Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

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All this being said, one must consider the available weapon systems, the targets and the timing of deep operations, in conjunction with a deception plan, as part of the overall operation at the theater or front level. I see many players who conduct very skillful deep operations that are not supporting a major operation intent on defeating the enemy in his tactical and operational depth. These are but pin-****s.

I think where you state that "the timing of deep operations" is where I make my differentiation between Strategic and Deep battle. The U-boats in the Pacific, US subs in the Pacific, and strategic bombing in Europe and Japan were all open ended time wise - when the enemies economies or war production capacity collapsed the effect would have been achieved. I would think these are examples of Strategic Warfare.

Deep battle to me would have a specific time frame attached to it and be part of a expanding upon a tactical victory to enable sequential follow on tactical events. An example would be using air power to enable a breakout and pocket creation (blitzkrieg) or denying an enemy the ability to bring in reinforcements or supply - isolating defensive forces for piecemeal destruction (Gulf War I and the plan for Cobra).

(in reply to Wirraway_Ace)

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ORIGINAL: Alfred

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ORIGINAL: desicat

Alfred, ... the two quotes I stole from you posted below are quite insightful...

Insightful about:

(a) moi

(b) assessment of Nemo's style

(c) how AE is generally played

(d) the fundamental issue raised by hartwig

You do realise that sitting in those big comfy red chesterfields at the club, having imbibed an appropriate beverage, one can say almost anything and the club members will just nod their sage acquiesence to anything said which is half coherent.


Now where has that club attendant gone with the cognac.

Alfred

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ORIGINAL: hartwig.modrow

Gentlemen,

thanks for the manifold of interesting contributions. However, what struck me as strange when reading them is that we actually don't find any mention of a Soviet operation for a Soviet doctrine. This makes me a bit wary whether we are currently discussing based on a sufficiently precise definition of deep battle (which was developed in the framework of a national situation). Not every approach striving to achieve deep penetration in order to wreak havoc in the rear classifies as deep battle, and concepts like Blitzkrieg (even though this does most likely not even qualify as a doctrine) or the combined arms approach.

So perhaps it would be useful to define what is the characteristic of deep battle are and how they distinguish deep battle from other approaches. Any takers?

Thanks for your interest

Hartwig

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Bah, there's no point discussing things out there. It just turns into a nightmare of people questioning motives and justifying why they shouldn't intervene when someone gets attacked. I tell you, I could do with some good alcohol right now though

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Well that and an unscrupulous hitman ;-). That might solve quite a few more of my problems.

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ORIGINAL: desicat

One quick point on Blitzkrieg vs Soviet Deep Battle. Blitzkrieg has been described as water flowing around and behind rock, seeking the path of least resistance to create a pocket. Deep Battle, using the same analogy, is like cutting a channel through rock to direct water to an intended destination.

Thoughts on this simple analogy?

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ORIGINAL: desicat

One quick point on Blitzkrieg vs Soviet Deep Battle. Blitzkrieg has been described as water flowing around and behind rock, seeking the path of least resistance to create a pocket. Deep Battle, using the same analogy, is like cutting a channel through rock to direct water to an intended destination.

Thoughts on this simple analogy?

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ORIGINAL: desicat

I was trying for a shorthand analogy to generate discussion, but let me clarify. Blitzkrieg is/was not a doctrine, Deep Battle is. The Germans trained with the Russians during the interwar period and gained a lot of the experience with tanks during military exchanges.

The Germans would push for a breakthrough and then use armor and close air support to exploit the situation and create a pocket. Follow-on infantry would then finish the job.

Soviet Deep Battle was designed to force a breakthrough, with combat units assigned for follow on targets behind the initial line. Artillery, air power, and mechanized formations had specific targets and assignments behind the initial battle line in an attempt to cause a battle advance like a line of dominoes - when the first fell it would set off a chain reaction further down the line. In practice it would be on a much larger scale than Blitzkrieg and be much more planned in execution. The doctrine took advantage of Soviet Officer rigidity and their mindset to follow orders while the Germans allowed their commanders much more flexibility.

Wirraway - I don't see where we disagree. The Soviets did create broad pressure and once a beech was created they filled it with units attempting to execute scripted orders. Soviet commanders had (or exercised) very little tactical flexibility. The Germans capitalized on this lack of flexibility by establishing mobile reaction units behind their front lines to counter scripted Soviet penetrations.

Fcharton - When I mentioned cutting a channel I meant the use of brute force to cause the initial breakthrough. As for a long battle line it isn't required, read the OMFTS pamphlet that I linked in post #95, it should only take a few minutes. No long established battle lines envisioned there, just a deep strike and falling dominoes not allowing the enemy an opportunity to fix the front.

Nemo, I would argue that Soviet command and control technological limitations combined with officer rigidity prevented them from ever truly fully exploiting their Deep Battle doctrine. The had many successful operations, but they almost all failed to meet their assigned operational objectives to achieve a true knockout blow. The closest they came IMHO was at Stalingrad where they collapsed the German allied line and trapped Paulus. If Paulus had decided to break out instead of hunkering down Soviet Deep Battle goals may have gone unachieved here as well. Note I'm not minimizing Soviet operational victories and encirclements, I'm just stating that they mostly failed to achieve their total deep battle victories.

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ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Bagration is the acme. Showing at least two Strategic Directions in action co-ordinating multiple offensives by Fronts designed to:
a) disrupt the German ability to commit their strategic reserves decisively and
b) attrit those reserves so that, eventually, they'd get a breakthrough.

Manchuria is a good example but always suffers because of the - "Ah but they faced the Japanese" factor. Bagration is a great example. The drive into southern Europe is another excellent example ( although perhaps not so apparent from a military perspective I believe it is an excellent example of the long-term nature of operations along Strategic Directions ) in which the need to co-ordinate with political national policy objective goals in pursuit of the much greater goal ( creating a suitable strategic position from which to prosecute the struggle against Capitalist Imperialism once the Fascists were defeated ) was also folded into the military plan. In a very real sense these military offensives in Winter 1944 which in the Western view were the end of the matter merely formed the opening phase of the Soviet drive to flip south-eastern Europe which continued at great pace until 1949 when the KKE was, to all intents, defeated and further action along the Southern Strategic Direction was relegated to guerilla actions designed to destabilise ( but not overthrow ) governments.

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus