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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

 
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 8:07:54 PM   
Canoerebel


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3/16/44

Asia: A good day for the Allies, primarily because of a naval clash and the enemy's failure to advance into the key hex protecting Gunzan.

I'll post more about the naval battle in a few minutes, but some thoughts about Gunzan first.

The score is currently 128,600 to 73,900, in favor of the Allies. I'm about 19,000 points from auto victory. Gunzan airfield will go to level 9 in about six days. About 1.5 million supply will land here in about ten days. Enough aviation support to handle 2k aircraft will be present. Lots of new B-29 squadrons have just arrived. Most of the veteran B-29 and B-24 squadrons have been resting, waiting for what's about to happen. In about 10 days, the strategic air campaign will begin from Korea. This time, Allied fighters in massive numbers will be involved.

I think the Allies will be able to score 10,000 to 15,000 points within a relatively short period of time. This, in addition to points for ships sunk, units destroyed, and bases taken or built, should put the Allies in a position for auto-victory within the originally estimated window - late April to early May. That's just a guestimate. Things may go wrong or take longer than expected. But at the moment I think everything is in place to end the game in the short term.

John's best chance to materially hamper things is to take Gunzan. I thought he might have sufficient troops in place to press forward and besiege the base. I figured Allied air and sea power might prevent him from actually taking the base but I'm not positive, just guardedly optimistic. But John's army is dallying a bit, possibly because Allied 2EB have really been messing with the IJA stack that had the best shot at advancing early. My fondest hope is that John has abandoned that plan but there is a slight chance he can still lay siege to Gunzan before the cavalry arrives. Unlikely but remotely possible

The naval battle that took place a few weeks back, in which John lost Musashi and Nagato, was a critical blow. Had he prevailed and somehow taken temporary control of the sea lanes, I'd have really started sweating. But he lost the battle, Allied combat ships are available to bombard if needed, and lots of Allied reinforcements have since come ashore.

In order to have a chance, John needed his full navy up here but so much of it was in the DEI. More about that in a little while.




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< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 12/29/2017 8:08:29 PM >

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 8:28:56 PM   
Canoerebel


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3/14/45

Naval Battle of Shanghai: The enemy gets a crack at valuable Allied shipping but instead gets roughed up. John is especially short on cruisers and DDs, so this is a serious blow to his ability to contest the seas.







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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 8:38:12 PM   
witpqs


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BB Howe protecting escort carriers - that's dirty pool. I love it!

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 8:38:41 PM   
Canoerebel


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3/14/45

Death Star: The cavalry is galloping towards Gunzan.




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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 8:39:22 PM   
Canoerebel


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quote:

ORIGINAL: witpqs
BB Howe protecting escort carriers - that's dirty pool. I love it!


I tried to make that TF as RN as possible. :)

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 8:49:40 PM   
jwolf

 

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In view of your sync bug as you said, are you sure of the overall results from the naval battle at Shanghai?

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 8:57:47 PM   
Canoerebel


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When this game finally concludes, I'll have three major questions to mull over:

1. Would John have been better off grouping his combat ships and carriers and striking en masse, along with massed LBA, when the Allies ventured deep to strike Luzon, Formosa, China or Korea? If he had consolidated KB and struck with 1200 naval aircraft and massed kamikazes and LBA from interlocking airfields, would he have done material damage to Death Star? Would he have done enough damage that I'd have been unable or reluctant to take on big airfields for some time? I think there's a chance that the answer is yes.

Instead he played a soft defense, devoting a considerable amount of his navy to nipping at the edges, usually far away. The advantage is that he kept his navy mostly intact while forcing me to cover supply lines and missions carefully. The cost was that the Allies invaded all four areas without meaningful opposition. That boggles my mind.

He only chose to attack when Death Star was far away on escort missions. He felt like he could achieve local superiority. But too much of his fleet was far away, leaving him to send in modest numbers of valuable combat ships. in each case - at Shanghai, at Ningpo, at Gunzan - he lost those surface clashes, thus frittering away his fleet ineffectually without ever concentrating and striking hard.

2. How could I have done Sumatra better? That was a wild and crazy invasion for November 1942. By about late January, I knew I was eventually going to lose. Still it took John until about June to really take control. He didn't take Sabang until July, I think. And the last Allied units weren't vanquished until August. I think if I'd have had 300k more supply, I might've made a stand there and employed Death Star to provide support. The two biggest mistakes I made was siphoning off units to invade Malaya and not understanding the meager Allied fighter pools. In the end, because of the peculiarities of how John and I play, and because I have a good feel for his proclivities, Sumatra turned into a strategic Allied victory. But I wouldn't want to repeat the experience against a player who doesn't leave holes in his defenses that can be exploited while his focus is elsewhere.

3. Did I manage the strategic war right? I elected not to directly engage John's major bases in the DEI or to seriously impede his shipping so that I could concentrate on pushing as deep as possible as fast as possible. I wanted to pursue points directly (strategic bombing) rather than indirectly (by strangling the enemy economy). I felt this would be more efficient. Had John not left holes in his defenses, I would've altered plans and instead targeted his resource/oil centers. I think it was more effective to target a weekly defended Luzon, China and Formosa rather than going sideways, but by doing so his economy remained far more robust. Tradeoffs.

What about strategic bombing? I struggled here, taking heavy losses (including a miserable B-29 raid against Singapore that cost me 37 of the valuable bombers). To this point, I haven't figured out how to score the "thousand points a day" that Lowpe predicted. Yet strategic bombing has contributed 27,000 points to my current 55,000 point lead. And I think the upcoming campaign from Korea will prove decisive. To this point, I'd give myself a C for strategic warfare with perhaps a chance to raise that a notch or two with Korea. But I do think the emphasis on strategic warfare was the right way to achieve victory.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 8:58:19 PM   
Canoerebel


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quote:

ORIGINAL: jwolf
In view of your sync bug as you said, are you sure of the overall results from the naval battle at Shanghai?


The overall results are based upon the written combat report that John sent. So I'm sure.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 9:17:31 PM   
Bif1961


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Happy Birthday

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 9:42:27 PM   
BillBrown


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I can't play golf and I can't play any musical instrument nor sing in a choir, but I can still walk!


Keep in mind that you are in age area of "use it or lose it" Keep walking/hiking, it is really good for your overall health.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/29/2017 11:20:16 PM   
Canoerebel


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Thanks, Bif.

I'll keep it in mind, Bill.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/30/2017 2:07:43 AM   
Alpha77

 

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Whow so many major combat ships that the IJN still had in 45 ? Seems he did not lose many before ? Was it careful playing on his side, luck or did he not use em hard enough in 42/43? I certainly used them harder having lost 4BBs and 3CAs in 42 already (but taking out some Allied ones too ). Damn these Yamato class is pretty fragile also evident here, their main gun ammo runs out fast and they drink too much fuel. "Luckily" Yamato is already sunk in my game, so saving fuel

But this is a mod perhaps beefing them up also a bit, I noted in a pic CA Haguro firing 10cm guns. I cannot remember that any CA got these guns at all in reality. Question is do these cruisers get the 10cm ones in this mod additional to their 12,7/40 ones ? That would be a good AA battery.


Btw, what is wrong with Johns CV based fighters, 1st I noted in an ealier battle around Pago Pago he had 101 Sam as escort.. they lost 1 (!) of their number according to the posted report. The Allies lost ca. 10 fighters and many of them older ones and then got already to the bombers ? What was the deal there ? Did the escorts not really fight ? And now more recent battle reports shows only 8 Sam as a CAP ? And escort kind of failing again? I thought the Sam is the best IJN as to offer for CV planes. Or something wrong with the pilots ? Would be surprising they should be the best IJ as left...

Edit, yes I know escorts are in a weaker position, however they at least should fight hard and DIE if neccessary to protect the strike

< Message edited by Alpha77 -- 12/30/2017 2:13:51 AM >

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/30/2017 4:42:04 AM   
Canoerebel


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The war at sea was intense from the beginning through September 1943, when John lost a major carrier battle. After that he protected his navy, staying away from the Allied carriers, nibbling at distant edges. I didn't go chasing him - catching rabbits that don't want to be caught is nearly impossible. Instead, I focused on "taking the high ground," thinking it would force him to attack. But he declined to offer any opposition at Luzon, Formosa, China, Korea. He would strike smaller forces occasionally, when Death Star was somewhere else, always losing those surface clashes. He lost two BBs at at Talaud Eilanden and perhaps four or five around China and Korea. He's always kept his carriers far away from Death Star until he lost detection and a bunch of his carriers in the South China Sea blundered into Death Star ten days ago. I think now the Japanese navy is gutted and can only compete on the margins. John will probably eventually put together a Banzai Charge but he doesn't have many BB, CA or CL left to fight with.

I don't recall John's fighter escorts not fighting hard at Pago Pago.


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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/30/2017 4:29:49 PM   
Alpha77

 

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Below the air battle I meant, but seems no other readers found it strange

quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

2/5/45

KB East:





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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/30/2017 9:26:54 PM   
JeffroK


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There are so many settings that we dont know about, but some WAG are:

43 minutes warning
Raid 15,000ft
So CR's fighters had time to get a height advantage.

The A7M2 has a top speed of under 400mph, about 40% of the CAP beat that by 20mph+ and the F6F-5 equals it.

Morale & Fatigue, we cant know but the CV fighters may have been run hard versus a and based defense which would have allowed rest until actually attacked (or CV sighted)

Escorting fighters often fail in their task, CAP with height bounces them and blows through the escort and causes carnage to the bombers (and there could be a bit of FOW about the results)

All of this is guessing, the game guarantees nothing.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 1:28:02 AM   
Lokasenna


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Speed isn't the end-all, be-all of air combat.

Really, what looks like happened to me is that with the large warning time, there was time to vector CAP onto the strike planes in particular (also going off of the high number of them destroyed, not destroyed by flak). Also, the estimated altitude is merely an estimate. I have had CV-borne (and LBA) raids with vastly varying altitudes - from 5K to 25K - that all arrived over the target at once. The game would only display one estimated altitude for such a raid.

It's possible that John's escorting fighters were at a completely different altitude, and the vectoring onto strike planes was more effective than it otherwise would have been. This is entirely conjecture on my part - I have no idea if John would even try such a thing.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 1:13:06 PM   
JohnDillworth


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

When this game finally concludes, I'll have three major questions to mull over:

1. Would John have been better off grouping his combat ships and carriers and striking en masse, along with massed LBA, when the Allies ventured deep to strike Luzon, Formosa, China or Korea? If he had consolidated KB and struck with 1200 naval aircraft and massed kamikazes and LBA from interlocking airfields, would he have done material damage to Death Star? Would he have done enough damage that I'd have been unable or reluctant to take on big airfields for some time? I think there's a chance that the answer is yes.

Instead he played a soft defense, devoting a considerable amount of his navy to nipping at the edges, usually far away. The advantage is that he kept his navy mostly intact while forcing me to cover supply lines and missions carefully. The cost was that the Allies invaded all four areas without meaningful opposition. That boggles my mind.

He only chose to attack when Death Star was far away on escort missions. He felt like he could achieve local superiority. But too much of his fleet was far away, leaving him to send in modest numbers of valuable combat ships. in each case - at Shanghai, at Ningpo, at Gunzan - he lost those surface clashes, thus frittering away his fleet ineffectually without ever concentrating and striking hard.

2. How could I have done Sumatra better? That was a wild and crazy invasion for November 1942. By about late January, I knew I was eventually going to lose. Still it took John until about June to really take control. He didn't take Sabang until July, I think. And the last Allied units weren't vanquished until August. I think if I'd have had 300k more supply, I might've made a stand there and employed Death Star to provide support. The two biggest mistakes I made was siphoning off units to invade Malaya and not understanding the meager Allied fighter pools. In the end, because of the peculiarities of how John and I play, and because I have a good feel for his proclivities, Sumatra turned into a strategic Allied victory. But I wouldn't want to repeat the experience against a player who doesn't leave holes in his defenses that can be exploited while his focus is elsewhere.

3. Did I manage the strategic war right? I elected not to directly engage John's major bases in the DEI or to seriously impede his shipping so that I could concentrate on pushing as deep as possible as fast as possible. I wanted to pursue points directly (strategic bombing) rather than indirectly (by strangling the enemy economy). I felt this would be more efficient. Had John not left holes in his defenses, I would've altered plans and instead targeted his resource/oil centers. I think it was more effective to target a weekly defended Luzon, China and Formosa rather than going sideways, but by doing so his economy remained far more robust. Tradeoffs.

What about strategic bombing? I struggled here, taking heavy losses (including a miserable B-29 raid against Singapore that cost me 37 of the valuable bombers). To this point, I haven't figured out how to score the "thousand points a day" that Lowpe predicted. Yet strategic bombing has contributed 27,000 points to my current 55,000 point lead. And I think the upcoming campaign from Korea will prove decisive. To this point, I'd give myself a C for strategic warfare with perhaps a chance to raise that a notch or two with Korea. But I do think the emphasis on strategic warfare was the right way to achieve victory.


quote:

without meaningful opposition. That boggles my mind.

Looking forward to the game being over because you've had a couple of head scratcheres yourself. Probably enough time has passed so Op Sec is not an issue but whats another month or less in a game spanning years?

BTW, on an only semi related note I was a bit surprised you let a pretty massive army waltz in to Fusan with only light resistance. I presume you didn't want your best assets exposed to mass air attack. If the battle of Korea goes your way after a hard fought struggle Johns air power will be greatly diminished. John is particularly good at evacuating ground units. will you contest a withdrawal by sea even if the game is on short time?



< Message edited by JohnDillworth -- 12/31/2017 1:18:04 PM >


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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 1:29:00 PM   
Canoerebel


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I took one stab at shutting down Fusan by sea and it largely didn't work. Shutting it down by air wasn't an option - attacking large enemy airfields is a good way to lose an air force. Persuading the enemy to attack my large airfields is a good way for the enemy to lose an air force. (The escort fighter in this game seems to have no chance whatsoever.)

More importantly, I wanted a big enemy army in Korea. Chewing up enemy ground units has been one of my most productive means of scoring points. I didn't want enough enemy troops to seriously pose a threat to Gunzan. That was a delicate calculation. I think it's going to turn out right, but there is still some chance.

When the Herd arrives with reinforcements and supply, the Allied army will switch to offense in Korea. The primary objectives will be the enemy army and Keijo, which is worth alot of point. I don't yet know whether I'll contest Dunkirk operations. I may, as at that point I should have overwhelming naval superiority. But I don't think it's worth the risk of putting Death Star in proximity to the Home Islands, if that's necessary to impose a blockade. John has been saving up kamikazes for a year. He'll unleash them eventually. I don't want Death Star two hexes from three level-9 Japanese airfields when he does so.

Up above, two of the three points I made dealt with my handling of the game. I don't doubt there will be many others, but I'll be suprised if I didn't have an articulable reason for doing what I did. Readers may question my reasoning but usually I had a reason for foregoing certain short-term opportunities in favor of long-term objectives. I think.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 4:16:51 PM   
Canoerebel


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I should clarify by saying that John too will have had articulable reasons for his strategy. I was trying to note this inherent uncertainty in my questions: He chose to keep KB away from my invasions for a reason; I chose to invade Sumatra for a reason; I chose to concentrate on strategic warfare in a certain way. There were reasons. The question becomes: was our reasoning on target or were there better approaches? Should John have used KB in a different way? Could I have done a better job in Sumatra? Should I have given more attention to the DEI and less to pushing forward?

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 4:31:54 PM   
crsutton


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

When this game finally concludes, I'll have three major questions to mull over:

1. Would John have been better off grouping his combat ships and carriers and striking en masse, along with massed LBA, when the Allies ventured deep to strike Luzon, Formosa, China or Korea? If he had consolidated KB and struck with 1200 naval aircraft and massed kamikazes and LBA from interlocking airfields, would he have done material damage to Death Star? Would he have done enough damage that I'd have been unable or reluctant to take on big airfields for some time? I think there's a chance that the answer is yes.

Instead he played a soft defense, devoting a considerable amount of his navy to nipping at the edges, usually far away. The advantage is that he kept his navy mostly intact while forcing me to cover supply lines and missions carefully. The cost was that the Allies invaded all four areas without meaningful opposition. That boggles my mind.

He only chose to attack when Death Star was far away on escort missions. He felt like he could achieve local superiority. But too much of his fleet was far away, leaving him to send in modest numbers of valuable combat ships. in each case - at Shanghai, at Ningpo, at Gunzan - he lost those surface clashes, thus frittering away his fleet ineffectually without ever concentrating and striking hard.

2. How could I have done Sumatra better? That was a wild and crazy invasion for November 1942. By about late January, I knew I was eventually going to lose. Still it took John until about June to really take control. He didn't take Sabang until July, I think. And the last Allied units weren't vanquished until August. I think if I'd have had 300k more supply, I might've made a stand there and employed Death Star to provide support. The two biggest mistakes I made was siphoning off units to invade Malaya and not understanding the meager Allied fighter pools. In the end, because of the peculiarities of how John and I play, and because I have a good feel for his proclivities, Sumatra turned into a strategic Allied victory. But I wouldn't want to repeat the experience against a player who doesn't leave holes in his defenses that can be exploited while his focus is elsewhere.

3. Did I manage the strategic war right? I elected not to directly engage John's major bases in the DEI or to seriously impede his shipping so that I could concentrate on pushing as deep as possible as fast as possible. I wanted to pursue points directly (strategic bombing) rather than indirectly (by strangling the enemy economy). I felt this would be more efficient. Had John not left holes in his defenses, I would've altered plans and instead targeted his resource/oil centers. I think it was more effective to target a weekly defended Luzon, China and Formosa rather than going sideways, but by doing so his economy remained far more robust. Tradeoffs.

What about strategic bombing? I struggled here, taking heavy losses (including a miserable B-29 raid against Singapore that cost me 37 of the valuable bombers). To this point, I haven't figured out how to score the "thousand points a day" that Lowpe predicted. Yet strategic bombing has contributed 27,000 points to my current 55,000 point lead. And I think the upcoming campaign from Korea will prove decisive. To this point, I'd give myself a C for strategic warfare with perhaps a chance to raise that a notch or two with Korea. But I do think the emphasis on strategic warfare was the right way to achieve victory.



Nothing to say. You played your opponent's weaknesses and that was good enough to do the job. I do firmly believe that it is a major mistake for the Japanese player to hold back in 1943 in an effort to save his ships. After mid 44 the hope for a major naval victory really diminishes as the Allies are just too strong. The Sumatra invasion set the table but your carrier victory around the Line Islands sealed the deal. John is a good naval player and has great tactics but you out played him in this particular battle. You held the DL advantage and your attacks were more effective as a result. That was probably his last good chance to defeat you at sea. Your Sumatra plan was good, you just underestimated the power of the Japanese air force at that stage. This is pretty easy for an Allied player to do.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 4:38:56 PM   
MakeeLearn


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quote:

When this game finally concludes, I'll have three major questions to mull over:



Causalities taken vs objectives achieved ?




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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 6:00:51 PM   
T Rav

 

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CR, I read this AAR every day. Thank you, and have a great New Year. T Rav

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 6:13:10 PM   
Alpha77

 

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@ Jeff and Loka, thanks your posts sound correct. Conclusion must be that the IJN must fight hard and risky in 42 and the first half of 43. Later on the faster planes and better radar for the Allies arrive and even huge escort numbers with a good plane like Sam can be outmanvered by the enemy defending air. As long warning time due to good radar and fast planes with good climb can almost nullify your escorts in 44 and 45 as all this allows them to often take perfect positions and ambush enemy raids. Which sounds quite correct historical too.

In my opinion John played good so he reached 1945 even with many good and heavy ships left. However it might have been a mistake not to combine his forces and strike hard when the enemy is already at the doorsteps. Yes, it could be a total failure and 50-60-70% of the IJ forces are lost, but then at least one is sure he must now play on the defensive and can concentrate on that. But the Allies would take losses too and in my estimination higher losses with an "all out all in" strike, then piecemeal strikes over half of the map. Or just concede that all is lost...I also wonder where he got all the fuel to sail so far with the IJN heavy fuel drinkers. Seems he did not lose many TKs and was able to extract oil from almost cut off areas.

Edit, or this mod gives more fuel/oil to the IJ ?


< Message edited by Alpha77 -- 12/31/2017 6:37:44 PM >

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 6:53:21 PM   
Canoerebel


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John deserves much praise for sticking with the game until the bitter end. Not many players do that.

But making it to 1945 is not particularly hard for an experienced Japanese player. In a game between equally matched players, or players within reasonable distance of one another, Japan's going to make it to 1945. For the Alies to achieve 3:1 in 1944 is nearly impossible.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 8:48:16 PM   
JohnDillworth


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quote:

ORIGINAL: crsutton


quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

When this game finally concludes, I'll have three major questions to mull over:

1. Would John have been better off grouping his combat ships and carriers and striking en masse, along with massed LBA, when the Allies ventured deep to strike Luzon, Formosa, China or Korea? If he had consolidated KB and struck with 1200 naval aircraft and massed kamikazes and LBA from interlocking airfields, would he have done material damage to Death Star? Would he have done enough damage that I'd have been unable or reluctant to take on big airfields for some time? I think there's a chance that the answer is yes.

Instead he played a soft defense, devoting a considerable amount of his navy to nipping at the edges, usually far away. The advantage is that he kept his navy mostly intact while forcing me to cover supply lines and missions carefully. The cost was that the Allies invaded all four areas without meaningful opposition. That boggles my mind.

He only chose to attack when Death Star was far away on escort missions. He felt like he could achieve local superiority. But too much of his fleet was far away, leaving him to send in modest numbers of valuable combat ships. in each case - at Shanghai, at Ningpo, at Gunzan - he lost those surface clashes, thus frittering away his fleet ineffectually without ever concentrating and striking hard.

2. How could I have done Sumatra better? That was a wild and crazy invasion for November 1942. By about late January, I knew I was eventually going to lose. Still it took John until about June to really take control. He didn't take Sabang until July, I think. And the last Allied units weren't vanquished until August. I think if I'd have had 300k more supply, I might've made a stand there and employed Death Star to provide support. The two biggest mistakes I made was siphoning off units to invade Malaya and not understanding the meager Allied fighter pools. In the end, because of the peculiarities of how John and I play, and because I have a good feel for his proclivities, Sumatra turned into a strategic Allied victory. But I wouldn't want to repeat the experience against a player who doesn't leave holes in his defenses that can be exploited while his focus is elsewhere.

3. Did I manage the strategic war right? I elected not to directly engage John's major bases in the DEI or to seriously impede his shipping so that I could concentrate on pushing as deep as possible as fast as possible. I wanted to pursue points directly (strategic bombing) rather than indirectly (by strangling the enemy economy). I felt this would be more efficient. Had John not left holes in his defenses, I would've altered plans and instead targeted his resource/oil centers. I think it was more effective to target a weekly defended Luzon, China and Formosa rather than going sideways, but by doing so his economy remained far more robust. Tradeoffs.

What about strategic bombing? I struggled here, taking heavy losses (including a miserable B-29 raid against Singapore that cost me 37 of the valuable bombers). To this point, I haven't figured out how to score the "thousand points a day" that Lowpe predicted. Yet strategic bombing has contributed 27,000 points to my current 55,000 point lead. And I think the upcoming campaign from Korea will prove decisive. To this point, I'd give myself a C for strategic warfare with perhaps a chance to raise that a notch or two with Korea. But I do think the emphasis on strategic warfare was the right way to achieve victory.



Nothing to say. You played your opponent's weaknesses and that was good enough to do the job. I do firmly believe that it is a major mistake for the Japanese player to hold back in 1943 in an effort to save his ships. After mid 44 the hope for a major naval victory really diminishes as the Allies are just too strong. The Sumatra invasion set the table but your carrier victory around the Line Islands sealed the deal. John is a good naval player and has great tactics but you out played him in this particular battle. You held the DL advantage and your attacks were more effective as a result. That was probably his last good chance to defeat you at sea. Your Sumatra plan was good, you just underestimated the power of the Japanese air force at that stage. This is pretty easy for an Allied player to do.

quote:

Nothing to say. You played your opponent's weaknesses and that was good enough to do the job. I do firmly believe that it is a major mistake for the Japanese player to hold back in 1943 in an effort to save his ships. After mid 44 the hope for a major naval victory really diminishes as the Allies are just too strong. The Sumatra invasion set the table but your carrier victory around the Line Islands sealed the deal. John is a good naval player and has great tactics but you out played him in this particular battle. You held the DL advantage and your attacks were more effective as a result. That was probably his last good chance to defeat you at sea. Your Sumatra plan was good, you just underestimated the power of the Japanese air force at that stage. This is pretty easy for an Allied player to do.


Not really sure why John became so reluctant to commit his carriers after the Line Islands battle. IIRC he lost 1 CV all of his CVE's and had some damaged CV's. A net lose of 1 CV. Sure he had to repair and Dan pulled off a pretty aggressive invasion right into the heart of Indian country (can I still say that?). John probably never quite had CV parity after that be he was not too far off and he had interior lines. Still, he would never commit his carriers. He probably thought his land units would hold up better. I certainly did. The complete collapse at Formosa was the most surprising. He had good units there, air support, some forts and supply. Still, his defenses collapsed almost overnight. Not sure what went wrong there. All that being said John's late game got much better. He handled his home industry well, accelerated and produced excellent fighters and had plenty of trained pilots to man them. Plus, with pretty much stock night fighters, continues to put up a credible home island defense. I expect John learned an awful lot and will play a bit different next time and be better prepared for the late game. It's been a real privileged to to enjoy both AAR's

_____________________________

Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. - Yasser Arafat Speech to UN General Assembly

(in reply to crsutton)
Post #: 13345
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 12/31/2017 9:05:08 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Sometime ago, several readers posted about John suffering "terrible die rolls at Formosa." I don't know anything about that but assumed that was an item of heavy discussion in his AAR.

I didn't have the feeling that Formosa was well defended. Allied ships and bombers were hitting his bases (with little opposition) for a long time and the Allied army always outnumbered the Japanese by what I felt like was a considerable amount. Especially since the Japanese army had to be disrupted and fatigued.

I too thought that KB had eventually drawn fairly close to Death Star in strength - at one time something like 1800 to perhaps 1400. So whenever I planned to approach big enemy airfields it was pretty daunting. But usually John would then reveal half his carriers somewhere very far away.

Supply constrained my own moves a great deal. Right now, for instance, my 4EBs have been mostly quiet for a month.

I've also lost a lot of 4EB, so that I was glad to rest them a month to be sure they'll be in top form when supply arrives in Korea (coinciding with Gunzan airfield going to level 9).

Readers may have many questions about why I did the things I did. In most cases, I think there will be answers that make sense. To my way of thinking, my biggest mistakes, as previously discussed:

1) Not understanding the severe limitations of fighter production and pools before triggering the Sumatra invasion (I blithefully figured that by 1943 the Allies would be able to stand toe-to-toe with Japan).
2) Not sticking with my instincts about the snap invasion of Malaya following Sumatra; this was encouraged by Nemo, who saw all kinds of opportunities that he'd have fully explored. But I didn't see those things and ended up diluting my forces so that I ultimately weakened my ability to defend Sumatra.
3) I really expected to eventually backfill and take places like Balikpapan, Palembang, etc. I figured John's defenses deep would eventually stiffen, forcing me to go sideways. I had lots of forces prepped and in reserve. But John's deep defenses never stiffened, so I had a pretty good army just sitting for a long time (not a total loss, because that army was centered around Boela, thus making it secure against counterattack).


(in reply to JohnDillworth)
Post #: 13346
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 1/1/2018 12:58:38 AM   
Alfred

 

Posts: 6685
Joined: 9/28/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Sometime ago, several readers posted about John suffering "terrible die rolls at Formosa." ...


Whenever the consensus explanation for a bad operation is "terrible die rolls", it is time to run to the hills where the clean air will clear the mind of such muddled thinking.

"Terrible die rolls" is never the real reason why an operation failed. Operations fail because they are badly structured with inadequate assets assigned or properly thought through in terms of potential benefits v costs or not factoring into the equation the opponent's reaction.

A "terrible die roll" on a specific occasion can expose a poorly structured operation to a greater check but it is not in itself the problem. A well structured operation can survive a "terrible die roll" and still prosper but a poorly structured operation will not survive a single "terrible die roll".

Alfred

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 13347
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 1/1/2018 1:05:34 PM   
Bearcat2

 

Posts: 577
Joined: 2/14/2004
Status: offline
Thank you for the great AAR! I have learned a lot because your style of play is much different than mine. I am impressed with your ability to stick to the plan without deviation.
There a couple of things that I have thought you might done in the context of your play, like trying night bombing of enemy airfields or night bombing port facilities that you see are being used to bring in reinforcement or supply

< Message edited by Bearcat2 -- 1/1/2018 5:46:25 PM >


_____________________________

"After eight years as President I have only two regrets: that I have not shot Henry Clay or hanged John C. Calhoun."--1837

(in reply to Alfred)
Post #: 13348
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 1/1/2018 2:04:09 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
Thanks, Bearcat, for reading and the encouraging words.

I've occasionally done some night bombing of airfields and port facilities. with rare exceptions, I didn't think the results were worth it. I've lost enough 4EB that I have to be careful in using them, so my preference is to preserve them for direct points scoring (strategic bombing) or decisive use against enemy troop concentrations in base hexes. I don't use 2EB because I don't have enough room and supply for them to bring them forward. Ningpo, Shanghai, Taihioku, and Taichu are filled with fighters and 4EB (with some exceptions - I am using 2EB at Gunzan to hit John's stack in the open, where 4EB aren't allowed per House Rule).

Readers who wish I'd made more use of my air force forward may see a lot more of that soon. With the supply inbound and with Shanghai and Gunzan at level 9, I expect the air war to increase dramatically. I've been working on bringing most of the aircraft forwards and making sure pilots are top notch. Most everything is rested and ready to go.

There is an old saying that no plan survives contact with the enemy. To a large extent, this one has. When the Allies left Pearl in Oct. '43 to invade the DEI, the plan was to sequentially hit Luzon, Foochow, and Korea. I knew those places were poorly defended and that continued to be the case, so the plan held up. There were departures from the plan, mainly Formosa. Also, as noted just above, I never carried through with the plan to widen the shoulders in the DEI to take Balikpapan, Palembang, etc.


(in reply to Bearcat2)
Post #: 13349
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 1/1/2018 2:45:42 PM   
witpqs


Posts: 26087
Joined: 10/4/2004
From: Argleton
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred


quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Sometime ago, several readers posted about John suffering "terrible die rolls at Formosa." ...


Whenever the consensus explanation for a bad operation is "terrible die rolls", it is time to run to the hills where the clean air will clear the mind of such muddled thinking.

"Terrible die rolls" is never the real reason why an operation failed. Operations fail because they are badly structured with inadequate assets assigned or properly thought through in terms of potential benefits v costs or not factoring into the equation the opponent's reaction.

A "terrible die roll" on a specific occasion can expose a poorly structured operation to a greater check but it is not in itself the problem. A well structured operation can survive a "terrible die roll" and still prosper but a poorly structured operation will not survive a single "terrible die roll".

Alfred

Sheet happens: plan accordingly.

_____________________________


(in reply to Alfred)
Post #: 13350
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