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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

 
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 4:07:28 PM   
JohnDillworth


Posts: 3100
Joined: 3/19/2009
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quote:

The coming carrier clash could go either way, right?

Is a carrier battle a "fait accompli"? I don't think you have to have one. He can't stay on station forever without splitting the KB. YOu guys may very well stumble into one but with good air search (which you have) you can certainly choose your fights. The bigger question is how much John is will to compromise so you will fight? I suspect you get to pick the place and maybe the time. As long as your troops are well supplied you can be pretty picky. Wouldn't it be nice if your coming CV's appears and the yard they were historically built at instead of the west coast?

_____________________________

Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. - Yasser Arafat Speech to UN General Assembly

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 2671
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 4:33:35 PM   
DW

 

Posts: 161
Joined: 2/14/2008
Status: offline 		All this talk of Nemo reminds me a bit of the "Latin lesson" scene from "Life of Brian".

"No support troops in Malaya?!?!?" Nemo draws his sword and puts it to a cringing Canoerebel's throat. :)

On another note, everyone seems to think JohnIII will press this battle to it's fullest extent, taking big risks with his carriers to reverse a desperate situation.

However, I seem to recall John failing to intervene decisively in the North Pacific during their last game. He initially reacted strongly, and had some success, but shied away after taking some relatively minor losses to his flattops.

That situation was every bit as dire for John as this one is, but instead of risking his carriers to throw CR off off Sakhalin Island and out of the Kuriles, he went on his Indian adventure instead.

I admit that I've not read John's other AARs. Has he gotten more willing to take losses to his carriers than he was last time around?


(in reply to JohnDillworth)
Post #: 2672
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 4:35:15 PM   
Chickenboy


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From: San Antonio, TX
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Seriously.

The coming carrier clash could go either way, right? I mean, the Allied carriers could react, get dispersed, and could lose ugly. Bad ugly. Ugly to the point that John's carriers and combat ships achieve control of the sea lanes. Control such that he can interdict all supply and reinforcement efforts into the distant future.

That's my nightmare scenario. If that happens, the Allied lodgement in Malaya isn't going to have an indefinite shelf life, so the Allied position in Sumatra had better be rock solid.

If, on the other hand, Japan loses a carrier battle - or it is a draw - then the Allies can remain more aggressive.

If the Joint Chiefs see it differently, they need to persuade Admiral King to remove me from command!


Alright, if you're seriously thinking about abandoning your lodgement on Malaya, I'd suggest you reconsider.

In controlling Singora and the rail bases in 'the neck', you're essentially throttling Singapore. It will take John months to bring an effective response from Burma by foot. True dat-there may be other forces coming in from the home islands, China, elsewhere, but if you think he'll be able to hastily dislodge you from that critical rail line, you're mistaken.

Like Sibolga, a US Division, dug into jungle / rough terrain and supplied will be extremely difficult to dislodge. If you can maintain such a lodgement well into 1943, it can be expanded and be a source for metastasis elsewhere on Malaya. If you can keep Singora, you can bring immediate pressure on the Gulf of Siam, reinforcement into Bangkok and, in short order, Singapore. If you can threaten / render Palembang unusable, you have the ingredients for a tightening gauntlet around his throat.

Agree with others that say that as Malaya heats up, Sumatra will be relegated to secondary importance too.

The risk:reward is decidedly in your favor for playing your hand aggressively on Malaya. You can do a lot of harm to his right flank for a modest price. I'd do it.

_____________________________


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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 4:40:26 PM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 24520
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: offline 		Oh, lastly-look at a strategic map (with the little dots on it). The Allied right hook coming across N. Sumatra, across the Malay peninsula pointing towards Saigon, CRB and Formosa should be a beautiful thing to an Allied fanboi. It's pointing right towards victory. Will you ignore the road map?

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 4:41:07 PM   
Miller


Posts: 2226
Joined: 9/14/2004
From: Ashington, England.
Status: offline 		I think if the proposed CV battle happens and John comes off worse then he will call the game. That is perhaps why Dan is somewhat reluctant to seek this decisive battle bearing in mind neither of his last two games got beyond 42. Could be totally wrong but just a thought.....

(in reply to Chickenboy)
Post #: 2675
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 4:51:14 PM   
Schlemiel

 

Posts: 154
Joined: 10/20/2011
Status: offline 		I'd suspect that to be part of the calculus on some level as well. Though Canoe does love his fighting retreats in '42.

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 5:06:13 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline 		A couple of things that may lend some perspective:

1. I am not talking about withdrawing from Malaysia! I'm talking about sending in supply and some infantry, but monitoring the situation before deciding whether to commit support troops. (The "wait" period being long enough to let the Indian division arrive and, in the meantime, seeing what else might occur to influence the strategic and operational picture.) I see the value of my Malay bases - goodness, Singora is nearly a level six airfield that will be tough in Japanese hands - but the Allies do not a great deal of additional troops and supply to feed to Malaya at this date. So before I weaken Sumatra, I have to "be sure."

2. The early dates my prior games ended - 1/43 with Q-Ball, 1/43 with Chez, 11/42 with PzH - aren't influencing me at all. What is influencing me is my desire, for reasons previously expressed, to kick John's butt across the map. IE, I want to win this game, the sooner the better.

3. This is by far the largest invasion I've been involved in since either (a) the Allied invasion of coastal China vs. Miller back about four years ago; or (b) my Hokkaido invasion vs. John III back in the WitP days. I've done nothing remotely like this in my games since. This has gone very well, but its immensely complex. I am still operating with the assumption that a November 1942 invasion is still pretty early. I think John still poses a serious threat. I think this invasion represents a knife into his guts, so I don't want to get too flamboyant and pull defeat out of the jaws of victory.

4. I've never won a major carrier battle in AE or WitP in which the two sides were relatively equal. Never. Zero. Zilch. My luck with carrier battles generally runs to them reacting against orders, leaving key amphibious ships they were providing CAP to unguarded, leaving behind key LRCAP I was relying on to provide some measure of equalization against superior enemy forces, and then getting plastered. Therefore, I find big carrier battles daunting. They are often a roll of the dice, and I'm the kinda dude that would much rather control things than let them come down to dice rolls. I'm not excited about taking a 50/50 chance on losing a battle. So, I'll play this pretty carefully. But I can afford to. I still think John has to come to me. I am quite content with the status quo if he wishes to cede it.

5. There is a great deal of fighting yet to come all over this theater. I think it'll be a fun ride.

(in reply to Schlemiel)
Post #: 2677
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 5:08:23 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline 		Uh oh, I think Nemo is in the house...

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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 5:08:24 PM   
Lomri

 

Posts: 232
Joined: 2/6/2009
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quote:

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

quote:

The coming carrier clash could go either way, right?

Is a carrier battle a "fait accompli"? I don't think you have to have one. He can't stay on station forever without splitting the KB. YOu guys may very well stumble into one but with good air search (which you have) you can certainly choose your fights. The bigger question is how much John is will to compromise so you will fight? I suspect you get to pick the place and maybe the time. As long as your troops are well supplied you can be pretty picky. Wouldn't it be nice if your coming CV's appears and the yard they were historically built at instead of the west coast?


I'm with John here - you are talking about win, lose our draw with a carrier battle. But you are controlling the tempo so if you want to side step a near term CV battle go for it. Imagine his frustration if he can't find your carriers ;)

(in reply to JohnDillworth)
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 5:17:13 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline 		11/21/42 - D+11, Operation Des Wallace

On the Ground: 27th USA Div. takes Langsa. It appears Medan is lightly held by one small unit. Further to the rear, Tandjoen has a modest garrison. I think what's happening here is that John's having a hard time feeding troops forward to Tandjoen, which is the closest Sumatran base to Singapore. He's concerend about my subs and combat ships. Tonight I'm sending minelayers forward. I feel pretty confident now that Medan will fall in four or five days and there's a chance the Allies can move on Tandjoen. No major news over at Alor Star and Singora.

On the Seas: Nagato and Ise, both showing some black smoke, bombard Singora, doing heavy damage to the feild but none to the garrison. Having BBs operating out in the Gulf of Siam is another example of the Nemo Dividend (and the very thing you guys are positing - that Malaysia siphons off enemy interest from Sumatra). Allied bombardment TFs hit VP (John's pulled out his damaged aircraft, as best I can tell) and Georgetown, catching a bunch of aircraft on the ground. The enemy carrier TF (unknown strength) operating NW of Cocos claims a picket xAK.

In the Air: Sibolga airfield goes to level 4.99. Not very much air activity today as most Allied ships are currently within the main perimeter or on the way back to Colombo.

Burma: Various Allied troops are emerging from the jungle and taking new positions - two Indian brigades, for instance, have bisected the rail line north of Schwebo. Movement dots still indicating a general Japanese withdrawal. Somebody made the valid point that the John can march overland from Tavoy to Bangkok to extract his army from Burma if necessary. True, but the main point has been that it will take John probably two months to get units from Burma into the contested ground at Sumatra. Since he has ten or so divisions committed in Burma, that forces him to haul in units from other distant locales, which will be tough and time consuming.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
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Singe My Eyebrows with a Lusty Bullwhip - 7/2/2013 5:24:35 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline 		....I'm testing to see if scintillating subject lines are effective in my race to catch up to GreyJoy. I draw my inspiration from Cap Mandrake.

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RE: Singe My Eyebrows with a Lusty Bullwhip - 7/2/2013 6:04:46 PM   
JocMeister

 

Posts: 8262
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From: Sweden
Status: offline 		Lusty bullwhip? That sounds...dirty?

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RE: Singe My Eyebrows with a Lusty Bullwhip - 7/2/2013 6:19:06 PM   
JohnDillworth


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quote:

....I'm testing to see if scintillating subject lines are effective in my race to catch up to GreyJoy. I draw my inspiration from Cap Mandrake.

GreyJoy has done the European thing and taken the summer off. He and Q-Ball are on summer holiday and the AAR will be pretty much dormant. You would have to sign a similar Armistice if you were not to catch John

_____________________________

Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. - Yasser Arafat Speech to UN General Assembly

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 2683
RE: Singe My Eyebrows with a Lusty Bullwhip - 7/2/2013 6:25:35 PM   
BBfanboy


Posts: 18046
Joined: 8/4/2010
From: Winnipeg, MB
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: JocMeister

Lusty bullwhip? That sounds...dirty?


Went to the Renaissance Fair just outside Mesa AZ last March and saw the world champion bullwhip performer. One of his tricks was to use a bullwhip with a burning end to ignite a tiny sardine can of fuel something like 35 feet away! The crowd were warned to stay well back lest any eyebrows - or other vital anatomical appendages- get singed ...

_____________________________

No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth

(in reply to JocMeister)
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 6:30:31 PM   
BBfanboy


Posts: 18046
Joined: 8/4/2010
From: Winnipeg, MB
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

11/21/42 - D+11, Operation Des Wallace

On the Ground: 27th USA Div. takes Langsa. It appears Medan is lightly held by one small unit. Further to the rear, Tandjoen has a modest garrison. I think what's happening here is that John's having a hard time feeding troops forward to Tandjoen, which is the closest Sumatran base to Singapore. He's concerend about my subs and combat ships. Tonight I'm sending minelayers forward. I feel pretty confident now that Medan will fall in four or five days and there's a chance the Allies can move on Tandjoen. No major news over at Alor Star and Singora.

On the Seas: Nagato and Ise, both showing some black smoke, bombard Singora, doing heavy damage to the feild but none to the garrison. Having BBs operating out in the Gulf of Siam is another example of the Nemo Dividend (and the very thing you guys are positing - that Malaysia siphons off enemy interest from Sumatra). Allied bombardment TFs hit VP (John's pulled out his damaged aircraft, as best I can tell) and Georgetown, catching a bunch of aircraft on the ground. The enemy carrier TF (unknown strength) operating NW of Cocos claims a picket xAK.

In the Air: Sibolga airfield goes to level 4.99. Not very much air activity today as most Allied ships are currently within the main perimeter or on the way back to Colombo.

Burma: Various Allied troops are emerging from the jungle and taking new positions - two Indian brigades, for instance, have bisected the rail line north of Schwebo. Movement dots still indicating a general Japanese withdrawal. Somebody made the valid point that the John can march overland from Tavoy to Bangkok to extract his army from Burma if necessary. True, but the main point has been that it will take John probably two months to get units from Burma into the contested ground at Sumatra. Since he has ten or so divisions committed in Burma, that forces him to haul in units from other distant locales, which will be tough and time consuming.

A comment to add to the posting count: thin black smoke from a ship usually indicates system damage in the 10-15 range, which is likely to have occurred during high speed steaming to get to the area.

I have been wondering where Yamato and Musashi are. Could he be assembling a large BB force to try muscle its way into your ports? I know you can account for the whereabouts of about half the IJN BBs, but have forgotten how many you have sunk.

_____________________________

No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth

(in reply to Canoerebel)
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RE: Singe My Eyebrows with a Lusty Bullwhip - 7/2/2013 6:36:32 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline 		Hmm, all this talk of excoriation seems a tad misplaced. I hope CR doesn't feel excoriated when or if I disagree with him re: a strategic opportunity. Its only because he actually tries to extend his play that I post. Most AARs there's no effort to extend oneself and so no point me posting anything.

Obviously, as I think is now clear, the ideal strategic approach to this would have been:
1. Landing on Malaysia on Day 1 with a view to cutting the peninsula's neck ( just as you've done ) with sufficient forces to stay the course there. This would have been based on the realisation that to threaten Malaysia is to draw his strategic reserves there --- and away from Sumatra --- into a fight which it would be NICE for the Allies to win but wouldn't be crucial. Essentially by choosing the enemy's essential ground to fight on but that also being ground which isn't essential to you you safeguard the essential ground you MUST hold ( Sumatra ).

I see the desire to be "sure" of Sumatra before committing to Malaysia as being indicative of a temerity which is caused by the fact that you haven't done operations like this before. You're in the walk before you run stage IMO. You are taking hugely advantageous strategic situations and turning them into nice operations and minor strategic victories. Over time as you gain confidence and experience we'll just have to see whether you begin looking for the possibilities inherent in the strategic situation at the strategic level and are willing to commit to exploit them. That comes down to temperament and experience and I think it also comes down to whether or not you've played someone who DOES do those sorts of things ( being on the receiving end of a balls to the wall invasion of Malysia which committed 80% of the ground force to Malaysia and 20% to Sumatra instead of vice versa does tend to teach you that that might be the way to go if the tables are ever reversed ). For example I'm quite certain that Damian would have launched this invasion with the clear intent of getting into Malaysia from Day 1.

2. Additionally the other 1/3rd of xAPs should have been loaded with forces ready to land elsewhere on the Japanese perimeter. Right now would be the perfect time to unmask them.

Extending one's strategic vision is all about going a little farther next time than you did this time and being prepared to fail ignominiously. You're trying something new for you this time, and for that you need to be applauded. You didn't commit to this as fully as, IMO, you should have but maybe next time you'll commit a bit more and next time even more and so on and so forth until you end up launching this sort of thing with the intent of getting into Malaysia from Day 1 whilst having additional forces ready to create a breach on another IJA/IJN Strategic Direction in co-ordination with this thrust.

I lost a LOT of chess matches when I tried "something interesting" or had an idea and wanted to see how it played out. Over time though I figured which brainwaves worked and which didn't and became a better thinker for it. If you want to improve you've got to risk and be prepared to lose... a LOT... ;-). Fortunately the Allies have endlessly deep pockets.


I'm a bit curious though as to why the three most obvious indicators of John's strategic counter-thrust with IJA forces haven't been highlighted and explored though... There's a lot of talk of what he might do but not much talk about the indicators which will clearly indicate what he;s going to do with the IJA.

Basically his IJA options boil down to five options, only 3 of which are even slightly feasible:
1. Commit the IJA to Malaysia wholesale and reduce your forces there before moving on to an invasion of Sumatra. This seeks to engage your ground forces piecemeal.
Indicator: INTENSE IJN efforts to close the Malacca strait with SC TFs and CV forays.

2. Commit the IJA to Northern Sumatra directly by forcing an opposed landing on one of the bases you've taken.
Indicator: Intense IJN efforts to isolate your southernmost base but limited to IJN surface assets. No CV forays.
Assessment: John won't do this as if he is going for the land war in northern Sumatra option he'll choose Option 3.

3. Commit the IJA to Southern Sumatra and march them into Northern Sumatra via the roads whilst containing the Malaysian beacheads.
Indicator: Limited IJA assets in Malaysia which are clearly insufficient to eliminate your landings combined with limited forays into the waters between Sumatra and Malaysia + significant mining efforts to close the Malacca straits to YOUR forces raiding southward.
Assessment: His most likely option IMO but it will be combined with option 4 IMO.

4. Commit the IJA to taking the islands off the WESTERN coast of northern Sumatra, turning them into Netty bases and using KB in the Indian Ocean only until such time as these bases are up and running as Netty bases ( Level 3 airfield + Air HQ ).
Indicator: KB enters the Indian Ocean and attempts to close it to traffic whilst covering landings on these western Islands ( he only needs 1 but will grab more than that for insurance ). If he lands on these islands then the ONLY explanation is that he wants to isolate northern Sumatra from supply. That speaks to a long grinding down of your forces there which removes the need for an amphibious landing into the teeth of your defences and thus would be combined with Option 3, IMO.


5. He tries to do everything at once. Won't happen. Too many people will scream at him not to even if that's his initial inclination.



Overall I think you'll see the following:
1. KB into the Indian Ocean plus acting as a covering force for amphibious landings on the Western Sumatran islands. Turning of these islands into Netty bases. Should be suspected if you see Air HQs in the landing group. He will want his big, flash, shiny stuff (KB) to make big bangs and cause excitement and ship sinkings. Thus he won't want to use it as part of a long-term blockade... This is why he will capture these islands, it'll let him baby his CVs for whenever they can do "cool, explosiony stuff".

2. IJA assets sufficient to contain your forces in Malaysia but no more than that.

3. IJA forces marching up from Palembang/Southern Sumatra into northern sumatra taking their time secure in the knowledge that you are cut off from supplies - Approx 2 months ETA on this.


I doubt John sees this clearly yet or has this formed as a cohesive strategic plan... e.g. I'm sure he'd like to crush you in Malaysia and will waste time and effort trying to do that whilst achieving the other strands also but force correlations will force this strategic reality upon his hubris over time and he'll reduce his plan to the 3 essentials outlined above.

Of course I could be entirely wrong in my assessment but assessing people and judging which way they'll jump on far more important stuff than this is what I do all day every day. With that said this is not his plan today BUT it is what his plan will be reduced to by logistical constraints and the objective reality of the situation.



In terms of CR's plan... I think it has gone well. Better than it would have for most but, obviously, the lack of appropriate weighting to the Malaysian aspect ( since it was only tacked on at the last minute ) has limited its success as has the lack of an attack along a second Strategic Direction. With that said CR needs to be congratulated for attempting it at all AND for taking a chance on Malaysia when that wasn't part of his initial plan. Most wouldn't have improvised like that, IMO.

I think Malaysia and the Western Sumatran islands are going to be the crucial garrisoning points for the Allies over the next month. I think that Northern Sumatra itself could be stripped bare at little risk. That's what I'd do, take all the troops from Sumatra and send them to garrison the western sumatran islands and to support the Malaysian beachheads. You have 3 islands in the west and need, IMO, to hold 2. I would plan accordingly, allowing one to fall to his troops in order to tie his fleet to it in terms of support etc.


< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 7/2/2013 6:38:59 PM >

_____________________________

John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 6:37:27 PM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 24520
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
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quote:

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy
A comment to add to the posting count: thin black smoke from a ship usually indicates system damage in the 10-15 range, which is likely to have occurred during high speed steaming to get to the area.


A comment to say that I concur with this assessment.

_____________________________


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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 6:38:03 PM   
crsutton


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From: Maryland
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy


quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Seriously.

The coming carrier clash could go either way, right? I mean, the Allied carriers could react, get dispersed, and could lose ugly. Bad ugly. Ugly to the point that John's carriers and combat ships achieve control of the sea lanes. Control such that he can interdict all supply and reinforcement efforts into the distant future.

That's my nightmare scenario. If that happens, the Allied lodgement in Malaya isn't going to have an indefinite shelf life, so the Allied position in Sumatra had better be rock solid.

If, on the other hand, Japan loses a carrier battle - or it is a draw - then the Allies can remain more aggressive.

If the Joint Chiefs see it differently, they need to persuade Admiral King to remove me from command!


Alright, if you're seriously thinking about abandoning your lodgement on Malaya, I'd suggest you reconsider.

In controlling Singora and the rail bases in 'the neck', you're essentially throttling Singapore. It will take John months to bring an effective response from Burma by foot. True dat-there may be other forces coming in from the home islands, China, elsewhere, but if you think he'll be able to hastily dislodge you from that critical rail line, you're mistaken.

Like Sibolga, a US Division, dug into jungle / rough terrain and supplied will be extremely difficult to dislodge. If you can maintain such a lodgement well into 1943, it can be expanded and be a source for metastasis elsewhere on Malaya. If you can keep Singora, you can bring immediate pressure on the Gulf of Siam, reinforcement into Bangkok and, in short order, Singapore. If you can threaten / render Palembang unusable, you have the ingredients for a tightening gauntlet around his throat.

Agree with others that say that as Malaya heats up, Sumatra will be relegated to secondary importance too.

The risk:reward is decidedly in your favor for playing your hand aggressively on Malaya. You can do a lot of harm to his right flank for a modest price. I'd do it.


It is so tempting but from my own experience I know that taking the northern half of Sumatra dooms Singapore and closes it as a Naval base. No real need to expose yourself in the Malay Peninsula. At this point Japan can still bring a lot of force to this theater. If it were mid 43, I would encourage CR to fight but at this stage holding Sumatra is a war winner anyways. I know the air production of a competent Japanese player at this stage of the war. It is pretty daunting.

CR knows his business here. There is no need for him to push it when he has already forced John to react. I think myself, I would be moving attack transport back to the Pacific for a follow up campaign. Because John will have to keep KB near until he get whipped or whips CR.

_____________________________

I am the Holy Roman Emperor and am above grammar.

Sigismund of Luxemburg

(in reply to Chickenboy)
Post #: 2688
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 6:51:12 PM   
BBfanboy


Posts: 18046
Joined: 8/4/2010
From: Winnipeg, MB
Status: offline 		CRSutton - are you saying that John III wields the Lusty Bullwhip? Not to worry - CR can handle a little eyebrow singeing ... while he moves in with his sledgehammer.

_____________________________

No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth

(in reply to crsutton)
Post #: 2689
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 6:57:58 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline 		Thanks, Gents.

Nemo's analysis makes for interesting reading. By the way, I forgot to mention that John landed a fast transport detachment at my second from the bottom island off western Sumatra. I agree that John currently wants "to do everything at once," which of course he can't do. I further agree that he will post the KB in the IO and will likely avoid the Malacca Straits (that's what I've been saying all along, so I had better agree!). If John implements a plan weighted this way - to parry with the KB in the IO, take one or more western isles, and march a grand army up the island - it's gonna take him a LONG time. It may also free the Allies to operate more aggressivelely across the straits, building up the Alor Star beachhead. That, in turn, becomes easier as the Allies take Medan (I consider this a near certainty within a week) and possibly Tandjoen (and outside shot at this).

Point: I don't see how John can ever hope to recapture northern Sumatra via a land campaign. He will need 10 divisions and four to six months.

What I take from this: First, I need to reinforce those western Sumatra islands - at least the two northernmost ones. Second, as the Indian garrison draws near to Sabang, that will free up troops to move to the front lines. The priorities being Alor Star, Medan, the two western islets.

(in reply to crsutton)
Post #: 2690
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 7:02:35 PM   
AcePylut


Posts: 1494
Joined: 3/19/2004
Status: offline 		So take Wake and Marcus while the KB is in the IO - and then you open the sea lanes to make a thrust to Marianas at some point in the future where you implement Phase 2 of the Sumatra Invasion and Beyond. Run some fast amphib fleets to take a few of the dot islands in the Marshals too. Just to give him something to think about.

_____________________________


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Post #: 2691
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 9:06:28 PM   
Nemo121


Posts: 5821
Joined: 2/6/2004
Status: offline
quote:

I forgot to mention that John landed a fast transport detachment at my second from the bottom island off western Sumatra


Well then, this confirms the hypothesis. KB block, western sumatran island re-occupation + land campaign from southern Sumatra it is....


quote:

I don't see how John can ever hope to recapture northern Sumatra via a land campaign. He will need 10 divisions and four to six months.


And you know this is a bad plan because of the greater strategic context of what not having those 10 divisions elsewhere for 4 to 6 months means in terms of Allied offensive opportunities. If, on the other hand, you weren't thinking about the greater strategic picture but were, due to surprise and shock, excessively focused on just retaking Sumatra then you might be so seduced at the idea of liberating your HULK, SMASH, CRUSH!!!! side that you didn't think of the greater strategic picture ( plus John has difficulty operating on that level at the best of times so it wouldn't take my to disequilibriate him to the point where that level gets utterly discarded in favour of monomaniacal focus).

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Well, that's that settled then.

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Post #: 2692
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 10:33:27 PM   
obvert


Posts: 14050
Joined: 1/17/2011
From: PDX (and now) London, UK
Status: offline
quote:

I don't see how John can ever hope to recapture northern Sumatra via a land campaign. He will need 10 divisions and four to six months.


Will he? What if these Allied bases are cut off, bombarded, and then attacked. What if the KB wins an engagement? Still need 10 divisions and six months?


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Post #: 2693
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 10:34:08 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline 		Nope.

(in reply to obvert)
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 10:56:12 PM   
AcePylut


Posts: 1494
Joined: 3/19/2004
Status: offline 		While it seems that John is a "hulk smash" and sees lots of victory points sitting in Sumatra - does he need to invade Northern Sumatra to make your bases ineffective? Or does he just need to isolate the bases to neutralize them?

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Post #: 2695
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 10:56:51 PM   
The Sandman

 

Posts: 7
Joined: 6/30/2013
Status: offline 		John tends to be a very aggressive player and you've currently got a lot more expendable xAKs and xAPs in the area than you'd need to resupply an existing lodgement, right?

Why not use that against him?

Send out a bunch of small, scattered TFs to make it look like you've started dispersing everything now that you know there are carriers of some kind in the area. Let John smash them. But make sure there's lots of them all over the place.

Once he's expended his sorties on the bait, then come in and smash him with your carriers. IIRC, if he's using aggressive settings for his carrier aviation in order to get them to launch on your warships, he can't keep them from deciding to attack any other naval target in range instead.

If your CVs are fast enough to do this, maybe try to run them through the Malacca and Sunda Straits in one or two turns, in order to interpose your carriers between the KB and Singapore/Batavia/Soerabaja when he sends his carriers back to restock.

Also, do you have any spare cruisers you can send in to bombard Palembang?

And do you know where that juicy all-AO TF that you spotted a few turns back is? They might be an even better target than KB itself.

(in reply to Canoerebel)
Post #: 2696
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 11:00:44 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: AcePylut
While it seems that John is a "hulk smash" and sees lots of victory points sitting in Sumatra - does he need to invade Northern Sumatra to make your bases ineffective? Or does he just need to isolate the bases to neutralize them?


Under the current set up, he can't neutralize by isolating. The Allies have too much supply and too many troops, plus aircraft can readily ferry in and out from Ceylon and Assam. So John can neutralize only by retaking the bases or pounding them (via bombardment) out of supply. He can't do either of the latter (at least within a single geologic age) without neutralizing the Allied carriers. So, we're back to square one: Carriers.

(in reply to AcePylut)
Post #: 2697
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/2/2013 11:06:09 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: The Sandman

John tends to be a very aggressive player and you've currently got a lot more expendable xAKs and xAPs in the area than you'd need to resupply an existing lodgement, right?

Why not use that against him?

Send out a bunch of small, scattered TFs to make it look like you've started dispersing everything now that you know there are carriers of some kind in the area. Let John smash them. But make sure there's lots of them all over the place.

Once he's expended his sorties on the bait, then come in and smash him with your carriers. IIRC, if he's using aggressive settings for his carrier aviation in order to get them to launch on your warships, he can't keep them from deciding to attack any other naval target in range instead.

If your CVs are fast enough to do this, maybe try to run them through the Malacca and Sunda Straits in one or two turns, in order to interpose your carriers between the KB and Singapore/Batavia/Soerabaja when he sends his carriers back to restock.

Also, do you have any spare cruisers you can send in to bombard Palembang?

And do you know where that juicy all-AO TF that you spotted a few turns back is? They might be an even better target than KB itself.


1. I use picket ships judiciously, but I won't "flood the zone" with sacrificial lambs to soak off sorties. I wouldn't like it if an opponent did that to me, so I won't do it to an opponent. :)

2. No way to run carriers through either of the straits unless I have a death wish. Mines and big airfields would do nasty things.

3. I don't have any cruisers to spare on missions that would be suicidal.

(in reply to The Sandman)
Post #: 2698
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/3/2013 12:55:54 AM   
paullus99


Posts: 1985
Joined: 1/23/2002
Status: offline 		CR - John has to come to you in this situation (very different from the "lay in wait & pounce" strategy he employed with great success against Andy). You beat him once in the IO, you can do it again.

He's way too aggressive to just sit back and attrit you - you have this one, you just need to keep looking at the bigger picture and make him react to you, not the other way around.

How does China look?

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Post #: 2699
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent - 7/3/2013 3:13:05 PM   
Canoerebel


Posts: 21100
Joined: 12/14/2002
From: Northwestern Georgia, USA
Status: offline 		11/22/42

At Sea: A sharp battle between a USN DM force and four IJN DDs at Tandjoen. The Allies lose two DD and a DM. The Allies bombard Georgetown. Lots of vulnerable Allied shipping between Sabang and Colombo (when John pounces, he'll clobber a bunch of whatever is out there at the time). The key lead xAPs carrying much of the Indian division combat squads are perhaps two days out of Sabang. No sign of enemy carriers.

On the Ground: The snap enemy invasion of Batoe-Eilenden will need reinforcements. The Allies lands a fast transport detachment of a RCT at Sinabang (the northernmost island) with another heading for Nias tonight. The Allies are perhaps three to four days out of Medan in force. I doubt Japan can hold this key base - not yet sure John is willing to try giving it's advanced location and the numbers he has available. To try to discourage him a bit - and in hopes of reducing the base's oil production - an RN TF will bombard tonight or tomorrow night.

In the Air: Not much happening today. Sabang airfield goes to level 5.19 (an increase of .20, so perhaps five days to level 6, though I am beginning to shift some engineers forward to Langsa). 215 fighters based here now.

Burma: 18th IJA Div. is retreating down the coastal road. It appears very likely John will pull back at least as far as Prome. If so, that will open up the Ramree Island causeway, making it possible for roughly 450 AV to advance and join the offensive aimed ultimately at Rangoon and Moulmein. Right now, John still seems to be trying to hold the Mandalay/Magwe sector, but I think he's likely to conclude soon that if he's retiring down the coastal road, his flank is insecure. There's a chance the Allies can "bluster" and "boo" and "scat" to encourage John to retire back to the Rangoon/Pegu region without much of a fight.

Oil: I don't think the threats (and isolation) of Magwe and Medan will have any short term consequences from an oil delivery standpoint, but the potential longterm impact might be two important considerations in John's overall mindset. IE, those are two more reasons for John to construe all of this as the "ultimate crisis" requiring a "no holds barred" attack. I mean, can he afford to keep his carriers back? I don't think so. I think he has to gather the full might of his fleet and attack.


< Message edited by Canoerebel -- 7/3/2013 3:14:01 PM >

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