janh
Posts: 1216
Joined: 6/12/2007 Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: turtlefang I think the bigger issue here is not that the Soviet player "can perfectly plan his attacks" but that the Soviet player doesn't attack anywhere near as much as he did historically. And that reason has nothing to do with the Soviet's ability to use deliberate attacks or not. It's more centered on the inability of the Soviet to mass enough firepower, in 1941, to attack a German occupied hex, period. The historical Soviet Army in 1941 was tactically trained (such as it was) as an offensive arm, not a defensive one. Now, you can question how effective these were, but that is a different issue. So, in 1941, the Soviets launch a large number of counter attacks at the local level - just as they had been taught. And they were destroyed piecemeal. The player, knowing the poor state of the Soviet Army in relationship to the German Army, and the supply situation, simply doesn't do that. And its not an issue of coordination, but one of looking at a difference between the CV value of a stack of Soviet units versus a stack of German units. It makes no logical sense. As a Soviet player, I might launch a few attacks against the Axis minor allies and an exposure, weak German motorize BG or unit until winter, but that's about it. So its not very many. And most AAR support that approach. Has nothing to do with MPs or deliberate attacks versus hasty attacks - the German units are just damn difficult to attack in 41. And the player knows it, so he simply doesn't attack often. Maybe I'm wrong on this one, but I would love to see a "promising assault" as a Soviet player. I just don't see them in 1941. And if I do see them, I can't get there anyway as I don't have the movement points as it now stands for a deliberate attack. ... Turtlefang, I can't exactly say I disagree, but I may have a very different take on achieving the same. I think the biggest challenge with a game like that is to negate the effect of hindsight, else it might not follow anything even distantly related to history even if you have underlying models that capture logistics, combat, ToEs, causal links between production (changes) and events, etc. perfectly nailed down. Player will just behave entirely different 100 years later than generals without that knowledge, acting in a time of different doctrines and casualty count valuing, and having their head personally on stake... Like you said, see your "player knowing" comment. You probably convolute two parameters, which I'd rather consider seperately: Unit combat value versus the issue of "poor C&C", "misinterpretation of orders", and other generalship or staff errors that seem to given the first couple of month in 41 a distinct face, though they occurred generally on both sides throughout the conflict as in any war. I agree that either the base morale/exp of Soviets ought to be tuned up a tid bit in 41 (in addition to more ample reinforcements, but overall in balanced measure...) in return for a lessening of blizzard combat penalties. Alternatively the combat engine could be adjusted to result in somewhat higher losses for a side that is far superior in strength or quality terms so that (counter or attrition) attacks begin to be at least minimally sensible. Having defending actions cost MPs too would be another awesome feature in the future of this series and add another level like fixing the enemy. Cavalry would suddenly find one of its original roles... Regarding the issue of "C&C" I would like to see in the future that poor C&C in the broader sense is not just parametrized into admin rolls or such, which all happen before the turn shows, or well hidden in the combat engine, but in fact happen during my turn: I move a unit around, and either like 76mm suggests it can't move as far/attack as projected and I am stuck, or it even has a chance to misstep based on its stats. So even LAH or some Guards should occasionally take the wrong road or fail to make an attack on time. Or that a group of units selected for a deliberate attack splits some off to mimic some C&C screw-up. Just something unforeseen, which I cannot really take into account into my planning when opening the turn. It is about the impression, the feel, in contrast to the present ruleset, which abstractly captures that in other, less-visible and not unpredictable fashion. It feels more like having to work with poorly trained troops that need breaks or help with their route and logistics planning twice as often as the Landsers, but as long as I know it (the MPs) accurately, I can adjust my plans without screwing up in the same fashion as the Soviets did. Some rules along these lines would be nice in the future of this series, and probably could even be needed to mimic the lethargy/failure of the French or Polish to properly grasp the key of the blitzkrieg, and shift is doctrines accordingly. I imagine that without such a penalizing rule, a French Army being wielded as freely as the Wehrmacht would probably make a repeat of the German coup almost impossible. It might rather end in WW1 all over. There is another major benefit from such random events as well: In return for "random" screw-ups, you could raise MPs (or lower the amount needed per hex for <=50 morale units), and raise combat strength of SHC units. Depending on how high you design the "C&C" failure probabilities as a function of leader and unit stats, you'd typically read significantly higher Soviet CV and given higher MP (lower hex costs), would probably be tempted more often than now to counterattack or stand your ground. Many of them just break down, but at least they have a probability to succeed. So in the end, you have also a finite probability to succeed with the hard Soviet counterattack strategy better than historically, and one to fail worse. But at least your units would attack/defend better, plus you'd have some incentive to try to fight as much as you can. Would this overcome the hindsight that the Soviets have failed at large with these counterattacks? Or that the counterattacks served the purposes of attrition and winning time? I don't know, but I think more I would be tempted to try more often at least. Just my two cents, though.
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