Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree they planned for a short war. But they did plan to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and beyond. So why would anyone think they did not plan to send and supply their armies that far east?

Anyway I digress. I don't rate Glantz. I prefer other authors. Simple as that. I form my views based on a wide range of books. Not just one author. I will leave it at that.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Erickson is very good but somewhat dated at this point. Still, surprising how much of his work stands the test of time. He had to work without access to the kind of records that only became available post Cold War.

...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Pelton
I agree with your points over all, just making the point that Romanian rail system was not useless or worse then Russia's.

If you read up on the who controlled the rail systems, Germany did.
But your point is a good one, but not and end all.

Germany was not stupid in the study I sent to MT it was clear that
Germany knew before invading they had HUGE issues they faced logisticly in the center.

AGN was never and issue and historically it never was logisticly. Ports/raods/not many lines to convert/rolling stock/engines/standard support system and willing workers.

AGS had a big advantage over AGC-ports, still a bitch but not as hopeless as AGC.

AGC was the bitch which is why 41/42 winter was a hit for AGC and not the other 2 AG's

Each area is its own logistical problem, to make all 3 the same is not historical.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Red Lancer

I've already translated the data on Baltic rail conversion into game metrics and shared
with Joel. We are already pretty close in with what we are seeing with the new rail
conversion rules.

Reading this excellent discussion two things come to the fore.

Firstly I need data for the non Baltic area so if any one has that info please share and
we can check that against the system.

Secondly please remember that with the new logistic rules rail conversion is
only half the problem. You also need to create depots.
Depots built on locations with larger railyards are much more capable.
It's not rail capacity that is the limiting factor it's depot capacity.
This is where the new system can be made to be much more historical as the end points
of the rails are not equal. Excessive rail usage (i.e congestion) means that freight
delivery costs more and therefore you get less but a Depot is still limited by its maximum
capacity. Testers are learning to capture key railyards and not just convert the rails
closest to the major targets like Moscow and Leningrad. For the Soviets holding these
locations for an extra turn is well worth it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree they planned for a short war. But they did plan to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and beyond. So why would anyone think they did not plan to send and supply their armies that far east?

quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp

quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree they planned for a short war. But they did plan to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and beyond. So why would anyone think they did not plan to send and supply their armies that far east?

The German operations department guys were notorious for not heeding the advices of their logisticians. German logisticians warned in 1941, and then again in 1942, that the plans set were unrealistic. They had no plan how to adequately supply their forces beyond Dvina and Dnepr. As Flavius or loki have already said, the Germans planned to defeat the Red Army west of Dnepr and Dvina. The rest was called "pursuit operations".

quote:

ORIGINAL: Pelton

quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp

quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree they planned for a short war. But they did plan to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and beyond. So why would anyone think they did not plan to send and supply their armies that far east?

The German operations department guys were notorious for not heeding the advices of their logisticians. German logisticians warned in 1941, and then again in 1942, that the plans set were unrealistic. They had no plan how to adequately supply their forces beyond Dvina and Dnepr. As Flavius or loki have already said, the Germans planned to defeat the Red Army west of Dnepr and Dvina. The rest was called "pursuit operations".

I would like to see your proof.

I have posted that AGN had no logistics problems and could have easly supported a 2nd PG and did for a short time- 3rd PG.

I and other's have posted things we like to see part of 2.0 based on historical facts we have provided links. 2by3 is not going to take so and so said and so and so said so it much be true as a reason to change something.

Who warned? When and where is the link?

Its like the rail and road net work in Baltic States, It was European standard rail and allot of paved roads. Hopefully this will be reflexed in 2.0, not because it a just so story it was an historical fact.

morveal's point of 4th PG waiting a week for supplies is correct, but before and after that it was never an issue as trains were delieveing supplies 400 miles from the front 27 days after the start of invasion.

Supplies did not stop the Germans from taking Leningrad KIA/WIA did, that's crystal clear historically.

GHC and Hitler figured they could simply cut the rail lines ( September 8th ) and the city would starve and moved 2 Panzer Corp to AGC + infantry + support
units to help with drive on Moscow. They could have stormed the city while it was poorly suppied and probably
taken it as they had 6 weeks before the mud hit.

AGC with the 2 PC from AGN attack on Moscow failed because of supplies, AGN did not fail because of supplies it failed because Hitler did not want to waste men taking it.

I am hoping that 2.0's logistics system and combat system can do this. 1.0 dispite morveals best simply can't.

Will 2.0 have historical options like this?

it is much better to post data that supports your points as Ice did then to just post a just so story.

To Stalin and his Generals credit they did not surrender at Leningrad.

Sigup take the time and read Hitler's Directives, start with 21 as from what I read they did not expect Russia to surrender any time soon.

Quote"At the beginning of March logistical exercises took place at ArmyHigh Command headquarters, and Army Group South held a supplyand administration game based on the lessons learned during Soden-stern's command post exercise of the preceding month. During thefollowing weeks the Armed Forces and Army High Commands issueda series of directives and regulations pertaining mainly to supply andadministration"

quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I agree with the gist of your 3rd paragraph, except in the case of Leningrad. Here I believe the city would have fallen had a determined assault been made upon it after it was isolated. Even with the forces on the scene at the time. But that doesn't mean I think it should fall every time in the game.

As a general observation I don't think the casualty rates are high enough in WITE, nor the exhaustion factor high enough, for both sides. Simply it's not bloody enough. And the replacement rates for manpower are too high, again for both sides.

quote:

ORIGINAL: GrauWolf80

With regards to Partisans, with the map regions being coded (i'm blind here on this), is it possible to incorporate the VP effect from WITW, but replace VPs with logistic problems.

So if security forces weren't enough, partisans would grow in the region preventing in turn a % of supplies from entering/flowing through the region based on the level of rebels. Moving additional security forces into the region would gradually reduce the partisan effects in the region until 0% is reached.

or something like that.

quote:

ORIGINAL: RKhan

quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

...

As a general observation I don't think the casualty rates are high enough in WITE, nor the exhaustion factor high enough, for both sides. Simply it's not bloody enough. And the replacement rates for manpower are too high, again for both sides.

+1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Pelton

I have posted that AGN had no logistics problems and could have easly supported a 2nd PG and did for a short time- 3rd PG.

quote:

Who warned? When and where is the link?

quote:

Sigup take the time and read Hitler's Directives, start with 21 as from what I read they did not expect Russia to surrender any time soon.

quote:

ORIGINAL: el hefe

Sorry, Pelton, I don't agree with your assessment that Army Group North didn't have any logistical issues. It is true that Army Group North was definitely better off due to the better quality rail system in the Baltics but they were also in constant crisis mode just like the other AGs. There were constant fuel shortages and supply deliveries did not meet Army Group North's daily requirements. Fuel and ammunition shortages were consistent with all Army Groups as was the rapidly declining capacity of the truck columns that were expected to deliver the supplies from the forward depots. Supply issues did severely impede Army Group North from making the progress that they had planned for.

Trey

quote:



I disagree and so does history



The German Concentration of Forces Against the Soviet Border

From the moment Hitler alerted the armed forces in late July 1940 for an attack on Soviet Russia, the army general staff thought in terms of rail schedules to execute the Aufmarsch (concentration) for Barbarossa and regauging or rebuilding the Soviet rail system for logistical support of the advance. Generalleutnant Rudolf Gercke, chief of German army transportation, began to oversee the railroad tasks under the first important OKW order for Barbarossa, the Ausbau Ost (Eastern Buildup) order of 9 August 1940, directing the improvement and expansion of eastern Poland's rail system. The Reichsbahn (State Rail Service) and the Ostbahn (Eastern Rail Service) began to build up the eastern rail facilities under the codeword, Program Otto. Concomitantly, Gercke was largely responsible for coordinating the transfer of thirty-five German infantry divisions from France to Poland and East Prussia, using existing facilities, at a leisurely pace from July to October 1940. By 17 January 1941, Gercke informed OKW that of the 8,500 km of rail lines to be improved or rebuilt to concentrate forces for Barbarossa, 60 percent had been completed, most double track.{4} On 2 February 1941, Brauchitsch and Halder began the concentration of forces for Barbarossa, intended to be in four waves of rail movement lasting through 15 May 1941.

Due to unexpected circumstances, including the Balkan campaign and the severe winter of 1940-1941, the German concentration of forces continued until 22 June. Amazingly, the OKH moved some 17,000 trains over and above the normal traffic in the east after the battle of France.{5} Through secrecy and deception, the German command achieved almost complete tactical and operational surprise against the Soviet armed forces and a large measure of strategic surprise against the high political leadership. Stalin and his advisors received warnings of German aggressive intent months before, but they reasonably discounted most of such warnings based on alternate explanations and the vast deceptive circumstance that Germany was at war with Britain. The Soviets must also have had aggressive intentions of their own. Retrospectively, it appears possible that they were preparing to attack Germany or dient states of Germany possibly as early as autumn 1941, and probably no later than summer 1942. Finally, although Stalin was prepared for German political pressure in the summer of 1941, and possibly even military incidents, he was caught totally off guard by a full-blooded military invasion with the Olympian mission to defeat the Soviet state immediately. The unobtrusive movement of 17,000 extra trains to the east and the deceptive explanation of unconcealable activity associated with the concentration of forces made possible the surprise on 22 June 1941, which could have translated into the defeat of Soviet Russia.

Gercke executed the eastern movement in waves beginning with the more innocuous infantry divisions and only a few mobile divisions at a maximum of twelve trains daily along each of the six main rail lines established under Program Otto. The chief of army transportation moved seven infantry and two mobile divisions in the first wave (relatively few), among which it was possible to disguise one panzer and one motorized infantry division. The Germans were extremely sensitive about transferring mobile divisions to the east. They were operating according to the doctrine that panzer divisions and closely associated motorized infantry divisions were to be employed exclusively for deep strategic offensive missions. The Germans assumed with a mirror-image mentality that the Soviets would immediately recognize danger regarding the excessive number of panzer divisions in the east. Accordingly, they left the overwhelming mass of the mobile divisions until the last possible moment for movement eastward. Table II illustrates the German sensitivity to ensuring surprise and the magnitude of the Aufmarsch for Barbarossa:

Table 11. Barbarossa Concentration of Forces (Aufmarsch)*

German Wave and Time Divisions Trains
Wave 1, 2 February—14 March 1941 9 ñ. 14,000 trains divisions
Wave 2, March 1941 18
Wave 3, 8 April—20 May 1941 17 ñ. 3,000 trains for Luftwaffe, army troops, supply and reserve forces
Wave 4a, 23 May—2 June 1941 9
Wave 4b, 3 June—23 June 1941 24
Beginning 21 June—24 July 1941 24
Totals 101 17,000 trains

* Prior to the concentration, the Germans had 47 divisions in the east that eventually took part in the invasion: 12 divisions from the Polish campaign and 35 divisions emplaced between July and October after the French campaign.

In Wave 4b, the last wave of the divisions that launched the attack across the frontier on 22 June 1941 (a day later in a few cases because of the relatively narrow attack fronts), the Germans moved twenty-four panzer and motorized infantry divisions. These, with their tracked and wheeled motor vehides, were difficult to move and even more of a challenge to conceal. The Germans took major precautions to screen the movement of these divisions, then make them disappear into the countryside after offloading. Once this movement began, they considered it would have significant chances of being detected, and it could not be explained by any subterfuge. The Germans also delivered to the border by train an additional twenty-four divisions, which would not take part in the initial attacks but would move into former Soviet territory toward the front from 26 June 1941 onward.


German Rail Lines, Rail Heads, and Truck Columns In the Soviet Union

The trains that moved the German army and the Luftwaffe ground organization to the border could not deliver the armed forces farther east. The Germans would have to move tactically from the frontier and depend for support on the distance between their rail heads and the infantry divisions in the front lines. For the mobile divisions, it was the distance between the German railway system and the finger-like projections deep into Soviet territory. In Barbarossa, the Germans advanced rapidly into territory having no normal-gauge railroads. Logistics would depend on the German capabilities to advance their own rail system into the Soviet Union while simultaneously connecting German rail heads with their troops, disappearing over the horizon into Soviet Russia. An untold, unusual situation almost immediately after Barbarossa began supports a view that, logistically, the Germans had the capability to defeat the Soviet Union. In Army Group Center, seventeen German panzer and motorized infantry divisions did everything in their power to distance themselves from the German railheads. By 26 June 1941, the 7th Panzer Division was 300 km into the Soviet Union from its start on the Lithuanian border, and on the following day the 3d Panzer Division reached Glusa. 350 km into Russia. Current literature has not asked how the Germans could resupply two panzer divisions at that distance from rail heads in German territory. Obviously, they successfully organized truck columns with enormous capacities to run the supplies from the German border to the advancing armies.

By 26 April 1941, the quartermaster general of the German army and the chief of transportation had collected 25,020 tons (freight capacity) of trucks for Army Group Center and smaller amounts for the remaining two army groups.{6} When the campaign opened, the high command of the army provided Army Group Center with approximately 45,000 tons of trucks to deliver supplies from the rail heads on the border to the advancing armies. After a complex transition, their new rail heads were at various distances from the border in Soviet territory.{7} The Germans considered that the 60-ton (freight capacity) truck columns could bridge approximately 400 km between rail heads and the advancing field armies.{8} As the normal-gauge rail lines were constructed along the most important logistics routes into White Russia from Brest to Minsk, the Germans expected on 17 July to take off most of the 60-ton truck columns from the frontier to Minsk between 20 and 30 July 1941. The columns continued to run from the border in decreasing numbers until finally stopped on 5 August 1941.{9} By then, the rail lines were completed beyond Minsk, and the Germans would be operating from rail heads approaching Smolensk.


German Logistics: Quantity of Material and

Mode of Operations Required to Reach the Moscow-Gorki Space
To advance on Moscow in August 1941. the Germans depended logistically on the capacity and location of the rail system they had built by that time. The army high command massed strong forces of railway pioneer troops, battalions of the Reich Labor Service (Reich Arbeits Dienst, or RAD). and Organization Todt (ÎÒ) immediately behind the field armies to ensure construction of the normal-gauge rail lines, train stations, and marshalling yards. In Army Group North, the high command inserted 18,219 men for railway construction during June-August 1941,{10} The construction troops were organized along military lines, armed with rifles, pistols, and light machine guns, and advanced so aggressively behind the German combat formations that they reported 84 combat incidents with scattered Soviet troops. These resulted in 162 combat casualties to themselves. The Germans placed similar construction troops and special railway reconnaissance detachments with the panzer group spearheads to estimate damage and help pull the construction process forward. The details of German-gauge railway construction into the Soviet Union and the exploitation of undamaged Russian-gauge lines, locomotives, and rail cars support" a conclusion that the Germans accurately forecast the logistical necessities for Barbarossa and effectively executed the operations.

Gercke, chief of German army transportation, estimated that one railway battalion could change tracks from Russian to German gauge at a rate of 20 km per day.{11} Railway pioneer units also quickly employed Russian-gauge lines to help bring supplies forward even before they completed the German lines. They used both simultaneously, as long as Russian locomotives and rolling stock held out. On 24 June 1941, Railway Operations Company 203 took over the intact Soviet wide-gauge rail line from Brest to Zabinka, 30 km from the border. The company observed that the Russian-gauge line was intact for an additional 25 km eastward to the station at Tevii. The company began to reduce the haul of the 60-ton truck columns, already running far to the east to support Guderian's panzers, now 220 km on the road to the upper Dnieper at Rogachev.

The German railway pioneer and other construction troops simultaneously built normal-gauge rail lines at a fierce pace. advancing by 25 June some 80 km toward Minsk.{12} By 29 June, they extended normal-gauge track from the frontier at Brest to Oranczyce and, by I July. onto Baranovice.{13} As Gercke commented, a German railway pioneer battahon could replace wide-gauge line with normal at 20 km per day. The distance from Brest to Bara-novice is 210 km, a httle longer using the rail line. The Germans took eleven days to construct the new line, uncannily close to Gercke's estimate despite violent fighting on the southeastern lines of encirclement around the Bialystok pocket. Contrary to conventional interpretation of underestimating the challenges of a campaign in the Soviet Union, the Germans mastered logistics and built their own rail system into the Soviet Union.


Blitz Logistics: Normal Gauge Rail, Brest to Minsk

To operate the rail lines, the Germans had to regauge rail sidings and marshalling areas and, depending on battle damage, to repair buildings and equipment at the train stations.{14} On the most important rail line in Barbarossa, the tracks from Brest directly toward Moscow, the Germans completed the line from Brest to Oranczyce by 29 June 1941 and began to move German trains on normal-gauge track on 30 June. That day. four supply trains arrived at Oranczyce, 85 km into the Soviet Union, with approximately 2,000 tons of supplies. Meantime, regauging of Russian lines continued with work being completed to Baranovice junction by 2000, I July, and three trains reaching that city, 210 km into the Soviet Union. The Germans continued their impressive pace of building a normal-gauge rail system into White Russia and completed regaug-ing from Brest to the capital, Minsk, at noon on 5 July. Army Group Center ran four supply trains there the same day, more than 330 km into the Soviet Union.{15} By 5 July, the Germans began to develop a great rail head at Minsk, which capably supported the lightning panzer advance to Smolensk that overran the city on 16 July. In a historic performance, the Germans regauged the Russian rail system from Brest to Minsk by early July and extended construction to Smolensk before the end of the same month. Their performance established a logistical system able to support an offensive toward Moscow before the middle of August 1941 and bridge the gap between Smolensk and Moscow in a single offensive, similar in style to the earlier leaps to Minsk and Smolensk.

That generalization derives from the actions of Army Group Center from the middle of July to early August 1941. On 15 July 1941, the quartermaster general reviewed the supply status of, Army Group Center in terms of its capabilities to continue offensive operations. He made it clear that the great rail head for continuing operations lay in the cities of Minsk and Molodecno, no longer on the prewar frontier. The army group then had 45,450 tons of 60-ton truck columns and, deducting one-third as inoperable at any time and in repair, still had approximately 30,700 tons available for continuous operations.{16} In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting the battle of Smolensk and would take two more weeks to finish the job and another week to tidy up operationally. The Germans used this time to build up logistic stockpiles at the rail head in the center of White Russia and regauge the main rail line from Minsk through Orsha into Smolensk{17}.

By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941. Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.





_____________________________

Beta Tester WitW & WitE

(in reply to Great_Ajax)

quote:

This book is more of an anti-German, anti-Nazi tirade than a careful analysis of the military events of Operation Barbarossa, 1941. The author goes to lengths to tell us why the Germans were doomed to failure from the get go. The lengthening supply lines, the difference in railroad gauge, the partisans, the size and defiance of the red army, the difficult terrain, the
inhospitable climate, the primitive or non existent roads, the lack of mechanization of the German army, the inability of the infantry armies to keep pace with the Panzer Groups, the incomplete encirclements, the attrition of German strength, lack of replacements for men and material, the infighting in the German high command regarding the strategic direction all have been brought to the fore long before this author penned this book. Having read JFC Fullers history of the Second world war and works by earlier authors in the 1970's none of the German problems cited in the text of this book is new.

What is new is the anti-wehrmacht screed. All the German Generals are incompetent dotes or sychopantic opportunists with congenital superiority complexes. All German successes are due to the equally incompentent Russian deployments or Russian obsolete equipment. Basically the Germans blundered their way across some 700 miles to the gates of Moscow while capturing millions of prisoners. According to the author the Germans had no chance to capture Moscow and were bound to lose the war after June 22, 1941. It is all quite evident in his conclusion what his real goal is, to demythologize the supposed operational excellence of the German army and the German High command.

No where does he talk about the problems facing the Soviets during these opening battles because no matter what the Germans did the Soviets were bound to overwhelm them with numbers because even the loss of Moscow would not have brought about a Soviet surrender. They would have kept on fighting as in 1812. He may be right, but who can really say. The end result of an immense life and death struggle involving millions over a 6 month time period cannot be easily foretold. There is no mathematical formula you can plug in and come up with a right answer.

Despite what the author thinks, a neutral observer in late August, 1941 would have thought the Germans had a good chance to secure Moscow and more importantly destroy the Russian Army.
They went South instead. The entire month of September was lost to secure the Kiev encirclement. This gave the Russians a full month to reinforce their defenses in front of Moscow which appears to have done the Russians little good as the Germans blew through them with ease starting on September 30th. If the Germans had started their drive earlier they could have reached Moscow before the bad weather set in. With all due respect to Dr. Forczyk and Colonel Glantz the South Western front would not have been able to intervene effectively against Army Group Center. Even Dr. Forczyk has acknowledged the Soviets were unable to launch an effective offensive until Stalingrad over a year later. Most of the South Western fronts mobile units and tanks were destroyed in the battles of Dubno and Brody. Any northward turn would have exposed
their flank to Army Group South.

Whether the loss of Moscow would have brought about a soviet collapse, who knows for sure? They could have kept on
Fighting and with the coming of winter would the Germans have been able to hold the City and its environs?
Again, all conjecture and hypotheticals. One thing is for sure, boths sides of this debate will continue to throw
more wood on the fire.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Stolfi? LOL. A fantabulist. I assume that's an extract from Hitler's Panzers East, which isn't a serious work.

Stahel pretty thoroughly demolishes Stolfi, btw.

quote:

ORIGINAL: chaos45

Want to say im not disagreeing with the fact the Germans could have attempted a drive on Moscow earlier...but there are other facts to the situation. LOC is the big reason Hitler turned south.....driving on moscow would have left AGC with a greatly extended flank they didnt have the forces to protect from Soviet counterattacks and it was worried a drive like that on Moscow while AGS was still trying to take Kiev would love AGC exposed to possible soviet counterattacks into AGC exposed southern flank since AGS wouldnt be there to protect it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: chaos45

The game isnt real life---AGS vs the southern front---was very bloody heavy fighting in real life
that you dont see in WITE 1. Lengingrad as well should be a much bloodier campaign for the
Germans to reach and actually storm the city.