LTCMTS
Posts: 300
Joined: 1/6/2003 From: Newnan, GA Status: offline
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The film and Gen Hackett weren't kidding. The alternative to advancing on the enemy was to have the NKVD/KGB bordser units shooting at you too. On troop morale, the complexity of why men fight and die in combat is incredible. Historically, units have retained their coherence and combat effectiveness in direct proportion to their levels of training, the length of time the unit has been together, confidence in their leadership, trust that they have the right weapons for the war they're fighting, the sense of doing something valuable and a basic commitment to the values of the nation they are fighting for. Historically, weak units often do not even need to suffer casualties. The appearance of the enemy from an unexpected direction, the failure of their tactics and weapons to suppress an enemy, the experience of combat being totally different from their training can break units with poor morale. On the other hand, very rarely, units will retain the coherence and continue to fight after 50% and more casualties. The rate of casualties also impacts performance. A sudden massive casualty event can panic a unit, when the same number of casualties suffered over a period of time will not, though eventually such attrition will eat the heart out of a unit. US Army studies indicate that individuals need 30 days of combat before they reach optimum performance. After 120 days, performance begins to diminish and the breaking point is usually reached at about 240 straight days. The success of the NTC and the JRTC has been to produce a simulated combat environment that provides that 30 day learning curve. The problem with the US is the personnel policy of feeding individual replacements, though the original concept in 1940 was to withdraw units to reconstitute, we just ran out of combat units to do this, and a short, intense war would prevent it. The Vietnam War tour length also recognized the above data, but failed in not rotating units as cohesive groups, rather than shuffling a continuous line of "FNG"s through units. As far as morale in a NATO-WP clash, it would be difficult to really rate the various troop elements because of the complexities I alluded to, and the ratings would change from moment to moment dependent on those complexities. But here goes. The Brits, especially their infantry, first and foremost with the Canadians their equal. The Germans and US, with some variations on the Heimatshuetz, the ARNG and the USAR depending on how long they've been mobilized. The French and Dutch regulars and conscripts of the standing forces. The Belgians and Danes. The Soviet GSFG, the CAT A in western TVDs, the CAT B and then the CAT C. The Volksarmee, at least initially at the GSFG level, but the Poles at CAT B with the Czechs and the Hungarians at CAT C, all three declining if the Soviet-WP offensive meets delays and defeats.
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