up, but rather its way in telling you what casualties you experienced is. Should air commander have reported back all damaged and destoryed aircraft in WW2 (vs. just reporting destroyed or lost aircraft), then the rates would match PW rates.

Also, most Japanese players will send a lot of their fighter and bomber groups on 'experience gaining missions' in quiet regions to get more experience for their air groups then historically. Historically, the IJAAF and IJNAF did not send their new pilots to rear areas, like Bataan or China, to give them extra experience against 'soft' targets. However, most players use this tactic to bring up practically all of their 1941-early 1942 fighter and bomber squadrons to 80+ experience, basically making everyone aces due to bombing missions.

This is one of the reasons why I want experience levels, instead of experience percentages. As working in percentages it is possible for any pilot to be anywhere from 1-100%, but realistically pilots were not based on averages, or percentages, but labled as one of the following.

Raw
Green
Regular
Experienced
Veteran
Elite

A raw pilot did not become Green, then Regular, then Experienced, etc... They either became veteran/elite or died. Chances are, they will die. A regular pilot will have a better chance then a raw or green pilot to become veteran, and an experienced pilot even greater then that.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 70
- 11/6/2002 10:47:30 AM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		Posted by Mdiehl
[QUOTE]That analysis by Thach is not germane to my argument. Bear in mind that when Thach made that analysis, he was basing it on actual (we may presume) USN losses and "confirmed" kills on Japanese a/c, roughly inflated by 100%. If he had the details of the battles in his hands, he looked at the results and thought a 2:1 favorable loss ratio was inadequate. My point is that contemporary analyses judge performance against pre-war expectations that may well have been unrealistically optimistic. I will note, however, that in detail his analysis of Japanese pilot tactics that he had seen in person (and which we may presume to be reasonably reliable) substantiate that Japanese deflection shooting was poor. [/QUOTE]

Regarding this whole arguement of Thatch and Nimitz commenting on the basis of pre-war expectations :

A large amount of air combat had already occurred prior to Midway (including Coral Sea). Why would someone as intel savvy as Nimitz not have adjusted his expectations? Thatch obviously knew the USN fighters would be under the hammer against the superior performing A6M's as he came up with his "weave" for that reason. It was a tactic devised to allow the F4F to defend against superior fighters. At the same time, you're arguing that he had still expected the USN fighters to show the pre-war expected superior kill ratio? Neither Nimitz nor Thatch said anything about pre-war expectations when they were talking about Midway. Do you have a source showing these comments were made in a pre-war context or are you just giving an opinion that fits in with your POV?

Regarding your focus in Nimitz's and Thatch's mention in the text of "expert tactics", etc. Given the negative textual context in which they were made, it would be wrong to assume that they thought at the time that the USN fighters were the equal or superior because of these. I would not think Thatch or Nimitz would be in agreement with your POV when they made their comments.

Re : 1000 hrs training vs 300 hrs training.
[QUOTE]What are your expectations and how do you judge any given model qua your expectations? [/QUOTE]

At what point do you decide a pilot can learn nothing more about training? If we knew a pilot was trained to the maximum at 300 hours, extra hours would add nothing. But we dont. For that reason, I would hold the opinion that there would still be something to be gained from the extra 700 hours but certainly not at the same rate that skill increased over the first 300 hours.

We obviously will have little control over what model Matrix supplies. I did play Pacwar (a long time ago) but dont remember what I thought of the training/exp model. I think UV's model is too simplistic but still adequate for the purpose. My expectation is obviously heavily dependant on my own opinion. You obviously put a high priority on certain details like the F4F kill ratio vs the A6M. Thats your choice but, as others have pointed out, the apparent "unfavourable" kill ratio has little influence on the overall result of battles in UV and may well be the same in WitP.

My personal preference would be a model that deals seperately with training (how well trained (both basic and advanced) you are in flying the plane), combat experience (surviving and learning while flying under the influence of gunfire) and tactics. Individual plane characteristics obviously need to be modeled seperately. Individual pilot qualities (ie ace potential) are probably a bit much in a game of this size but would still be nice. If the model dealt with the above aspects seperately, you might have a better chance of modelling the unique characteristics of the combatants in the Pacific.

However, based on UV, I'm happy to put my trust in the designers at the moment as it's probably better than most operational level games.

[QUOTE]I think he's (Bergerud) wrong. [/QUOTE]

That's your opinion. The fact that he generalises does not mean he has not studied the battles in detail. His writing approach may have been for the benefit of the general reader and not a grognard.

My opinion is that neither Bergerud nor Lundstom should be taken as the final word. They both accessed detailed information that I've never seen and then offered an interpretation. They just help shape a readers perception and opinion but its still going to be up to the reader. We obviously differ on certain POVs but try to accept the fact that its often in degree and not direction.

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 71
- 11/6/2002 2:57:37 PM   
Nikademus


Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Fire in the Sky is adequate but it does not take a close look at the combats in detail, relying instead on a few anecdotes. It does have a few treasures, though.



Hardly.

You have attempted to discredit Sakai mainly by calling it a "biography" of the man, steeped in bias and unsupported by fact while Lundstrom is more of a strategic analysis.

Not exactly correct. Lundstrom's work is not strategic.....it is an in-depth, analytical, but ultimately, also a biography of sorts.....its a biography of the USN VF's from 12/41 thru 11/42. It does not attempt to go beyond that subject other than to also analysis Japanese carrier VF's as well.

As such, yes, it is much more specific in describing fighter combat than Bergerud. This is hardly suprising, as Berguerud's work is a "true" strategic work as it covers the entire South Pacific air campaign from start to finish, a considerably wider scope.

As such, naturally it cannot contain the same level of detail for specific battles such as Midway, or Guadalcanal, however it contains far far more than "mere" anecdotes.

But dont take my word for it....I invite one and all to read him themselves and see what he has to say.

It should also be noted that Lundstrom himself endorses the book. The exact quote is as follows;

"Historians have treated the fierce air battles over New Gunieau and the Solomons from 1942 to 1944 as if they took place in isolation from each other. The first was primarily a US Army Air Force show, the second mainly Marine and Navy. The Japanese air effort was similarily divided between the Imperial Army Air Force and the Imperial Navy. Eric Bergerud is the first to examine these unique air campaigns as a whole. Not simply a chronological rendition, "Fire in the Sky" offers a well integrated analysis of what it was like to fly and fight under primitive conditions so different from the massive air war in Europe."

His approach was indeed unique. While daunting at first in terms of what one usually expects in terms of format, it does make sense after one has read through it. He divides his book into three main sections.....terrain and it's effects on men and machines, the machines and men of the air war on both sides, and finally, the events themselves as they happened. The analysis is in-depth, revealing and very much thorough.

I recommend the book to all who wish to learn of combat in the South Pacific that occured off of the vaunted carrier decks of both sides.

One last two commentaries

quote:


There's the account of the P38 squadron attacking the Oscar. The Oscar thwarted all of the approach runs and got away. It does *nicely* illustrate the point that in a hopelessly outclassed a/c, the best a really great pilot can hope for is that his enemy will really screw up (so he can be shot down), or else that the Oscar veteran somehow manages to escape. It illustrates the point that in the hands of a merely level headed (not combat experienced or ace) pilot, an a/c with a great speed advantage holds all the cards, because the pilot can disengage at will, and can use his speed to set up conditions that favor his run.



Really? screw up? holds all the cards?

here is the full story;

"There were four of us one day that caught one little lone Oscar, and that was the lightest, most maneuverable fighter they made-it only had two .30 caliber guns on it-but we made passes on that Oscar for over forty minutes. I came home with a hole in my prop-we never touched him. It was just remarkable. The guy was so sharp. When you'd line up and start to fire he could turn into you, he could dance on the rudders, and just turn around and fly back almost underneath itself. And all four of us just gave up and flew back home."

account of American Ace Perry Dahl, P-38 pilot describing a confrontation with a Ki-43 in the fall of 1943 over New Gunieau.

2nd commentary;

quote:



That analysis by Thach is not germane to my argument. Bear in mind that when Thach made that analysis, he was basing it on actual (we may presume) USN losses and "confirmed" kills on Japanese a/c, roughly inflated by 100%. If he had the details of the battles in his hands, he looked at the results and thought a 2:1 favorable loss ratio was inadequate. My point is that contemporary analyses judge performance against pre-war expectations that may well have been unrealistically optimistic. I will note, however, that in detail his analysis of Japanese pilot tactics that he had seen in person (and which we may presume to be reasonably reliable) substantiate that Japanese deflection shooting was poor.



No, it does not. His specific quote is as follows;

"It is indeed surprising that any of our pilots returned alive. Any success our fighter pilots may have against the Japanese Zero fighter is not due to the preformance of the airplane we fly but is the result of the comparatively poor marksmanship of the Japanese, stupid mistakes made by a "few" of their pilots and superior marksmanship and team work of some of our pilots. The only way we can ever bring our guns to bear on the Zero fighter is to trick them into recovering in front of an F4F or shoot them when they are pre-occupied in firing at one of our own planes."

Thach went on to express his exasperation of the F4F4 vs the Zero, describing its "pitiful" inferiority in climb, maneuverability and speed.

And no, it was not an isolated incident. Most, if not all pilots familiar with the F4F-3 and F4F-3A felt the same way about the F4F-4 with it's additional weight.

Does this mean the F4F-4 was a bad plane.....no. Of course not, but it was no superior fighter either.....which was why 2nd gen fighters were needed for the war.

As for Thach's comments......they do not constitute proof of superior USN tactics nor inferior Japanese marksmanship....they represent the comments of one man made in angst after the heat of battle. They are not solid fact.

Maybe the Japanese that engaged Thach that "one" day did indeed shoot badly.....maybe they were confounded by the first documented employment of the Thach weave.....maybe they struck home but their 7.7 mm bullets failed to impress the Grumman Iron works, maybe Thach was just raving to bring attention to the fact that he felt his weapon (and his fellow pilots) was not sufficient to the job and he was trying to draw attention to the fact.

We dont know.....all we know is that it is not "fact". You choose to disperage most of what Sakai says yet we are supposed to take the words of an American pilot who was "also there" at face value. This is highly selective.

As for Nimitz.....his exact quote;

"Our F4F is markedly inferior to the Japanese Zero fighter in speed, maneuverability, and climb. These characterisitics must be improved, but not at the cost of reducing the present overall superiority that in the Battle of Midway enabled our carrier fighter squadrons to shoot down about 3 Zeros for each of our own lost (estimates at the time) However much this superiority "may" exist in our splendid pilots, part at least rests in the armor, armament, and leak proof tanks of our planes"

This is a pep talk after the battle....again it is not hard fact. Is there truth in it.....sure, but it is not a hard line analysis. How could it be given it was issued by an American admiral shortly after the battle concluded via 2nd hand sources?

One can easily draw different conclusions from the above....whether or not it constitutes "proof" of Japanese inferiority.......is highly questionable. Its a matter of perspective thats for sure.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 72
- 11/6/2002 6:07:07 PM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		I liked this pep talk from Cactus Ace Joe Bauer.
[QUOTE]When comparing the Zero with the F4F, Bauer said, ‘A Zero can go faster than you can, it climb faster than you can, and it can outmaneuver you. Aside from those things, you’ve got a better airplane.’” [/QUOTE]

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 73
- 11/6/2002 9:45:17 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]Regarding this whole arguement of Thatch and Nimitz commenting on the basis of pre-war expectations :
A large amount of air combat had already occurred prior to Midway (including Coral Sea). Why would someone as intel savvy as Nimitz not have adjusted his expectations?[/QUOTE]

The question you should be asking is "Why would a fellow be disappointed with an apparent 2:1 favorable kill ratio?" All we can know about Nimitz is that he wrote his comment when the best estimates indicated that the Allies were on the winning side of the equation. If that wasn't good enough, it tells you something about his expectations at the instant that he wrote his remark. I assume that these expectations are consistent with pre-war expectations, because the alternative works as follows: pre-war - "We're gonna get our asses whipped and lose more a/c than we destroy or at best achieve parity" followed, after several engagements, by "We're defeating the enemy losing 1 ac for each two of theirs and that is a really unacceptable result."

[QUOTE]Regarding your focus in Nimitz's and Thatch's mention in the text of "expert tactics", etc. Given the negative textual context in which they were made, it would be wrong to assume that they thought at the time that the USN fighters were the equal or superior because of these.[/QUOTE]

That was precisely my point. Given that the F4F was acknowledged to be inferior in some respects, the "EXPERT" USN tactics vs. flawed IJN ones clearly says something about the quality of USN training in the face of IJN training and combat experience.

[QUOTE]I would not think Thatch or Nimitz would be in agreement with your POV when they made their comments. [/QUOTE]

I do not think Thach or Nimitz appointed you to declare their opinions about my comments. Of course, your remark is an attempt to pretend that your argument successfully "appeals to authority" by pretending that you'd have any idea what Nimitz or Thach would think of this conversation. I'm willing to debate the implications of the things they actually said, but not the implications of "whatever you think they ought to have said."

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 74
- 11/6/2002 10:09:20 PM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		Posted by Mdiehl
[QUOTE]I do not think Thach or Nimitz appointed you to declare their opinions about my comments. Of course, your remark is an attempt to pretend that your argument successfully "appeals to authority" by pretending that you'd have any idea what Nimitz or Thach would think of this conversation. I'm willing to debate the implications of the things they actually said, but not the implications of "whatever you think they ought to have said."[/QUOTE]

Ditto

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 75
- 11/6/2002 10:09:43 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		[QUOTE]You have attempted to discredit Sakai mainly by calling it a "biography" of the man, steeped in bias and unsupported by fact while Lundstrom is more of a strategic analysis.[/QUOTE]

A complete lie. I have not attempted to discredit Sakai or claimed he's steeped in bias. What I've said, inconveniently for your hero-worship approach to history, is that Sakai is not an authoritative source on Allied aircraft losses. (And I'm not the only fellow who says so.) I've also said that some of the reflections on combat from Sakai must reflect information he gleaned from fellow pilots, because there he may never have fought against a P39, and because *someone* (you?) said he commented on the capabilities of the P39. If I can get ahold of the excellent 5th AF unit histories there will surely be a way to verify whether his unit flew against any P39 units before Sakai himself was invalidated for several years by his mishap with the SBDs.

[QUOTE]It should also be noted that Lundstrom himself endorses the book. The exact quote is as follows.[/QUOTE]

I truly don't give a rip what Lundstrom thinks of Bergerud. That sort of back-cover glad-handing is par for the course. The information that I want to know about is not available in Bergerud's book, and I'm not convinced that he new the details very well. My opinion about FitS was that it borrowed heavily and verbatim from "Touched with Fire" (his *other* book) and that he really glossed the complexities of air combat, relying primarily on anecdotes, and not even examining various claims (such as the alleged inferiority of the P40).

[QUOTE]"There were four of us one day that caught one little lone Oscar, and that was the lightest, most maneuverable fighter they made-it only had two .30 caliber guns on it-but we made passes on that Oscar for over forty minutes. I came home with a hole in my prop-we never touched him. It was just remarkable. The guy was so sharp. When you'd line up and start to fire he could turn into you, he could dance on the rudders, and just turn around and fly back almost underneath itself. And all four of us just gave up and flew back home." [/QUOTE]

Thanks for proving my point so nicely. None of the P38 pilots screwed up. Despite being far more maneuverable than the P38s, the Oscar pilot could not get a shot at them. By thwarting their approach runs through maneuver, he lived long enough to fight another day. Great pilot. Crappy plane. Couldn't win.

[QUOTE]"It is indeed surprising that any of our pilots returned alive. Any success our fighter pilots may have against the Japanese Zero fighter is not due to the preformance of the airplane we fly but is the result of the comparatively poor marksmanship of the Japanese, stupid mistakes made by a "few" of their pilots and superior marksmanship and team work of some of our pilots. The only way we can ever bring our guns to bear on the Zero fighter is to trick them into recovering in front of an F4F or shoot them when they are pre-occupied in firing at one of our own planes."[/QUOTE]

Thank you again for proving my point. The F4F is an inferior plane in many respects. Despite much more intensive IJN training and combat experience (allegedly) in China, USN F4F pilots with no combat experience and very good training "tricked" (Thach's word) Japanese pilots and capitalized on their "stupid mistakes" (Thach's phrase), and benefitted from the "comparatively poor marksmanship" (Thach's phrase) of these highly trained, veteran Japanese pilots that AF hero-worshipers adore.

Case closed, I'm right, you're wrong: next...

[QUOTE]As for Thach's comments......they do not constitute proof of superior USN tactics nor inferior Japanese marksmanship....they represent the comments of one man made in angst after the heat of battle. They are not solid fact. [/QUOTE]

I love this thread. Any anecdote counts until it becomes inconvenient for your argument. So we *must* believe everything stated by Sakai. Thach's opinions are "not solid fact." That USN F4F pilots shot down as many IJN A6M pilots in direct engagements (despite a generally inferior plane in the F4F-4) seems not relevant (even though it's the only "solid fact" that we have to go by) for judging the merits of USN training.

Y'all are desperate to find anything to preserve The Myth. You're talking nonsense and you're talking off the top of your head. Come back when you can figure out what standard you can use to evaluate the debated claims, without then changing your standard and running from it the moment you are *again* proven to be wrong.

And, *DO RECALL,* that I'm not the fellow who brought Thach's anecdote into this in the first place, before you accuse me of applying a double standard.

[QUOTE]As for Nimitz.....his exact quote;

"Our F4F is markedly inferior to the Japanese Zero fighter in speed, maneuverability, and climb. These characterisitics must be improved, but not at the cost of reducing the present overall superiority that in the Battle of Midway enabled our carrier fighter squadrons to shoot down about 3 Zeros for each of our own lost (estimates at the time) However much this superiority "may" exist in our splendid pilots, part at least rests in the armor, armament, and leak proof tanks of our planes" [/QUOTE]

He's wrong about the loss rates. The number was more like 1:1 through November 1942. We all know how the USN solved the tech problems.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 76
- 11/7/2002 7:49:39 AM   
Jeremy Pritchard

 

Posts: 588
Joined: 9/27/2001
From: Ontario Canada
Status: offline 		I do feel that everyone is talking around me, and debating the same issues over and over, without really understanding that experience/training (and even aircrft types) is not EVERYTHING to determine losses/victory.

I feel that the Luftwaffe comparison works very well. Both air arms had extensive experience (of course, combat in Spain 'could' be compared to combat in China..., but then the Luftwaffe also fought in Poland and France). Both were defeated when they stopped doing what they did to win. Germany stopped its combined arms advance, and used its air force as its mode of crushing England. England was allowed to concentrate its forces, which were poorer trained, and equipped, and few in number, but had some key benefits (airbases that will not be overrun and early warning). The US was in much the same situation as the RAF. They had the 'safety' of airbases that will not be overrun, good early warning systems, and the benefit of fighting close to their base.

Even in carrier to carrier combat, 'losses' themselves do not necessarily denote pilot ability. Ranges may be similar, but what one groups priorities are are different. I beleive that IJNAF pilots stuck with protecting their bombers over engaging enemy fighters (like what the Luftwaffe fighters did). This lowers bomber losses, but increases fighter losses (while decreasing air-air victories).

It may be that US pilots were able to kill more Japanese fighters, but this is probably due to the fact, that like the Luftwaffe in 1940, the IJNAF fighters were usually escorting bombers. The priority for an escort is to keep the bombers alive, which means that you keep fighters away (not necessarily hunt them down and kill them). US fighters tended not to defend their bombers as tightly as the Japanese, resulting in when they engage in combat more enemy fighters will be fought against with higher determination (vs. only goal is to defend the bombers).

However, this does not mean that IJNAF veterans, or trained USN pilots were better then the other. It merely states that pilot quality does not necessarily determine aircraft casualties.

Had the IJNAF went on the defensive after Midway, instead of on the offensive, it is difficult to say what the losses would have been. When the US finally went on their big offensive in 1944, they fought a very fluid war, like the Luftwaffe in 1940, and the IJNAF/IJAAF in 1941/42. Quickly moving from base to base, not allowing for the opponent to concentrate, or develop a strong early warning system (air attacks on the Home Islands experienced sharp increases in losses by the USN in 1945 when the IJAAF went up to engage them).

So, when you see possibly skewers of history, it may not be that just experience or aircraft quality are affecting it, but possibly tactical considerations (such as defending vs. attacking, morale, base support, etc..). Possibly a requirement needs to be included to show that the Japanese fighters (when on bomber escort) fly close to their bombers instead of acting just as long range CAP. Realistically, fighters who escort bombers will not be as 'effective killers' as those who are on a fighter sweep, but PW and UV put all aircraft at their maxium (i.e., if fighters are escorting bombers and are engaged by enemy fighters, the fighters act as if there are no bombers, and attack as doggedly as if they were just out on patrol).

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 77
- 11/7/2002 7:55:26 AM   
Jeremy Pritchard

 

Posts: 588
Joined: 9/27/2001
From: Ontario Canada
Status: offline 		I do feel that both Thatch and Sakai worship both tend to obscure reality. Relying on individuals, their actions and/or theories are only good if they really affected the majority of combat, and/or that their tactics/reflections of quality really affected losses/victories to the extent that both sides claim.

I do see both sides doing their best (in this subject) to downgrade the importance of one aspect, while propping up the other. I say that neither is as important as the actual missions assigned. Aircraft rarely ever met on even terms, and there are countless other reasons as to why losses/victories were the way that they were other then just pilot quality (experience or training) or aircraft use 'maximization'.

The Japanese didn't do so well in 1941 because of uber-combat experience, but they didn't do so poorly in 1942 because they were against USN trained pilots who were better then IJN veterans.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 78
History Channel - 11/7/2002 8:03:45 AM   
mogami


Posts: 12789
Joined: 8/23/2000
From: You can't get here from there
Status: offline 		Hi, I just watched a show on BOB. One British pilot said in his first combat mission he downed 2 enemy aircraft and never had a clue what was going on. (they both just flew in front of him)
They were using the Vic formation (he said it stunk since only the leader was looking round the other 2 planes spent all their time staying in formation.)

_____________________________






I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 79
- 11/7/2002 9:53:04 AM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		Posted by Jeremy Pritchard
[QUOTE]I do feel that everyone is talking around me, and debating the same issues over and over, without really understanding that experience/training (and even aircrft types) is not EVERYTHING to determine losses/victory. [/QUOTE]

Ah, the wasted voice of reason.

Jeremy,

Most people posting here are fully aware of the enormous number of elements to be considered in analysing an aerial campaign and its outcome.

The design of a game like WitP is hopefully going to be influenced by both what happened and what also could have happened. For example, the air battles around Henderson Field in Aug-Nov '42. You dont take the actual air losses and exchange rates from that as being the norm for all encounters between the IJN/IJAF and the USN/USMC in the same period. What would have happened if the Japanese had not had to fly 3-4 hours either way and if the damaged Wildcats were not able to land immeadiately? What would have happened if the US didn't have coastwatchers reporting inbound raids? What would have happened if F4F's were forced to fly patrols further up The Slot against a closer Japanese airbase that had the benefit of friendly ground observation posts? All these situations could occur in WitP (although coastwatchers give no bonus to defending fighters at present in UV but they might in WitP). All could expect to result in a different "kill ratio" as well as differing levels of success.

Part of the reason why we get bogged down in debate is that people are aware of the different factors but choose to weight them differently or dismiss them as irrelevant.

What you need to consider is that if someone makes a blanket statement along the lines of "force A was superior/equal/inferior to force B because of this reason(s) and any other view is just wrong", of course people without the same POV are going to attack the reasoning behind the arguement.

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 80
- 11/7/2002 9:49:27 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		Thr problem with the "extreme range leading to pilot fatigue" defense is that it does not work for the cv engagements, all of which occurred at ranges favorable to the A6M and near the edge of F4F range. The pilots were equally well rested and the F4Fs were at the limit of their fuel. In these engagements, both sides escorted bombers.

The Guadalcanal loss ratios (which actually *favored* the Japanese through Oct (about 1.1:1), principially becaise of a single successful surprise raid in late August) might be attributable to close escort, except that the most successful Allied engagements occurred when the Japanese feigned a bomber strike, sent the bombers home about 20 km distant from Guadalcanal, and went in conducting fighter sweeps.

Clearly, all those other factors that I mentioned some time ago weigh in on the results of air combat. I placed EXP near last because I think it really belongs near last. I omitted mission type. It ought to be ahead of EXP.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 81
- 11/7/2002 10:42:21 PM   
Drongo

 

Posts: 2205
Joined: 7/12/2002
From: Melb. Oztralia
Status: offline 		Posted by mdiehl
[QUOTE]The pilots were equally well rested and the F4Fs were at the limit of their fuel. In these engagements, both sides escorted bombers. [/QUOTE]

Were the IJN pilots well rested?

The CAP fighters had been cycling through since about dawn and then involved in heavy combat with the US strikes from Midway. The Hiryu's (?) fighters had been involved in the initial stike on Midway (wouldn't they have been in the large dogfight with land based Buffalos/Wildcats as well)?

The range may have been short but the combat was fairly full on prior to both the USN stikes and Hiryu's counter strike.

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 82
- 11/8/2002 12:38:23 AM   
Jeremy Pritchard

 

Posts: 588
Joined: 9/27/2001
From: Ontario Canada
Status: offline 		I do beleive that the IJNAF tended to stick with their bombers closer then USN pilots did with theirs. Boom and Zoom tactics don't work if you are closely protecting slow and lumbering bombers. When IJNAF fighters attacked a coordinated USN strike, the USN tended to have their fighters losely attached to the bombers, and primarily went after fighters over defending the bombers. More IJNAF fighters were shot down this way (as USN fighters were able to fly 'independent' of their bombers). IJNAF fighters tended to keep close to their bombers, which would give them less kills as they could not afford to go and finish off damaged enemies as their primary goal is to protect bombers.

How does PW and (probably) UV model this? It models air combat as if both sides send in fighters, then send in bombers.

First action, fighters engage other fighters.

Second action, surviving defending fighters engage bombers.

Realistically, combat was more chaotic. Japanese fighters kept with their bombers, to keep Allied fighters away, while USN fighters kept with enemy fighters, to clear the way for the bombers. IJNAF way results in fewer enemy fighter losses, higher friendly fighter losses (fighters are not at their maximum when they keep with their bobmers) bomber losses to enemy fighters is less. USN way was to keep groups working losely. Fighters worked with other fighters, and the bombers hoped that the fighters manage to keep the enemy fighters busy.

It really is not that much of a difference, as both fighters try to defend their bombers in different ways (USN to eleiminate resistance before the bombers move in, IJN to protect bombers by keeping enemy fighters away). Just because they both attacked with bombers does not mean that tactics were similar as to how they protected them.

IJNAF tactics were based on minimizing bomber losses, USN tactics were based on maximizing losses for enemy CAP. IJNAF fighters will rake up fewer fighter kills, while USN fighters will get more, based primarily on tactics used for escorting bombers.

You will never get the same casualty results as the fighting model does not take into account different escort tactics. As it stands now, the IJNAF use historic USN tactics, i.e., destroy enemy CAP then let the bombers go through. This way results for higher IJNAF fighter kills then historic, as they are more aggressive against enemy fighters and less protective of friendly bombers.

The main reason for this USN tactic was shoud the fighters closely defend the bombers, they would not be able to use their aircraft to its maxiumum. Tactics for the Thatch Weave, as well as Boom and Zoom require freedom of position and timing for fighters. Altitude and speed are important for these tactics, which do not coincide with closely protecting slow bombers.

So, the Japanese get unrealistically high fighter victories (occasionally) because they fight with their aircraft to its maximum when escorting bombers, when realistically, like the Luftwaffe, they spent more effort in keeping enemy fighters away, which increase their casualties lower enemy casualties, but lower friendly bomber losses to CAP.

(in reply to angus)
Post #: 83
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