el cid again
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AE Japanese Logistical Limits
A serious student of WW2 history, and play-tester, has objected that AE permits IJA far too much capability in logistical terms. Specifically, he is upset that it is possible to conduct an offensive in China at the same time that is possible to launch operations in the SRA, and sometimes, far into the Indian Ocean. His position is somewhat supported by historians who argue that the “limit of practical reach” for Imperial forces was approximately Rabaul – and that any effort beyond that point was doomed to failure.
These objections are well intended, but surely incorrect. Further, within its limits, both the WITP and the WITP/AE engine is remarkably good at logistical calculations. Players CAN over-extend themselves, or not, and the engine makes it apparent when and if that occurs? While stock scenarios have numbers of problems in detail – this was because the time it would take to do microscopic development was cost prohibitive. If you do take the time to research all historically and economically important locations, it is possible to make a reasonable model of the logistical potential of the campaign area. If you also model the actual cost to lift of ground units (so that pack units are harder to lift than draft units, and draft units are harder to lift than motorized units), and add most of the missing ships, it is possible to turn AE into a remarkably good logistical computer. You will constantly find yourself forced to make realistic trade off decisions: yes, we can lift those units and supply them over that distance, but ONLY IF we FAIL to import the resources required to maintain production. We can STILL do it IF the stocks are high enough, but we SHOULD be increasing stocks rather than depleting them – so there WILL BE a down side medium term if we do not.
It would, in theory, have been better to have made “supplies” more complicated. In particular, ammunition and a re-defined “fuel” should be separate from general supplies. Pack and draft units, and many static units, need no fuel at all. Motorized units need it. Ammunition is not consumed at all except in combat – but then it rises to as much as 90% of consumption. General supplies are needed all the time by all units, but are relatively constant. Fuel should really be what logisticians call POL, and should include vehicle, aircraft and ship fuels, and some industrial fuels. Ammo, on the other hand, does not come from LI or even HI Centers – it comes from Munitions Plants. Just as weapons do. This would permit even better logistical modeling. Never mind, the as designed system still works surprisingly well. The main problem is that a “supply point” is too flexible – you always have what you need until you run completely out – and combat does not run you out of ammunition even though you still have large stocks of other things – as it should.
Now let us consider the case of IJA strategy and distant operations in logistical terms. By that I mean substantially the ability to perform operations in terms of stocks of weapons, supplies/munitions, and the ability to move and support units with sealift. The best historical indicator of the logistical potential of Japan is what it really was able to field, recognizing that it never controlled the entire area, and that it suffered a great deal of damage to places it did control. Japan starts with the largest army in the area (neglecting Soviet forces that never left ETO). It still has the largest army at the end of the war. And it fields millions of men in Axis allied forces as well. While production does increase during the war, much of the material and ordnance required is either very old (some of it pre-dating WWI), or of foreign origin (counting Chinese manufactured as foreign to Japan). Nor was Japan very efficient in production or organization: the actual limit of what Japan might have produced is larger than what it did produce.
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The source of logistical material is industrial production. Japan controls several over-developed industrial centers in the Home Islands which require massive imports of resources and some petroleum to function. It also controls numbers of smaller industrial centers in Manchukuo, Korea, Northern China and the Home Islands, many (but not all) of which require imports to remain productive.
The foundation for industrial production is raw materials – resources and oil in game terms. This may either come from owned or captured resource centers or oilfields, or from stockpiles. The war essentially is fought because the USA, Britain and the NEI embargoed imports to Japan in an attempt to force Japan to end its war in China. Japan was not only unwilling to end the war in China, after five years and significant casualties – it also was unwilling to establish the precedent that the Western powers could dictate its policy (by embargo) any time they wanted, over any issue. It also had stockpiled significant amounts of what it would need if isolated. In terms of oil, Japan had what it believed was an 18 month supply at the time the embargo began, which was July, 1941. [It really consumed more than it expected to, so the clock had somewhat less time on it.] Stockpiles of resources were not as great, but the potential to import them was much greater. In fact, Japan did not work many of the mines it captured. According to Parillo, author of The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II, the amount of oil in the SRA was vastly greater than Japan needed. The situation was similar, if not quite identical, with respect to other materials. Most of the world’s tin was in NEI, and Japan could not use even 10% of production. Other materials had far lower proportions, so the % Japan needed to import was greater – but there was generally far more than required.
The critical link between industrial production and resources was shipping. Japan not only had to capture sources of resources and oil, it had to move them to the industrial centers that needed them. Most difficult were the centers in Japan which had to be fed by sea, vulnerable to submarine and mine warfare. More difficult still was allocation of shipping. Although it IS more efficient to import from East Asia and the SRA than from North America, Japan and Europe – Japan was renting a million tons of foreign shipping in peacetime it could not use during the war. [Partially mitigating that is 300,000 tons captured in the first few months – shipping generally not in AE because there is no mechanism permitting a ship to “change sides” during the game.] But management of shipping is the real strategic organizational challenge facing both the historical Japanese strategists and the game players. Japan in history did not do this very well (see Parillo). That means that what a better managed Japan in terms of shipping allocation would actually be able to produce more than historical Japan did. And the game does a very good job of modeling this. In RHS test 9A, Axis players managed to virtually shut down HI production in Japan in six months – due to over-allocation of ships to offensive operations in Australia and Ceylon (simultaneously!).
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The key to success for Japan is moderation and using what it has well – as in most things. There is a reason for colonial exploitation of China as well as of all of the SRA except Thailand (the only country to maintain independence entirely). That reason is there is a lot of resources and/or oil to exploit, and even distant countries found it economic to exploit them. It is much more efficient (in terms of shipping efficiency) for Japan to exploit these same resources, because it is closer. And the resources available generally are vastly more than what Japan requires, even if it manages to achieve a near optimum war economy. [Above all that means that industry never shuts down for lack of the resources it needs to produce every day.] The problem is NOT “are there enough resources to meet Japan’s needs?” It is “can Japan move those resources from where they are to where they need them?” In absolute terms, the answer is “no” – Japan ALWAYS has some centers unable to produce for lack of something. Japanese players are constantly allocating shipping – or changing “stockpile settings” at locations – to bring places unable to produce back on line. Real production, as IRL, is always less than theoretical production. But the greatest extent of this problem is due to a failure to allocate enough shipping, in time, because either it was needed to move military units or supplies for them, or because it was too dangerous to use the ships in a given area at the present time. In this sense, AE is a gigantic logistical computer model, constantly calculating the impacts of player decisions.
One of the best ways to optimize Japanese power projection is approach WW2 in the same way Japan approached “The Short, Victorious War” (the Russo-Japanese War) which put Japan on the map as a major power. That means Japan needs a plan – not just to start the war – but also to end it when it reaches the limits of its offensive power. In the former war, Japan sued for peace just after it committed the last reserves (the 55 year olds) to win the Battle of Mukden. Going with “the facts on the ground” at that point was optimum for Japan. Broadly, Japanese militarists were aware of this in 1941: they knew they could not win a long war. But, apart from the idea of neutralizing the United States Fleet during the period of initial expansion, and capturing the SRA to create an autarky – there was no actual plan of what to do – even had that succeeded. The Battle of Midway might be said to be the ultimate expression of “naval war without a proper plan.” [Admiral Morison in the official US Naval history claims they violated “every one of the laws of war” in this battle!] As well, the IJA forces initially committed to the SRA were a tiny fraction of those available – and those eventually committed to the area. IJA eventually sent most of the experienced troops and most of the weapons of its strongest theater – the Kwangtung Army – into the fighting areas. It also had sufficient stock of rifles, mortars and other arms to form vast numbers of infantry formations later in the war – mainly to secure the Home Islands or other areas not near a battlefront. Players need not make these mistakes. Japan can commit the forces it has early and in numbers to areas where they matter to achieve strategic goals. And in AE, and especially in RHS, they can have a plan to end the war using the auto-victory rule. AE code nominally conducts a test on the first day of 1943 to see if the Victory Point ratio is 4:1. RHS says ANY day a 4:1 ratio is achieved is auto victory – doing so before 1943 is just as good as on January 1. This is a high bar, but probably not impossible.
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Consider China. Eventually IJA conducts operation Ichi-Go – due to the threat of B-29 bases in country. That threat is real in game terms too – and need not wait for the B-29 to be a problem. China is thus a two edged sword – captured it generates supplies and resources for Japan – uncaptured it represents a potential significant enemy base for operations against Japan. Japan has a significant Army in country and even larger military forces in Manchukuo and Korea which need not move by sea to reach China. In 1942 the chances of a Soviet offensive are essentially nil. While a prudent garrison should be maintained, there is no reason not to transfer the forces (which actually were transferred in 1943 and 1944) in 1942. As well, there are significant forces in the Home Islands. Again, the chances of an Allied invasion in 1942 are essentially nil. Again, a prudent garrison should be maintained, but all experienced and high quality units (except where restricted to Japan by the scenario designer) are available to send to China or the SRA. The IJA is much larger than the US Army and US Marines. What good is that advantage it is isn’t exploited? And why wait to exploit it until later in the war, when the qualitative edge of veteran troops is less in addition to facing larger numbers of enemy soldiers as well as vastly larger and better air and naval forces? A Japanese offensive needs to strive for victory in 1942. And in logistic terms, this is much more feasible in China than in much of the Pacific. The Pacific is a logistical desert – producing very little. China is able to produce more than the troops require – it also is a source of exports useful (after a short over-water trip) to the Home Islands – much more efficient than long-distance sources are. On top of these considerations, remember that the Pacific War is ABOUT China to begin with. Except the US, UK and NEI wanted to force Japan to end its war in China (which began in 1937 – when such an effort might have succeeded – and when Japan had not yet suffered large losses making defeat “unthinkable”) – except for the Allied ultimatum and embargo, Japan would not have embarked on the conquest of the SRA at all in 1942. Except for the need to isolate China, Japan might not have invaded Burma at all – is only other utility is as a Western buffer from the “threat” posed by Allied armies in India. [Allied players know India is not a threat in 1942 – it has too few ground units and almost no air force or navy.] Thailand – particularly a neutral Thailand – might serve as a cheaper buffer. The occupation of Indochina – which led directly to the embargo – also was because Japan wanted to isolate China. What is the point of going to war, rather than getting out of China as the Western powers demanded, only to then put it on back burner and not go for a win there? Particularly if a win is possible quickly – releasing forces for other operations.
It is probably impractical to conquer China writ large. But China in 1941 is a divided nation. Manchuria and several other provinces in the North are Japanese controlled. Sinkiang and a neighboring province – a vast area – are Soviet allied (and so modeled in RHS). Sian is surprisingly well defended by nature and limited approach routes. Chunking is the same. And Yunnan – the “national redoubt” of ROC China – probably is not conquerable. Nevertheless, it is probably entirely practical to capture East and Southeast China, and with some skill, Central China. This creates a significant buffer area in which Allied air bases cannot be established in medium or heavy bomber range of the Home Islands, and from which significant exports may occur. The same rough terrain (forest and mountains) that defends Western China also means IJA can defend against attacks from that area with modest forces – mainly covering the few roads. As important, the remaining ROC controlled area does not produce enough supplies to feed the (constantly regenerating) NRA (ROC) Army well enough to permit offensive operations. If this can be achieved by the fall of 1942 – some troops and air units can then be transferred to other areas – precisely the time of year when a push for more Victory Points will be needed.
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This document will not consider what “victory” means in game terms, and mechanisms to achieve it, as well as why that might also be meaningful in historical terms? The Victory Point system designed for WITP and WITP/AE values locations as well as enemy units lost on a point system. Locations are valued by what is present at the location multiplied by a constant which is related to where the location is on the map. A complex system is used to determine the VP value players ultimately see on the game display. There are apparently three values involved: what I call the “base value” which is a field that shows in the editor; what I call a “multiplier” which varies in zones by map location; and what I call “infrastructure value” which seems to be the sum of port and airfield values in the hex.
The “multiplier” has two different standards: for Japan, at the map edge, the value is ten while for the Home Islands it is one; for the Allies at the map edge, the value is one while in the Home Islands the value is ten. There are also intermediate zones with values of two, three and five, between these extreme zones with values of one or ten.
In RHS, the “base value” is standardized with a formal definition:
Case VP Base Garrison
10+ Population Centers (700+ Industry) 30 VP 60 Gar "Industry" = HI + LI + Shipyards + Refineries Note 1
10+ Population Centers (Normal Case) 20 VP 40 Gar
4-9 Population Centers 15 VP 30 Gar When a location is of unusual economic significance
4-9 Population Centers 10 VP 20 Gar
0-3 Population Centers 3 VP 10 Gar When a location is of unusual economic significance
0-3 Population Centers (Special Case) 3 VP 5 Gar When location is important for ANY reason
1-3 Population Centers (Normal Case) 2 VP 0 Gar
0 Population Centers (Normal Case) 1 VP 0 Gar
Note 1: VP base value also 30 if the location is defined as a Capital (and garrison also 60).
It is the product of the base value so defined (in the editor), the multiplier (for the map zone), and the infrastructure value (ports and airfields) which players see on the map and which they are credited with if they control the location.
From the above it will be seen that players are rewarded for the locations they control. While the more population and industry and base infrastructures all matter, there is also the effect of the area multiplier which skews the result such that there is minimal reward for areas “easy to control” near the vital home areas of each side, and maximum reward for controlling distant areas which are presumably “harder to gain control of.” Consider this in terms of Japanese economic necessity and strategy: areas near Japan either start under Japanese control or, if captured, are easier and more efficient to export resources and oil from (as well as easier to support occupation forces in). But the greatest rewards (in VP terms) come from capturing major locations distant from Japan – which is both harder to do and less efficient to export from or to support occupation forces in. This implies that Japan should attempt to secure nearby areas early on – both so the Allies cannot use them as bases from which to launch attacks on Japan – and to export from efficiently whatever resources or oil they may contain. Once this is achieved, it also implies that more distant operations might result in the high VP values needed for auto-victory.
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Let us digress and consider the case of out year Japanese victory. Code runs a test on January 1, 1944 to see if the VP ratio is 3:1? It also runs a test on January 1, 1945 to see if the VP ratio is 2:1? [RHS considers a value of 3:1 any time in 1943, or of 2:1 any time in 1944, as auto victory.] Given the massive numbers of reinforcements the Allies get in 1943 and 1944, neither is realistically likely to happen. It remains, these are default secondary goals for Japan to try for if it fails to achieve 4:1 in 1942. All of them essentially have the same context: achieving such VP ratios requiring capturing high value Allied locations while not losing too many VPs because of unit losses.
How does this VP system (which I think is well conceived) relate to the real world? In Grave of a Dozen Schemes, British historian H. P. Willmott considers one such case which might have happened had the units in position been used with a different objective. At the time of the Indian Ocean raid of the Kiddo Butai, 15th Army was being committed to the invasion of Burma. Had it instead been committed to invading Ceylon, where prospects for success were high given the dismal state and number of defending forces, he thinks the British government might have been forced from the Pacific War altogether, and India might have been neutralized (with significant effects even on Allied forces in ETO). In 1942, US planners were very concerned about a Japanese investment of Alaska and Canada’s Northwest and Yukon Territories.
These concerns were pre-dated by local residents of Alaska ever since Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931, and by Brig Gen “Billy” Mitchell in 1935, when he singled out Alaska as “the key point of the whole Pacific,” and he told the House Military Affairs Committee “He who holds Alaska holds the world…Alaska is the most strategic place in the world. It is the jumping off place to smash Japan. If we want to fight her in the Philippines, it will take five years to defeat Japan.” [This position looks more reasonable today than it did in 1935. Anchorage is, decade after decade, the air cargo hub of the entire world. Most flights from the US West Coast to Asia enter Alaskan waters and, weather permitting, pass in sight of the Aleutian Islands. Expeditionary Air Wings and airmobile Rangers and Stryker Brigades can reach Asia in less than half the time than from any part of CONUS.] Fairbanks is fifteen hours flying time of Tokyo -- or New York. Others echoed Mitchel’s position in 1937: Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Homer Lea and Bern Balchen. But in 1940 Territorial Governor Ernst Gruening could say “A handful of enemy parachutists could capture Alaska overnight.” The only military post was Chilkoot Barracks, built to protect a gold trail in the 19th century. It had no roads or airfield and its only “transportation asset” was a 51 year old harbor tug. The only “artillery piece” in Alaska – a Russian relic – served as a flower pot! Buckner found it ironic that Alaskans, the most air-conscious people on Earth, had no air force. [Alaska still has six times as many pilots per capita as any other state. In 1940, it had the highest number of pilots per capita in all history – one in three. Finally, the Soviet-Geman Pact resulted in significant defenses for Alaska. $350,000,000 were spent within 18 months, mainly to build airfields, many of which were useful in the Northwest Staging Route (by which most Russian aid aircraft were sent) and for the Aleutians campaign. [See The Thousand Mile War, pp 52-55]. One result of this is that, by the end of 1941, Alaska has significant airfield development, but virtually no ground or naval defense forces! For this reason, depending on how much players send to Alaska, it may be possible to invade at minimal risk or cost, and capture immediately useful airfields – able to bomb the largest aircraft factory in the world (at Renton, Washington) among other thingsCanada can be invaded via the Yukon River in Monsoon, 1942, and via the Mackenzie River as well in Fall 1942. It was concern over an invasion that led to the historical construction of the ALCAN highway and the CANOL (Canadian Oil) project.
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Every near map edge location has a multiplier of ten for its VP value. If Alaska has fallen, and Whitehorse (Yukon Territory) is captured and supplied by river (any time in Monsoon or Fall seasons), operations with distant air support over the Pacific Northwest become feasible. The historically planned invasion route was to use the twin ports of Aberdeen and Hoquiam, Washington (which are on the RHS map) – because they lack the major coast defenses of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Columbia River. Both rail and road connections from there threaten Portland, and the Seattle/Tacoma area. Once secured it might be possible to march North to Vancouver, and capture many locations of significant VP value while depriving Canada of its primary logistic base.
Similar operations are possible relative to Siberia. In particular, the Lena River offers (Fall only) ocean access deep into the Continent – almost to Lake Baikal. If Japanese forces are willing to take on Soviet Forces – it was the primary historical objective of the IJA. [During the Russian Revolution the IJA, reinforced by a contingent of US Marines, actually occupied Siberia as far West as Chita!] It offers significant resources and some oil and heavy industry. Against a sufficiently inept Allied player or team, an invasion of the USSR in Fall, 1942 might be feasible as a way to generate significant VPs.
Finally, it may be possible to occupy the major cities of India or Australia – in 1942 before the major Allied build ups of mid war. It will not be practical in logistic terms to support all such operations – but one of them probably is completely feasible assuming relatively low Japanese shipping losses during the campaign.
< Message edited by el cid again -- 6/7/2015 11:06:37 AM >
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RE: RHS Thread: Update 7.15 (scen files) - 
Wow......I am blown away by the detail of all this work. Thank you very much for the effort, I look forward to checking it out soon.
RE: RHS Thread: Comprehensive update 7.22 - 
good job. 
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