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All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> Options?

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Options? - 1/24/2003 1:03:25 PM

Odin

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I want to have some options to customize the victory conditions.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 31

- 1/24/2003 7:02:02 PM

Hoplosternum

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Well perhaps by saying the US will brush aside the IJN I have over stated this. But during late 43 and 44 the US will have a lot of CVs with better planes, stacks of top quality replacements and excellent flak support supplied by his DDs, CLs, CAs and BBs. Plus a lot of LBA and transports. I expect that the Allied player would usually be able to throttle the Japanese as they did historically by mid - '45 even though a human IJN may avoid a Midway type disaster.

Mogami - I agree there will be plenty of blunders and if UV is any guide the IJN capital ships are quite frail re their US counterparts due to damage control. Still I expect the Japanese will usually do better (as long as the Philippines, East Indies and Malaya can actually be taken!). After the initial conquests I would expect them to be a little more cautious than they were historically and make sure there CVs are usually covered by their long range LBA. I just don't think the IJN will be able to stop the US fleet in 44 unless it has been hugely successful in 42 and can continuously attrite the US reinforcements far more than they did historically.

Mdiehl - I am surprised you are impressed by the two prong strategy. I have heard almost nothing good about it and cannot think how it does anything but slow down the attacks. A single main stroke is surely much better.

Consider the position after the Marshalls are captured. The Japanese do not know whether the US will go for the Marianas (threatening the Bonins and the Philippines) or the Carolines (cutting off all their forces in eastern NG and the Solomons). Historically they took the Marianas then threatened three key Japanese bases (Carolines, Philippines and Bonins). But IRL they were still sending huge amounts of reinforcements, planes and shipping to support attacks along the coast of NG. As transport shipping was by that stage the key determinant of how fast the allies could advance (in all theatres not just the Pacific) how could this be anything other than a hindrance? I am not saying that the other theatres go into hibernation. They can and should be used to distract the IJN player. If he abandons a theatre (which historically he never did) then relatively light forces could make limited advances. The thrust need not be through the central Pacific. It may follow the MacArthur route, or even from Australia towards the Eastern East Indies and then north (if logistically possible). The whole advantage of the single thrust is that it concentrates your forces but is not entirely predictable to your opponent. He must spread out.

As a human IJN may not have lost his pre war CV fleet and will simply concentrate against one prong, possibly getting a victory he is highly unlikely to get against a single prong attack. I have never seen any commentator on the period expressing the virtues of the two pronged attacks (although many do not either praise or criticise). It seems to fly in the face of most military strategy I am familiar with.

Timjot - Yes the US will need a base to assault Japan either the Philippines or Taiwan. But they need not conquer all of the Philippines as they historically did to get this base. I am aware that from the time the allies get sea superiority (late 43 or early 44 even if the IJN avoids a Midway unless the US are continuously being battered) they still have a lot to do. Each attack and then stock piling for the next will take time. This is another reason why a human player will not go all 'two pronged' in his advance. He will concentrate his transports supporting one front so these stockpiles are built as soon as possible.

Feinder - I think you are correct that the Victory Conditions may well be similar to the UV ones. Actually I hope that it is.

As I believe that a single stroke will be very hard to stop I am quite hopeful that victory is not determined on some kind of 'get X number of B - 29s on size Y airbases by mid 45 in range of Japan'. I think it will be almost unstoppable even if the Japanese play a good early game. A system based on bases will at least encourage the allies to push forward sooner and so give the Japanese some chance in the end game phase. It may also force the allies to split up their attacking force to take the necessary objectives.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 32

- 1/25/2003 1:19:06 AM

mdiehl

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The two prongued strategy accomplished (accomplishes) several tasks. 1. It tied/ties up more Japanese forces in an attrition battle that is stacked in favor of the US. 2. It resulted/will likely result in the dstruction of far more Japanese troops & material than Allied ones (and these will not be available for deployment or reaction elsewhere). 3. It provides more locations from which the US may base superior aircraft in superior numbers and thereyby reduce Japanese installations and attrit their a/c further down the line. 4. It makes Allied objectives that much more ambiguous.

Since the Allies have sufficient infrastructure to support simultaneously a 2-prongued approach, it seems the best way to me. The 1-thrust thing only works if the Japanese player does not anticipate where you will attack. If he does, then it will fail (or simply fail to progress as rapidly as is needed) in spectaular fashion.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 33

- 1/25/2003 3:14:04 AM

thantis

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Actually, the Japanese player with have three to four prongs to worry about:

1) SWPAC - Solomons, New Guinea & beyond

2) SOPAC - Mid Pacific Offensive

3) Indian Ocean, SE Asia & Java - a British Offensive from India through Burma & possibly Air/Sea offensive back into the Pacific & into Indonesia

4) China - on going actions against the Chinese & the potential for more aid & more agressive operations by the allies in this theater

5) Soviet Union - eventually they will become a player (hopefully an option in the game)

The amount of forces necessary to truly tie down the allies is more than the Japanese had at any time during the conflict. It will be interesting to see how play balance is addressed....

_____________________________

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(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 34

- 1/25/2003 3:37:22 AM

TIMJOT

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]The two prongued strategy accomplished (accomplishes) several tasks. 1. It tied/ties up more Japanese forces in an attrition battle that is stacked in favor of the US. 2. It resulted/will likely result in the dstruction of far more Japanese troops & material than Allied ones (and these will not be available for deployment or reaction elsewhere). 3. It provides more locations from which the US may base superior aircraft in superior numbers and thereyby reduce Japanese installations and attrit their a/c further down the line. 4. It makes Allied objectives that much more ambiguous.

Since the Allies have sufficient infrastructure to support simultaneously a 2-prongued approach, it seems the best way to me. The 1-thrust thing only works if the Japanese player does not anticipate where you will attack. If he does, then it will fail (or simply fail to progress as rapidly as is needed) in spectaular fashion. [/B][/QUOTE]

Mdiehl

Although I agree with you that the two prong approached worked well enough and offered some distinct advantages. It had never been envisioned as the planed strategy to defeat Japan. Its implemention was due to compromised default rather than some grand enlighten strategy.

Just because one strategy worked doesnt exclude the possibility of other strategies could have worked just as well or better.

If you are saying that the long planned for single central pacific thrust could not have succeeded without SOPAC/SWP campaign. I totally disagree. The USN had planed for nearly 40 years for just such a strategy and certainly it could have and most likely would have succeeded. All the attrition inflicted in Sopac would most likely also been attained in the Central Pacific. If anything the attrition would have been more favorable because the US surface radar advantage would not have been nullified as it was early on by Slot geography. The geography in the centpac favors the offense where barren atolls are easily isolated and offer no where to hide. The small size of the islands do not allow for large scale deployments. If the centpac offense starts earlier (landing craft shortages not withstanding) then the garrisons are going to be even weaker than historical.

Certainly the CenPac advance entails its own set of hazards and difficulties, but to state unequivically that "it would fail in spectacular fasion" is a bit overstated to say the least

Regards

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 35

- 1/25/2003 6:01:55 AM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]If you are saying that the long planned for single central pacific thrust could not have succeeded without SOPAC/SWP campaign. I totally disagree.[/QUOTE]

I'm not saying it *would not* have succeeded. However, there's the distinct possibility (and a higher probability than with a multi-prongued approach, IMO) that Japan could have met such a thrust on more-equal terms, possibly even obtaining the desired "decisive battle." They'd have lost such a battle, IMO, even without the substantial lessons learned in the water and in the air in the SOPAC, but the cost might have been *much* greater to the US.

[QUOTE]The USN had planed for nearly 40 years for just such a strategy and certainly it could have and most likely would have succeeded.[/QUOTE]

I disagree with "certainly" and marginally agree with "most likely" with the caveat that the success might easily have come at a much higher price. Bear in mind that the 30 years of study devoted to the problem was conducted at a time when the real effectiveness of airpower to control the battle and to sink ships was not known. Aircraft lethality towards ships increased by leaps and bounds after 1939. Guam and Saipan alone could have based a thousand aircraft.

[QUOTE]All the attrition inflicted in Sopac would most likely also been attained in the Central Pacific.[/QUOTE]

Maybe, but from where? Sailing TF 38 or 58 up to say, Guam, out of the range of US land based a/c, in the face of an unattrited IJN land air flotilla (since you're assuming no Cactus or no New Guinea campaign, let's assume 11th Air Fleet), is a much riskier proposition than attriting IJN air projection by dragging them into a losing war in New Guinea or the Solomons (where the Allies held the advantage). In each case (to Truk, then to Guam/Saipan/Tinian) the US CVs go it alone against Japanese CVs and land bases wityh well-developed, mutually supporting airfileds. Then there's the ground combat, with US CVs tied down in support of the operation until US land bases can be built (or Japanese ones captured), and all the while with Japanese CVs free to hit you when and how they want.

It'd be Marianas w/o the Turkey Shoot. Several times over. Good way to run the USN/USMC pilot pool into the ground, even if you don't lose half the CVs in the process.

[QUOTE]If anything the attrition would have been more favorable because the US surface radar advantage would not have been nullified as it was early on by Slot geography.[/QUOTE]

Well, so you're suggesting a complete delay in confronting the Japanese until what, SJ radar is available? It's not like SC is going to give you that much of an advantage in a decsisive naval battle fought near Truk or the Marianas in 1942. In the meantime, Japan's unattrited pilot pool expands and gets better.

[QUOTE] The geography in the centpac favors the offense where barren atolls are easily isolated and offer no where to hide.
The small size of the islands do not allow for large scale deployments. [/QUOTE]

This is only true for the, first chain (Marshalls?). Basically, Midway, Wake, Tarawa, and possibly Eniwetok and Kwajalein. Once you're up against Truk or Guam/Saipan/Tinian you're up against a hard know of substantial land masses with multiple airfields capable of mutual support.

[QUOTE]If the centpac offense starts earlier (landing craft shortages not withstanding) then the garrisons are going to be even weaker than historical.[/QUOTE]

I agree with *that* at any event. But I think the only places you're going to grab easily, in the face of a largely unattrited Japanese pool of pilots and a/c, are on the margins.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 36

- 1/28/2003 11:45:49 AM

Snigbert

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Any two prong or multi prong attacks means that the Allies are dividing their forces, making multiple weaker forces. Although historically the Japanese were unwilling to abandon any areas, in the game the Japanese could withdraw everything but token forces from one of the allied axis's (how do you pluralize axis?) of advance and attempt to defeat the divided allied forces in detail. That's what Napoleon would have done, at least. Easier said then done, but I think when you have overwhelming superiority you want to concentrate your forces for the knock out blow.

On the other hand, the odds are so one sided that you can divide into two forces and each one has the ability to inflict the knock out blow. But I think it goes against conventional military wisdom.

_____________________________

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"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 37

- 1/28/2003 2:05:48 PM

bradfordkay

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In the long run, the US followed two and a half axes (I believe that it is spelled that way) of attack: Central Pacific, Solomons/New Guinea/Phillipines, and supplying the Commonwealth attack through Burma.

Personally I think that the Japanese player should receive VP for transporting resource points back to Japan. This, after all, is the reason for the war. Scoring VPs for delivering raw materials to Japan would also even out a system that only counts VP for bases controlled at the end of the game.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 38

- 1/29/2003 10:39:59 PM

mdiehl

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I tried to respond yesterday but there was some sort of error.

Anyhow, *one* prong straight through the CenPac actually weakens the US attack. Two prongs allows the Allies to bring the USAAF and RAAF into the fray, enabling the Allies thereby to take full advantage of their overwhelming logistical superiority. One prong through the CenPac means that the US CVs multitask CAP, airfield suppression, ground support, and perimeter defense (including bagging any pesky Japanese CVs that show up). Multitasking CVs is a stupid idea, as the IJN learned at Midway, unless you have overwhelming air supremacy. Since the cenpac island bases held by Japan can in theory base thousands of a/c, the USN will not have air supremacy. Since you've given the Japanese the luxury of concentrating them all against your point of attack, odds are you lose 2 CVs every time you move against another island. By the time you get to Guam, there are no US CVs left with which to continue the assault.

In sum the one-prong approach is a great way to get the decisive battle that Japan wants on odds that most favor Japan.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 39

- 1/30/2003 6:08:56 AM

Yamamoto

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The US should face some sort of victory point penalty for not making it a priority ofLiberating the Philippeans prior to advancing on the home islands. Historically it was very important for the US to liberate the American territory.

Yamamoto

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Post #: 40

- 1/30/2003 9:10:57 AM

Jeremy Pritchard

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The multi pronged attack did many things.

#1. It gave a better chance of success (should one attack fail, you have others advancing that you can base further operations on)

#2. Not only were American resources divided, but so too were Japanese resources. Japan had an 'idea' where the Allies were going, but not exact knowledge. They knew that the Marianas would be attacked, but which islands, beaches would be assaulted. Should US goals be more direct, so too could Japanese counters.

While the Japanese would still have lost, Allied losses would have been higher, and there could possibly have been some landings that actually failed (had the Marianas been garrisoned by more then just the equivalent of 2 IJA Divisions, 50% of them newly raised).

Remember, they could land only X many divisions on a beach at a time, however, defending forces can be increased much easier.

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Post #: 41

- 1/30/2003 9:40:23 AM

Dirtdog20

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As I understand Sun Tzu and Liddle-Hart, advancing by two mutually supporting axis of advance would be a "better",(many factors need to be looked at here), strategy than the single thrust axis of advance. The ideal of course is to give your opponent so many options to have to guard against that your forces are able to fall upon his divided forces and defeat him in detail. Preferably, (and this again is in theory), united to strike in a massive blow.
The same strategy can be executed on a single axis of advance as long as the ultimate objective is kept shrouded from your enemy for as long as possible. The down side is that we all know what the "Victory Conditions" are and that makes the single axis advance more difficult in wargaming than the two pronged advance.
A strategem I am testing now in PacWar is following a dual path through SW Pac and SPac and swinging my Carrier and surface TF from one operation to the other. While one operation is being executed the other is being built up and protected by LBA. The end result being that I am able to advance on two prongs while focusing all my combat elements in just one theater at a time.

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Post #: 42

Plan 9 from Outer Space - 1/30/2003 9:41:02 AM

mogami

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hi, I don't know about the rest of you but I will have as many operations going as I can support. I expect at some point SOPAC and SWPAC will converge. CenPAC will have divisions (and I don't intend that they be idle) And I'd want the British to be busy.
Any base recon tells be I can take (provided the means are on hand) I'm going to jump on.

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Post #: 43

COUPLE OF THOUGHTS - 1/30/2003 2:47:48 PM

Mike Scholl

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One advantage no one seems to have mentioned to the original
"two-pronged" was that it allowed the US to make use of more
of it's resources. SWPAC's drive along the north coast of New Guinea was made primarily with Army and Army Air Corps units.
The Central Pacific drive was primarily a Navy/Marine effort. The
Army drive could be made with minimal Navy involvement until
the "hop" to the Phillippines by using Army land-based air cover
to jump along the coast. The Navy's Central Pacific drive needed
a large "fleet train" but fewer troops as the islands were minimal
in size and when "by-passed" the garrisons couldn't do much
to interfere. It might have been wasteful in some respects---but
it wasn't without it's advantages. It will be an interesting
decision for the Allied player.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 44

- 1/30/2003 5:27:06 PM

Hoplosternum

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Hi,

I still believe that a single thrust that threatens multiple objectives is better. That does not mean that the other fronts are completely quiet nor that if a good opportunity arose some advance or redirection of resources could not be made. As for Liddell Hart I believe he preferred the single thrust strategy as it was more efficient than the two thrust one and says so in his History of the Second World War book.

I will try and give an example from UV. If you, as the allies are out numbered 4 CVs to 6 in UV and the IJN are on the offensive. If he simultaneously attacks Luganville (from Lunga) with 3 CVs and an invasion force plus Cairns (from PM) with 3CVs and an invasion force are you pleased that he has split his forces or downcast that he is attacking two objectives? Would you split your mobile defensive forces to fight at both?

Come on you would be delighted that your opponent has split his forces, throwing away his numeric advantage and concentrate against one thrust on equal (or possibly) superior terms. You can deal with the success of the other attack later.

Now in UV it is relatively easy to concentrate your mobile forces (airgroups, CVs, BBs etc.) on one front then switch them to the other, so you can attack along two axis without really spliting your forces. For the allies everything could be supplied from Noumea if necessary and the land combat units could be used from either command. For the IJN a forward base at Rabaul or Shortlands can support either axis of attack. But in WitP it will take a week or more to transfer forces and the forward supply bases will not be able to support either thrust. A campaign around Lae or the Solomon's can not be supported by the stock piles for Central Pacific's campaigns and these stock piles will be crucial and take a long time to accumulate even with the huge allied sealift mid to late war. So you will have to split your logistic forces and your army / marine forces.

As for attriting down the Japanese forces this is more easily done if you have overwhelming superiority at the point of attack (easiest and earliest done by a single thrust) and you choose an axis of attack that threatens multiple objectives that are valuable to your enemy (so the defender is the one who splits his forces). A two prong attack can be every bit as predictable as a single stroke, but because each attack is weaker gives the enemy more of a chance to concentrate and counter attack.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 45

IT WILL BE AN INTERESTING DECISION.. - 1/30/2003 8:27:35 PM

Mike Scholl

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What a great "straw dog". Sounds knowledgeable...and has
very little to do with the subject. Said subject being the ALLIED
Offensive of 1944, and the advantage/disadvantage of making
it "Two-Pronged".

The POINT I was making is that by this period the Americans will
have SO MUCH coming into the Pacific that they may need to
make multiple drives just to "bring it all to bear". By the start of
1944, MacArthur had not only his own complete Air Force but
damned near his own Navy (By the end of the war the US Army
was operating MORE ships than the US Navy---primarily support
and amphibious warfare craft. He'd gotten 2 of the first three
division-sized Amphibious Landing Brigades---everything needed
to put troops ashore and keep them there). And he had TWO
Armies. The only thing the Army sometimes needed to "borrow"
were a few days of carrier support if they were making a "long"
jump.
The Navy was steadily recieving the results of the "Two-Ocean
Navy Bill", and the first "War Emergency Acts". Not only were
they recieving carriers every month, but also Battleships,
Cruisers, and Escorts.., plus the entire "Fleet Train" needed to
keep the whole mass "at sea and fighting" for extended periods.
All they needed was a "Theatre" with enough "blue water" to
use it in..., and to borrow a few Army Troops and Aircraft to
suplement their own.
Now in game terms, the player will make the decision on how
he wants to bring this mass of assets into action. And I think
that even proponants of the "single thrust" theory will find
themselves "widening" it just to get all their toys into the fight.
Those Central Pacific Islands are mostly atolls until the Marianas,
and while they are often great fleet anchorages they have a
minimum of surface area for basing hundreds of Army Bombers.
The New Guinea coast has plenty of land area, some decent
anchorages, but not a lot of "blue water" to manuever carrier
fleets in. Now in WitP an Allied player could theoretically try to
launch his attack West of Australia to the East Indies, or send
more to Stillwell in the CBI, or all kinds of things. So I think a
dialog over the merits of single vs. multiple "prongs" is an
interesting one---but in the end it will come down to how well
your Japanese opponant did early and how well you can apply
the massive Allied strength later in making the choice. The
"example" using the Japanese in 1942 doesn't hold water---
they would never in the whole war have such monsterous forces
that "basing area" became a tactical/strategic consideration.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 46

- 1/30/2003 11:09:54 PM

Hoplosternum

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Hello Mike,

I don't want this to get heated but I am still unconvinced by your arguments :) I accept that the US had an embarrassment of riches by the late war. But even it never had enough for everything. Halsey's carriers were either off bombing Japan or some other base or covering and supporting the landings in the Philippines Campaign. Likewise with the fast battleships - off chasing rumours of the IJN or guarding / supporting the landings. The CVEs were not enough to secure the landing areas and the IJN even at this late stage had a chance to severely dent the transports.

But where I think your argument is at it's weakest is when you start talking about attriting down the Japanese. I am sure that the MacArthur prong captured / killed many troops but how did this really help finish the war earlier? If the whole of the upper Solomon's and north NG had been cut off after the wrecking of the Carolines bases and capture of the Marianas and Philippines so what if there are 100,000s of unfought (but starving and unsupplied) troops there? The Japanese were not really at any point short of troops overall. What they could not do was switch these forces to the crucial islands / fronts quickly enough or supply them enough once the allied attacks were in progress. Even in '42 during the Guadalcanal battles the Japanese had plenty of troops in New Britain / Solomon's, but not enough on Guadalcanal. They will have plenty of troops on unattached islands, China, Japan itself etc even at the end of the war. So why spend vast resources attriting these?

We were also discussing the effect on WitP too. I suspect that the Japanese player will not have lost the heart of his CV force by mid '42. Nor will he contribute to his own down fall quite as willingly as they did historically by constantly trying to supply his forward bases with numerous destroyer and transport ship runs and by wasting his last experienced naval pilots in fruitless efforts to slow up the US advance in the Bismarck Sea etc. One big plus of the late Solomon's / NG campaign was getting rid of the remaining elite Japanese air groups. When the IJN sacrificed itself at Leyte there was at least a big prize if it paid off (smashing a huge landing force) plus they were by then absolutely desperate. That just was not the case in the Solomon's, indeed even Rabaul was largely pointless except as a blocking point once the Japanese own offensive was over. I would not count on a WitP player making the same mistake and getting attrited away so easily. You will need to threaten something he really cannot afford to lose before the weaker force commits to battle. A single thrust campaign should get you to that point sooner and because you're concentrated in better shape to decisively beat him.

Now if you intend to wait until late '44 when I grant you the US has overwhelming strength then you may be able to use the luxury of a two pronged attack. I also agree with you that as and when you have stacks of spare stuff you can perhaps start pushing on other fronts too. But in the real war this split strategy occured in late '43, far earlier than US power really warrented. I think a single thrust will be safer and quicker in WitP. Especially as in WitP you are likely to be faced by a IJN who still has a largely intact CV force and has not thrown away all his best pilots. Unlike in real life the IJN could still have a real chance of hurting you. Are you going to split your forces against that :)

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 47

You are right! - 1/31/2003 3:03:43 AM

Mike Scholl

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From: Kansas City, MO
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There is no need to get heated. So to quote myself, "Now in
game terms, they player will make the decision on how he wants
to bring this mass of assets into action." Obviously you plan to
try to shove it all up a single pipe. OK, and good luck in your
gaming. I will continue tho believe you are going to end up
"widening" your thrust just to find enough bases to support
them and places to bring them to bear. Neither of us will know
how it will turn out until the game (and probably the first 3 patches) are out and we can try putting our plans into effect.

And I'll continue to believe the best way to attrite an inferior
force is to bring as much of it to action as you can. Otherwise
you risk having them mass in front of your single drive while
they still have quality forces available. But I will grant you
your point that in playing the game your Japanese opponant
will probably conserve his forces better than their historical
counterparts. To me, this would be all the more reason to try
to keep them guessing where the next hammer blow will fall.
You feel that a bigger hammer is the answer. Hopefully by this
summer we will both have had a chance to find out.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 48

- 1/31/2003 4:04:50 AM

mjk428

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Interesting discussion.

There are a couple of reasons that I haven't seen mentioned that make a "single thrust" less desirable in my eyes.

The geography is the number one reason for not making a single thrust in the central pacific. Historically the allies went on the offensive in 8/42 but I don't think that would have been possible in the central pacific. They would have been going into the teeth of land based air without CV superiority and without their own land based air. Midway achieved only parity. I don't believe they could begun offensive operations before 9/43 at the earliest.

The second reason would be the political pressure for the navy to "do something" that would come from all directions. Multiple Doolittle raids would not satisfy the desire for revenge that was so strong after Pearl Harbor. I just don't think the public would have accepted a two year wait.

I do agree that some of the fighting in New Guinea late in the war and elsewhere was a needless waste of lives. However that's easier to see in hindsight and it doesn't mean the overall strategy of multiple advances was wrong; just that some of the objectives were.

To tie this in with the initial "A-Bomb" thread: Why not make the single thrust in Europe (invade @ Antwerp and head straight for Berlin) and simply hold in the Pacific until 1945; then drop A-bombs on Tokyo with kamikaze B-29's from Alaska? Could have won the war with Japan with only the lives of a couple of B-29 crews lost; although maybe they could have made it to China.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 49

HAVE YOU SEEN A MAP? - 1/31/2003 5:41:47 AM

Mike Scholl

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
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In response to your final paragraph, how about the fact that
Antwerp is 50 miles up a heavily fortified and mined estuary
that took almost 3 months to clear after the Allies had captured
Antwerp in September 1944? As an Invasion Target---it stinks!

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 50

Re: HAVE YOU SEEN A MAP? - 1/31/2003 10:35:46 AM

mjk428

Posts: 1944
Joined: 6/15/2002
From: Western USA
Status: offline

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl
[B]In response to your final paragraph, how about the fact that
Antwerp is 50 miles up a heavily fortified and mined estuary
that took almost 3 months to clear after the Allies had captured
Antwerp in September 1944? As an Invasion Target---it stinks! [/B][/QUOTE]

Yes, I've seen a map. As a matter of fact I've seen several.

My point was that the shortest distance isn't always the best route of advance. I thought the sarcasm was obvious. Guess not.

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Post #: 51

- 2/1/2003 4:43:43 AM

TIMJOT

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The Navy planed for nearly 40 years:eek: for a single, direct, methodical thrust accross the central pacific. It never even considered either a sopac approach or a two prong approach. True to Mahanian theroy the Navy was adamant on concentrateing the fleet as a whole. It devised its tactics, training and even ship and a/c design for its central pacific strategy. There is every reason to believe it could have succeeded.

IMO after Midway, the whole sopac theater was a needless waste of time, energy, material, and most importantly lives. Admittedly there were some legitamate reasons to commit reasources there, prior to Midway; to secure the sopac supply route to Austrailia, protecting MacArthurs flank, stop a potential Japanese advance and so forth. After Midway the IJN realistically no longer posed a threat of a southward advance. Makeing Guadalcanal neglible threat at best.

IMO the the US would have been better off expending the resources used in the solomons in the summer of 42 on gaining a foothold in the Marshalls instead. Think of it. In the weeks after Midway the US had 3 fleet carriers operational, the IJN had nothing but a few CVLs available to counter them. The Marshalls were very weekly held by small garrisons and a handful of foatplanes and submarines. Certainly it would have taken far less troops to take Kwajalein in summer 42 than it did in 44 or it did for GD and Tuligi in 42 for that matter. From there you build up airbases to support and cover a move into the Carolina's or the Marianas.

There is nothing accomplished in the sopac that couldnt have been better and more ecomomically accomplished in the centpac. The Japanses could not, as some have suggested, fully concentrate in the centpac because with the allies firmly established in Australia and New Guinea, they would still be forced to garrison with substantial forces both the sopac and SE asia against possible incursions.

The Navy's pre-war planners had it right the sopac was a strategic deadend.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 52

WE'LL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE... - 2/1/2003 5:48:25 AM

Mike Scholl

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline

A lot of the questions and opinions that have come up in these
discussions are going to depend on how much Political Reality
the designers chose to include in the game. The SouthWest
Pacific front came into being because of Roosevelt's assumption
of responsibility for the defense and support of Australia/New Zealand from the British in early 1942. Once the flow of material
began, and especially after MacArthur was brought out to command, pressure to use the accumulation offensively could
only mount.
Another factor was a reluctance of the US to mount "invasions"
beyond the range of land-based air support. This was another
factor in making the shorter ranged "hops" of the Solomons/
New Guinea area attractive in the first place.

If the game is totally "free style" with no political, casualty, or
VP limitations then all kinds of wild and wooly operations are
possible. The US could load up everybody and try landing in
Japan directly from Hawaii in 1943. Probably wouldn't work---
but it would be a possible strategy if no restrictions are imposed.
In reality, Roosevelt would have had any admiral proposing such
a plan in a straight jacket in short order. We're going to have to
wait and see just how much "reality" 2by3 is going to impose;
and how they will chose to do it. With no restrictions the game
is going to explore some very strange scenarios. Even with a
good effort on the designer's part, you can count on players
seeking victory to find ways to exploit whatever "edge" they
can find. It's the nature of gaming. Some of us will want to
explore only historical solutions, while others will seek "game"
victories however the rules allow and regardless of historical argument. When one type plays the other, arguments are sure to abound. We'll have to wait and see what we are going to get....

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 53

Japan in 43 - 2/1/2003 7:02:06 AM

mogami

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Hi, (I know you were not serious but...)I can guarantee any landing in 43 will fail, I am also certain landing in 44 (or later) will fail as well if Japan has not been putout of supply first. In PACWAR the Japanese Home Islands contained around 10 bases (I'm sure someone can post the actual number.)
Look at the WITP map. The Japanese home Islands contain at least 20 bases. All the main ones are connected by rail. Many of these bases are safe from shore bombardment and will have airfields. There are many ground units that are not allowed to leave Japan. Not to mention mines. While in Pac War bringing 5 divisions might have gained a foothold the Japanese would have difficulty removing. In WITP it will result is 5 divisons worth of victory points for the Japanese. (unless you can somehow bring in the required 20k supply per day) (There really is no slick way of defeating Japan, by the same token those absurd Japanese landings on the West Coast of the United States have also gone the way of the dinosaur) NDA observed

_____________________________

I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!

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Post #: 54

- 2/1/2003 8:37:48 AM

mjk428

Posts: 1944
Joined: 6/15/2002
From: Western USA
Status: offline

[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT
[B]The Navy planed for nearly 40 years:eek: for a single, direct, methodical thrust accross the central pacific. It never even considered either a sopac approach or a two prong approach. True to Mahanian theroy the Navy was adamant on concentrateing the fleet as a whole. It devised its tactics, training and even ship and a/c design for its central pacific strategy. There is every reason to believe it could have succeeded. [/B][/QUOTE]

In those years there was little understanding of how important air power would become. IMHO, Pearl Harbor threw that plan out the window and the US adopted a better plan.

When playing PACWAR I tended to hold off in the central pacific and concentrated on linking up with Australia. Then I focused on cutting off Japan from being supplied from their newly acquired territories to their southwest. This may or may not have been the best strategy but it made sense to me.

Here's hoping that WitP will allow us all to follow the strategies we prefer in a fun and realistic way. I certainly expect that will be the case.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 55

- 2/1/2003 9:22:33 AM

TIMJOT

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
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Mike

I dont see an earlier central pacific point of attack as being unrealistic, becuase thats exactly what the Navy planed to do all along. I do agree that the decision to send men and material to the south pacific was partly political. However the decision to go on the offensive there was due to no small part on the egos of two individuals. Admiral King and General MacArthur. MacArthur's motivation is well known, but it was King who got the Navy sucked in.

Admiral King considered the Pacific the Navy's War and he did not want to wait to go on the offensive. The only problem was Rainbow-5, which called for staying on the defensive in the Pacific until the war in Europe was decided. An attack directed in the central pacific could not be justified under Rainbow-5 but an attack thru the sopac could be justified as a "defensive" move to defend Australia and secure the south pacific shipping route. Even so King had to fight hard to get it authorized. Marshall agreed mostly to placate MacArthur. While FDR and the British gave the ok to appease the Austrailians. The desision had very little to do with sound strategic thought.

That being said, given the unexpected opportunity afforded by the Midway victory. Rainbow-5 could have and probably should have been modified to allow for an early initialization of an offensive in the cenpac. We will probaly never know for sure, but IMO it would have been the more economical and efficient course of action.

Regards

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Post #: 56

- 2/1/2003 10:52:48 AM

Bulldog61

Posts: 1517
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From: Aurora,CO
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Not to mention by sending reinforcements to the South Pacific IT allowed the 6th, 7th and 9th Australian Divisions to remain in the Middle East longer.

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You can run but you'll die tired!

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Post #: 57

- 2/2/2003 5:44:09 AM

TIMJOT

Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001
Status: offline

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mjk428
[B]In those years there was little understanding of how important air power would become. IMHO, Pearl Harbor threw that plan out the window and the US adopted a better plan.

When playing PACWAR I tended to hold off in the central pacific and concentrated on linking up with Australia. Then I focused on cutting off Japan from being supplied from their newly acquired territories to their southwest. This may or may not have been the best strategy but it made sense to me.

Here's hoping that WitP will allow us all to follow the strategies we prefer in a fun and realistic way. I certainly expect that will be the case. [/B][/QUOTE]

MJK428,

That is incorrect. WPO was continually updated over the years right up to the out break of the war. The USN planners were very much aware of the importance of airpower. Thats precisely why the plan for the fleet to dash off to Manila bay and rescue the Philipines was canned in favor of a methodical advance thru the mandates. Where the objective was to capture and secure bases from which Land base air could provide cover for the fleet as it proceeded step by step thru the centpac.

Rainbow-5 (Europe first strategy) is what thru the plan out the window NOT Pearl Harbor. The losses incurred at PH were all but made up two months after the attack. IMHO the notion that Pearl Harbor had any real effect on Pacific strategy is a MYTH.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 58

- 2/2/2003 7:21:23 AM

TIMJOT

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Joined: 4/30/2001
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by MikeKraemer
[B]Not to mention by sending reinforcements to the South Pacific IT allowed the 6th, 7th and 9th Australian Divisions to remain in the Middle East longer. [/B][/QUOTE]

Not quite. The 6th and and 7th Australian Divisions were dispatched almost immediately after Pearl Harbor. Intended for the defence of the Dutch East Indies. Unfortunately only the first echelon of the 7th arrived before Java fell. The Brits wanted the both divisions diverted to defend Burma. The Aussies would have none of it, but reluctantly allowed the 7th to be diverted to Ceylon temporily when FDR offered a US National guard division in compensation.

Regards

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 59

- 2/2/2003 7:33:47 AM

mjk428

Posts: 1944
Joined: 6/15/2002
From: Western USA
Status: offline

[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT
[B]MJK428,

That is incorrect. WPO was continually updated over the years right up to the out break of the war. The USN planners were very much aware of the importance of airpower. Thats precisely why the plan for the fleet to dash off to Manila bay and rescue the Philipines was canned in favor of a methodical advance thru the mandates. Where the objective was to capture and secure bases from which Land base air could provide cover for the fleet as it proceeded step by step thru the centpac.

Rainbow-5 (Europe first strategy) is what thru the plan out the window NOT Pearl Harbor. The losses incurred at PH were all but made up two months after the attack. IMHO the notion that Pearl Harbor had any real effect on Pacific strategy is a MYTH. [/B][/QUOTE]

Hi Timjot,

I didn't mean to say that the planners didn't consider air power important, just that they did not fully appreciate HOW important it would be. Certainly there were a few that did but they were in the minority prior to WWII.

When I said that Pearl Harbor threw the plan out the window it was not simply because of the display of air power. There were political effects that couldn't be ignored that influenced every decision made up until Midway.

Rainbow-5 became the new war plan based on the situation immediately after Pearl Harbor and certainly was influenced by what was learned after the attack. If the planners had believed they could win a quick victory against Japan, I don't think the "Europe First" plan would have been adopted. The US public wanted "Japan First", that's for sure.

Maybe the planners were wrong and you are correct. I can certainly understand why they weren't willing to take the risk. I prefer to think they made the right choice.

(in reply to Odin)

Post #: 60