Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

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ORIGINAL: Sangeli

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
But my ace in the hole is the idea I mentioned yesterday: there's a green dot hex in the Java Sea. I'm sending supply there by sub and will eventually insert a base force fragment. Then I'll send a PBY unit there (it's only about 37 hexes from Normanton and Portland Roads).

Does that work? I've definitely had issues loading units into SSTs before. Though I can't remember what the restrictions are off the top of my head.

I think it is only paratroops that can travel by SST. Go figure.

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

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ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

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ORIGINAL: Sangeli

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
But my ace in the hole is the idea I mentioned yesterday: there's a green dot hex in the Java Sea. I'm sending supply there by sub and will eventually insert a base force fragment. Then I'll send a PBY unit there (it's only about 37 hexes from Normanton and Portland Roads).

Does that work? I've definitely had issues loading units into SSTs before. Though I can't remember what the restrictions are off the top of my head.

I think it is only paratroops that can travel by SST. Go figure.

If I got this right, only paratroops can load in Combat mode on subs. Other type have to be in (I think it's) Move mode. They want to make sure that only paratroops can assault from subs.

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ORIGINAL: BBfanboy
Oh, right! So they strap on some water skis, open their parachutes and sail right onto the shore. Slick!

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I have a few questions about Japanese SigInt and Glen-generated detection levles.

1. Several of my big Australian ports show detection levels like 1/0 or 2/1. There are IJN subs close by. I "think" the detection levels are from Glen reconnaissance. Any chance, in your experience, that John could be getting an specific information like the number and quantity of ships in port? (I have some BBs down there and I'd prefer that John not find them.)

2. Several of my big West Coast ports show similar detection levels. I haven't seen a sub near the West Coast since before the Sumatra invasion. I'm pertty sure there aren't any subs around, so I've been attributing the detection levels to the usual "radio signal" SigInt reports. Any chance in your experience that a Japanese player could be getting more specific information, like numbers and kinds of ships?

So the basic question is really the same: what kind of information might a Japanese player get from a 1/0 or a 2/1 detection level of a port?

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

In Sumatra, John must be thinking as simply as this: "I've got you where I want you now. You have to come to me if you want to save your troops."

That's a logical stance. So, how do I use it against him?

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

In Sumatra, John must be thinking as simply as this: "I've got you where I want you now. You have to come to me if you want to save your troops."

That's a logical stance. So, how do I use it against him?

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ORIGINAL: JeffK

Consisting of a Hvy AA Rgt & Light AA Rgt they are too strong, with the 3.7's in permanent positions and the unit filled out with approx. 50% women they should be static.

http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/auck.htm

In the period before Japan entered the war the only significant change was in personnel, but Japan's sudden marauding in the Pacific zone, altered the situation entirely. Our Government showed commendable energy in the steps it took to defend this country against direct attack, and at the same time it had the wisdom to leave our "Ball of Fire" division in the Middle East. At this time, the decision was made to expand our anti-aircraft defences to 46 3.7-inch heavy guns and 36 Bofors quickfiring 40 m/m guns.

The siting of the heavy guns was an urgent task and as they arrived they were placed, in sets of four, at Belmont, Bayswater, Northcote, Orakei, Outer Domain, Epsom Showgrounds, Ponsonby, Chamberlain Park, Te Atatu, Hobsonville and Whenuapai. Two mobile guns were also kept in reserve. Each gun was bolted to a concrete base 10 feet thick. The concrete work for each set of gun emplacements cost £10,000, and the sets of four guns each cost £48,000. It has been estimated that the total cost of each gun-site, with its accommodation for 120 personnel, would be not less than £150,000.

The second decision was to recruit women to operate the instruments on each gun-site. Women had already proved their worth at this task in Britain and, although the prospect was viewed initially with some alarm, a few month's experience with our woman gunners on predictor height-finder and radar cabin soon convinced us of their superiority in operating these delicate aids to accurate gunfire.

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Battle of Sumatra: No enemy invasions. No bombardments. No ground attacks. Air attacks focus on Langsa and the adjacent contested hex. We all wait and wonder.

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Peanut 3 will reach the port of embarkation tomorrow, joining Cotton Candy 1.

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ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Sorry about the uncertainty and vagueness, witpqs. Even I'm not 100% positive of the date of embarkation yet. There are still a lot of things to get into place. Here's what's going on behind the scenes:

1. The carriers are still roughly 10-15 days from the port(s) of embarkation. They have zero or minimal SYS damage, so that's not a problem. They'll need to top of fuel. That's not a problem. Two carriers will swap out F4Fs for Hellcats. A few other carriers need to draw replacements to have full F4F compliments. As we all know, sometimes the replacement and/or upgrade buttons are grayed out when we don't expect them to be, but I think I can get this done pronto.

2. This is a massive amphibious operation that will involve well over 600 ships. I'm still trying to figure out exactly how much I can cover, parceling things out this way: (1) advance assault wave carrying Cotton Candy 1 that will land on D-Day along with a big amphibious engineer unit (lots of naval support) and a USN base force with 60 AV; (2) secondary assault waves carrying Peanuts and Cracker Jacks to nearby bases. This will also include tanks, engineers, and other support troops; (3) backup assault waves carrying several RCT and marine raider battalions prepping for smaller ports, mainly in case I encounter problems seizing one or more of the major bases, thus allowing me to get some bases (and NavSearch) up and running; (4) follow up transport TFs carrying lots more support troops, etc. plus at least 300k supply (and hopefully as much as 500k).

Right now I don't have enough ships to carry what I want to carry. I have lots more ships strung out all over the place making for the port(s) of embarkation. Some of these clearly won't make it in time. But each day brings in more - and the biggest glut arrives from about 5 days from now to about 20 days from now.

When first conceived, this operation was to be late summer or early autumn with 10 divisions. Then, realizing the Sumatra might hold out into the early summer, acting as a massive diversion, I figured I'd do everything I could to cobble together a big enough invasion to suffice before Sumatra falls. I had hopes of making it in early June, but now I'm trying to see if I can pull the trigger by mid May. I'll probably have the equivalent of at least six divisions, but I think two more will be available by the end of May and two others by early June (though additional divisions mean more ships, etc.).

We all know the feeling of needing everything, not having enough of anything, and lacking time above all else. But I'll say this: with Sumatra in the present situation, time is the most important factor of all. So I think it's better to move with six divisions in May than 10 divisions in June.

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ORIGINAL: JeffK

Consisting of a Hvy AA Rgt & Light AA Rgt they are too strong, with the 3.7's in permanent positions and the unit filled out with approx. 50% women they should be static.

http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/auck.htm

In the period before Japan entered the war the only significant change was in personnel, but Japan's sudden marauding in the Pacific zone, altered the situation entirely. Our Government showed commendable energy in the steps it took to defend this country against direct attack, and at the same time it had the wisdom to leave our "Ball of Fire" division in the Middle East. At this time, the decision was made to expand our anti-aircraft defences to 46 3.7-inch heavy guns and 36 Bofors quickfiring 40 m/m guns.

The siting of the heavy guns was an urgent task and as they arrived they were placed, in sets of four, at Belmont, Bayswater, Northcote, Orakei, Outer Domain, Epsom Showgrounds, Ponsonby, Chamberlain Park, Te Atatu, Hobsonville and Whenuapai. Two mobile guns were also kept in reserve. Each gun was bolted to a concrete base 10 feet thick. The concrete work for each set of gun emplacements cost £10,000, and the sets of four guns each cost £48,000. It has been estimated that the total cost of each gun-site, with its accommodation for 120 personnel, would be not less than £150,000.

The second decision was to recruit women to operate the instruments on each gun-site. Women had already proved their worth at this task in Britain and, although the prospect was viewed initially with some alarm, a few month's experience with our woman gunners on predictor height-finder and radar cabin soon convinced us of their superiority in operating these delicate aids to accurate gunfire.