warspite1
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Joined: 2/2/2008 From: England Status: offline
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The Loss of HMS Glorious What should Marschall do now? Well one thing was certain; Hipper and the destroyers would need to refuel in the not too distant future and, with Marschall fearing his presence must by now be known to the Allies, he decided this wasn't going to be possible at sea without interference. He therefore took a decision for which he has been much criticised (but its hard to see what choice he really had) and ordered Hipper and the destroyers back to Trondheim - searching en route for any Allied ships. Meanwhile his battleships would continue heading northwest in order to make a sweep into Vagsfjord. We left HMS Glorious in post 355 as she was about to head home with Ark Royal and the convoy of ships from Group II. We will shortly pick up events in the early hours of the 8th June and the continuation of the tragic chain of events that had been in motion aboard HMS Glorious for sometime, that would claim over 1,500 British sailors and airmen, and for which, almost 80 years later, there is still no satisfactory explanation. But first it is probably appropriate to provide some backstory... The Captain and the Air Commander Captain Guy D'Oyly Hughes joined HMS Glorious in May 1939. By all accounts his appointment was welcomed. American born, of at least one English parent (his father), D'Oyly Hughes was an ex-submariner and highly decorated World War I hero with a DSC and two DSO's to his name. Between the wars he had learnt to fly. Descriptions of D'Oyly Hughes by former colleagues make it difficult to reconcile the man they knew "The sort of fellow senior officers like to have at their table", with the man that took over command of Glorious, and who immediately made a bad impression with many of the officers of the carrier. But even during his time on Glorious, there appears to be mixed reports about the man - the crew apparently thought the world of him and he was generous with shore leave for a ship that had been in commission as long as Glorious had. But there are also tales that D'Oyly Hughes behaved contemptuously with the men of the Fleet Air Arm, disagreed with tactics and doctrine and "would brook no discussion". One man who served with the captain in 1935 and then again in 1939, believed that "something must have happened in the meantime to change him". When war broke out he placed a box on the bridge that contained revolvers. He was supposed to have said that this was for any officer that failed to do his duty... But whatever the truth about this complex character, the fact was that by May 1940, Glorious was not a happy ship - and it was the officers of the Fleet Air Arm that seemed to be singled out to feel his wrath. The two main targets appear to have been Commander (Flying) John (JB) Heath and Staff Officer (Air) Paul Slessor. Slessor had been with Glorious since before D'Oyly Hughes' arrival, but Heath - one of the most experienced officers in the Fleet Air Arm - had joined the ship in January 1940 (his predecessor was Guy Willoughby who couldn't wait to leave the ship due to D'Oyly Hughes behaviour). Heath appears to have been a laid back character, whom years of experience with the obsolete aircraft the Fleet Air Arm were expected to fly, made him perhaps too cautious for a man with the zeal of D'Oyly Hughes, who would not listen to what he did not want to hear. Two men working together in this sort of environment is never healthy. The executive officer aboard Glorious seems to have been ineffectual, and Vice-Admiral Wells - although he seems to have known about what was going on in Glorious - does not appear to have intervened. The incident that brought matters to a head took place on the 26th May. At this time Glorious had only six Gladiators and six Swordfish aboard (see post xxx). But a signal was received from the Flag Officer, Narvik about the possibility of Glorious's aircraft mounting an attack against enemy troops on the Jamo-Mosjean road and of attacking the airfield at Mosjean. Note: there is no such place as Jamo and it is thought the reference was to Mo. A conference was held and Slessor and Heath went away to study what maps they had of the area. The two men returned later and discussed with the captain. Heath's concern, agreed with by Slessor, was that the proposed action was unsound due to the few aircraft available, the poor performance of the Swordfish, and the fact that intelligence was unclear as to where the airfield, let alone the enemy, were. The decision was that they would look at it again in the morning. The following morning further discussion was held and ultimately D'Oyly Hughes insisted on an operation being carried out. He ordered that Glorious would move to within 40 miles of the coast and that five Swordfish, escorted by three Sea Gladiators would fly to Hemnes first and then fly south to Mosjean, bombing any suitable objective they could find. The strike would commence with take-off at 8pm on the 27th May. The orders were signed by the captain. At this point the Commanding Officer of 823 Squadron, who would lead the operation, asked Heath for an audience with the captain. During this interview Stephens made clear to the captain that he believed the operation to be unsound. The captain asked Stephens to go away and come back with an alternative. Stephens, Heath and Slessor reviewed the options but at 1:40pm - while still struggling to come up with an alternative - they were ordered back to see D'Oyly Hughes by the executive officer. During the subsequent meeting D'Oyly Hughes is alleged to have claimed he didn't know anything about the orders he'd signed and accused Heath of being reluctant to come up with a plan in response to F.O Narvik's request. He was relieved of duty. The operation - even the original one signed by the captain - was never flown. One can speculate on why the captain didn't proceed with this if he thought Heath was being unreasonable. When Glorious returned to the UK Heath was left behind to await a court martial, and HMS Glorious left for Norway for the last time.... Commander (Flying) John (JB) Heath and Captain Guy D'Oyly Hughes. The Battle So we now come back to the early hours of 8th June. D'Oyly Hughes requested permission from Vice-Admiral Wells, aboard Ark Royal, for Glorious to break from the convoy and head for home with the destroyers Ardent and Acasta. This escort was less than that considered necessary by the Admiralty following the loss of Courageous' sister in September 1939, but in fairness to Wells, he had no reason to believe there was anymore danger to Glorious now than there was all the other times the carriers had sailed to and from Norway without loss (this was Glorious's fifth operation off Norway). The official reason given for this request was that Glorious was short on fuel, although the captain of the destroyer HMS Diana, Lt. Commander E. Le Geyt, stated in an enquiry in 1968 that he saw an Aldis lamp signal from Glorious to Ark Royal that stated D'Oyly Hughes wanted permission to sail ahead in order to prepare for a forthcoming courts martial (JB Heath but also possibly Slessor). Apparently fuel consumption tests post the war indicate that the shortage of fuel story was incorrect. Sailing home in convoy would have used up little more fuel than proceeding alone at high speed and zig-zagging. Furthermore, the amount of fuel expended by Glorious on her last operation - even allowing 15% for error - makes it unlikely that fuel was an issue. But whatever the reason, Wells gave Glorious permission to part company with the convoy and steam ahead. But that does not explain why, with extreme visibility, no one aboard Glorious was posted in the look out tower and there was not a single aircraft overhead. Furthermore there were no aircraft ranged on deck ready to fly - but one Swordfish and three Sea Gladiators were at 10 minutes notice down below. Meanwhile, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sailing line ahead in a northwest direction when, at 15:46hrs, smoke was sighted in the distance. At 16:10hrs with the range was 40,000 metres, the smoke appeared to be coming from an aircraft carrier. The ships went to action stations, and increased speed to 26 knots. With no one in the crow's nest on-board Glorious, it was not until just after 16:00hrs that mastheads were sighted. Glorious was zig-zagging, travelling at 17 knots (two thirds of her boilers) in a southwest direction, with Ardent and Acasta on either bow. HMS Ardent was ordered to break off to investigate and Acasta was ordered to switch to Glorious's starboard bow. The order went out on Glorious to range her Swordfish but D'Oyly Hughes did not alter course at this time, and only at 16:25 did Glorious turn to the southeast and Acasta was ordered to make smoke. Marshall had ordered his ships to proceed in a southwesterly direction, and had increased speed to 29 knots when Scharnhorst opened fire at 16:27hrs. At this point Glorious was just 28,000 metres away. Fearing that aircraft would be launched, Marschall was keen to finish the aircraft carrier as quickly as possible. Secondary armament was ordered to concentrate on Ardent which was closing the battlecruisers and flashing her recognition signals. The German guns were fired with their usual accuracy. The first salvo was long, the second straddled the carrier and the third was absolutely devastating. A shell landed on the flight deck, easily penetrated the thin armour and destroyed the aircraft about to take off. With a hole in the flight deck, Glorious would never fly off another aircraft. A massive fire began to erupt in the hangar, fuelled by the stowed Hurricanes of 46 Squadron. But the fire was contained and Glorious continued on, shielded to some extent by the smoke from Acasta which, like her 'chummy' ship Ardent, fired - although hopelessly out of range - at the battleships. By now Ardent was around 14,000 metres away and running parallel to the battleships and preparing to launch torpedoes but this proved unsuccessful. While on Acasta, her smoke screen, being broken up by the wind, could only hold good for some time before the battleships found their target again.... and again. At some point the bridge on Glorious received a direct hit, likely killing all there. Soon her speed began to fail and the battleships pummelled the carrier. Soon the fires became uncontrollable as the battleships closed the range down to 12,000 metres. Scharnhorst was having boiler trouble and was limited to 29 knots, so Gneisenau passed her and concentrated her fire on Glorious and Acasta. Scharnhorst stopped firing at Glorious at about 17:00hrs and her attention was fixed on Ardent. The destroyer had been hit early on and had to escape within her own smoke screen for a while, before positioning herself for a torpedo strike. Four torpedoes were launched but were evaded by both the enemy ships, although one passed close to Scharnhorst. Ardent continued to fire and one shell hit Scharnhorst, but further torpedo salvoes (she launched a total of five) failed to find the target and instead, at 17:01 Scharnhorst began to inflict serious punishment on the little ship. Her speed began to reduce and she took on a list. at 17:25hrs Ardent sank beneath the waves. By now the conditions on-board Glorious can only be imagined. She was being hit repeatedly and was listing. One of her sides began to cave in. Acasta continued to try and shield the carrier but it was no use. Abandon ship was ordered between 17:20 and 17:30hrs and she sank at 16:10hrs. But Acasta wasn't finished. She hid in her smokescreen and then emerged to launch a salvo of torpedoes. At 17:34hrs one of her torpedoes struck Scharnhorst abreast her aft turret, killing 47 men. The battleship began taking on water and her starboard engine failed. Her magazines were flooded as a precaution and speed reduced to 20-knots. But both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau continued to hit Acasta and she was soon on fire from bow to stern. Abandon ship was ordered and she too succumbed at 16:20hrs but not before a shell landed on Scharnhorst's middle gun of Bruno turret. And so, with all three British ships sunk, the battle was over, but the listing Scharnhorst was badly wounded, leaving Marschall with little choice but to head for Trondheim. The end of Glorious The Aftermath HMS Devonshire, complete with her VIP passenger list, now re-enters the story. A message was sent by Glorious that was picked up Devonshire. The official version is that the message was garbled, although there are those on board Devonshire, including the Petty Officer Telegraphist, that testify that the message was crystal clear and confirmed that Glorious was being engaged by two battleships. What happened was that whatever form the message was received in, Vice Admiral Cunningham, aboard the cruiser, ordered speed increased, guns readied and maintained radio silence. That there is debate over whether the message was garbled or not is simply irritating and fuels the over active imagination of conspiracy theorists. Cunningham was in an impossible situation - even if the message was crystal clear. If true what was he supposed to do? He had direct and express orders to bring the Norwegian government and King Haakon to the UK. He was aware that Glorious was in trouble but knew nothing about the wider picture. It seems he was about 50 miles away from Glorious at 17:30 hrs - too late in any case to save the carrier. But a thinly armoured heavy cruiser against two battleships? We know subsequently that the Germans had to retire (and so Devonshire would have survived and been able to pick up survivors), but Cunningham didn't know that. Nor would it be fair to assume that Cunningham should have known about Glorious sailing alone or that the Home Fleet weren't 'on the case'. Imagine what history would say of Cunningham if he disobeyed ordered and got his ship sunk and his VIP's killed? But what is tragic is the fate of many of the 1,531 sailors and airmen that were killed from the three ships. It is estimated that some 900 men escaped the sinkings. Many of these would have succumbed quickly to their wounds, shock, exposure, etc - and that is the ones that made it to a float. For others unable to do so, death would have not been long coming in those temperatures. But it is also true that a great many could have been saved - but once again the fates conspired against them. To make matters worse, and to add to the charge sheet against D'Oyly Hughes, it appears that the Carley floats were inadequately provisioned. But because of the radio silence of Devonshire and the loss of all three ships, no one knew the fate of Glorious until the following day when German broadcasts were intercepted. It was only the next morning that the Home Fleet knew of the presence of the two battleships (from the men of the hospital ship Atlantis). Forbes ordered heavy units to sail to join Valiant but the Germans were by then back in Trondheim. Sadly for the survivors, none of the ships heading south located them. Men aboard Southampton came across dead bodies but no survivors, and nor did Ark Royal's aircraft spot them. It was in the late evening of the 10th June that a Norwegian steamer, Borgund, that was heading to the Faroes, came across some of the Carley Floats. She picked up 38 men alive and continued to the Faroes (sadly 3 men died either on board or soon after arrival). A second Norwegian vessel, Svalbard II, rescued 5 men (1 died after rescue) but the ship was forced to turn back to Norway and they became POW's. A German seaplane also rescued two men (1 died). So in total just 40 men survived, and of these, only 1 each came from the two destroyers. The incident attracts its fair share of conspiracy theorists. But as with most disasters, the cause can be put down to a number of errors, circumstances and actions that, if you remove one of them, the outcome may be entirely different - and not just from the British side either. With hindsight, and being able to piece together all the relevant information from the time, there are many questions raised. But as usual not everyone knew everything - there were massive gaps in intelligence, there were individual mistakes, there were specific orders applied to certain ships, and the weather was unusually fine, and there was a German commander disobeying orders. British intelligence suspected the German heavy units had left the Baltic and suspected an operation was underway but this information does not appear to have been passed to the Home Fleet - although how 'certain' this information was is unclear. The evacuation from Norway was kept as secret as possible so those in the intelligence section didn't realise the significance of the evidence they were identifying. There is nothing to suggest VAA Wells in Ark Royal was made aware and certainly Coastal Command were not given this information. On the 5th June a false sighting by a patrol vessel had seemed to indicate enemy ships heading for Iceland, and elements of the Home Fleet, including the battlecruisers Renown and Repulse, had been ordered to sea but found nothing. What was known by Forbes and the Home Fleet was that the Kriegsmarine had been badly hurt during Weserubung and had been necessarily quiet during late April, May and early June. With hindsight, adding Valiant and/or the battlecruisers to the convoys heading south from Norway would have been sensible just in case, but one can see why this wasn't done. This was just another example of the tragedies that happen in war..... That Glasfurd and Barker did not receive Victoria Crosses' is, in the opinion of the author, an absolute disgrace. If it was right to award Lt. Commander Roope (HMS Glowworm) a V.C. for his action against Admiral Hipper (see post xxx), then it makes no sense not to do the same for these fine sailors who sacrificed themselves, their ships and their men in order to try and save HMS Glorious. It is also likely that their action saved a bigger disaster for the convoys following up. Why no one has made a film about this episode is extraordinary. There are more plots and sub plots, intrigue, conspiracy theories, tales of heroism, tales of rank stupidity, tales of cover up to fill a hundred films.... who are the bad guys? Take your pick according to preference - Churchill, Wells, D'Oyly Hughes, Marschall, Saalwachter, Cunningham - but its clear who the heroes are - just ask the officers and men of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau whose admiration for the gallant little destroyers remained firm to their dying day. Sources: Carrier Glorious (Winton) Secret History: HMS Glorious (Channel 4 Documentary) The Battle for Norway (Haarr) www.Glarac.co.uk
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England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805
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