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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 1:24:05 AM

chaos45

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The reason I make my statements as well is anyone researching the topic before the 1990s had limited to no access to Soviet records...so most work prior to 1990s is very pro German, for many reasons- primary sources almost exclusively Axis available...secondly the Soviets were the red menace that needed to be belittled by the Nato side.

Its why I say more recent research is actually, and most likely more accurate as to the total picture. You like or not like Glantz all you want but his work- however dry it is, gets into some very deep details on the real situation and I think sheds better light on militarily why the Germans lost.

IMO- its a ton of reasons why the Germans lost the war....did they have a glimmer of chance in late 1941---I think so...however its also as overwhelming blunt on the economics side of the war that short of the allies just giving up the Germans never had a chance.

Its why this campaign is fun to play---as the Germans historically have a slim chance to win, but the odds are stacked against them.

Me and Pelton talk alot and he knows my opinion is that losses were the main reason the Germans ended up losing...it was a simple numbers game and the odds were so stacked against the germans their kill ratios would have to be insanely good for a very long time to win the war...esp when you add in the economic might of the CW and the USA. Also the fact is the Soviets were willing to die/be sacrificed by their commanders at much higher rates than the Germans were at first willing to accept.....this is huge....as tooth to tail ratios is where your real combat ratios are. Frankly put the soviets kept more manpower actually in the trenches than the Germans did period...so each german lost in the line was a greater loss overall than each soviet.

As trained frontline combat infantry/panzer crew/combat engineers were only like 1:4 of every german......so when only 25-30% of your troops are actual combat troops each loss in those units is more heavily felt. Soviets managed a closer to 1:2 ratio...meant less support per rifleman but at the same time each rifleman lost meant less overall loss in combat power.

Raw numbers are meaningless really---its all about how many actual combat trained troops you have that willing and trained to grab a rifle/faust/MG and face the enemy in the battleline. After the losses of 1941, this was something the Germans were never able to fix/make up for the losses of trained combat personnel.

Again everyone has their own take on things....I think the Germans did some amazing feats of arms in WW2 but the facts are even with those amazing feats they still lost......in fact you can really point to the fact that only because the Germans did better than all expectations did the war last as long as it did...as on economic facts they should have lost the way much more quickly.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 1:26:12 AM

Peltonx

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

I'd like to know who that reviewer was.

But you will hate Stahel's work, MT. Not because it is an anti nazi screed, but because it doesn't fit into your narrative of German hypercompetence. But here's the thing: he works completely from German sources. Their own words damn them. He's not making anything up here. If you want to go ahead and ignore all that, go ahead. But you're basically cutting yourself off from all the top scholarship of the last quarter century or so.

So could AGC have driven towards Moscow Starting August 22nd instead of driving 200 miles to help AGS or not?
Loses aside and Choas correct thoughts on flanking attacks.

Was Stolfi right or not?

< Message edited by Pelton -- 7/7/2016 1:37:18 AM >

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 1:37:03 AM

Flaviusx

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Stolfi was wrong.

AGC couldn't have mounted an offensive before September or so. As it was Typhoon in October was launched on a logistical shoestring despite the extended pause in the center. Trying to do this in August? Not a chance. The Germans were actually on the defense in AGC at that stage. Soviets didn't spend themselves until another month or so.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 1:58:12 AM

Flaviusx

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That being said, a mid September Typhoon might just have gotten Moscow, although AGC wouldn't have been fit to get much further than that. An extra 2-3 weeks of clear weather could be just enough to pull it off.

It would've had a very long southern flank to worry about in this scenario, with SW Front still a going concern. And AGS would've ended up far short of its historical gains. Very doubtful they take the Donetz in this situation.

So instead of the Ukraine, the Germans get Moscow (unclear if they can hold it through the winter.) Not clear to me if that's really much better than the opposite. I'd call it a wash.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 2:04:33 AM

Michael T

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The writers I take notice of are the impartial ones. As soon as I smell a wiff of bias or a hidden agenda (or not so hidden in Stahel's case) I tend to disregard the *authors* interpretation of the facts and draw my own conclusions from personal accounts, records and factual advances/defences.

I agree with the reviewer in so much as nothing new is being uncovered. What is new is the *authors* interpretations of the records. I don't disagree that the Germans had logistical problems. I do not agree they were incompetent. Stahel call's Guderian reckless. This is an absurd opinion of him. I wonder what he would think of Rommel in that case. These guys, Glantz and Stahel make the Germans out to be bumbling fools. It's just rubbish. Not worth the paper it's written on.

What I would dearly love is someone of Erickson's caliber to write an account from the German perspective as he did from the Soviet perspective.

I stand by my statement that authors who write new books on subjects already well covered have to make some kind of new claim or assertion in order to sell books. And let's be real. They do it to make a living out of it. Not for charity. So the motivation is income and/or their own biased agenda.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 3:54:45 AM

chaos45

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I guess I would disagree on Glantz....at least on his stalingrad series....I found it quite in-depth on the entire situation and why what happened, happened.

In fact he specifically pulls from German data alot and specifically says he's pulling more from Soviet operational records since the German side of the operations had been previously well written about. Wont speak to his other series but I think he does a great, if dry bit of historical research on the entire Stalingrad operation.

When you look at the day by day accounts of German records on losses and where they were occuring during the stalingrad operation you quickly see the problem the Germans had was they just didnt have near enough manpower to do everything they wanted to do...and you can also quickly see how determined but disastrous soviet counterattacks all summer long in 1942 actually played a key roll in stopping the Germans at Stalingrad.....as they basically just slowly bleed the German army dry....not just in the streets of stalingrad but all summer long on the flanks as well.

You can take support personnel and make them combat infantry and combat engineers---but their effectiveness and average length of survival in combat is much less...and this is exactly what happens to the German army in 1942...you see Paulus constantly worrying about combat infantry and engineers to make up frontline strength...and being that the Germans robbed AGN/AGC to supply manpower and equipment to AGS the situation must be exactly the same if not worse for those sectors in 1942. The daily loss reports and specific instances of losses when replacements are added into German units really brings the picture to light of how desperate the Germans were for manpower from the very early days of the 1942 campaign.

Was one report in those massive books he wrote about a significant chunk of new replacements being feed into a battalion to get it up to a nominal strength for a push and that by the end of the first 24 hours like 90% of the replacements were dead or missing- in fact like 90% of the unit was dead/missing

Now units kept up with these losses by quick retraining of support personnel, new replacements coming in, and lightly wounded coming back...but what you see is its never enough to even break even on daily losses...so all summer long the German units just get weaker and weaker until almost the entire 6th army is virtually combat ineffective aside from barely having enough men to hold the line....and this is after robbing combat engineer battalions from divisions all of the eastern front and sending them into stalingrad.

Now the soviets lost loads of men and Glantz doesnt cover that up at all....in fact they launch alot of very bad attacks that cost them 10s of thousands of men for each major attack...however its does also inflict losses on the Germans and at critical points in the battle for stalingrad draws off forces from the assault on the city and probably even more critically draws off vast sums of artillery ammunition to defeat soviet attacks that had been needed to support offensives inside the city of stalingrad.

So ya IDK about a total Bias in glantz books...he does say he is mainly covering the soviet side as the german side is well covered, but at least in the stalingrad series I dont feel he makes the Germans out to be idiots...just generals asked to do far to much with far to little--which is a very real and factual analysis of the campaign IMO.

< Message edited by chaos45 -- 7/7/2016 3:58:48 AM >

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 7:13:35 AM

SigUp

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Oh boy, the heavy use of Stolfi. Where do I start?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Pelton

By 26 June 1941, the 7th Panzer Division was 300 km into the Soviet Union from its start on the Lithuanian border, and on the following day the 3d Panzer Division reached Glusa. 350 km into Russia. Current literature has not asked how the Germans could resupply two panzer divisions at that distance from rail heads in German territory. Obviously, they successfully organized truck columns with enormous capacities to run the supplies from the German border to the advancing armies.

It's not the literature that hasn't asked. It's Stolfi who is glossing over something, namely the "Handkoffer" system put in place specifically to ensure supply for the German spearhead in the border areas. The "Handkoffer" system saw the Germans advance their supply columns with the panzer spearheads to replenish them. Obviously this system broke down with increasing distance.

quote:

By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941.

In the middle of August 2nd and 9th Army actually experienced decreasing ammunition stocks due to the heavy fighting encountered (van Creveld, Supplying War, p.168). Generally it was impossible for Army Group Centre to build up stockpiles in August.

quote:

Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} � approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.

Von Bock requested 24 trains a day just to ensure the daily operations of the army group. And this number was not even reached. In the first half of August Army Group Centre only got 18 (Sch�ler, The Eastern Campaign, p.213). To build up supplies for an offensive von Bock stated the need for 30 trains a day. Moreover, Stolfi just glosses over the fact that the number of trains for Army Group Centre does not equal the number of trains reaching Smolensk, where the conversion reached on 16 August 1941. As late as July 1943 the Orsha-Smolensk line could only handle 13 trains per day (Pottgie�er, Die Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug). The figure for August/September 1941 is bound to be lower.

quote:

No one can refute the fact that instead of going to Kiev (fuel/ammo required) it could have driven to Moscow a full 8 weeks sooner.

Distance was same and there were no rail lines between the 2 running.

Just like Stolfi you are ignoring one key fact: the different supply hubs. Guderian's panzer group could drive south without all too significant supply problems because they were using the railheads at Gomel (van Creveld, Supplying War, p.170), which would have fallen out as supply hub for a drive towards Moscow.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 7:54:44 AM

loki100

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Pelton

quote:

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

I'd like to know who that reviewer was.

But you will hate Stahel's work, MT. Not because it is an anti nazi screed, but because it doesn't fit into your narrative of German hypercompetence. But here's the thing: he works completely from German sources. Their own words damn them. He's not making anything up here. If you want to go ahead and ignore all that, go ahead. But you're basically cutting yourself off from all the top scholarship of the last quarter century or so.

So could AGC have driven towards Moscow Starting August 22nd instead of driving 200 miles to help AGS or not?
Loses aside and Choas correct thoughts on flanking attacks.

Was Stolfi right or not?

No and no. To go east would have meant major combat operations on a sector where the Soviets had the advantage (temporarily) and only lost it again in mid-September - by exhausting their freshly arrived units in the failed sequence of attacks. As an aside WiTE2 gives you the same dilemna. If you attack you stop the Germans building up supplies and inflict heavy losses but also undermine your own build up ... so which to choose.

The key is the Gomel operation to drive in behind SW Front was not a combat operation. Stalin blundered big time (not for the first or last) by pulling back the weak armies of Central Front (yes there was a short lived Front with that designation in 1941) from covering Gomel-Chernigov back to protect Bryansk and allow Western Front to build up for another attack. This decision is well covered by Erickson (Road to Stalingrad: 275:278). Even so the operation was weak as it was very hard to provide fuel for the formations committed and, as they did in the Caucasus in 1942, the Germans had to take fuel from some vehicles to move others.

Good rule of thumb Stolfi is wrong. In the same way that many of the new wave of Russian historians who are pushing the 'wise Stalin' line are fundamentally wrong.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

The writers I take notice of are the impartial ones. As soon as I smell a wiff of bias or a hidden agenda (or not so hidden in Stahel's case) I tend to disregard the *authors* interpretation of the facts and draw my own conclusions from personal accounts, records and factual advances/defences.

...

This is, of course, an excellent approach but one with real challenges. Since you are clear that you are seeing things much more clearly than everyone else would like to know which books/authors you are relying on.

I'll be upfront, from the German side I like Fritz and Stahel. I think both do a great job acknowledging the strengths of the Wehrmacht but pointing to its feet of clay - no about of cleverness could mask their massive logistical challenge and lack of logistical resources. For the Soviets, Erickson remains excellent. I think that Glantz is a bit of a mixed bag. As with Chaos above I think his 1942 stuff is excellent.

My issue is he is too quick to claim this or that action was the 'decisive' step. Also always worth remembering he started his historical research as he was trying to get the US planners to take the Warsaw Pact seriously at a tactical/operational level. He felt (probably with some reason) that the orthodoxy was too focussed on lack of tactical/operational flexibility and how to exploit the flaws in Soviet centralised control.

edit: there is a key and serious point here. Given that to really handle the material you need to be fluent in either German or Russian and to understand the political and military structures and dynamics on both sides. I have yet to find anyone who can manage this. Fritz is a good eg, he is basically a German specialist and it shows. His treatment of the Soviet side is never to the high standard of his scholarship and mastery over German sources and this gap really undermines the final part of his book. At a more political level, Kershaw is another who falls into this trap. His grasp of the structures of the Third Reich is excellent, his attempt (in 'Hitler and Stalin') has the same problem - he just lacks the background on the Soviet side.

Now add on there is no shortage of biases flying around. On the Soviet side you can find endless reworks of the 'Great Stalin/Bad Stalin' argument. On the Axis side you have the Nuremburg defense of the German commanders (the bad man made us do it) and then variants of Hitler being let down by his generals or his generals being undermined by Hitler.

FWIW, I'd argue that anyone who tries to separate out Soviet military decision making from the political structures of the Soviet state is going to struggle. And anyone who can't read Russian is, at best, limited to reworking already existing non-Russian sources.

< Message edited by loki100 -- 7/7/2016 8:18:26 AM >

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 8:36:27 AM

SigUp

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

Stahel call's Guderian reckless. This is an absurd opinion of him. I wonder what he would think of Rommel in that case.

You are ignoring context. Stahel doesn't call Guderian generally reckless. He called his insistence on releasing the 29th Motorised Division for a continued advance east in late June 1941 reckless (a request that was denied by von Bock). And Stahel in this specific instance has a case. At that point the 29th Motorised Division was holding the eastern end of the Bialystok pocket by itself and had to fend off breakout attempts by the Soviet forces.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 8:59:20 AM

Michael T

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I really can't believe this narrow mindedness that gets displayed by the Red fan club every time a what if comes up. Do you guys possess any imagination at all?

Can't you see that if a decision was taken to go for Moscow prior to making the decision to go for Kiev that said supply hub/resources at Gomel would simply have been moved north well beforehand? Gimme a break. Have a little room in your heads for some relative logistical changes if objectives were changed earlier.

You are arguing that if the Germans decided to go for Moscow instead that they would have still built and positioned supply dumps for a drive on Kiev. I don't think even Stahel would think them that stupid.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 9:11:57 AM

loki100

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I really can't believe this narrow mindedness that gets displayed by the Red fan club every time a what if comes up. Do you guys possess any imagination at all?

Can't you see that if a decision was taken to go for Moscow prior to making the decision to go for Kiev that said supply hub/resources at Gomel would simply have been moved north well beforehand? Gimme a break. Have a little room in your heads for some relative logistical changes if objectives were changed earlier.

You are arguing that if the Germans decided to go for Moscow instead that they would have still built and positioned supply dumps for a drive on Kiev. I don't think even Stahel would think them that stupid.

Michael

it really doesn't help to trot out the rather tired 'red fan club' (or its opposite).

Look at the map, Gomel can be resupplied by a different rail line to Smolensk. So there is a rail capacity issue you can't send all the Gomel supplies to Smolensk by rail. What you need to do is to use (more) of your (scarce) trucks to do so?

Of course they swapped supply around as their priorities shifted but there is a finite limit to the amount you can send to anyone sector.

The point is the road east was full of rather irate Soviet formations who had, in late August, the tactical advantage. The road south was effectively empty (see the source I used above for why). I presume you too share my view that the supplies needed to not just conduct a major offensive, but to do so by starting on the back foot, are different to those required to push through an area held by little but battalion sized blocking detachments?

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 9:28:09 AM

Michael T

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The true sign of intelligence is not knowledge but imagination. - Albert Einstein

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 9:41:04 AM

SigUp

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I really can't believe this narrow mindedness that gets displayed by the Red fan club every time a what if comes up. Do you guys possess any imagination at all?

Can't you see that if a decision was taken to go for Moscow prior to making the decision to go for Kiev that said supply hub/resources at Gomel would simply have been moved north well beforehand? Gimme a break. Have a little room in your heads for some relative logistical changes if objectives were changed earlier.

You are arguing that if the Germans decided to go for Moscow instead that they would have still built and positioned supply dumps for a drive on Kiev. I don't think even Stahel would think them that stupid.

Red fan club, first time that I've been accused of that.

As loki said, you are completely ignoring the limits of rail capacity. The supply hub at Gomel was supplied via the line Minsk - Bobruisk - Zhlobin - Gomel. For a drive to Moscow there were two possible hubs with Vitebsk and Smolesnk. Vitebsk relied on the line Daugavpils - Polotsk - Vitebsk while the Smolensk hub relied on Minsk - Borisov - Orsha - Smolensk.

If now the rail capacity towards Vitebsk/Smolensk was already struggling to keep the Germans in the Smolesnk region in adequate supply for daily operations alone in August 1941 (9th Army as mentioned experienced dwindling stocks in ammunition), how do you imagine the Germans procuring the capacity to supply another panzer group, and all that for a major offensive towards Moscow?

< Message edited by SigUp -- 7/7/2016 9:45:25 AM >

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 9:43:57 AM

loki100

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can we skip the insults? Please.

Ok, try this as an argument. A number of posters in this thread are arguing (in different ways) that logistics was the fundamental flaw behind the German invasion of the Soviet Union. That may have been made worse by the rather unclear strategic directives but the Germans weren't the first to fail to solve the problem that the political structures of the Russian state are in the north and its economic strength in the south.

You deny that logistics was so important. I presume you share my view that the Soviet command etc was so disorganised that they couldn't win a battle/campaign in any meaningful sense - the best they could do was to avoid a crippling defeat - which is what they managed.

So why did the Germans fail? In your model you seem to be left with some variant of Hitler undermining his generals or his generals undermining Hitler (depends if you prefer the post-war Wehrmacht explanation or the revisionist neo-nazi narrative). Those you accuse of being 'red fan boys' can easily cope with the idea that operationally and tactically at this stage of WW2 the Germans had the best army in the field.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 10:23:40 AM

Michael T

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I don't know what your on but it must be good stuff.

The only argument I have made here is that Germany could have reached Moscow in September 1941 with a PG, since they got to Kiev with one PG in the same period. I stand by it. And will always do so as it is feasible. Any rational and impartial person would recognize that.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 10:38:11 AM

zakblood

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everyone is entitled to there own opinions and we all should respects others points of views on any given subject, debate is good, insults, flaming, name calling is for the play ground only and is against the rules here and could in the end lead to another thread being locked, which would again be a shame for all the good posts and good members contributing so far constructively, this isn't aimed at anyone or any post either, just a reminder to be and stay civil please, thanks

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 1:39:51 PM

Manstein63

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It seems to me that the major problem that we have is that the Axis didn't defeat the Soviets in 1941, so everything that has been said can only be conjecture or personal opinion. We can all agree that the logistic model in WitE 1.0 leaves an awful lot to be desired however from what I have read WitE 2.0 appears to handle logistics in a more realistic manner. I for one am prepared to wait to see how the game has evolved before making any judgements. That being said I am quite sure that it would have been possible for the Germans to have pushed one Panzergruppe towards Moscow Rather than turning it south toward Kiev, but at what cost? As I understand it the Kiev pocket captured significant amounts of men & materials. If they had not been dealt with what would they be doing while the Germans were advancing, I'm sure that they wouldn't just be sitting around on their hands. It's easy to look at something in isolation & say that it can be done but every action has consequences unfortunately we will never really know what might have happened if the Germans continued to Moscow without dealing with Kiev.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 1:58:00 PM

HardLuckYetAgain

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Manstein63

It seems to me that the major problem that we have is that the Axis didn't defeat the Soviets in 1941, so everything that has been said can only be conjecture or personal opinion. We can all agree that the logistic model in WitE 1.0 leaves an awful lot to be desired however from what I have read WitE 2.0 appears to handle logistics in a more realistic manner. I for one am prepared to wait to see how the game has evolved before making any judgements. That being said I am quite sure that it would have been possible for the Germans to have pushed one Panzergruppe towards Moscow Rather than turning it south toward Kiev, but at what cost? As I understand it the Kiev pocket captured significant amounts of men & materials. If they had not been dealt with what would they be doing while the Germans were advancing, I'm sure that they wouldn't just be sitting around on their hands. It's easy to look at something in isolation & say that it can be done but every action has consequences unfortunately we will never really know what might have happened if the Germans continued to Moscow without dealing with Kiev.

Manstein63

So, what if the Germans didnt have to come to the reacue in the Balkins and North Africa? All of those troops and supplies could be sent East. Would love to have a "what if" scenario in WitE2 for that. :-). (Along with an earlier start month for the invasion)

< Message edited by HardLuckYetAgain -- 7/7/2016 2:01:55 PM >

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 2:02:37 PM

Flaviusx

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Hey.

The only True Red Army Fanboi around here is me! Loki and SigUp? Those guys are just pretenders.

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 4:36:05 PM

Manstein63

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quote:

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

So, what if the Germans didnt have to come to the reacue in the Balkins and North Africa? All of those troops and supplies could be sent East. Would love to have a "what if" scenario in WitE2 for that. :-). (Along with an earlier start month for the invasion)

Exactly my point, just where exactly do you draw the line. If there was no Med campaign what would Britain be doing? & remember the initial German contribution to Africa was small in comparison to what was going to Barbarossa.

Manstein63

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RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 5:32:41 PM

Capitaine

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Above all else, actual historical truth about capabilities should take precedence. There is not however always complete agreement on what is the objective reality in every case, especially where possibilities of unachieved objectives are concerned. In such cases we must extrapolate the facts from data we do have. And given that to achieve victory certain goals must be attained, in cases of reasonable disputed assessments I would slightly incline toward the side saying something *was* possible than the side saying it wasn't. Because if we preclude a goal from happening, it would likely result in a decidedly less interesting game experience.

And I emphasize the words "reasonably disputed" and "slight inclination", not to make a fictional exercise by any means.

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Post #: 951

RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 6:01:27 PM

Commanderski

Posts: 927
Joined: 12/12/2010
From: New Hampshire
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Are any improvements or upgrades being made to the AI for 2.0 or will be pretty much the same as WITW?

(in reply to Capitaine)

Post #: 952

RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 7:50:35 PM

loki100

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From: Utlima Thule
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Commanderski

Are any improvements or upgrades being made to the AI for 2.0 or will be pretty much the same as WITW?

I think its already a lot better.

The German AI still struggles to close pockets as opposed to routing units but this is less a clear cut mistake than it is in WiTE. For a start the Soviets in 1941 get a lot more shatters (esp if its a low morale/low experience unit) so that is a second way to cull the Soviet OOB. Secondly as mentioned early combat itself is more lethal. So even vs AI, around 2.2m Soviet losses to the start of the blizzard offensive seems pretty normal.

Soviet AI seems to be a lot more intelligent about terrain. Again what is fatal in WiTE is good play in WiTE2 so holding onto cities to deny their use as depots and salients etc are less of a death trap than in WiTE. It also counterattacks in a very Stalinist style, so as the German you have this horrible feeling of winning all the battles even as the war slips away from you.

So my feeling is it is far more situational aware than in WiTE and the switch in game play away from relying on the formation of pockets as the key means to make progress seems to minimise one of its earlier weaknesses.

Its still going to have a specially script for the axis T1 but it is always going to need that crutch to get it started.

Some builds it is really good, others less so but that is more a reflection of other game parameters being shifted rather than its basic competence.

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Post #: 953

RE: WitE 2 - 7/7/2016 8:24:58 PM

Aurelian

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Manstein63

quote:

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

So, what if the Germans didnt have to come to the reacue in the Balkins and North Africa? All of those troops and supplies could be sent East. Would love to have a "what if" scenario in WitE2 for that. :-). (Along with an earlier start month for the invasion)

Exactly my point, just where exactly do you draw the line. If there was no Med campaign what would Britain be doing? & remember the initial German contribution to Africa was small in comparison to what was going to Barbarossa.

Manstein63

From what I've read, the spring rains and mud in the USSR had lasted later than usual in 1941. And there is always the problem of logistics.

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If the Earth was flat, cats would of knocked everything off of it long ago.

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Post #: 954

RE: WitE 2 - 7/8/2016 4:30:16 AM

Tejszd

Posts: 3437
Joined: 11/17/2007
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quote:

ORIGINAL: loki100

Its still going to have a specially script for the axis T1 but it is always going to need that crutch to get it started.

If a script is used for the opening Axis T1 there should be a few alternatives, as option, to add variety....

(in reply to loki100)

Post #: 955

RE: WitE 2 - 7/8/2016 9:29:02 AM

loki100

Posts: 10920
Joined: 10/20/2012
From: Utlima Thule
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Tejszd

quote:

ORIGINAL: loki100

Its still going to have a specially script for the axis T1 but it is always going to need that crutch to get it started.

If a script is used for the opening Axis T1 there should be a few alternatives, as option, to add variety....

this might change but I doubt there will be a range of options. As I understand it, the AI has to be given a sequence of moves/attacks where there is no risk of failure (at the critical points) or the entire script will fail. Equally it is set up to model the historical German force allocation (so far in testing WiTE2 this makes far more sense to stick to than it does in WiTE).

You can vary it by altering the NM %. The above works at 100% so if you push NM up to say 120% the AI will do better - not least as movement costs in enemy territory will drop for a number of formations that now meet the morale thresholds etc.

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Post #: 956

�N A declassified, unbiased look at the German logisti... - 7/10/2016 6:44:21 PM

Peltonx

Posts: 7250
Joined: 4/9/2006
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A declassified, unbiased look at the German logistical issues on the Eastern Front 1941.

Shortly after December 7th 1941 the USA is now part of the WA fighting against Germany.

The question before President Roosevelt and the rest of the free world was:

Could Germany in 1942 finish off Russia and turn west again before the USA had time to gather the strength to be felt across 2 Oceans.

The task of answering this question was given to the OCI later to become The Office of Strategic Services of War Information
or OSS headed by �gWild�h Bill Donovan a precursor to the CIA. Bill was also known as the Father of the CIA.

Information was gathered from all allied, governments, armed forces and intelligent branches.
At this time the OCI had no political axe to grind, no history to rewrite.
It had to answer a central question based on data/facts.

As Chaos/Flaviusx/MT and others have stated we can believe what we want to support which even side we want, but here we have a study that has to be honest as best it can.
Because the free world is at risk and its leaders need to make decisions based on what is really going on and not what they wish was
going on over the last year.

The world was in the balance and there is no room for politics or just so fairytales.

The study was printed March 25th 1942 and later reviewed by CIA and other offices not for political reasons, but because this was the first of its kind and going forward was critical for our leaders to make decisions based on the facts on the ground. It was a ground breaking study that is the model many governments still use to this day in the area of logistics and intelligences gathering.
I am not sure how 2by3 is modelling unit consumption, but this report does quantify divisional consumption. What is also very helpful is it corrects the March 1942 report with new information gathered after the war. Like the areas where unit consumptions was high, low, corrects Halder in area ect ect. It was critical to get things right going forward so the next war leaders would be given better information over all. I would think 2by3 would want to base 2.0 consumption rates on an unbiased historical model.
The report also splits the information by AGN/AGC/AGC, time periods, battle tempo, rail tonnage required, transport capacity, rail line conversion rates, ect.

It also gives conclusions.

Again to be clear this is not some one writing a book to make coin, the victors retelling history or the losing Generals blaming
someone else for the lost battles and war.

Quote: With respects to the past , what happened in 1941, the estimate was right that there had been no over-all supply deficiency but that there has been temporary and local ones and that intervals of comparative quiet on the fronts reflected time required to build up supplies for a new push. But the aggregated figures for supply requirements and transport capacity supporting this conclusion were inflated by compounding errors to several times those revealed in the Halder notes and other sources.
.

As stated the study was not perfect, but corrected over time so I would think this would be the best model to use when 2by3 is
making the logistics model for 2.0

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol6no4/pdf/v06i4a07p.pdf

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(in reply to loki100)

Post #: 957

RE: �N A declassified, unbiased look at the German log... - 7/10/2016 7:54:35 PM

demyansk

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Joined: 2/20/2008
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Thanks for the link and I downloaded.

(in reply to Peltonx)

Post #: 958

RE: �N A declassified, unbiased look at the German log... - 7/10/2016 9:07:21 PM

Peltonx

Posts: 7250
Joined: 4/9/2006
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quote:

ORIGINAL: demjansk

Thanks for the link and I downloaded.

NP bro.

Just tring to keep things focused non-personal/political and focused on historical data unbiased data/facts.

A few questions for 2by3.

1. On paper the USSR had a total of 24,000 tanks on June 22.
10,650 were out of service for routine maintenance, 6,950 were undergoing major maintance (transmition/engine repairs) leaving just
6,450 to face Germanys invasion. That number fell quickly because Russia did not have a single armored recover vehicle do
they were forced to leave behind 1000�s of vehicles. Will this be reflexed during turn 1-3?
2. 2.0 is centered around depots. Historiclly some 200+ depots were captured intact by the Germans by July 10th .
Will there be any special rules that does not let the Russian player simply disband these depots during the first 3 weeks?
3. As I have stated as far as AGN goes will it reflex history? AGN captured a bridge over the Luga near Kinisepp on
July 13th or turn 3 or 4 by game time. We also know supplies were being delivered by rail 40 miles east of Poskv.
Directive 21 and other leading up to 22nd states Leningrad as the #1 objective of the operation.

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Post #: 959

RE: WitE 2 - 7/12/2016 11:30:01 AM

MechFO

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quote:

ORIGINAL: chaos45
As trained frontline combat infantry/panzer crew/combat engineers were only like 1:4 of every german......so when only 25-30% of your troops are actual combat troops each loss in those units is more heavily felt. Soviets managed a closer to 1:2 ratio...meant less support per rifleman but at the same time each rifleman lost meant less overall loss in combat power.

There is no free lunch. The support system the Germans had in their Division TOE also existed somewhere on the Soviet side, just in another ledger column. A tank needs a certain maintenance infrastructure, food needs to be made, supplies need to be transported and distributed.

Don't provide that in house and it will have to come from outside or efficiency will break down sooner rather than later.

What can be argued is that several factors led to the Soviets being able to substitute industrial production for manpower, while the Germans did the reverse, but either way, the Soviets should have Support deficits which needs higher level units to help out (which in turn should arguably be bigger than the German counterparts).

(in reply to chaos45)

Post #: 960