sandman455
Posts: 209
Joined: 7/5/2011 From: 20 yrs ago - SDO -> med down, w/BC glasses on Status: offline
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: Jaroen @sandman455: class dismissed! I just love source material! I will try to get through all your sources but I'm still on Matthew Rodman's book which I thought to be the best by far. I'm through 45 pages and he has been doing nothing but supporting my post. Although he is trying hard to muddying the water by using unsupported references and conclusions. Some examples: Page 32-33 - He outlines the low vs skip bombing tactic, and on page 33 he give a story of pilots doing low level bombing at dawn. They bombed stationary targets in Rabaul. They hit 2 merchants and a destroyer at dawn using a "20 second run straight and level" after breaking out of "weather at 2500 feet." Results were "fantastic" but as far as I can tell they only did minor damage to the Tenryu - 17 days to fix in Rabaul. I couldn't find any other IJN ship with damaged that day. None of the targets were named. No matter. . . They didn't skip bomb and the 4E's used the very things I stated must be present for them to hit targets down low and survive. Page 34 - He's got two NIGHT missions on ships in port at Rabaul used to support his "low-altitude and skip bombing" success. End of discussion as far as I'm concerned. Because clearly they would have had more accuracy if they attacked DURING THE DAY. I think we all know why it was done at night. Also, he is pulling quotes from the book "Skip Bombing" which are not sustantiated by any IJN or USN loss list. I couldn't even find a record of them damaging anything on 23 October 1942. He's got sinkings on 15 November 1942, yet they aren't listed in any of the sources I checked. And of course they are unnamed which is fine for hits, but you start claiming sunks - the USN will document it and there is no excuse for not naming the ships sunk. Doing this kind of stuff really detracts from what he is trying to convey which is good stuff, but if it's not generating results please say so - otherwise he's leading the reader to false conclusions which is what I think he's trying to do. For instance: He references the Admiral Scheer's attack by 2E's on the first day of the war as the first "decisive use" of skip bombing tactics. Here are the "decisive" results: First 5 Blenheims attack an unalerted German CA Scheer - 1 aircraft shot down, 3 hits but all bombs failed to arm. Yes, its hard to miss when you are that low. Just ask a Uboat crew. Second group of five aircraft moments later (AA crews were ready) - 4 of 5 Blenheim's were shot down. No hits. Scheer was undamaged and it was stationary. 50% loss rate of aircraft on a totally surprised vessel on the very first day of the war. "Decisive" was the word he used. I'm detecting a little bias here. But hey there was still a useful quote for me to use in those first 40 pages: "After all, a single lumbering B17 just a few hundred feet above the water made an easy target for antiaircraft fire." Can't argue with that at all. And as for your Uboat reference - its the exact one I used. I think you need to examine the data for what it is. Uboats shot down a confirmed 120 aircraft thru May 1943. They were specifically ordered not to stay up after that. Adm Donitz actions tell it better than I ever could. He was briefly convinced that his boats had a chance because a few (most Uboats dove everytime) of his crews reported having plenty of success against 4E's. He thought wrong only because the playing field changed in a matter of 24-48 hours. The 4E's saw the new tactic and wisely changed theirs. It is noteworthy to me at least, that the 4E's new tactics pointed out in my post, mirror what is outlined in diagrams in Matthew Rodman's book (pg 110).
_____________________________
Gary S (USN 1320, 1985-1993) AOCS 1985, VT10 1985-86, VT86 1986, VS41 1986-87 VS32 1987-90 (NSO/NWTO, deployed w/CV-66, CVN-71) VS27 1990-91 (NATOPS/Safety) SFWSLANT 1991-93 (AGM-84 All platforms, S-3 A/B systems)
|