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All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> USN CV

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USN CV - 4/11/2003 11:25:46 PM

mogami

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Hi, The main reason for avoiding carrier battles in UV is numbers.
In the Historical Coral Sea scenario it is OK to fight a carrier battle.
In scenario 17 and 19 the USN has to be very carefull. His 2 CV might have to fight 4 or more IJN CV (with at least 1 IJN CVL)
The odds are very bad. Then if he losses the Lex and Yorktown
(even if he sinks 2 IJN CV in return) the next carrier battle will once again be 2 USN CV versus 4 or more IJN CV. In UV it is better to play it safe and wait for at least 2 more USN CV (also this gives time for Lex and Yorktown to upgrade AA and build full size airgroups) Not to mention waiting on the CLAA's
IN UV 1 on 1 carrier battles the USN will match if not out right clobber the IJN

In the early battles it seems the IJN coordinate strikes better then USN. But 2TF of 2 CV each moving together can defeat 6 IJN CV. The one thing the Japanese player dreads is all 6 USN CV moving together in 3 TF's. The IJN loses almost every battle.

_____________________________

I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 121

To SNIGBERT and TIMJOT - 4/11/2003 11:33:24 PM

Mike Scholl

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
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Fair enough, and I withdraw my own snideness. It was the
attitude and tone that the discussion had taken that I was reacting to. My appologies for any ruffled feathers.

I think we all (even the detested MDIEHL) want the same
thing---the best possible WAR IN THE PACIFIC that we can beg,
bully, request and cajol out of 2by3. And "sniping" at one another doesn't help us on that path. It's not each other that
we're trying to influence.

Most of us have one or more points that we would like to
see included in the new game. And we sometimes dissagree
as to what is most important. That's good---makes everyone
refine and re-think their own points. But the sarcasm isn't any
help as it allows the points to be lost in the rhetoric. So how
about we all take a deep breath and start again by stating one
problem that we think 2by3 needs to address. Those that feel
that UV WAS perfect can wait on the sidelines to offer opinion
on the subjects raised. Does that sound like an idea?

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 122

To MDIEHL - 4/11/2003 11:55:39 PM

Mike Scholl

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From: Kansas City, MO
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You maintain that US planes were "routinely" superior to
their Japanese counter-parts in the 1942 period, based as far
as I can tell on loss ratios. I can't fault your overall argument
on that basis, but what about effectiveness?

At Midway, the Japanese CAP kept every attack but the very
last from even scoring a hit---and on the last they had been
drawn totally out of position and didn't really engage. Yorktown's
CAP, however, was unable to stop either of the two "scratch-
force" attacks launched against her from scoring hits. And her
CAP certainly had as good a force ratio as the Japanese had had,
with radar to vector them in as well.

I'm not certain loss-ratios for the year reflect the skill of the
initial group of Japanese pilots in achieving results against their
targets. For most of the second half of 1942 the Japanese were
either trying to counter Allied advances from long ranges (as in
supporting Guadalcanal from Rabaul) or fighting "attritional"
battles with forces that were hurting for replacements and parts
against an enemy with a better supply of both (in New Guinea).
Pretty much makes their coming out on the short end of the
loss ratio guaranteed even it their opponants wearn't always
as skilled. I don't say your wrong---but I don't think you're
quite right either.

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 123

- 4/12/2003 12:15:41 AM

Hoplosternum

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One of the big disadvantages that the US player has at the beginning of Scenario #17 is the fighter wings. There is not a huge difference in performance between the two Wildcat types but there is in numbers.

Yorktown and Lexington have 16-18 of the earlier Wildcats a piece so their fighter squadrons are below their usual strength of 36 each. There are no reinforcements for this type, but the replacement pool is filling up with the F4F-4s. Until one of these squadrons upgrades (towards the end of May) to it's full complement of 36 Wildcats the US CVs are at a disadvantage. The IJN fly 24 or 27 Zero's on each of Zuikaku and Shakaku plus some more on Shoho. Thats over 60+ fighters to the US 35+ until the upgrade.

That is not great odds, but with the improved flak and damage control of the US fleets not always suicide. I have certainly come off worse as the IJN in such an early duel :) Especially as a damaged IJN CV is likely to be out of action for much longer than a damaged US CV and sea supremacy is so vital for the IJN early on.

Once the upgrade takes place then both US Carrier wings go to full strength because the withdrawn F4F-3s go to the pool and then fill up the other CV's fighter wing. Most allied players - or at least the less cautious ones :) would relish a CV duel in the small window between getting their full fighter wings and before the extra Midway IJN CVs arrive.

Now whether this lack of fighters for the US Coral Sea CVs is accurate I don't know. But it is that or a general allied caution that leads to the US player avoiding an early CV confrontation - not invincible IJN CVs or planes. In my experience the IJN carrier planes tend to drop like flies (although they often get a lot of hits too).

Mdiehl you should try the game you might even like it :)

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 124

IJN pilots - 4/12/2003 12:17:53 AM

mogami

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Hi, In UV you are forced into using IJN groups. In Pac War and WITP I would recommend using IJA airgroups in defense and save the IJN groups for offensive operations. You don't really want the IJN engaged in day to day activity.
(particulry the long range bombers and fighters-the carrier type bombers in non carrier groups can be utilized up front)

For airbase defense use IJA. The IJN units should be held for use in areas where their commitment will be short in duration and where they will have a numerical advantage. The bombers do not have to be kept in forward bases. Rather keep them in rear areas where they can reach the forward bases. When Allied invasion fleets show up "unleash the hounds"

_____________________________

I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 125

Strategic Surprise - 4/12/2003 12:35:22 AM

LTCMTS

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As far as it goes, Kimmel and Short could have had every strategic warning they had in Washington, and maybe even the decripts of JN-25 made later, and they probably would still have been surprised at Pearl Harbor. Remember that the Navy and War Departments had sent them a "War Warning" on 28 Nov 41, yet both commanders continued peacetime routines. To be caught with your ammo lockers locked and AA guns unmanned after over two years of a world at war was inexcusable.

But remember that what one side thinks another will do is conditioned by what they know of the other side's plans and strategies. The Japanese strategy of invading and conquering the Philippines and Guam, then sitting back and waiting on the USN to come charging through the Mandates to the rescue was based on what they knew about "Plan Orange" from the 1920's and early 1930's. This response was devined by USN attaches and ONI from the mid-1930s. It was for this reason that the "Through Ticket" strategy of immediate attack was replaced with a "cautionary" strategy of accumulating strength before fighting by phases through the Mandates. When Secretary Knox was told of the Pearl Harbor attack, his response was one of disbelief, "They mean the Philippines don't they?". Both Kimmel and Short believed from what we knew and what we planned that the PacFleet and the Hawaii garrison would have time to ramp up for war based on the initial attacks by the Japanese on the Philippines. Short figured that he had to conserve his assets from attack by sabotage and continue training ops in prep for war. Kimmel was saving his assets for a climactic battle he hoped to lure the Japanese into off Wake Island. Only an operational decript telling them the target was Pearl Harbor would have energized them and prevented the IJN from achieving surprise at Pearl Harbor.
Unless you remove MacArthur from the equation, you would also still have operational and tactical surprise and operational failure in the Philippines. It was MacArthur's vacililations that prevented a bomber recon-strike on Taiwan and the mishandling of the air defenses, which included radars that gave early warning of Japanese approachs. Worse, you would still have an egotistical battle plan which sought to stop the Japanese on the beaches with the under equipped, under trained PA divisions. The result was a precipitate retreat which prevented the proper movement of combat sustainment resources into Bataan.
An interesting Allied strategy would be to retire most Philippine/US ground forces into Bataan, leaving the 26th CAV and some PA assets in the San Carlos mountain area to strike into the IJA's rear. Even with the mistakes MacArthur made, the Philippines held out until May 42. With the supplies that had to be abandoned historically available to the defenders, that defense could have lasted 3-6 more months. What impact would that have had on US strategy in the Pacific, specifically the commitmant of major naval forces to combat in the Mandates?

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 126

VF Strengths - 4/12/2003 12:49:52 AM

LTCMTS

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VF strengths on carriers were not just set by production and servicability rates. The F2A-3 and F4F-3 did not have folding wings. There was no air warning radar available before 1941 with which to provide early warning of an air attack, though the tactical disposition allowed for picket destroyers to spot attacks optically and warn the carriers. It did not make tactical sense to use limited hanger and deck space for fighters for an ineffective defense versus offensive capapbilities of VB, VSB and VTBs. That more fighters could be carried was shown by May 1942, when the USN had experience with radar for early warning and fighter control. The fighter complement was increased to 27 F4F-3s. If I remember right the first 36 F4F-4 VFs did not enter combat until Aug 42.
The British response to a similar tactical situation was to build armored carriers and strike down their "fighters" into the armored hanger and rely on AA guns to defeat enemy air attacks. When technology provided the means to defend the carriers and the fleet from air attack at ever greater distances, the British were at a disadvantage because of their dedication of weight and volume to armor and AA guns in lieu of hanger and deck space for fighters.
The IJN's response was to concetrate on offensive power. The Akagi and Kaga both only carried 18 A6M2s to Pearl Harbor. The IJN learned its lesson and increased its fighter complements by Midway, only to come up against the problem of fighters with non-folding wings limiting numbers that could be carried in the hanger (the IJNAF did not use deck parks).

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 127

- 4/12/2003 12:53:37 AM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]Also, maybe I missed something. My available references say that the F4F-3 had superior speed at height, initial climb rate and range on the F4F-4 because of the F4F-4's added weight, the result of additional guns, armor and fuel. David Brown makes this point clearly describing his experiences with the Martlet I and the Wildcat IV.[/QUOTE]

LCTLMTS that is what I recall too. Snigbert's assessment of the relative merits other than the number of guns doesn't jib with my a/c encyclopedia. Snigbert, are you certain you are looking at the F4F3 stats and not the F3 stats?

Mike Scholl:
[QUOTE]I can't fault your overall argument on that basis, but what about effectiveness?

At Midway, the Japanese CAP kept every attack but the very
last from even scoring a hit---and on the last they had been
drawn totally out of position and didn't really engage. Yorktown's
CAP, however, was unable to stop either of the two "scratch-
force" attacks launched against her from scoring hits. And her
CAP certainly had as good a force ratio as the Japanese had had,
with radar to vector them in as well.[/QUOTE]

Midway was a one-off in many ways. Japanese cap successfully intercepted all of the piecemeal, low altitude attacks. They were out of position for the DB attacks because the Jpns ships lacked the radar to detect the inbound DBs (in the USN, CAC procedure would have left some CAP at altitude to deal with the threat). Frankly, there were enough Jpns CAP available to deal with all the SBD and TBD strikes, given that these arrived largely unescorted. Yet all the Jpns cap were drown down to the duck-shoot at low altitude. It can scarcely be called Japan's best moment, CAP-CAC wise.

Similarly, the US strike coordination was atypically badly done for the time period. The only interesting "what if" scenario here is what would have happened had theJapanese CAP been in position and the US strikes had arrived in a coordinated fashion. For that study I take my cue from Coral Sea... except, of course, the Japanese CVs at Midway would still have been brimming to the gills with improperly stowed ordnance and planes in ready positions. IMO, the outcome is roughly the same, since Jpns CAP-CAC at the time, while effective, was incapable of simply shutting out a coordinated inbound strike.

As was Yorktown's by the way. It's the main reason why one cannot assume that in 1942, even a 1 carrier strike against a 3 carrier group is going to be a complete failure.

[QUOTE]... not certain loss-ratios for the year reflect the skill of the initial group of Japanese pilots in achieving results against their targets.[/QUOTE]

I was specifically talking about USN vs IJN combats through Coral Sea, and the numbers are available in Glantz. At Guadalcanal, the loss ratio favored the US by 2:1, but in fighter vs fighter engagements it was almost exactly 1:1 and slightly favored the Japanese. The event that tilted the loss ratio at Cactus in favor of the 25th AF was, IIRC, a raid on 26 August or thereabouts in which an inbound IJN strike was not detected and caught the defenders out of position.

Range was not that much of a issue here. The Japanese A6M2s had about 10 minutes of air time over Guadalcanal, and most of the engagements lasted less than two minutes. Nor was post-furball losses of damaged Japanese a/c as they returned home. Glantz has done an outstanding job of documenting, momemnt by moment, using logs and records from both sides, which pilot was most likely shot down when and by whom. While both sides had a few instances of "missing, presumed lost" the majority of losses occurred right there over the island.

[QUOTE]For most of the second half of 1942 the Japanese were either trying to counter Allied advances from long ranges (as in supporting Guadalcanal from Rabaul) or fighting "attritional"
battles with forces that were hurting for replacements and parts
against an enemy with a better supply of both (in New Guinea).
Pretty much makes their coming out on the short end of the
loss ratio guaranteed even it their opponants wearn't always
as skilled.[/QUOTE]

I haven't brought NG into this discussion because there is a ton of ambiguity about 25th AF vs PM engagements. You can find lots of accounts of devastated Allied units, but most of the losses were operational rather than to Japanese fights. Since pilot claims from either side are almost useless in this matter, one needs to turn to unit records. There are a couple of published unit histories for units at PM through June 1942, but I don't have them (yet), and no one in these forums has cracked them open to make any sort of case about the performance turned in by P40s vs A6Ms.

[QUOTE]I don't say your wrong---but I don't think you're quite right either.[/QUOTE]

Then I'll try to be clearer about what ground I'm "defending." I'm saying that in any engagement between the USN (or a land based USMC air unit) where comparable numbers of a/c are engaged and the primary types are F4Fs, SBDs, TBD/TBFs, A6Ms, Kates and Vals, aircraft loss ratios in the first half of 1942 should tend to favor the USN. Where comparable numbers of CVs are involved, ship loss ratios should be relatively even.

Tactical surprise in 1942 should be very unlikely unless one player is assailing, for example, a land airbase with no supporting a/c from one of his own land bases. The Japanese defeat at Midway was a likely, expectable, predictable outcome (as both Japanese and American pre-engagement wargaming suggested might happen), when you overtask (the modern phrase is "mission creep") your CVs.

To all:

As to attitude, I'll brook no rebuke on that grounds. My patience is limited, and if you push my "nuke" button enough, don't be surprised when you get nuked.

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 128

- 4/12/2003 5:08:03 AM

Snigbert

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[B]LCTLMTS that is what I recall too. Snigbert's assessment of the relative merits other than the number of guns doesn't jib with my a/c encyclopedia. Snigbert, are you certain you are looking at the F4F3 stats and not the F3 stats?[/B]

It was the F4F-3 but unfortunately the site I was looking at doesnt quote a source.

http://www.acepilots.com/planes/f4f_wildcat.html

[B]As to attitude, I'll brook no rebuke on that grounds. My patience is limited, and if you push my "nuke" button enough, don't be surprised when you get nuked.[/B]

The trick is, waiting until someone pushes them beforing nuking.

_____________________________

"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan

"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket

"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 129

- 4/12/2003 9:08:30 AM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]The trick is, waiting until someone pushes them beforing nuking.[/QUOTE]

True. Per my private communique I'll agree that I may have been hasty.

So, does UV rate the F4F3 as an inferior a/c with respect to speed and climb than the F4F4? If so, Matrix should consider amending the data.

From [I]The Complete Encyclopedia of World Aircraft[/I] (Barnes and Noble 1997:474) the F4F3 is rated with a top level flight speed of 335 MPH @ 21,300 feet) in contrast with the F4F4 (318 mph @ 19,400 feet). [I]Aircraft of WWII[/I] (Aerospace Publications, Fishwyck, Aus, 1998) gives the F4F4 a top speed of 320 mph @ 18,800. basically consistent between sources on the F4F-4. The airspeed of the F4F3 and climb rate is not given. I recall several sources mentioning a preferance for the F4F3, and late war FM2s, because both were lighter, more maneuverable, and had more gun time. Moreover, it stands to logic that the F4F3 had a greater climb and roll rate because it ws in fact a lighter plane, had the same wing and body configuration, and had the same engine.

The problem in PW was that the EXP ratings were so deterministic that one could not duplicate historical USN/USMC success owing to the difference between the EXPs assigned to the Japanese and American units. From the AARs in UV, it certainly looks like the problem is still there.

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 130

F4F data - 4/12/2003 9:25:38 AM

LTCMTS

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The references I use are Green's Warplanes of the Second World War series, Brown's Wings of the Navy, Green and Swanborough's Complete Book of Fighters and Wagner's American Combat Planes. The problem in Wagner's is that the data tables for the F4F-4 and F4F-3 are definitely switched as max weight for the F4F-3 is given as 8152 lbs and F4F-4 is given as 6711 lbs, which doesn't track with other references. Remember that there was also an F4F-3A model with significantly different performance using the R1830-90 with a single stage suoercharger ILO the R1830-76 with the two stage supercharger. The F4F-3A was used primarily by the Marines. The USN and USMC received 185 F4F-3 and 95 F4F-3A, along with 108 F2A-3 and 43 F2A-2 by Dec 41. With seven carriers in service, there were more than enough aircraft, even after attrition to support 27 a/c VF squadrons in Dec 41, yet during the abortive relief of Wake Island the Lexington had 21 F2A-3 and the Saratoga had 11 F4F-3 and 14 F2A-3 (from VMF-221, intended as reinforcements) according to Lindstrom in First Team,

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 131

Air Base Defense - 4/12/2003 9:31:37 AM

LTCMTS

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The problem with using the IJAAF for air base defense outside the China, SEA and Home Islands is the IJA's antipathy for the IJN. IJAAF units served in the Rabaul and New Guinea areas, and later in the defense of the Philippines but the defense of those areas and the Pacific islands was left to the IJNAF. The other reason was the very short range of most IJAAF fighters which precluded self-deployment over any distance over water and the lack of a/c transports to deploy these units the way the US did with the train ferrys and the surplus of escort carriers.

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 132

- 4/12/2003 10:05:10 AM

Admiral DadMan

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]...
So, does UV rate the F4F3 as an inferior a/c with respect to speed and climb than the F4F4? If so, Matrix should consider amending the data... [/B][/QUOTE]UV Wildcat Values:

F4F-3
Speed 325; Cruise 155; Climb 2200; Combat Radius 210 Mi; Extended Radius 280 Mi

F4F-4
Speed 318; Cruise 155; Climb 1950; Combat Radius 187 Mi; Extended Radius 250 Mi

Geez, I'd trade the -4 for the -3 for the action range alone...

_____________________________

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Post #: 133

- 4/12/2003 11:52:35 AM

Snigbert

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[B]The problem with using the IJAAF for air base defense outside the China, SEA and Home Islands is the IJA's antipathy for the IJN. IJAAF units served in the Rabaul and New Guinea areas, and later in the defense of the Philippines but the defense of those areas and the Pacific islands was left to the IJNAF. The other reason was the very short range of most IJAAF fighters which precluded self-deployment over any distance over water and the lack of a/c transports to deploy these units the way the US did with the train ferrys and the surplus of escort carriers.[/B]

Fortunately for the Japanese player, there is no IJN/IJA rivalry in game terms...so the player has the (unhistorical) luxury of meshing his IJAAF and IJNAF units in a defensive network of his liking.
It would be cool if they could create an AI for the IJN or IJA only, and you could play either and let the AI control the other against the allied player or allied AI. That would help limit the game to realistic interactions between the two. Of course, then you would have the problem of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.

_____________________________

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Post #: 134

- 4/12/2003 12:08:55 PM

Snigbert

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[B]So, does UV rate the F4F3 as an inferior a/c with respect to speed and climb than the F4F4? If so, Matrix should consider amending the data.[/B]

I went and checked and the -3 has superior speed, manueverability and climb but lower firepower rating. Someone did their homework there, it seems.

I also checked the pilots ratings...

In May '42 (Start of the game) the Lexington and Yorktown have pilot experience ratings of 74 and 76 for their fighter squadrons.

In a scenario starting in Feb '43 the Saratoga's -4 pilots start with experience 80, and some of the escort carrier's squadrons were in the mid 80s. I'm not sure how drastic of an effect experience has on combat (morale has a very large effect) but it seems there is an average of 10 points difference from beginning to mid game.

_____________________________

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Post #: 135

- 4/12/2003 2:59:39 PM

Drongo

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Posted by Mdiehl
[QUOTE]If you knew any history you'd know that F4F3s, F4F4s throughout the first six months of 1942 USN pilots ran up an almost 2:1 favorable kill ratio when F4Fs of any kind confronted A6Ms. [/QUOTE]

[QUOTE]Then I'll try to be clearer about what ground I'm "defending." I'm saying that in any engagement between the USN (or a land based USMC air unit) where comparable numbers of a/c are engaged and the primary types are F4Fs, SBDs, TBD/TBFs, A6Ms, Kates and Vals, aircraft loss ratios in the first half of 1942 should tend to favor the USN. [/QUOTE]

On my understanding, the first 6 months of 1942 covers only 2 engagements that involved clashes between the USN F4Fs and the IJN A6Ms. Are you stating that the overall exchange rate in head to head aerial combat between those 2 a/c types during that period favoured the F4F (almost) 2 to 1?

Since I don't know who this Glanz/Glantz is (I'm sure you'll excuse my ignorance), would you care to post which particular work of his you are referring to?

Even better would be to show a break down of his exact figures on the following :

May 7 1942 - losses from fighter vs fighter clashes during the attack on the Shoho.
May 8 1942 - losses from fighter vs fighter clashes during the USN attack and seperate losses for the IJN attack.
June 4 1942 - losses from fighter vs fighter clashes during the IJN attack on Midway, the USN attacks on the Jap CVs and finally, the Hiryu's strike on the Yorktown.

During testing, we have done comparisons between the combat model's results and historical results (using various references like John B. Lundstrom's First Team books). It would be interesting to see how Glanz/Glantz's figures sit with the others. Another view is always helpful.

Thanks for any effort.

_____________________________

Have no fear,
drink more beer.

(in reply to Raverdave)

Post #: 136

Making my point... - 4/12/2003 7:13:22 PM

Mike Scholl

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Admiral DadMan
[B]UV Wildcat Values:

F4F-3
Speed 325; Cruise 155; Climb 2200; Combat Radius 210 Mi; Extended Radius 280 Mi

F4F-4
Speed 318; Cruise 155; Climb 1950; Combat Radius 187 Mi; Extended Radius 250 Mi

Geez, I'd trade the -4 for the -3 for the action range alone... [/B][/QUOTE]

The aircraft shown above are virtually identical except that
one is carrying slightly more weight in equipment/armament---
yet there is a distinct difference in performance and range.
This is one problem which UV doesn't address on a MISSION
basis for each aircraft type. Different missions required different
loading and attachments for the aircraft involved. Strap a bomb
on one of the above aircraft (such as was done at Wake) and
the range/performance falls off significantly.

A P-51 in "escort" mode could fly missions of almost 1000
miles with it's drop tanks, though usually the planning was for
5-600 with the tanks being dropped as soon as opposition was
encountered. But as a "fighter-bomber", with ordinance replacing
the feul tanks, the range fell to around 200 miles. To a greater
or lessor degree, the same is true of most fighters. They have
an "extended" fighter range which they can reach with the
minimum feul needed for a very short engagement; a "normal"
range at which they can make full use of all their capabilities for
a more lengthly engagement; and a "fighter-bomber" range to
which they can drag meaningfull amounts of strap-on ordinance.
Their best air-to-air capabilities are at the "normal" range, where
they have plenty of reserve feul to climb and manuever and are
unencumbered with external loads and fittings.

The same thing is true for bomber type aircraft. Maximum range and performance are achieved with maximum feul and
no ordinance load (for reccon or transfer). The range with a
"maximum ordinance" load is the shortest, and puts the most
"bang" on the target. But most attacks (especially with the ranges in the Pacific) involved a trade-off with smaller bomb-
load allowing feul for a greater strike range. B-17's and 24's
could carry their 'maximum loads" to only about half the range
they could carry a "minimum useful load". A Betty could carry
an 1100 lb bomb load about half again as far as it could carry
an 1800 lb. torpedo (which required the removal of the bomb-
bay doors in most of the earlier models). They could bomb Singapore from Indo-China, but they couldn't torpedo any ships
unless they came north a way.

The early reporting I've seen from the WITP testing seems
to indicate that the system still doesn't really make these distinctions well. Any of you playtestors out ther who would confirm or dispute this? What's the "extended" range of a P-40,
as opposed to it's "normal" range, as opposed to it's "fighter-bomber" range?

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Post #: 137

- 4/12/2003 10:16:48 PM

Snigbert

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Mike, the way that UV and WitP make this distinction (my understanding) is as follows:

Take a Val for example. If it is attacking a target withing a certain distance (I dont have any exact figures off hand) it will use the 250kg bomb. However, if it attacking a target at a further than optimal distance it will use the 60kg bombs which give it a longer range due to less weight.

I havent made enough observations on Fighter bombers to see if this holds true for bombing missions vs fighter sweeps, CAP, etc.

Another example is the Betty, which can attack targets with torpedos up to a certain range, or with bombs at a different range.

I wasnt sure why my Vals were attacking with 60 kg bombs sometime and 250kg other time, and getting frustrated by it until I realized it was the range factor.

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Post #: 138

F4F-3 - 4/12/2003 11:27:31 PM

mdiehl

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OK. Matrix needs to reconsider the combat stats for the F4F-3, IMO. I have three sources that consistently give the F4F-3 a max level flight speed of 330 mph (making it dead even with the A6M) above 20K feet. My sources vary on climb rate; it is possible that Matrix rate of 2200 is a little too high.

Here's an internet source that you can examine that gives the stats for the F4F-3 (most just say "F4F" and then proceed to give the stats for the F4F-4, or just give the stats for the latter):

http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/baugher_other/f4f.html

[QUOTE]Engine: Pratt & Whitney R-1830-76 Twin Wasp, 14-cylinder, two-row radial engine, with a two-speed, two-stage mechanical supercharger. Three-bladed Curtiss Electric C5315(S) propeller with a diameter of 9ft 9in. Power of 1200hp at 2700rpm for take-off. Military power 1100hp at 2550rpm, sea level; 1000hp at 19000ft. 147 US gallons in internal fuel tanks, provision for one 58 US gallon external tank under each wing.

Performance: 278mph at sea level, 330mph at 22000ft. Max range cruise 185mph. Initial climb rate 2050ft/min. Service ceiling 31000ft, absolute ceiling 32600ft. Max endurance 9.4 hrs. Take-off distance 228ft into a 25kn wind.

Weights: 5293lb empty, 7467lb normal, 3978kg max take-off.

Dimensions: Wing span 38ft, length 28ft 9 3/8in, height 8ft, wing area 260ft2. Wing root chord 8ft 7in, wing tip chord 5ft 1 5/8in.

Armament: Four Colt-Browning 0.50 guns. Two 100lb bombs.[/QUOTE]

Naturally the bomb load would be an unusual load out for an F4F, although they used bombs to great effect in the defense of Wake Island, sinking (IIRC) one ship and contributing to the destructoin of three others (in combination with coast defense artillery).

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Post #: 139

- 4/12/2003 11:37:43 PM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]On my understanding, the first 6 months of 1942 covers only 2 engagements that involved clashes between the USN F4Fs and the IJN A6Ms. Are you stating that the overall exchange rate in head to head aerial combat between those 2 a/c types during that period favoured the F4F (almost) 2 to 1?[/QUOTE]

About 1.6:1. (The 2:1 was apparently my recollection of Halsey's estimates that he found to be an unacceptable loss ratio in August 1942.) My error on the reference. Lundstrom's "1st Team" pair of books is the one. When you go over the tallies in "~at Guadalcanal" the Japanese come out a little ahead in direct clashes between A6M types and F4Fs, but as Lundstrom points out, there was one surprise strike in late August that makes all the difference. In direct clashes between CVs, the USN fighter pilots consistently shot down more Japanese fighters than the Americans lost. If the EXP/combat stat combinations are leading to results that consistently put the Japanese in the victory column, then things need to be tweaked. I would expect any good simulation to engineer parity in losses or better as the expected outcome for the USN prior to September 1942 in CV engagements. Thereafter, improvements in Allied CAP CAC should result in the Jpns carriers being gradually left behind, regardless of pilot or carrier attrition. (Assuming that there is no "research" function or anything like that akin to, for example, Avalon Hill's "Empire of the Rising Sun.")

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Post #: 140

- 4/13/2003 12:16:03 AM

madflava13

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I've got to agree with mdiehl here -- although the Zero was in a completely different class than the F4F series when it came to maneuverability, it only took a couple hits and the Zero went up like a Roman Candle. Combined with US tactics (Thach Weave, slashing attacks, etc.) and the durability of the Wildcat, and its not hard to see how those ratios were feasible. (assuming all other factors, such as pilot skill, are equal).

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Post #: 141

Comments - 4/13/2003 12:30:05 AM

LTCMTS

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As a note, the most common load for B-17E/F/Gs enagaged in strategic raids into Germany was 8 x 500lb GP bombs (4,000 lbs) versus a maximum bomb load of over 8,000lbs.

The difference between the VS and VB squadrons in WW2 became very minor, but the doctrine was that VS VSBs would launch with 500lb bombs for greater range to scout for a fix enemy forces, attacking targets of opportunity, while the VB a/c would make the main attack with 1,000lb bombs when the range shortened.

I quote Capt (RN) Eric Brown from his book "Wings of the Navy: Flying Allied Carrier Aircraft of World War Two", (USNI, 1987)"I was to engage in many mock combats with RAF Hurricanes and Spitfires (this was Nov-Dec 40 in the Martlet I (G-36A) an export equivalent) of the F4F-3) and was soon convinced that the Martlet was a formidable fighting aircraft, capable of holding its own in every phase except that it was slower than its RAF opponents in the dive. However, this shortcomming was more than compensated for by its steep climb, excellent turning circle and completely innocuous stalling characteristics." He gives the G-36A with the 1,000hp (at 13,500ft) R1820-G205A an initial climb rate of 3,300 ft/min., with top speed at 248 kts (281mph) at S/L and 265 kts (301mph) at 15,000 ft in service conditions with a good rate of roll. The manual carriage handle was a problem causing an undulating climb profile as the pilot cranked in the gear and at least once, apilot cranked his head into the cockpit when the radio cord got caught in the handle.

"The Martlet Mk.II (F4F-4B) had been tested at Boscombe Down where it had been found to weigh about 1,000lb more than the Mk.I... Understandably, this extra weight had some affect on performance..." He mentions longer take-off distance and higher landing speed as impacting operations from smaller escort carriers, especially MACs. The weight increase was 13% over the F4F-4 w/o a compensating increase in engine power or wing area. He says the tested top speed of the Martlet II was 254 kts (288 mph) at 5,400 ft and at 13,000 ft. Range was 773 nm at 143 kts (163 mph) at 15,000 ft.

He says the FM-2 version was the best, being able to be spun with impunity, whereas deliberate spinning of all earlier versions was not authorized. The FM-2 was 500lb lighter than the F4F-4 and mounted the 1,350hp R-1820-56. He also says the F4F had the best landing charateristics he experienced from a shipboard carrier aircraft, this from a man who flew everything from Swordfish to Phantom IIs of British carriers.

His book gives a notional top speed for the F4F-4, clean at 7,975lb of 274 mph at S/L and 320mph at 18,800ft. Range at 830 mi at 161 mph at 5,000 ft. ICR 1,950 ft/min. Green & Swanborough in "The Complete Fighter Book" say the same. Wagner in "American Combat Planes" gives the FM-1 at the same weight the same performance except 284 mph at S/L. Green in the "Warplanes" series, Fighters vol.4, gives 318 mph at 19,400 ft, 275 mph at s/l, 1,950 ft/min and 770 mi. at 7,406lbs. Swanborough & Bowers in "USN Aircraft since 1911" gives 318mph at 19,400ft, 155 mph cruise, 1,950 ft/min ICR and 770 mi range.

Green also gives the F4F-3 328mph at 21,000 ft; 281 mph at s/l; 2265 ft/min and 845 mi. at 7,002 lbs. Wagner gives the F4F-3 as 330 mph at 21,100ft, 281 mph at S/L; 845 mi at 147 mph and 2265 ft/min at 7,002lb and the F4F-3A as 312mph at 16,000ft; 2430 ft/min and 825 mi at 6876 lbs. The Aircraft in Profile No.53 by Greene gives the same figures for the F4F-3A, weight unknown and the F4F-3 as 331 mph at 21,300ft; 2,300 ft/min from s/l and 860 mi range at an unknown weight.

Weight impacts performance and an F4F-4 at maximum combat RADIUS will have superior performance over an F4F-4 just launched on an escort mission or perhaps at the beginning of a CAP turn.

AS a comparison, Francillon in "Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War" gives the A6M2 Mod.21 as 288 kts (331 mph) at 14,930 ft; cruise at 180 kt (207 mph), normal range at 1,010 nm at 5,313lb.
Wagner gives the F2A-3 as 321 mph at 16,500 ft; 284 mph at s/l; climb at 2290 ft/min and range at 965 mi.

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Post #: 142

Re: Strategic Surprise - 4/13/2003 12:43:44 AM

TIMJOT

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS
[B]
Unless you remove MacArthur from the equation, you would also still have operational and tactical surprise and operational failure in the Philippines. It was MacArthur's vacililations that prevented a bomber recon-strike on Taiwan and the mishandling of the air defenses, which included radars that gave early warning of Japanese approachs. Worse, you would still have an egotistical battle plan which sought to stop the Japanese on the beaches with the under equipped, under trained PA divisions. The result was a precipitate retreat which prevented the proper movement of combat sustainment resources into Bataan.
An interesting Allied strategy would be to retire most Philippine/US ground forces into Bataan, leaving the 26th CAV and some PA assets in the San Carlos mountain area to strike into the IJA's rear. Even with the mistakes MacArthur made, the Philippines held out until May 42. With the supplies that had to be abandoned historically available to the defenders, that defense could have lasted 3-6 more months. What impact would that have had on US strategy in the Pacific, specifically the commitmant of major naval forces to combat in the Mandates? [/B][/QUOTE]

OK LCMTS I respect your opinion, but I cant resist biteing on this one.

First regarding vacilations. IMO this has been completely over blown. The FEAF had virtually no intel of the number and locations of the Formosa airodomes. Which is why the only mission contemplated on the morning of the 8th was angainst Takao Harbor. It is highly unlikely an attack of 18 B-17Ds on shipping in the harbor would have had any appreciable effect in the campaign. An attack on the aireodromes could not be even considered until the recon flights and then again it is highly doubtful that the 18 B-17s would have much effect. Particularly when you consider that the IJN and IJA air units were dispersed over a dozen airfields and that the bulk of the aircraft would no longer be their by the time the attack took place. About the only positive outcome from an immediate attack on Formosa would be that the B-17s would not have been destroyed on the ground. However when you consider that they would be flying unescorted and they would be returning to a completely destroyed Clark field, a combat/operational loss of 50% is not unreasonable IMO. Under these circumstances the only realistic option was to concentrate the B-17s at Delmonte Field on Mindanao until which time an accurate assessment of the situation could be obtained. MacArthur does bare responsibility that this was not done but to state the he also somehow is responsible for the mishandling of the air defence and early warning systems is a stretch. Could you please elaborate.

Regarding egostical battle plan. It was a battle plan approved by the War Dept and chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall. It was based on an expected attack no sooner than April 1942 and given the reinforcement schedule of USAFFE, had very good chance of succeding by that date. You can fault him for trying to implement with the insufficient means at his disposal in Dec 41, but, what real choice was there? True he could have he could have reverted back to Rainbow5 immediately and withdrawn into Battaan with much more supplies than were historical, but to what end? The Battaan defence would have lasted months longer but ultimately could only end in defeat. Its understandable that such a dead end defeatist strategy would be distasteful if not unthinkable to an egostical personality as MacArthur. Actually there is sound strategic reasoning to defend the beaches. USAFFE knew that they could not count on the navy comming to the relief. The only chance was for massive air reinforcement, which required holding Clark and the other major airfields. Given the reinforcements promised by Marshall and FDR it is not an unreasonable strategy.

Where I agree, where MacArthur failed was trying to defend the beaches with the poor quality PA divisions. It would have been better to commit his best troops the Pilipine division, 27th Cav PS, and concentrated the two Light tank Bns. at Linguyen, which USAFFE knew full well, was were the main attack was to come. The Japanese landings were a messy affair and took several days to complete. Had he counterattacked with his best troops when the enemy was most vulnerable, there stood a good chance of success.

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Post #: 143

- 4/13/2003 2:01:38 AM

Snigbert

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Mdiehl - I'll copy that information on the F4F-3 to the development board and see if they want to put it into an upcoming alpha build for WitP.

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Post #: 144

- 4/13/2003 2:06:19 AM

madflava13

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To piggyback on something TIMJOT said:
Even if the B-17s had raided the Japanese airfields on Formosa, beyond the (I think good) arguments against success that TIMJOT laid out, there was also the weather. In his book "Samurai!", Saburo Sakai describes incredibly thick fog obscuring his (and other) airfields on Formosa - that was why the aristrikes on Clark Field didn't coincide with the Pearl Harbor strike as originally had been planned. So even if the B-17s were committed, it's doubtful they could have hit anything...

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Post #: 145

- 4/13/2003 2:10:25 AM

Snigbert

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[B]In his book "Samurai!", Saburo Sakai describes incredibly thick fog obscuring his (and other) airfields on Formosa[/B]

Just finished reading this myself, great read! I especially liked the part where the doctor was cutting glass out of his eyes with no anesthetic. Ouch!

Only thing that bugged me was some typographical errors that the editors didnt catch.. That irritates the hell out of me, what are these editors and spell checkers getting paid for but to avoid that sort of thing?

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Post #: 146

Defense of the Philippines - 4/13/2003 3:24:34 AM

LTCMTS

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I agree on the probable ineffectiveness of B-17 strikes on TAiwan except for the comments by the Japanese that such a strike might have caught their a/c on the ground as the fog lifted in interviews with the SBSS. And Kearny had his own ax to grind. Besides, use them before you lose, them, which was the eventual fate.

As far as holding as much of the Philippines as possible, the main island Luzon had more landing sites than any force could have covered, especially an organization as understrength as the 26 Cav (PS) and the Philippine Div. The Japanese would have found a lightly or undercovered beach, gotten troops ashore and proceeded to pry the US/PA defenders out of every blocking position they assumed and forcing them to fight through IJA blocking positions on their retreat to Bataan, which is what historically happened. Supplies positioned forward to support the OPLAN were lost to the Japanese who used them to support their own ops. Remember that the Japanese had to invade the Philippines between OCtober and December, when the rice crop was harvested, allowing the IJA to "live off the land" through foraging from commercial storage sites.

If the Japanese had waited until 1942, then the situation would have been better for the US. But as indicated before, the Japanese strategic situation couldn't wait till Oct-Dec 42 for the next years harvest. Yet if they had, the 32d ID (ARNG), a medium tank battalion and enough equipment to bring the Philippine Division to the 1941 triangular MTOE would have become available by Feb 42 and the PA would have been further along in its training program. Of course, any reading of the official history would bring some doubt on whether the PA divisions other than the 1st and 2d would have reached a sufficient level of readiness by even May 42. A larger force, however, would still, with Japanese control of the air and sea, only add to the "bag" if not relieved by the USN.

Once the US lost any ability to contest air superiority by the Japanese, and with the freedom represented by control of the local seas, the Japanese could pick and chose their landing areas outside the coverage of US coastal defenses, or even invaded the surrounding islands like Visayen and Mondanao to set up air bases to stage to from Taiwan and French Indo China. A larger, better prepared force could have caused more casualties, but the combined wisdom of Army officers in the Philippines from 1902 to 1941 was that the shores could not be held. Additions to the force structure would only allow the US to extend the size of its perimeter of defense beyond Bataan. In TOAW-COW, with the forces that would have been available in Feb 42, I have been able to hold the Japanese north of Manilla across the northern neck of Luzon, but eventual they come ashore in the south and flank me.

Notice that the Japanese solution to the problem by Yamashita, who had far more effective and numerous ground forces in 1944 on Luzon than MacArthur in 1941, but had also lost control of the air and seas around Luzon, was to concede the beaches to the US and fall back into the San Carlos mountains as a redoubt area, intending to deny the US free use of the nearby airfields and force the commitment of ground forces to the Philippines to cover him that would become unavailable for further offensive actions.

A final sidebar. There could have been a far more effective garrison available in the Philippines. The US could have created a larger Philippine colonial army, along the lines of the British and French. They could have supported creation of a Philippine National Guard from 1902 (remember that Puerto Rico was a former Spanish colony and future Commonwealth, and was allowed an ARNG), and accepted Philippino voluteers for service in Europe and elsewhere (Quezon offered to raise 15,000 in 1917)during WWI who could have been incorporated in an Organized Army Reserve (PS) in 1921 (which would have provided a cadre of officers and NCOs, along with the PARNG to build a PA around). There was a move to "exile" the four "colored" regiments (9th, 10th Cav & 24th,25th Inf) to overseas duty (These rgts had the fewest AWOLS and desertions and the highest readiness ratings of any rgts in the Army between the wars). Finally, in the late 20's, the War Department made a massive shipment of surplus arms and equipment to the Philippines, Panama and Hawaii. Unfortunately, the action wasn't properly coordinated and the resources were not on hand to receive and properly store the equipment , most of which ended rotting and rusting away on the Manilla docks. With proper preperations, some of the massive numbers of artillery and MGs (M1915 Colt-Vickers, M1917 Lewis, M1918 Marlin-Savage) available at the time and as good as anything the Japanese brought to the Island in 1941 could have been available to support a more potent force of 2-3 US Army (combined RA/AR) divisions, 1-2 Philippine ARNG divisions and 2-3 Philippine AR (PS) or PA divisions, all built on the 1923 "square" MTOE and properly equipped. In 1922, the US Army had on hand 102 2.95" Mtn Gun M1911, 490 3" Gun M1902, 54 4.7" Gun M1908, 271 75mm Gun M1916, 832 75mm Gun M1917, 1644 75mm Gun M1897, 135 120mm Gun M1917, 36 6" How M1908, 108 5" Gun M1917, 54 6" Gun M1917, 832 155mm How M1917, 388 155mm Gun M1917 and 244 8" How M1918. All these weapons would be more or less obsolescent in 1941, but other than a handfull of designs such as the 75mm Gun Type 90, the Japanese artillery park would be in no better shape.

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Post #: 147

- 4/13/2003 3:42:46 AM

mdiehl

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[QUOTE]I've got to agree with mdiehl here -- .... (assuming all other factors, such as pilot skill, are equal).[/QUOTE]

I hate to disagree with someone who I find so agreeable, but that's exactly the point against which I am arguing. Without disputing that the Jpns pilots had more air time and combat experience, USN pilots came out equal or better [B]despite[/B] such factors as "pilot skill." The reasons are a combination of better USN tactics (even before the Thach Weave became common), a harder hitting armament, fairly soft targets (in that the Jpns planes were unarmored), and an aircraft that was in some ways much more maneuverable than the Zero. Ericson Shilling (a P40 driver), for example, placed a high degree of value on roll rate. A good roll rate allows, for example, a pilot to maneuver out of a disadvantageous situation without an enemy pilot, sitting for example in the 6 o'clock, being able to react to the maneuver. The F4F had a faster roll rate than the A6M. At speeds above 310 mph the F4F was as maneuverable [time to 180 degree course change] as the A6M. At 350 mph, which both planes could only achieve in a dive, the F4F could turn much faster than an A6M.

The F4F was only "less maneuverable" when the driver let the airspeed drop. This could happen if the F4F was still climbing to its position, was caught landing or straggling with damage, or had engaged in sustained maneuvering that bled off airspeed. It could also happen if an F4F had insufficient time to accelerate from cruise to combat airspeeds before being engaged. The superior maneuverability of the F4F at high speed had little to do with any special properties of the F4F, but instead because of limitations on the A6M. This is one of the reasons why, as the war progressed and combat speeds increased with new a/c designs, the Zeke became increasingly dangerous to fly.

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Post #: 148

F4F and others - 4/13/2003 4:30:24 AM

LTCMTS

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Further notes:

F2A-3 performance was at 6321lbs, when wing loading was 30.25 lbs/sq.ft.

At 7002lbs, a F4F-3 was at 26.9lbs/sq.ft

At 7975lbs, a F4F-4 was at 30.67 lbs/sq.ft.

At 5313lbs, a A6M2 Mod.21 was at 22lbs/sq.ft.

At 5599lbs, a P-35 was at 25.45lbs/sq.ft, P-35A at 27.8lbs/sq.ft

At 5650lbs, a P-36A was at 24lbs/sq.ft

At 7325lbs, a P-40B was at 31lbs/sq.ft

At 7500lbs, a P-39D was at 35.21lbs/sq.ft.

At 4,515lbs a Ki-43-Ia was at 19.1lbs/sq.ft.

Wing loading isn't every thing but it does corespond to manueverability (turn ratio) at low to mid altitude at normal combat speeds. It becomes less important as speed and altitude increase.

For some interesting takes on combat aircraft comparisons, see Eric Brown's "Duels in the Sky: World War II Naval Aircraft in Combat", USNI, 1988. Capt ((RN) Brown does demonstrate a partiallity for the "small, corpulent" Wildcat though.

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Post #: 149

- 4/13/2003 10:33:40 AM

Drongo

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Posted by Mdiehl
[QUOTE]About 1.6:1. (The 2:1 was apparently my recollection of Halsey's estimates that he found to be an unacceptable loss ratio in August 1942.) My error on the reference. Lundstrom's "1st Team" pair of books is the one.[/QUOTE]

OK, Lundstrom was what you were referring to. There was no Glanz/Glantz? Any extra references are always useful.

[QUOTE]
When you go over the tallies in "~at Guadalcanal" the Japanese come out a little ahead in direct clashes between A6M types and F4Fs, but as Lundstrom points out, there was one surprise strike in late August that makes all the difference. In direct clashes between CVs, the USN fighter pilots consistently shot down more Japanese fighters than the Americans lost.[/QUOTE]

While not wishing to bog down the thread further with endless debate on the merits of the A6M vs F4F and their head to head exchange rate, I would suggest that care be taken in the use of overall losses to back your statement on what you would expect to see in the game.

USN fighter pilots "consistently" shot down more fighters than they lost? Head to head engagements only?

If your talking about the first 6 months (Coral Sea and Midway), Lundstroms losses for Coral Sea were - May 7's overwhelming of the Shoho, 1 A6M and 2 A5Ms - May 8's IJN strike on USN CVs, 4 F4F's downed - May 8's USN strike on IJN CVs, 2 F4Fs for 1 A6M.

Lundstroms Midway figures were - USN attack on IJN, 9 A6Ms for 1 F4F (the majority of IJN losses from the clash with Thatch's flight - superb stuff, especially since he only had 3 a/c effective(IIRC)) - IJN Hiryu's attack on Hornet, 7 A6Ms vs 5 F4Fs. I don't have the figures on any head to head losses from the final USN strike on the Hiryu (if there were any).

I'm supplying these figures from a set of UV beta notes that were gleaned from various sources. I've attempted to go through and pull out only Lundstrom's figures. If you have the book, feel free to correct any of the figures from my notes.

I do have a note that has Lundstrom stating on P. 4 of his Book II that he estimated the A6M/F4F (IJN vs USN only) losses in the first 6 months of '42 to be 15 to 10. I assume that is the 1.6 to 1 exchange rate you mentioned earlier. This figure shows that overall, the IJN lost more A6Ms in fighter combat than the USN lost F4Fs. However, based on his analysis of the 2 battles as seperate events, I don't see how you can say the the exchange rate was "consistently" in favour of the USN. According to the notes, Coral Sea was in the A6M's favour while Midway was in the USN's.

You also refer to the later IJN/USMC(only?) Guadalcanal total exchange rate as being in the A6Ms favour but then put it down to being so only because of the occurance of one raid that heavily favoured the A6Ms in exchange rate. If this is an attempt to soften the blow of unfavourable figures to your POV, I'd think it's a dangerous thing to do since the same logic could be applied to Thatch's standout clash on 4 June. The results of that clash was not repeated in other encounters at Coral/Midway and it could be argued that it occurred only because of the influence/ability of the man himself rather than being indicative of the overall effectiveness of USN pilots/tactics/aircraft at the time.

For clarification, the rationale behind the gathering of info from various sources on air losses in the South Pacific was to meet a request from 2x3 on having a detailed reference to compare the UV combat model's results for with historical, especially in CV vs CV clashes. I would expect that WitP will go through a similar process at the appropriate time but that is still up to 2x3. The notes I made are my own and are based on information presented in a development thread as well as exchanges between fellow testers. If you find those I presented are inaccurate, the fault lies with me and it should not be assumed that they were taken as gospel by Matrix/2x3 during testing.

In my opinion, overall exchange rates for a given period should not be used as guide to what the final game should be delivering. It is more important to look at each historical clash on an individual basis and then try to establish an expected result when similar circumstances occur in the game (ie radar, numbers, quality, weather, leadership, etc).

[QUOTE]If the EXP/combat stat combinations are leading to results that consistently put the Japanese in the victory column, then things need to be tweaked. I would expect any good simulation to engineer parity in losses or better as the expected outcome for the USN prior to September 1942 in CV engagements.[/QUOTE]

EXP/combat stat combinations? Are you referring to UV or PACWAR? If it's UV (since WitP air combat is still heavily based on it at this point in time) - IIRC, UV's F4F/A6M combat results were discussed in an earlier WitP thread on a related topic in which you took part. The general consensus then by UV players was that there was parity in loss rates between the 2 opposing pilot-exp/aircraft combinations. There has been a patch since then that introduced a few changes to air combat routines but should not have effected the discussed loss rates. Given this and assuming you are talking about the UV combat model, can you state why you still think it's still necessary to infer that UV's exp/combat may be flawed when it seems to be delivering parity results? Have you seen a common complaint in the forums? If you state your reasons, I'm happy to bring it up in the UV/WitP development forums.

[QUOTE]Thereafter, improvements in Allied CAP CAC should result in the Jpns carriers being gradually left behind, regardless of pilot or carrier attrition. (Assuming that there is no "research" function or anything like that akin to, for example, Avalon Hill's "Empire of the Rising Sun.")[/QUOTE]

Agree completely.

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Post #: 150