Bullwinkle58
Posts: 11302
Joined: 2/24/2009 Status: offline
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: obvert quote:
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58 quote:
ORIGINAL: obvert quote:
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58 quote:
ORIGINAL: obvert Shouldn't the Japanese always have a garrison on critical islands near the Home Islands, especially against a risk taker like Bullwinkle? Wouldn't these depot divisions make any move to the Bonins, Hokkaido, the Marianas or Sakhalin have to be a big nasty sigint blip instead of a stealthy operation? isn't that worth quite a lot to make sure your best troops can be mobile? As you get into the center of the onion, yes, garrisons matter. They're core to the "defend enough" process I spoke to above. Garrisoning ones that can straddle a lot of approaches is obvious. But that isn't Baker, or Marcus, or Tulagi. Look at your own game. Of the bases you mention here and in your previous post--Hokkaido, Bonins, Marianas, Sakhalin, Okinawa, Formosa, Ryukus (did I miss any) had you had these ten depot divs to plunk down on them, would they have stopped Jocke from standing in Korea at the end of the game? The very problem I'm talking about comes from my experience in the game you mention. Due to the ability of the Allies to be mobile with a crapload of units, able to land 5kAV in one base in about a day, these depot divisions would have been priceless! Korea didn't end that game, strat bombing did, so anything earlier that could have slowed Allied progress would have prolonged the game. 1. They would have allowed me to better garrison the Burma and Thai coast, likely preventing the easy capture of Tavoy and the eventual encirclement of the Burma Army. (I could easily have avoided it anyway by taking the Pisanoluke road but simply miscalculated movement). (3 depot divisions) 2. They would have provided welcome reserves for the front lines and likely slowed Jocke at Sarmi, in the Moluccas and on Mindanao. (3 depot divisions) 3. They would have given me a few extra units to bulk up Formosa defenses and released some better divisions to go to Okinawa, slowing the fall of that base dramatically, and thus directly delaying the invasion of Korea. (2 depot divisions) 4. They wold have given me a few more units for the Marianas defenses that could easily have slowed the fall of those bases, thus postponing the strat bombing of the HI industry. (2 depot divisions) All of these things would have helped prevent a landing in Korea when it happened and they would have also saved me supply by delaying strat bombing in several locations as the progress of the Allies slowed. I don't get your point. The point is more troops would have slowed Allied progress, as outlined in specific detail above. There are never enough to go around as Japan. This in turn would have likely delayed destruction of HI/LI production and possibly let the oil flow longer from the DEI. Production of supply for longer means the depot divisions could pay for themselves if they delayed stoppage of oil and strat bombing by 30-40 days. (Japan makes ~28k supply a day full out. Half that in three months of strat bombing and you have a supply problem. One month of 14k production is 420k supply. That feeds ten depot divisions for 2+ years. 50 points a day x 365 = 18,250). On the "I don't get your point" thing I messed up the quoting. All I noticed was the bolded line. I see now you had added comments I thought were old at that point. On your supply argument I think we have to back up a little here. To be clear on the facts, as the "depots" are actually nine "depot divisions" and one new Guards Depot Div, one has to look at what they actually are and where they are. All 10 LCUs come in at 35% training and 35% morale. Nine of them are carbon copies device-wise; the Guards is almost exactly twice as large but no better trained. TOEs are about 65%. The Guards and one Depot division can be disbanded; eight Depots cannot be. The PP cost to unrestrict one of the nine Depots, before reinforcements, is 611 PPs. In my test game I disbanded the Guards to see what happened to the pools, so I don't have a PP number, but I figure it's about twice given the TOE ratio. So, to summarize, they're bad LCUs capability-wise, and they're nailed down in the HI unless Japan comes up with about 6721 PPs. At 60/day that's 112 days if my calculator batteries aren't dead. Nearly four months of not spending a PP point on anything else. If that PP cost is not incurred, even if the two disbands are let go, then Japan is stuck for the rest of the war with 8 depot divisions in the HI. It is also true that the ONLY way these 8 can "pay their way" is to either: 1) take a supply source that would otherwise not be taken, or 2) prevent loss of a supply source currently held or that will be held later, up to the equilibrium supply consumption/supply gain point. In the HI, if PPs are not paid, neither of these options exists. The 8 are a millstone. Perhaps not a back-breaking one if they don't fight and never are set for replacements, but as you say five-figures of supply consumption just sitting there. And recall this cost me only about 250 VPs. (An SST activation would have been only 70 men and no ships lost.) Then take the case that PPs are scraped up to deploy them. There is the opportunity cost on the PPs themselves of course. But these 8-10 are deployed. Where is going to depend on the game and era when the activation is achieved. But regardless, they will also consume 8 or 10 divisions' worth of sealift. Maybe just to the China coast where they rail and walk to Tavoy, as you say would have been the case in your game. Or, substantial lift, escort, fuel, and submarine loss-risk to go to the Marianas. Where they will need extra supply from somewhere, but will not be self-funding. (In almost no island garrison role will they be self-funding.) You say that they would have helped stave off strat bombing in your game. To some extent, having read both sides, I agree with you. IMO what you did with NFs, which I'm still studying and I believe others as well, was much more instrumental than anything 8 depot divs at 140 AV each could have done. But here you also help make my point a bit. No, Korea wasn't the cause of the war win for the Allies. It was the strat bombing. But if you had sent three depots to Formosa he still would have bypassed them. Three to Hokkaido he still wouldn't have gone there. If you could have sent three to Formosa to free up three better divs for Okinawa, I might suggest you should have sent the three to Okinawa anyway; it's far more vital to a strat bombing campaign than Formosa. I am sympathetic to Japan's problem though. I'm not criticizing; it's just a matter of the map. Japan is faced with the old "which shell is the pea under" game, with mobility the key (IOW, the Allies are moving the shell in this tortured analogy.) Where will they land? They know, or adjust, and Japan has to try to defend everywhere and wait for a non-feint to reinforce. Very hard, especially in late-war fuel-starved conditions for sealift. So we're back to Alfred's point about mobility versus fixed defenses. These depot divs, if the PP pain is handled first, still can only help set up static defenses. If the Allies bash on them, they help. If the Allies go around them, they eat supply for no ROI. The worst case for Japan in every sense other than PP savings is they squat in the HI for three years and never, ever fight. An Operation Shangri-La puts Japan to that decision at very low cost to the Allies. Exactly how useful they are is a function of individual games and players, and I agree they are not worthless in some sense. But they're expensive in a couple of ways, and cheap for the Allies to trigger. As I am often accused of never letting go of the bone I'll try to stop here and give you the last word. You made good points above and I am still thinking about many of them. A long, long time since I played late war and never in PBEM.
< Message edited by Bullwinkle58 -- 3/25/2014 7:14:34 PM >
_____________________________
The Moose
|