mdiehl
Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000 Status: offline
|
MO - [QUOTE]Hi, Even your own math is funny. 132 minus two CV (44) equals 88(you say 80) Half of 88 is 44 (you say 40 but the difference here is half as many fighters then you would have up on CAP so I point this out). [/QUOTE] Sorry. I was ballpark estimating this and writing fast. [QUOTE]Now I think each CAP CV could maintain 75 percent of assigned fighters (these are long range ac only 2-3 landing every hour would maintain the CAP (That makes 33 in the air).[/QUOTE] One could DO that, but ... Cycling these guys out at a rate of 2-3 per hour gives you an 11-hour CAP rotation for some of these pilots. Totally unrealistic for CAP assignment at the time. It's theoretically doable, but the IJN and USN did not keep individuals on CAP for more than about 2 hours unless emergencies (like an incoming strike) demanded it. The practice of both navies at the time was OF THOSE A/C RESERVED FOR CAP, to have about 1/3 in the air, 1/3 ready, and 1/3 deploying, returning or refueling. Doing it your way also means that you're CONSTANTLY steaming into the wind and running up to launch speed. No way KN gets to transport 400 miles to the east per your revised battle plan while it is maintaining all these launches. [QUOTE]The number that actually intervened in aircombat can be debated. It would depend on picket ships (or subs of which there are plenty).[/QUOTE] ??? There were three subs assigned to the area of HI, mostly positioned to intecept US ships entering or exiting PH. KB also did not maintain picket ships for this operation. Iindeed, the strike force was quite streamlined for a "get in get out" operation. One COULD assign ships to picket, but you'd be stripping KB of ASW escorts. I doubt Nagumo would have gone for that. [QUOTE]Allied radio discipline (I'd guess weak on the 2nd day of the war). [/QUOTE] You'd guess wrong. [QUOTE]And of course whether or not any allied search planes had been spotted. (KB will be several hundred miles from where it launched the Dec 7 attacks) In WITP the IJN has basically a 1 hex range advantage. [/QUOTE] KB won't be several hundred miles away if they're rotating their CAP at a rate of 3 planes per hour. [QUOTE]Your almost convincing me the USN did not need to build all those CV. They can do Midway on Dec 8 with only one.[/QUOTE] They can try it. With 1 CV they'd get a "half Midway" assuming that the strike arrived when KB was most vulnerable, IMO. With 2 CVs the USN strike, IMO, sinks at least 3 CV (if it arrives when KB is, for example, recovering Wave 3), or else damages most of KB. [QUOTE]The combined arms attack was important at Midway. The torpedo planes did draw down the Japanese CAP. Here there will be no torpedo attacks (just 36 divebombers minus scouts minus damaged) With little or no escort.[/QUOTE] The CAP-vs.TBD thing is a red herring. If the US strike had arrived at Midway COORDINATED, then most of the US TBDs, along with most of the SBDs, and fewer of thr F4Fs would have returned to their launching decks. KB would still have lost 3 CVs straight off, but Japanese fighter cover would be so chewed up that none would have been available for the subsequent retaliation against Yorktown. [QUOTE](But lets say the USN goes all out and assigns 100 percent escort. AC attack in groups of 4. without any loss from fighter or AA you get 9 bomb runs (possibly more if some of these groups break up).[QUOTE] Midway saw three CVs sunk by three bomb runs from SBDs. We can expect AAA from KB to be even less valuable than it was at Midway, which is going from bad to horrebdous. [QUOTE]I don't see this as winning the battle. The IJN counter strike will be much stronger. [/QUOTE] Like the real Japanese, you have envisioned a theoretical set of circumstances in which everything is timed perfectly for the Japanese. That's unlikely. First, KB has to find the attacking CV. Who'se going to mount the effective 360 degree search? Then those 2 IJN interdiction CVs have to be the ones who somehow survive the US strike. Since they're sitting in readiness to attack the US, if a bomb hits one, you get the same ordnance detonation effect as at Midway. If these two are hit, they're sunk. Then KB has to land the returning waves and rearm them (whilst the USN lands [I]their[/I] returning waves and rearms. After that, it's a stand up fight between KB with 4 operational CVs and depleted air wings, vs. USN with 2 operational CVs and depleted airwings, with the US knowing KB's location and KB possibly knowing the location of the US ones, or then again not. At that point, as the USN, I'd run. Drang nacht osten baby, or in whichever direction takes one further away from KB. [QUOTE]Akagi Fighters CAP Vals Port Kate NI Kaga Fighters Escort Vals NI Kate Port Zuikaku Fighters Port Vals Port Kate NI etc. [/QUOTE] Again, you're talking Game Reality, rather than anything that looks like real Japanese plane handling doctrine. You are also crediting the Japanese with a degree of tactical sophistication that, IMO, they could never have achieved. I'm not disputing that your suggestion is a good idea for UV/WitP. [QUOTE]The Japanese player could even logicaly split his TF during the night and assign one TF to stand off at max range and hit the port while the other TF moved 1 hex in and stands guard.[/QUOTE] In no way, however, does this maneuver prevent a Midway type fiasco. It just limits the maximum number of CVs that can be sunk by the first US surprise strike. [QUOTE]2 Jobs 2 forces (they just share the same hex and TF number)[/QUOTE] That'd be completely contrary to IJN doctrine and OUGHT to come with a substantial operational burden besides. No way the TF commander simultasks such a diverse set of missions. NO CV TF (Allied or Japanese) was capable of that sort of multitasking until 1943.
_____________________________
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics. Didn't we have this conversation already?
|