Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: KWG

For the game to be HISTORIC...


When the Allies and the Germans go toe to toe at close strengths it will have to be the ALLIED AIR POWER that breaks the Germans.

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ORIGINAL: LiquidSky

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ORIGINAL: KWG

For the game to be HISTORIC...


When the Allies and the Germans go toe to toe at close strengths it will have to be the ALLIED AIR POWER that breaks the Germans.

Ummm...no. For the game to be HISTORIC... when the allies and the germans go toe to toe, it is the successive (failed) attacks with infantry, artillery...armour that attrit the Germans to the point where they could no longer hold the ground. (breaks the Germans)

This does not say that allied airpower did nothing. But it certainly did not kill off the German army while the allies stood by and waited on the ground.

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ORIGINAL: LiquidSky


It was Patton's tanks that broke open the German lines. After a month and a half of fighting.

I would argue that the only 'historical' use of unit bombing was the carpet bombing by the 8th airforce. Unit bombing should be removed from the game. It is an unhistorical use of airpower.

Airpower was used either in conjunction with ground attacks to attack fixed areas (The ground support mission) or to stop/slow the movement of troops/supply to the front lines. (Interdiction mission) when it was sent to bomb enemy troops. The unit bombing mission serves no historical purpose.

I agree that airpower was helpful in defeating the germans. Its just a question of scale.

Rank this in order of damage done to German units:

The Red Army
The Red Airforce
The Allied Army
The Allied Airforce

I think even my 13 year old daughter could rank this properly. Yet you are arguing that the Allied Airforce should be ranked 1st. And the game is acting like it is. I say it is a pretty distant last.

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Yet you are arguing that the Allied Airforce should be ranked 1st

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I would argue that the only 'historical' use of unit bombing was the carpet bombing by the 8th airforce.

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(The ground support mission) or to stop/slow the movement of troops/supply to the front lines. (Interdiction mission) when it was sent to bomb enemy troops. The unit bombing mission serves no historical purpose.

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Yet you are arguing that the Allied Airforce should be ranked 1st. And the game is acting like it is.

quote:

ORIGINAL: KWG

For the game to be HISTORIC...


When the Allies and the Germans go toe to toe at close strengths it will have to be
the ALLIED AIR POWER that breaks the Germans.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Pelton

quote:

ORIGINAL: KWG

For the game to be HISTORIC...


When the Allies and the Germans go toe to toe at close strengths it will have to be
the ALLIED AIR POWER that breaks the Germans.

But as seen in picture as per Sig and myself

the exploit hits HQ's which means they are under 90% toe in some cases as low as 70% which is a -3 to commander rolls

Which effects every single roll.

This causes loses/misses ect ect

Lets stick to the data and not get off on personal issues.

1. you had no idea you were using a poor design/bug/exploit.
2. its effects HQ' massively
3. ToE effects commander rolls.
4. Commander rolls effect EVERY SINGLE ROLL so a 7 commander goes down to 4. This alone is HUGE as all WitE people know and I am guessing most here do.
5. Because of -30% rolls more losses happen during ground combat that never should have happened.
6. because of exploit Germany suffers more loses to HQ and more losses during ground combat.

This issue is massive which is why WitE players have house rules its effects are just not loses to the HQ's its loses to ground forses because of lost rolls which never should have been lost.

Again stick to the data.

As you said more then once you really don't have much of an idea what your doing.

You need to understand this is not all about our game and you winning.

Its about following the data no matter where it leads.

Our game and chances are every game is effected by this - not because people new what they were doing but because system is WAD, but with a massive problem.

The problem effects every single roll during ground combat if a Corp HQ takes more then 500 in loses. Your best bombing run was vs a HQ unit and several others.

So I had 3 Corp HQ rolling with lower then normall commander ratings.

This also effect logistics - MP's replacements ect ect

Again look at the data, follow it - what are the effects in game to EVERYONES game not just ours.


5.

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ORIGINAL: HMSWarspite

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ORIGINAL: Pelton

quote:

ORIGINAL: KWG

For the game to be HISTORIC...


When the Allies and the Germans go toe to toe at close strengths it will have to be
the ALLIED AIR POWER that breaks the Germans.

But as seen in picture as per Sig and myself

the exploit hits HQ's which means they are under 90% toe in some cases as low as 70% which is a -3 to commander rolls

Which effects every single roll.

This causes loses/misses ect ect

Lets stick to the data and not get off on personal issues.

1. you had no idea you were using a poor design/bug/exploit.
2. its effects HQ' massively
3. ToE effects commander rolls.
4. Commander rolls effect EVERY SINGLE ROLL so a 7 commander goes down to 4. This alone is HUGE as all WitE people know and I am guessing most here do.
5. Because of -30% rolls more losses happen during ground combat that never should have happened.
6. because of exploit Germany suffers more loses to HQ and more losses during ground combat.

This issue is massive which is why WitE players have house rules its effects are just not loses to the HQ's its loses to ground forses because of lost rolls which never should have been lost.

Again stick to the data.

As you said more then once you really don't have much of an idea what your doing.

You need to understand this is not all about our game and you winning.

Its about following the data no matter where it leads.

Our game and chances are every game is effected by this - not because people new what they were doing but because system is WAD, but with a massive problem.

The problem effects every single roll during ground combat if a Corp HQ takes more then 500 in loses. Your best bombing run was vs a HQ unit and several others.

So I had 3 Corp HQ rolling with lower then normall commander ratings.

This also effect logistics - MP's replacements ect ect

Again look at the data, follow it - what are the effects in game to EVERYONES game not just ours.


5.

So why isnt KWG rolling your army all round western France, with all these negative command checks. Oh? Wait. Do negative command checks have no effect unless there is ground combat?

PELTON, you have changed your argument throughout these threads, have shown no sign of listening to anybody, and this whole subject is now boring me. Have you played your turn in the AAR recently?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Walloc

Sigup,

Did u note what type of terrain u did the attacks in?

In my experience terrain has an IMHO unwarrented effect on air caused casulties and u might not have noted in ur tests. I say this because if one looks at the bombings / loss rates in german units that was near Caen vs those facing the Americans simplistic said. There is no evidence that those in "clear" hexes suffered any more from air than those in "bocage" terrain. I've never in a singel annicdotal story or AAR written by german officers ever read that being in those "clear" areas was any worse or better than those in Bocage. They seem to complain just as much about the jabo and air attacks in general. Nor does historic loss rates for those division in "clear" terrain give any indication of this.

See Harry Banana test in another thread with the 1300 ish sorties on 12 SS aka combat unit for 4400 casulties. Or more than 3 per sorties. With that in mind the nearly approximately 80k sorties of Allied single engine figther bomb loaded mission during normandy(not to say that all actually hit any targets or that all directly targeted "Manpower) would account for more than 300k alone(nearly 3 times actual casulties to all causes not counting MIA/pows. Nor allowing for any MB and HB caused casulties. While results migth vary in WiTW and depending on whom does the air campaigns some seems to get alot more missions of the same planes than others. Rarely less u dont fly at all do u get zero result mission(abort, no targets to drop bombs on, aborted cause of weather and so on) unlike in the real world.

For those that think the "combat" formation results doesnt look out of place. Im sorry but historicly u didnt come close to 1 kill per sortie. Clearly to get historic loss rates u hafta go well below 1 per sorties to reach historic levels. How many sorties u then do compared to historic levels is another matter.

I would suggest that ppl study the real effects of teh carpet bombs seems to be alot of mis information around. In 2 of the 5 big "carpet bombings" the actual number of corpses accounted by the BOAR Group for in the area of the bombings is less than number of fingers on a normal human being. Which is perfectly in line with the german sources on these 2 particualr attacks. A recent(2012) BNHD study into the two carpet bombings preceding Cobra that the casulties on the german side in terms of actual losses was significantly less than the blue fire ones. The actual number of german soldiers in teh bomb box it self is also a good clue. Futher If u look at the weekly reports of losses in Pz Lehr the week that encompassed the 2 bombings plus a weeks fighting and withdrawl, it isnt even in the top 5 of weeks of high losses for pz lehr in normandy. Neither suggesting that the bombings purely casulties wise did any thing statisically significant. The only carpet bombing mission with actual confirmed significant losses is the one at Goodwood. Including a good number of tanks and other armored vehicles.

As too Rundtsted opinion on the Cobra bombings. One should study his source which happens to be Fritz Beyerlein. As to his credability on the subject(and in general) i refere to the chapter at page 36 onwards in Zetterlings Normandy book.

Further more yes its true that 232 heavy bombers was used on Villers bocage at Epsom but unlike the implied reading in another thread it isnt used for attacking german troops. Like on both St Lo, St Vith and Houffaize in the ardennes the information on pz formation is heading into the area precipitate the launching of a HB strike on cites/road center/choke points purposfully with the rubble effect on cities in mind. To slow/halt the use of this roads in the cities. Trying to put a plug in the choke points these road centers was. This is best in game terms described as pure interdiction, hinder movement. No tanks or armored vehicles was in fact lost at Villers Bocage as a result of the city bombing. As the cities are far beind enemy lines the usual restriction regarding HB/carpet bombings are a non factor in these cases. As these was cities tho not large ones there was no targeting problems for HB hench their use on these targets.

Tank and Manpower are lost as a result of bombing strikes in Epsom causing losses in particular those that off seting the time table of the II SS Pz Corps planned counter attack, but this was done purely by medium bombers who purpousfully attack the concentration of ground forces(unlike the HB) that the until then unexperienced to western front conditions the 9th and 10th SS divisions commits. Live and learn. A bombardment of 672 British gun from 3 different British corps onto this concentration/assembly area makes this the the largest german attack in normandy you've never heard of.

Kind regards,
Rasmus

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I would suggest that ppl study the real effects of teh carpet bombs seems to be alot of mis information around. In 2 of the 5 big "carpet bombings" the actual number of corpses accounted by the BOAR Group for in the area of the bombings is less than number of fingers on a normal human being.

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From a ground attack AD perspective can we now assume that this issue is just about too many losses from HQ bombing?

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Lets stick to the data and not get off on personal issues.

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As you said more then once you really don't have much of an idea what your doing.

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Again stick to the data.

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You need to understand this is not all about our game and you winning.

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ORIGINAL: Red Lancer
This avoids two issues, firstly that there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics and secondly this...

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ORIGINAL: Seminole

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I would suggest that ppl study the real effects of teh carpet bombs seems to be alot of mis information around. In 2 of the 5 big "carpet bombings" the actual number of corpses accounted by the BOAR Group for in the area of the bombings is less than number of fingers on a normal human being.

I'Losses' from a combat perspective are not the same as corpses accounted.

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ORIGINAL: Ralzakark

For COBRA the figures I have are some 1,000 casualties total from Panzer Lehr and its supporting paratroops on 25 July. This was from a raid of 1,490 B-17s and B-24s which dropped over 3,370 tons of bombs, 380 mediums and over 550 fighter-bombers. Bayerlein estimated that 50% of his casualties were from bombing. So 2,420 aircraft caused 500 casualties.

So in these examples it needed 6.7, 4.4 and 4.8 sorties to produce one casualty.

This is the permanent damage only of course, the short-terms effects were usually more significant as these raids preceded major ground assaults.

Bayerlein reported that the morale of his men was seriously affected: ‘The morale attitude of a great number of men grew so bad that they, feeling the uselessness of fighting, surrendered, deserted to the enemy or escaped to the rear, as far as they survived the bombing. Only particularly strong nerved and brave men could endure this strain… For me, who during this war was in every theatre committed at the points of the main effort, this was the worst I ever saw’.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Seminole

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From a ground attack AD perspective can we now assume that this issue is just about too many losses from HQ bombing?

I think the 'problem' isn't HQs per se, but support squads (and vehicles?). My guess is that support squads are very squishy, and easily susceptible to bombardment, and since that and vehicles is all that makes an HQ they stand out due to concentration.

What I do notice when I look through all the bombing reports with no kills in my own experience is that they still have lots of disruption. Any way for us to observe how many losses are coming from damaged/disrupted elements failing checks and going into the losses column?

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1. As per more then one persons tests (Liquadsky, Sig, me to name a few)and Helpless post 69, it appears it is a HQ issue.
Could possibly have other factors involved no one knows for sure until some like Liquadsky does some hours of testing.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joel Billings

Pavel has made some changes to address the HQ bombing issue.
IIRC from our conversation lots of support units in a HQ was a major culprit.
He has made several changes to better simulate the dispersal of forces in these HQs,
which will also tend to reduce the flak coming from these HQs in the HQ hex.
He said in the test saves the 10,000+ casualties were being reduced to 300 with the changes.
It really helps Pavel to have specific saves he can test as he did in this case.
That's when changes can get made and tested for their impact. Thanks.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Walloc

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ralzakark

For COBRA the figures I have are some 1,000 casualties total from Panzer Lehr and its supporting paratroops on 25 July. This was from a raid of 1,490 B-17s and B-24s which dropped over 3,370 tons of bombs, 380 mediums and over 550 fighter-bombers. Bayerlein estimated that 50% of his casualties were from bombing. So 2,420 aircraft caused 500 casualties.

So in these examples it needed 6.7, 4.4 and 4.8 sorties to produce one casualty.

This is the permanent damage only of course, the short-terms effects were usually more significant as these raids preceded major ground assaults.

Bayerlein reported that the morale of his men was seriously affected: ‘The morale attitude of a great number of men grew so bad that they, feeling the uselessness of fighting, surrendered, deserted to the enemy or escaped to the rear, as far as they survived the bombing. Only particularly strong nerved and brave men could endure this strain… For me, who during this war was in every theatre committed at the points of the main effort, this was the worst I ever saw’.

For the sake of historical accuracy an in regards to the recent BHND study. The reason for the study and came about as a wondering regarding these casulties figurs that has been around for years. As the weekly loss report for Pz Lehr for the week of the 2 bombigns is less than the 1000 reported over all. How can the casulties during the week for all causes including a week of intense fighting and withdrawl be excede by 1 of the days. How can u then take 1000 casulties on the 25th alone. Where how did the 1000 come by. Clearly both cant be true.
The BHND study does come with a conclusive number as such is by nature of it impossible in a defintive but the result is estimated to be in the very low end of 3 digits numbers. Herin is number of actual german troops in the box(s). As that in self prohibits 500 losses alone. Also if u look at the OOB strength of Pz Lehr on the 23/24th and again on the 1st august where numbers are present. The 1000 cant number be supported as there isnt 1000 in difference between the numbers and no replacements is recieved.

Beyerlein comes up with these numbers it should be noted comes in interviews after the war. He comes with a number of other statements during these which also have been later fact checked. His memory in regards to these intentionally or unintentionally have some very serious flaws. So IMO and otehrs teh credability of his estimate should regarded with a critical eye.

As to the other effects i dont think there is much doubt. Both American and german reports and annecdotal evidence talk about the psycological effect of the bombings. Dazed and crazed german soldiers, suicides and more. Still these casulties are included in the loss reports/difference in the OOB strength.

Futher communication breaks down, phonesline are cut, radios concussed which might to give Beyerlein some credit feel like his division was "obliterated" as he has little control over parts of his division in the imidiate aftermath.

This in it self is ofc also a reducing factor in actual fighting power. Which prolly has alot to do why the Allies break through. At the point of the Cobra bombinbs Pz Lehr is alrdy in a severly reduced state. The six pz gren btn of Pz Lehr plus the eng btn and the parts of the recon btn that is not vehicle based so soldiers that can be used in the front lines is less than 700 men in total. So the total thrench strength of Pz Lehr pre the bombings cover several miles of front line is 700 or so low that the density of troops doesnt allow for the usual german tactics of defending. A forward line to absorb and disrupt and a main line further back. Nor is there any manpower for counter attack unit(s).

The designed reserve of the dívision is exclusivly from the pz regiment(note is has a eng coy). The disruption from the bombs crates and such made it slow going for the german tanks as well as allied plus lack of communication hinder the commander in seing where to deploy this reserve force effectivly. Negating the standart german way of deal with breakthroughs, counter attacks. Nor is there any corps or army reserves to be used in this role at this time for the germans.
IMO its this that is the main reson for teh breakthrough at Cobra along with a much focused appliance of strength(more troops on shorter frontage. Not to forget Rhinoes. All of a sudden germans that was set up and used to having Allied vehicles bound to the narrow lanes/road in the dense bocage. The strength point covering those could all of a sudden be bypassed and attacked from unexpected directions.

There in my mind is no doubt that the distruption effect of carpet bombings should be real if they "hit" their target but these are temporary effects. Pz Lehr fights on just like the other german pz divs and conductes a semi figthting withdrawl in the following days. It doesnt disovlve in any way and is later used in the campaign including Mortain. It isnt withdrawn any soon than the other german divisions and keeps fighting on and doesnt digstignvis it self particular worse. So the "moral" effects very much seem temporary. Hench IMO the model should focus on the temporary effects aka disruption.


This will futher have the effect with the lowered combat value that the chance as historic that the division is booted from the hex allowing for the dazed/morally impaired soldiers to be picked up/added as withdrawl added casulties. Where as u if u dont ground attack it and just bomb it that effect is passing and there soldiers would recover. This how ever is different than the IMO current problem of being able to use HB in an effect of air based attrition. Bombing for the sake of causing casulties and doing so, which is limited evidence of they do in larger numbers espcially if not attacking right after acception the disruptional effects for furthing casulties in retreats effects. Those wouldnt happen if ones attacks here and there with pockets of 40 HB.

I have no problem using HB all they want in teh game and bombs troops all they want but my question is if the model is off. That u give more significantly more casulties than histroic per sorties this in it self is an incentive to use as such a role. Not that if u use airforce 10 times more than historic u shouldnt give 10 times the casulties, but if the model gives 10 times as many casulties per sorties u give 100 times not 10 as many casulties. It in self giving an incentive to use the airforce in that role.

If the BHND study is to beleived the sortie rate per casulty is then some what off for the Cobra bombings not thats its ur fault, u go by given numbers. Its just teh numbers given by Berleyin isnt support by his own divisional loss reports.
Futher the other rates are based solely on ORS estimates that isnt fact checked vs actual german record. Just saying taht would have been nice.
I see u didnt do the same sortie rate to casulty for Charnwood and the D-day use of HBers

Kind regards,
Rasmus

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ORIGINAL: Walloc

I see u didnt do the same sortie rate to casulty for Charnwood and the D-day use of HBers

Kind regards,
Rasmus