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Little China map... - 9/13/2011 12:23:36 AM

modrow

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Gentlemen,

As requested by Nemo, here�s a picture of southern China.

1) represents a stack of 20 Japanese units, if cursor intel is correct. There are about 10 more LCUs scattered in the neighboring hexes. You can see the red/black lines that illustrate how I try to block the flow of supplies (the one up north is due to another Chinese roadblock LCU which is not visible).

Note that I don�t believe I have cut them off, but I think that supply flow should be at least impeded a bit. I think the fact that so far the stack appears to be rather static may support that assumption.

There�s a second stack of about 20 Japanese units further north.

2) represents the heroic defenders of Chuhsien. There was another attack on the base this turn, these are the results:

Ground combat at Chuhsien (88,56)
Japanese Deliberate attack
Attacking force 20690 troops, 192 guns, 72 vehicles, Assault Value = 648
Defending force 15699 troops, 81 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 514
Japanese adjusted assault: 412
Allied adjusted defense: 601
Japanese assault odds: 1 to 2 (fort level 2)
Combat modifiers
Defender: terrain(+), preparation(-), experience(-)
Attacker:

Japanese ground losses:
1427 casualties reported
Squads: 12 destroyed, 97 disabled
Non Combat: 1 destroyed, 101 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 9 disabled

Allied ground losses:
296 casualties reported
Squads: 1 destroyed, 17 disabled
Non Combat: 1 destroyed, 9 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled

Assaulting units:
17th Division
22nd/A Division
2nd Ind.Mixed Regiment
22nd/B Division

Defending units:
88th Chinese Corps
100th Chinese Corps
3rd War Area
25th Group Army

I think he will need more troops to take the base (which is well supplied). Also, the Japanese LCUs involved in the attacks will hopefully need a bit of a break when the fighting is over. Japanese raw AV started at 841 when Chuhsien was first attacked (c.f. my post 38 above). I did extract a base force (which may have triggered this attack) comprising 40 AV, thus I lost something like 40 raw AV since the beginning of the attacks.

At 3), there is the 115th Jap. Rgt, on which 3 Chinese corps are converging. 2 more are coming down south as well. It should not only be possible to beat the Rgt up a bit, but against a force of 5 Chinese corps the three bases on the southern rim of the map I present should not be able to hold, especially as I know that at least one more LCU from the region has been moved to the Canton region.

I think the main effect here may be to create a bit of a diversion which may cause aztez to weaken his main assaults.

As always, thanks for your interest, and feel free to comment.

Hartwig

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< Message edited by hartwig.modrow -- 9/13/2011 12:24:52 AM >

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Post #: 61

RE: Little China map... - 9/13/2011 5:00:07 AM

Ketza

Posts: 2227
Joined: 1/14/2007
From: Columbia, Maryland
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That is a wonderful picture (err screenshot) of China.

One can only imagine that an intelligent, cultured fellow such as yourself might have some access to some rather wonderful "actual pictures". If examples of these pictures are not provided who knows where imaginations could wander off too..

That being said, imagination can be fun!

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Post #: 62

RE: Little China map... - 9/13/2011 7:41:11 AM

modrow

Posts: 1100
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Ketza,

I won't be able to match your fantastic WitE AAR layout with all those actual pictures anyway, thus I won�t even try. Btw, have you run out of pictures? There�s not too much AARing by you to be seen over there these days.

With respect to the picture you provided, German beer tastes quite well in any case. During my days as astudent I occasionally happened to notice a related effect - German beer can have the curious effect of making girls look more beautiful

.

Returning to the AAR, I have an event of your most favourite kind to report from last turn

:

Night Time Surface Combat, near Kwajalein Island at 132,115, Range 11,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
PB Shonon Maru #11, Shell hits 1, and is sunk
PB Takuna Maru #6, Shell hits 7, and is sunk
PB Takuna Maru #7, Shell hits 3, and is sunk
xAK Azuchi Maru, Shell hits 17, and is sunk
xAK Bingo Maru, Shell hits 11, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAK Chowa Maru, Shell hits 31, Torpedo hits 3, and is sunk

Allied Ships
CL Hobart

A pity your TFs are no longer around these days...

Hartwig

(in reply to Ketza)

Post #: 63

RE: Little China map... - 9/13/2011 2:27:20 PM

Ketza

Posts: 2227
Joined: 1/14/2007
From: Columbia, Maryland
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My eastern front wanderings although at times fun have become somewhat frustrating due to the ever changing aspects of WITE. The latest patch does address many flaws in the game but like the other patches it does take the wind out of the sails of ongoing games. I am down to one game that is more like WW1 with trench lines the length of the front. Rather boring and hard to make exciting even with the prettiest of pictures.

(in reply to modrow)

Post #: 64

A gentleman's way of passing the time... - 9/18/2011 1:24:45 PM

modrow

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Gentlemen,

as per popular demand, in absence of a turn a crossword puzzle�

C=column, L=line

Note that letters should be included in boxes that already hold a CX or LY or both

C1: tantivying between 390 and 487 mph
C2: important for performing military operations, optional for processing binary operations
C3: recently raided by CL Hobart in this game
C4: should be raided this turn, not possible with BB
C5: red in the east, red in the west, red on the flag
C6: swimming workshop
C7: port level required to rearm CB Alaska (no LCU around)
C8: training tool, punching bag
C9: useful bay to keep Rabaul at bay
C10: DD = home of tin � sailors
C11: most flying machines in AE feature at least one machine�
C12: reason for engines and wars to start
C13: consumable in the air war
C14: a delicate carrier (hint hint) of 250kg bombs

L1: popular alcoholic beverage, hinted at in this AAR
L2: author of a prime source relating to the air war in the pacific
L3: player 1
L4: Grounded AVG; if you are into college football think LSU
L5: fuel for our friends from the US
L6: up in the skies, down under the waves
L7: lost its bonus
L8: art of denying the enemy C2
L9: scenarios 1 and 2 qualify as�
L10: the type of support needed to reduce C7
L11: guy with five shining stars, still outshone by most AE players � or maybe not?
L12: important upgrade of C11 in order to bring bombers down

Have fun while waiting for your turn

Hartwig

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< Message edited by hartwig.modrow -- 9/18/2011 3:07:52 PM >

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Post #: 65

RE: A gentleman's way of passing the time... - 9/18/2011 2:49:17 PM

modrow

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Gentlemen,

sorry about the temporarily strange format of the embedded crossword puzzle - problem should be solved now...

Hartwig

< Message edited by hartwig.modrow -- 9/18/2011 3:06:01 PM >

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Post #: 66

RE: A gentleman's way of passing the time... - 9/18/2011 7:21:27 PM

Nemo121

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Hmm, L6 and C1 have me stumped.

L6 is AxxxxOxE
C1 is xUxTxxx

Hints?

_____________________________

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Well, that's that settled then.

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Post #: 67

RE: A gentleman's way of passing the time... - 9/18/2011 7:42:22 PM

modrow

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Nemo,

both are related to in-game objects, each to more than one - the AE in game database might help.

Further hint:

L6: Do you like tuna?

C1: derived from Spanish mestengo.

Hartwig

(in reply to Nemo121)

Post #: 68

Action update... - 9/19/2011 10:13:03 PM

modrow

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Gentlemen,

I finally received a turn from atzez today. He says that he is quite busy due to job-related issues, which is a statement I have to make frequently as well. Thus, there is some information to share, which I will do gladly.

As those of you who solved my crossword puzzle know already, there was a raid going into Rangoon, as I had finally detected some shipping activity there. These are the results of a rather one-sided battle:

Night Time Surface Combat, near Rangoon at 54,53, Range 3,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
xAK Yamadori Maru, Shell hits 13, and is sunk
xAK Yomei Maru, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 4, and is sunk
xAK Kinrei Maru, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAK Taijima Maru, Shell hits 20, and is sunk
xAK Fukko Maru, Shell hits 24, and is sunk
xAK Fukoku Maru, Shell hits 18, and is sunk
xAK Yamamiya Maru, Shell hits 18, and is sunk
xAK Oyashima Maru, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 3, and is sunk

Allied Ships
CL Danae
CL Dragon
CL Glasgow
CL Newcastle
DD Napier
DD Nestor
DD Nizam
DD Norman

There was a price to be paid for this result after all, as one of the DDs hit a mine. I think it might make it to Calcutta with 51 flotation damage, but we�ll see.

The bombardment of Rangoon that followed did not yield any results, nor did my attempts to sweep Mytkina. Oh well, I guess my ships and pilots gained some experience after all � which is a good thing.

While there was not much action elsewhere on the map, this is bound to change over the next two turns. Last turn, I had an AKL near Milne Bay that was sunk by a carrier plane on patrol and I had a corresponding sighting report of one TF which was reported to contain a CV and a BB.

When I ran this turn with a notably increased number of planes on naval search, there were not only a few attacks on merchant ships hauling supplies to PM and unloading at PM (which lead to the exchange of 5 A6M2 for 4 P39D), but it turns out that there are about 5 enemy TFs positioned 1 hex off PM. Thus, it seems like the fight for PM is about to start - a little earlier than I had hoped, but so be it. I will provide a picture... ahem, screenshot of the vicinity and say a few things about the brave defenders of PM in a future post.

As always, thanks for your interest, and feel free to comment.

Hartwig

(in reply to modrow)

Post #: 69

RE: Action update... - 9/20/2011 12:28:29 AM

Nemo121

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Do the brave defenders have a steady beer supply? I believe this is an essential constituent of any Australian defence...

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

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Post #: 70

Australian or not... - 9/20/2011 7:55:18 PM

modrow

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Nemo,

well, as I stated previously I think CMF inf squads are best used to bolster Aussie brigades at this point of time. The US units currently have more complete TOEs. Therefore, whereas there will be an Australian contribution to the defense of PM, it will not represent the majority of the defenders.

Accordingly, the relevant question for you is what the essential constituent of an American defense will be and whether it differs between marines and regular infantry.

Looks like something has changed at PM

(although aztez made his move a few days earlier than I would have liked).

More details once I have completed the turn.

Hartwig

< Message edited by hartwig.modrow -- 9/20/2011 7:56:12 PM >

(in reply to Nemo121)

Post #: 71

RE: Australian or not... - 9/20/2011 11:07:48 PM

Nemo121

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Artillery and infinite amounts of shells

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to modrow)

Post #: 72

RE: Australian or not... - 9/21/2011 9:19:17 AM

modrow

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Artillery and infinite amounts of shells

Hm. That would have been my guess for Soviet LCUs.

In any case, there is a notably increased amount of supplies at PM. We will see how long it will last. Details are still postponed though, but I sent back the turn yesterday evening, so that the next slot of time can be used to provide the promised picture... ahem screenshot.

Hartwig

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Post #: 73

Deep battle - 9/22/2011 4:09:38 PM

modrow

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Gentlemen,

I have a question for the club to discuss� I recently tried to improve my understanding of the concepts of deep battle, and would appreciate some input, including comments relating to the question to what extent it can be transferred to AE.

My impression is that it varies with the level one is looking at. On a front-size scale, I can definitely see how a multiplicity of operations could induce a failure in the enemy�s defensive system in AE as well. As a matter of fact, using multiple operations in series or parallel to divert enemy attention and induce a fatal mistake in the defensive system seems to me in some ways like a prequel to Boyd�s OODA loop.

As an aside, looking back I believe that this is where one (of many) key mistake(s) in my approach during my old game fragment vs Nemo did reside. The diversive operations that I was running (or trying to run or wanted to run) in that game were never significant, not just in size but also because they were not connected to significant secondary strategic objectives.

On the operational and especially on the battle level, though, I have more problems. Given the granularity of AEs map, is it even possible to define tactical zones?

Could, e.g., someone familiar with deep battle (e.g. Nemo) demonstrate/elaborate, e.g., how assuming that I have identified Perth (or any other place you prefer to use as an example) as a strategic target a defense in accordance with the principles of deep battle could be constructed? In theory, I think it would be required to blunt the enemy spearheads several times and provide shock forces near the target itself to achieve the destruction of the then spent enemy. But how would one implement this in-game?

Thanks in advance for your views.

Hartwig

P.S: If anyone has pointers to additional information/reading, I would be interested...

< Message edited by hartwig.modrow -- 9/22/2011 4:12:24 PM >

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Post #: 74

Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/22/2011 7:25:05 PM

modrow

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Gentlemen,

Here�s the promised picture of the PM invasion/situation (produced by combination of screenshots, thus definitely not a screenshot).

As mentioned above and illustrated in the picture, some things have changed at PM between turn one (right) and now (left). In general, this is one of the things I frequently try to achieve: a quick modification of the starting position so that a streamlined, optimized invasion force based on the perfect knowledge at the start of a scenario just won�t work. Accordingly, in case aztez should have designed his force based on the AV and TOE of what starts at PM, I might be able to hurt his efforts � at least I hope so, perhaps turn resolutions will show faulty execution.

As you know, my strategic approach aims at direct destruction of the Japanese military as such. Consequently, one question to consider at the start of the game was how this may be obtained in an early phase during which it is not easy to mount a successful offensive action in this scenario. As a matter of fact, this is what triggered my interest in deep battle illustrated by my last post. Whereas according to my interpretation(which may be wrong, I am no expert here) in general, deep battle appears to be less focused on destruction of forces on the battlefield as, e.g., Clausewitz seems to suggest (though I have to admit that Clausewitz is difficult to understand for me in spite of my German background) and may at least in relation to the offense aim at removal of the ability to conduct meaningful defensive operation, defensively it seems to demand wearing down the enemy and then induce the collapse of the attack and destruction of the attacking force (note the previous announcement of the formation of the first imperial shock army). In other words, its correct application (if it is applicable) may be an approach to enable realization of my strategy while being involved in defensive operations.

PM was a likely target, so it received a lot of my attention early on (and I invested a considerable number of PP there). It is essentially a place which I assume ultimately will be taken, but I would like to start the process of wearing down the enemy attack there, paying with assets I can replace.

As you see on the picture, AV at PM has been almost doubled, gun barrels tripled, there are more engineers. More importantly, though, an AV is not an AV. Exp and morale of the garrison used to average a little below 40 each � now they average a little above 50 and 60, respectively. And the devices that are now at PM have significantly increased firepower, especially anti-soft values compared to the original garrison. As the obtained AV ratio is determined after the exchange of fire, this should also contribute to obtaining an improved result � if nothing else with respect to the losses.

(As an aside: Do we know how the increased anti-soft value works exactly? Is it an increased probability to damage/destroy a device, or is it just an increased damage if a device is hit?)

Note that all of the above-listed factors differentiating equal AVs are hardly recognizable by way of recon; but the same number of men/units should lead to quite a different result. At the same time, by moving the Australian battalion starting at PM out before moving US squads in, I tried not only to conserve CMF INF squads and shift the losses to the more readily available US squads, but also kept the number of units recon flights might show constant for a long time. Only quite recently, unit count may have started to appear increased, so I hope that there was no reason for aztez to increase his invasion force.

Now, I told you a lot of theoretical stuff and considerations that influenced my action. All of it may be complete nonsense, feel free to tell me if you think so. The first test will be how this battle goes.

However, at the same time bear in mind what happened �when Titans clashed�. Deep battle had to be learned to become a success � and I am here trying to learn and experimenting with concepts which may or may not be useful and/or applicable.
As always, thanks for your interest, and feel free to comment (including harsh comments).

Hartwig

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RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/22/2011 11:05:40 PM

Nemo121

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Hartwig,

I'm a little unclear as to the scenario you would like described.... Are you talking about a defence vs an opponent attempting an offensive utilising deep battle concepts OR are you asking how one might implement deep battle concepts in your own offensive?

As to who to read:
1. Tukhachevsky.
2. Development of Soviet Military Art 1939 to 1945.
3. Soviet doctrine from the 60s and 70s.

English writing: I've always been partial to Simpkin myself but you may find it difficult to find anything still in print. House is good and more penetrable than Glantz.

< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 9/22/2011 11:07:47 PM >

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

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Post #: 76

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/23/2011 5:14:08 AM

Wirraway_Ace

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It has been 20 years since I last tried to write on this topic--the role of Deep Battle in the defence.

I always caution people that the Soviet writings on deep battle were elegant, compelling, but never practiced.

Instead I find the German Uboat campaign against the US East Coast in 42 and the Pearl Harbor attack as good examples of attacking the enemy throughout his operational and strategic depth in order to disrupt his ability mass against you. Against more evenly matched opponents, both operations might have been decisive.

The only deep battle campaign of WW2 that was arguably both decisive and cost effective was the US submarine campaign against Japan.

In game, submarines are certainly a key deep battle weapon, but a one dimensional offense is easily thwarted. Carrier strikes are an option against forward bases in the enemy's operational depth, but the risk has to be carefully accessed to these strategic assets. Surface TFs of cruisers and destroyers can make very effective deep attacks, penetrating through airsearch gaps and striking at logistics hubs with moderate risk. That being said, the long range 4-engine bombers are the Allies' primary deep battle weapon (along with the submarine). Massed 4Es can strike forward air, naval and ground troop concentrations, making it more difficult for the enemy to mass, contributing to earlier culmination. Protect these assets, train them, and employ them only in mass.

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Post #: 77

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/23/2011 9:54:26 AM

Nemo121

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Well I suppose it all depends on how deep you talk about being deep ;-).

One could argue that for the submarine war the depth was the entire Atlantic ( or Pacific ) Ocean while for ground combat different scales have to be used. One could argue that Normandy and Arnhem had some elements of deep battle in terms of the use of the air power to paralyse German movements and an attempt on several occasions to break through the enemy's operational depth into their strategic depth ( one cannot count the British offensives in Normandy as deep battle efforts since their goals were only ever really at the low-operational end of the scale ) but some of the American attacks in Normandy ( including the one leading to Falaise ) and Market-Garden were attempts ( often ill-conceived ) to get some breakthrough into the strategic depth.

That's one of the problems with the Pacific - there's a mix of scales.... With that said once Hartwig replies I'll give it a stab.

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

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Post #: 78

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/23/2011 2:36:23 PM

Wirraway_Ace

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Well I suppose it all depends on how deep you talk about being deep ;-).

One could argue that for the submarine war the depth was the entire Atlantic ( or Pacific ) Ocean while for ground combat different scales have to be used. <I very much agree; however, the campaign off the East Coast was about as deep as the war could be taken to the US and illustrated the stengths and weaknesses of the German U boat arm to take the war to the enemies shores> One could argue that Normandy and Arnhem had some elements of deep battle in terms of the use of the air power to paralyse German movements and an attempt on several occasions to break through the enemy's operational depth into their strategic depth <Absolutely, Market Garden is a case study in the risk of deep battle> ( one cannot count the British offensives in Normandy as deep battle efforts since their goals were only ever really at the low-operational end of the scale ) but some of the American attacks in Normandy ( including the one leading to Falaise ) and Market-Garden were attempts ( often ill-conceived ) to get some breakthrough into the strategic depth. <The planning and execution conundrum of deep battle: one must penetrate into the enemy's strategic depth to conduct it, while its purpose is to allow your forces to penetrate into the enemy's strategic depth. The Soviets intended to solve this issue on land with long range tube, rocket and missile artillery>

That's one of the problems with the Pacific - there's a mix of scales.... With that said once Hartwig replies I'll give it a stab.

Very interested in your take.

Mike

(in reply to Nemo121)

Post #: 79

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/23/2011 3:26:07 PM

modrow

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Nemo, Wirraway Ace

first of all, thanks for picking up the subject. Always good to have some experts around ;)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Hartwig,

I'm a little unclear as to the scenario you would like described.... Are you talking about a defence vs an opponent attempting an offensive utilising deep battle concepts OR are you asking how one might implement deep battle concepts in your own offensive?

I generally struggle to understand how a tactical implementation of deep battle may be ported to AE. How to defend against an opponent using this concept is certainly an interesting question, but right now I am asking how to implement deep battle concepts myself on the tactical level (higher level application appears more clear to me) in the game. If I understand things correctly, this is not limited to offensive implementation, but also to defensive implementation. I assume I would need a holding group forward of several main defensive line(s) and a shock group. But is the granularity of AE's map sufficiently small to allow for thinking in these terms at all (Would the WitE map be?)?

The problem is similar in offensive use as well, so if you prefer to elaborate on that, I will probably help my understanding as well. I just referred to defense because it may be more directly applicable.

quote:

As to who to read:
1. Tukhachevsky.
2. Development of Soviet Military Art 1939 to 1945.
3. Soviet doctrine from the 60s and 70s.

English writing: I've always been partial to Simpkin myself but you may find it difficult to find anything still in print. House is good and more penetrable than Glantz.

In general, a problem seems to be accessibility (apart from Glantz). Probably better than Isserson's "Fundamentals...", but apparently still out of reach...

Do you have an opinion on R.W.Harrison?

But now, I'll settle in my comfortable chair and start looking forward to your stab at the response.

Hartwig

< Message edited by hartwig.modrow -- 9/23/2011 3:29:11 PM >

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Post #: 80

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/23/2011 6:50:36 PM

Wirraway_Ace

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Simpkin is still findable, but at a premium price. I have never read Harrison's book on Isserson.

I read some papers published by Glantz while I was being trained as staff officer. I was not a fan of those writings at the time, but I have recently picked up his books on the Manchuria Campaign which came recommended by some exceptionally well read Forum members.

I am very interested in what Nemo comes up with. It may indeed take a brain of a psychiatrist to apply Tukhachevsky well to deep operations in the Pacific Theater.

Mike

(in reply to modrow)

Post #: 81

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/23/2011 7:56:00 PM

Nemo121

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I've had a think about this today and I think it is really a multi-post answer. I think I'd have to explain the development of Deep Battle, the theoretical underpinnings and then how it worked in practice before moving it from the Ostfront to the Pacific. Also I'd caution that deep battle in 1942 is a very different thing than deep battle in January 1945 due to the advances on the technical/tactical axis.

One other thing: Alfred's thread on good players and my concept of also nominating sensei ( those who are worth listening to when discussing various levels ) made me think about how many good posts discussions are lost as AARs drift down the page. I was wondering if you'd mind me starting a thread to post the answer with a view to acting as a repository for good questions and answers. Since it would deal with discussion of AARs it could fit in the AAR section as there is precedence.

What do you think? I'm a bit leery of writing long replies and having them lost forever just a week later only to have the same thing pop up 6 months later and there being no way to find the original posts.

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Wirraway_Ace)

Post #: 82

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/23/2011 9:16:18 PM

modrow

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Nemo,

I would have assumed there would be no more fitting place than the armchair strategist's club for such a discussion, but if you prefer starting a separate thread, just go ahead and do so.

I should add, though, that I saw the thread Alfred started and your contribution to it. As a matter of fact, when the discussion shifted to possible matches I was close to add my dream 2x2 combination (Alfred and Hortlund vs jrcar and you), but refrained in the end from doing so because I think that everyone should find out for himself who is worth listening to. The material to find out is readily available in these forums.

But apart from that aside, feel free to post wherever you wish.

Hartwig

(in reply to Nemo121)

Post #: 83

RE: Little China map... - 9/24/2011 2:19:22 AM

racndoc

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Wirraway_Ace....would you consider Patton's breakout and pursuit with 3rd Army......after 1st Army punched a hole in the German 7th Army's line in Operation Cobra....a good example of the American version of Deep Battle? How about the US XVIII Airborne Corps penetration into Iraq during Operation Desert Storm?

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Post #: 84

RE: Strategic musings continued - 9/24/2011 3:11:42 AM

desicat

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Joined: 5/25/2008
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Alfred, Not that you need any praise from someone like myself but the two quotes I stole from you posted below are quite insightful.

quote:

You were quite correct to say in post #8 that on the AE forums, much which passes for discussion as strategy is really at best only tactcs only some of it being truly operational planning in nature. Eventually Nemo will discover this AAR and probably comment as strategic matters greatly interest him. If you ran an AE poll, I have no doubt that he would be voted overwhelmingly as the best AE game strategist. That would be a result I would not quibble with except for one point, albeit in my view very critical. Most of Nemo's writings deal with and his great game results demonstrate, his superior operational planning rather than strategic insights. As I said in post #12 operational planning is really tactics. It is however useful to assess his operational plans against others to ascertain why his level of success is not generally replicated by others.

Nemo's operational pre-planning is meticulous, but then so is other players' operational planning. It is very much mated to logistical considerations, an area which very few other players match to the same degree. His operational planning focusses on optimal objectives which are pursued ruthlessly. Too many other players direct their operational planning towards sub-optimal objectives and are diffident in their execution. Above all else, what distinguishes Nemo's operational planning and play from the maority of AE players is that it is always truly subordinated to and consistent with his grand strategy. At this point i would remind you again of what i said in post #12.

Strategy is the plan to bring victory. Tactics is the means adopted to implement the adopted strategy.

Nemo may very well dispute my assessment but I believe that he would agree that compared to the real world, the freedom to formulate and pursue various grand strategy options in AE is limited. At it's centre, the game is much more about operational planning. To me, his games have limited variation in strategy (a function of the game's limits) but considerable variety in operational play. His operational play is so closely tied to his grand strategy, that it is easy for others to mistake one for the other.
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One needs to be aware that real world strategy and game strategy is not the same thing. the same definition for one will not be adequate for the other. Partly this because a geopolitical/military game is always an abstraction of the real world. In a game, one simply does not have available all the tools (tactics) available in real life. The pressures of the real world are also not present in a game.

I agree that much of what is discussed as strategy is in fact a tactical discussion that may fringe on the operational level. I will disagree that Nemo dabbles mostly in the Operational realm.

I would argue that Grand Strategy does play a major impact on the efforts put forth by upper level players due to the numerous theaters that players can conduct operational campaigns in. To conduct sequential campaigns in separate theaters requires the prioritizing of logistical assets to project the kind of combat power that allows for sequential tactical encounters. This is one area that separates players by skill level, can they capitalize on a tactical victory and turn it into a series of sequential tactical victories (a campaign).

Many Japanese players start with a plan and stray from it as seemingly great tactical victories drag their forces from place to place, they seek to extend the execution of maintaining the initiative. It takes great discipline to stay on task when juicy targets present themselves, and a good grand strategy driving an operational campaign in the chosen theater of operations is the secret to success. Nemo seems to me to set a strategy and then do the logistical groundwork to ensure the opportunity for success. In the course of his AAR's you can read how he notes his opponents changing their plans based on tactical events...much to their later regret. I would argue that Nemo's ability to conduct multiple campaigns in separate theaters demonstrates his use of strategic planning to drive his operational efforts.

(In the battle(s) of the Wilderness Lee tried to derail Grant's campaign plan via a series battles that the South could claim as tactical "victories". Grant ignored the tactical setbacks and resultant casualties and used his superior logistics and manpower to complete an Operational level victory by staying on task. Grants grand strategy was decisive and it could be presented to Lincoln logically so he could understand and accept the huge tactical losses.)

I too agree that the game allows players to execute strategies that would be impossible in a political environment. A "Brave Sir Robin" would bring about a political collapse of one or more Allied governments and would potentially persuade theater "Allied" countries to go over to the seemingly victorious Japanese. The Japanese proved IRL that brutal losses in personnel and military assets could be sustained and not bring down the ruling government, I doubt the Allies had the same luxury (hence the atomic bomb). Many Allied players win victories at a far greater cost than would be remotely acceptable IRL, not having the option to sustain fearsome losses would cause a huge change in the way the Allies are currently played.

< Message edited by desicat -- 9/24/2011 3:23:24 AM >

(in reply to Alfred)

Post #: 85

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/24/2011 3:48:08 AM

desicat

Posts: 542
Joined: 5/25/2008
Status: offline

quote:

It has been 20 years since I last tried to write on this topic--the role of Deep Battle in the defence.

I always caution people that the Soviet writings on deep battle were elegant, compelling, but never practiced.

Instead I find the German Uboat campaign against the US East Coast in 42 and the Pearl Harbor attack as good examples of attacking the enemy throughout his operational and strategic depth in order to disrupt his ability mass against you. Against more evenly matched opponents, both operations might have been decisive.

The only deep battle campaign of WW2 that was arguably both decisive and cost effective was the US submarine campaign against Japan.

In game, submarines are certainly a key deep battle weapon, but a one dimensional offense is easily thwarted. Carrier strikes are an option against forward bases in the enemy's operational depth, but the risk has to be carefully accessed to these strategic assets. Surface TFs of cruisers and destroyers can make very effective deep attacks, penetrating through airsearch gaps and striking at logistics hubs with moderate risk. That being said, the long range 4-engine bombers are the Allies' primary deep battle weapon (along with the submarine). Massed 4Es can strike forward air, naval and ground troop concentrations, making it more difficult for the enemy to mass, contributing to earlier culmination. Protect these assets, train them, and employ them only in mass.

Interesting, I would classify the German (and American) submarine campaigns as economic warfare attempting to collapse the enemy economy at the strategic level. This same thought process could apply to the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. (The collateral attritional damage to German fighter aircraft and pilots would actually qualify as an operational deep battle effect if it had in fact been a planned activity instead of a by product.)

Ironically the Japanese attempted use of their submarines to strike at US Capital ships could be argued as an attempt at "deep battle" at an Operational level. I think Nemo's example or Arhnem or the US WW III Fulda Gap war plan would be plans attempting tactical deep battle.

(in reply to Wirraway_Ace)

Post #: 86

RE: Little China map... - 9/24/2011 4:28:11 AM

Wirraway_Ace

Posts: 1400
Joined: 10/8/2007
From: Austin / Brisbane
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: AdmSpruance

Wirraway_Ace....would you consider Patton's breakout and pursuit with 3rd Army......after 1st Army punched a hole in the German 7th Army's line in Operation Cobra....a good example of the American version of Deep Battle? How about the US XVIII Airborne Corps penetration into Iraq during Operation Desert Storm?

AdmSpruance,

I agree these are both good examples, however with some differences as you might expect. The 3rd Army's breakout and pursuit was similiar to German concepts of blitzkreig and the schwerpunkt. XVIII Airborne Corps was manuever against an exposed flank into the enemy's operational depth. Air Supremacy in both cases greatly contributed to deep operations which disrupted the enemy's ability to mass reserves against the rapidly moving spearheads of mechanized forces. These deep operations, fighterbombers for Patton, fixed wing and rotary wing attacks and air assualts ahead of McCaffrey's rapidly moving tanks in the case of XVIII Airborne Corps were critical to the overall operational success of these campaigns.

(in reply to racndoc)

Post #: 87

RE: Thoughts on the eve before battle - 9/24/2011 4:49:22 AM

Wirraway_Ace

Posts: 1400
Joined: 10/8/2007
From: Austin / Brisbane
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: desicat

Interesting, I would classify the German (and American) submarine campaigns as economic warfare attempting to collapse the enemy economy at the strategic level. This same thought process could apply to the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. (The collateral attritional damage to German fighter aircraft and pilots would actually qualify as an operational deep battle effect if it had in fact been a planned activity instead of a by product.)

Ironically the Japanese attempted use of their submarines to strike at US Capital ships could be argued as an attempt at "deep battle" at an Operational level. I think Nemo's example or Arhnem or the US WW III Fulda Gap war plan would be plans attempting tactical deep battle.

desicat, I would say it a little differently. The warmaking potential of the enemy is a strategic target. The submarine campaigns were operational and tactical plans to attack that target. They were, I would argue, classic examples of deep operations in the enemies strategic depth to disrupt movement of resources, but also movement of troops, supplies and fuel with the intent to cause the enemies offensive operations to culminate. Later, the sub campaign in the Pacific would severly limit the Japanese ability to effectively mass against US Amphib operations. The subs in the DEI did significant damage to the Japanese fleet as it left Palembang, before it could ever come to grips with the US forces at Leyte.

Another aspect of deep operations, or the threat of them, is to draw off enemy combat power from the decisive point. Sometimes pinning reserves or simply reducing available enemy combat power through economy of force operations. Subs are ideal for this in terms of naval combat power.

Japanese sub operations were certainly a type of deep battle, but their objective was possibly poorly chosen.

All this being said, one must consider the available weapon systems, the targets and the timing of deep operations, in conjunction with a deception plan, as part of the overall operation at the theater or front level. I see many players who conduct very skillful deep operations that are not supporting a major operation intent on defeating the enemy in his tactical and operational depth. These are but pin-****s.

< Message edited by Wirraway_Ace -- 9/24/2011 5:05:52 AM >

(in reply to desicat)

Post #: 88

RE: Australian or not... - 9/24/2011 6:41:02 AM

Alfred

Posts: 6685
Joined: 9/28/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: hartwig.modrow

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Artillery and infinite amounts of shells

Hm. That would have been my guess for Soviet LCUs.

In any case, there is a notably increased amount of supplies at PM. We will see how long it will last. Details are still postponed though, but I sent back the turn yesterday evening, so that the next slot of time can be used to provide the promised picture... ahem screenshot.

Hartwig

Surely for American GIs, the requisite commodities were:

(a) Coca Cola

(b) Chewing gum

(c) for bartering with the local population subsequently when on R & R, nylons and chocolate

Alfred

(in reply to modrow)

Post #: 89

RE: Strategic musings continued - 9/24/2011 6:50:52 AM

Alfred

Posts: 6685
Joined: 9/28/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: desicat

Alfred, ... the two quotes I stole from you posted below are quite insightful...

Insightful about:

(a) moi

(b) assessment of Nemo's style

(c) how AE is generally played

(d) the fundamental issue raised by hartwig

You do realise that sitting in those big comfy red chesterfields at the club, having imbibed an appropriate beverage, one can say almost anything and the club members will just nod their sage acquiesence to anything said which is half coherent.

Now where has that club attendant gone with the cognac.