Canoerebel
Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002 From: Northwestern Georgia, USA Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Wargmr I have a question for you. If you had it all to do over again. What would you fundamentally change in terms of the timeline and/or troop composition for this campaign. What have you learned essentially. Man, I've learned alot by doing this invasion. Alot. Here are some of the key things - a few that I got right, others that I got wrong, and others I wasn't aware of or didn't grasp until too late. 1. This invasion was awfully early. November '42 is very early to invade the Japanese heartland. It's done as well as it has for two reasons: (a) I managed to get total, absolute suprirse on John; he didn't react in strenght for weeks, giving me time to get things up and running; and (b) the proximity of Ceylon and Ramree Island, allowing the ready transfer of supplies, aircraft and ships to Sabang and the repair of damaged ships heading out of theater. John (after we quit the game in '13) and a few players said it was a mistake to not go for Palembang at the start. At first I accepted that as truth. But it was wrong. An invasion on that side - or an invasion of Java or Okinawa or the Home Islands - in November '42 is so early that logistics becomes incredibly difficult, bordering on impossible. So the choice of western Sumatra was a great choice. 2. I made a mistake in listening to the gifted and smart Nemo, who pushed hard to expand the invasion to Malaya, thus further disrupting and threatening the empire. I siphoned off troops and managed to cut the peninsula in two. But I couldn't "see" how to make it work and ended up dispersing too many troops that I couldn't used better in pursuits I'm about to describe. (It's not Nemo's fault. The guy is brilliant. He could have take the situation and made much better use of it than I could. My fault was not playing within my own capabilities.) 3. I took a bunch of islands - a bunch - and garrisoned them. What I failed to do - what I absolutely should have done - was take at least one of the Nicobars, garrison it strongly - say 150 AV - and build the airfield to allow offensive ops and to facilitiate the transfer of shorter range fighters between Ceylon and Sabang. Had I one major outpost in the Nicobars it would have facilitated what I was doing, it would have slowed John in regaining the other nearby islands, and it would make it easier to come to Sabang's relief now. This, above all things, was a failure in foresight. The biggest thing I'd do differently. 4. I should have considered going for Port Blair. I did, but not seriously due to its garrison. I figured I might need 200 to 300 AV, that they'd be more useful in Sumatra, and that I could backfill to get Port Blair later. I think John had immense supply problems at the base and 4EB from Assam kept it supressed for a long time. Utlimately this was a tough call, but an aggressive and gifted player might've pulled it off. 5. It was a judgment call whether to concnetrate on building forts or airfield at Sabang. The wise Bullwinkle advocated building forts rather than airfield. At that time, the airfield was at 8.7 and forts at about 4.2. I elected to concentrate on the field (and managed to get it to 9), thinking that the larger field might help against bombardments (I don't think it did) and that a Size 9 field would work on John's psyche (it has, I think). An argument could be made that I'd have been better off with level 5 forts. I"m not sure I could've gotten it there before bombardments began, but maybe. This one is a tossup. I'm satisfied with the decision I made. 6. Could I have cobbled together a counterinvasion sooner in order to force John to pull some assets from Sumatra? Well, I did in a way. I had a big offensive in Burma that pressed John and persuaded him to commit alot of air and ground troops. Lack of PP stopped me from undertaking a major amphibious operation (a small and unsuccessful invasion of Noumea doesn't count). I expended all PP for this operation and had only a few hundred as late as mid January of '43. By now I could've put something together, but I don't think it would succeed in siphoning off John's attention. An invaison way out on the perimiter wouldn't distract John (he'd just laugh and know he could react in great force later, when Sumatra was done with). A two- or three-division invasion of New Caledonia or New Guinea or someplace wouldn't pose a real enough threat to draw John from Sumatra; and something of that size in a more critical place - Java, Okinawa, Hokkaido - would have zero chance of holding once John turned his full attention there. So I believe biding my time to put together a credible force is the best course of action. In the meantime, John's active imagaination contributed some concern on his part, as he's obviously worried about Allied intentions elsewhere. So here I think the decision was the right one for me.
< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 3/1/2016 8:44:26 PM >
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