Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: GrumpyMel
The only crunch's I'm noticing are occasionaly on Canadian pilots and there is 1 squadron from Coastal Command who can't trade their aircraft (which aren't being built in the 43' Campaign) for any other model aircraft...which seems a bit odd to me. I'd figure you'd always be able to get assigned something in manufacture?

quote:

ORIGINAL: HMSWarspite

And that's a month when the war was almost over and the lw was gone

quote:

ORIGINAL: Smirfy

quote:

ORIGINAL: HMSWarspite

And that's a month when the war was almost over and the lw was gone

Those figures are all causes and the loss rate is .95% Im running that just at operational losses. I assume as well those losses are in a high intensity theatre as well like NW Europe. Just finished reading the interrogations of the FLAK officers in Italy against the 15th Airforce had not got enough petrol for generators to power radar when they did have power their radar were jammed and had to lay their guns manually and their crews were replaced with old men. batteries had to be moved by hoof.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ralzakark

For 2TAF the percentage figures were similar for ground support and armed recce sortie:

Month - Sorties per aircraft casualty
Aug - 126.7
Sep - 75.5
Oct - 143.7
Nov - 100.0
Dec - 49.4
Jan - 79.0
Feb - 90.8

A casualty here is an aircraft shot down or damaged.

Interestingly the most dangerous mission was armed recce, or interdiction, not close support, and the deeper the penetration behind the front line the riskier the mission was. Close support strikes at the front line could often be supported by artillery suppression of flak batteries, and damaged aircraft naturally had further to travel on armed recce missions.

It is worth remembering the huge scale of the Allied air effort. In August 1944 2TAF flew over 13,000 ground support and armed recce sorties alone. When dealing with such huge numbers even small percentage losses will give a large number of aircraft casualties.

I agree with Warspite1 that small-arms fire was little threat to fighter bombers. Doubtless a few were brought down by it but I have never seen any figures. A 1944 fighter-bomber was tough, well-armoured and very fast, so a difficult target to hit. When air forces attacked armies without proper anti-aircraft weapons, such as when the Germans invaded Yugoslavia, the result was usually very few casualties.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Smirfy

How many of your sorties are naval patrol?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Smirfy

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ralzakark

For 2TAF the percentage figures were similar for ground support and armed recce sortie:

Month - Sorties per aircraft casualty
Aug - 126.7
Sep - 75.5
Oct - 143.7
Nov - 100.0
Dec - 49.4
Jan - 79.0
Feb - 90.8

A casualty here is an aircraft shot down or damaged.

Interestingly the most dangerous mission was armed recce, or interdiction, not close support, and the deeper the penetration behind the front line the riskier the mission was. Close support strikes at the front line could often be supported by artillery suppression of flak batteries, and damaged aircraft naturally had further to travel on armed recce missions.

It is worth remembering the huge scale of the Allied air effort. In August 1944 2TAF flew over 13,000 ground support and armed recce sorties alone. When dealing with such huge numbers even small percentage losses will give a large number of aircraft casualties.

I agree with Warspite1 that small-arms fire was little threat to fighter bombers. Doubtless a few were brought down by it but I have never seen any figures. A 1944 fighter-bomber was tough, well-armoured and very fast, so a difficult target to hit. When air forces attacked armies without proper anti-aircraft weapons, such as when the Germans invaded Yugoslavia, the result was usually very few casualties.

It works out as one loss for tactical Bomber or fighter bomber for every 250 sorties over the period covered by the game for the tactical airforces. That is NW Europe in the Italian campaign losses one would have to imagine would be lower again.

quote:

ORIGINAL: KWG

meant that there was lots of small arms fire not that small arms shot down a lot of planes. I have done small arms anti aircraft training using rc aircraft. Just to hit the aircraft is difficult. The most people we had firing at one time was around 30. We shot it down twice one day. And just about any hit would bring it down. In real situations it would be critical hits to plane rather than massive damage that would make the difference.

Who was it wrote that during a strafe he swears he saw a horseshoe go by his plane.

Tobruk
One British captain shot down 6 with 2 rigged lewis guns. Claim lewis and rifles credited almost half of planes shot down.
http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/defga/

German pilots had a healthy fear of small arms.

quote:

ORIGINAL: KWG

The eastern front was different....

during ww1 while flying recon in the east the red baron's biggest fear was being shot down and beaten to death.

wow 100 years ago, first winter of ww1.

quote:

ORIGINAL: HMSWarspite

quote:

ORIGINAL: Smirfy

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ralzakark

For 2TAF the percentage figures were similar for ground support and armed recce sortie:

Month - Sorties per aircraft casualty
Aug - 126.7
Sep - 75.5
Oct - 143.7
Nov - 100.0
Dec - 49.4
Jan - 79.0
Feb - 90.8

A casualty here is an aircraft shot down or damaged.

Interestingly the most dangerous mission was armed recce, or interdiction, not close support, and the deeper the penetration behind the front line the riskier the mission was. Close support strikes at the front line could often be supported by artillery suppression of flak batteries, and damaged aircraft naturally had further to travel on armed recce missions.

It is worth remembering the huge scale of the Allied air effort. In August 1944 2TAF flew over 13,000 ground support and armed recce sorties alone. When dealing with such huge numbers even small percentage losses will give a large number of aircraft casualties.

I agree with Warspite1 that small-arms fire was little threat to fighter bombers. Doubtless a few were brought down by it but I have never seen any figures. A 1944 fighter-bomber was tough, well-armoured and very fast, so a difficult target to hit. When air forces attacked armies without proper anti-aircraft weapons, such as when the Germans invaded Yugoslavia, the result was usually very few casualties.

It works out as one loss for tactical Bomber or fighter bomber for every 250 sorties over the period covered by the game for the tactical airforces. That is NW Europe in the Italian campaign losses one would have to imagine would be lower again.

Sorry, where does 1 per 250 come from? And why would Italy be less flak prone? Terrain is the only real difference, the troops and flak were similar...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Smirfy

An example

quote:

ORIGINAL: Smirfy


For the Halifax reliabilty 22 experiece beween 57 and 78 fatigue 1 The Mitchill is 3 times more reliable with 8 and 72 experience. I'm not sure that matters when you see a 3.5% operational loss

quote:

ORIGINAL: meklore61

Not sure what your morale is on those air groups, but if you let them get too low on morale you op losses will increase significantly. I try not to fly any air groups below 50 during a push, and 60-70 during normal operations. Manage you morale and it will cost you less planes to op losses.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Smirfy

Your 2% is 4.5 times normal. But I do enjoy that some planes are real dogs like the Halifax

quote:

ORIGINAL: meklore61

Not sure if you got an answer Repsol, so this is my take on air superiority. The air groups you assign to AS will attempt to intercept axis planes in the area of coverage. So technically they are assisting all of your directives with in the area. It's also good to keep an air superiority directive over your beaches and out to sea a few hexes. That will lower the axis naval interdiction also cause your intercepting them. Just remember that the larger the area you use the less planes you'll have in the area at any given time. So don't try and make a huge air superiority box or area.