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Indian National Army? - 5/20/2003 3:57:47 AM   
Yamamoto

 

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In most games I’ve played covering the Pacific War the Indian National Army was available and allied with the Japanese. This is different from the British army in India, which contained many Indian conscripts. Will there be Indian National units that are under the Japanese player’s control in WitP ?

Yamamoto
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- 5/20/2003 5:28:36 AM   
Raverdave


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IIRC the Japs had about two divisions of Indian troops.

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- 5/21/2003 5:47:07 PM   
siRkid


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Can you point to any refrence material on this subject?

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- 5/21/2003 7:44:19 PM   
Raverdave


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I'll have a dig around and see what I can find.

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Indian Army - 5/21/2003 11:07:10 PM   
Highlander

 

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I found this at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWindia.htm

"During the war Subhas Chandra Bose formed a Indian National Army to fight against the British. Drawn mainly from soldiers of the Indian Army that were captured by the Japanese Army in the early stages of the war. About 7,000 of these soldiers fought under Bose against the British Army at Imphal and Kohima."

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And this... - 5/21/2003 11:12:17 PM   
Highlander

 

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Churchill, a violent opponent of Indian independence, was forced to reopen negotiations, pressured from Washington. As the Japanese pushed to India's borders, the Leader of the House of Commons, Labour's Sir Stafford Cripps, was sent to India to reopen negotiations. Churchill and Linlithgow, vetoed the agreement which Cripps brokered. The effect in India was dramatic. One Congress leader recruited tens of thousands of captured Indian soldiers into the Indian National Army which would assist the Japanese in the forthcoming conquest of India.

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- 5/22/2003 1:14:34 AM   
mdiehl

 

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So the INA would amount to about 1/2 division of ill-trained bodies who need to be armed and supplied by Japan. That ought to make them about as effective as the January 1942 Phillippine Constabulary.

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- 5/22/2003 5:01:00 AM   
Snigbert

 

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[B]As the Japanese pushed to India's borders, the Leader of the House of Commons, Labour's Sir Stafford Cripps, was sent to India to reopen negotiations.[/B]

Most historians dont know this, but Sir Stafford Cripps later went on to found the LA street gang that now shares his name.

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- 5/22/2003 5:36:34 PM   
Raverdave


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]So the INA would amount to about 1/2 division of ill-trained bodies who need to be armed and supplied by Japan. That ought to make them about as effective as the January 1942 Phillippine Constabulary. [/B][/QUOTE]

Well you could always send them to China and use them as garrison troops.

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Long post for Kid - 5/22/2003 5:54:41 PM   
Raverdave


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Ok here is some info on the Indian National Army.....it is somewhat long, but a good read:-

Indian National Army of Liberation in the East

On 15 February 1942, Singapore fell to the Japanese army advancing southward from the Malayan peninsula. Two days later, in an impressive ceremony held at Farrar Park in the heart of the town, Indian troops were handed over to the Japanese as prisoners-of-war by their commanding officer, Colonel Hunt.

Major Fujiwara took them over on behalf of the victorious Japanese, and then announced that he was handing them over to Captain Mohan Singh of the Indian contingents, who should be obeyed by them as their Supreme Commander. Mohan Singh then spoke to the Indian POWs, expressing his intention of raising an Indian national army out of them to fight for India's freedom. He held a preliminary discussion with some prominent Indians in Malay and Burma in a meeting in Singapore on 9 and 10 March, which was attended by Rashbehari Bose, a veteran Indian revolutionary exile living in Japan for the last quarter of a century. Bose then called a conference in Tokyo, which was held 28-30 March. The delegates representing several East and Southeast Asian countries present at the conference, decided to form the Indian Independence League to organize an Indian independence movement in East Asia. Bose was recognized as head of the organization. The conference further resolved that "militay action against the British in India will be taken only by the INA and under Indian command, together with such military, naval and air cooperation and assistance as may be requested from the Japanese by the Council of Action" and further, "after the liberation of India, the framing of the future constitution of India will be left entirely to the representatives of the people of India."[20] On 15 June 1942, a conference opened in Bangkok with over a hundred delegates of the IIL attending from all over Asia. By the close of the nine-day conference a resolution was unanimously adopted setting forth the policies of the independence movement in East Asia. The III, was proclaimed the organization to work for India's freedom; the Indian National Army was declared the military arm of the movement with Mohan Singh as the Commander-in-chief and Rashbehari Bose was elected president of the Council of Action. It was further decided that Singapore would be the headquarters of the IIL. Netaji had stated in a message to the conference that his personal experience had convinced him that Japan, Italy and Germany were sworn enemies of British imperialism; yet, independence could come only through the efforts of Indians themselves. India's freedom would mean the rout of British imperialism. The Indian National Army was officially inaugurated in September 1942.

Unfortunately, at this point a distrust began to grow within the Indian group against Rashbehari Bose's leadership. Some thought that having been long associated with Japan, he gave precedence to the Japanese interests over Indian interests. According to Japanese records:

Some even thought that he was just the protege of the Japanese, and that the latter was exploiting Indians for their own ends. Such resentment finally resulted in a revolt of a group of leaders headed by Captain Mohan Singh within the INA in November 1942. As a consequence, Mohan Singh and his associate, Colonel Gill were both arrested by the Japanese and the Indian Army was disbanded. However, in 1943 a new Indian Army was organized, put under the command of Lt. Col. Bhonsle, who held this post until the final dissolution of the army. [21]

Describing the revived INA. Joyce Lebra writes:

On 15 February 1943, the INA was reorganized and former ranks and badges revived. The Director of the Military Bureau, Lieutenant-Colonel Bhonsle, was clearly placed under the authority of the III. to avoid any repetition of IIIANA rivalry. Under Bhonsle was Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan as Chief of General Staff-, Major P.K. Sahgal as Military Secretary; Major Habibur Rahman as commandant of the Officers' Training School; and Lt. Col. A.C. Chatterji, and later Major A.D. Jahangir, as head of enlightenment and culture. Apart from this policy-forming body was the Army itself, under the command of Lt. Col. M.Z. Kiani. This was the organization which held the INA together until the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose from Berlin, six months later.[22]

In February, the Japanese military officer Iwakuro had called a meeting of about three hundred officers of the INA at Bidadri camp in Singapore and spoke to them about the advisability of joining the army, but with no effect. According to Ghosh, "Later on, in a 'Heart to heart talk' with some officers, it emerged that a large number of officers and men would be willing to continue in the INA on the express condition that Netaji would be coming to Singapore."[23]

The story of Netaji's exploits in Germany and the history of the Indian Legion was known to Indian revolutionaries of the IIL in East Asia for some time now, and they awaited his arrival eagerly. As the first INA wavered, faltered and was finally disbanded, and as its successor merely continued to exist, the need for Netaji's leadership began to be felt more keenly. Mohan Singh had mentioned his name to General Fujiwara as early as 1941. In all conferences the need of his guidance had been emphasized by the delegates.

While Netaji and Abid Hasan continued to push toward the East making a wide sweep out into the Atlantic, by pre-arrangement, a Japanese submarine left Penang Island on 20 April for the tip of Africa, under strict orders not to attack or risk detection. The two submarines had a rendevous four hundred miles south-southwest of Madagascar on 26 April. After sighting each other and confirming their identity, the submarines waited for a day for the sea to become calm. Then on 28 April, in what was known to be the only known submarine-to-submarine transfer of passengers (in the annals of World War II) in an area dominated by the enemy's air and naval strength, Netaji and Abid Hasan were transhipped into the Japanese submarine via a rubber raft. Travelling across the ocean, the Japanese 1-29 reached Sabang on 6 May, 1943. It was an isolated offshore islet north of Sumatra. There, Netaji was welcomed by Colonel Yamamoto, who was the head of the Hikari Kikan, the Japanese-Indian liaison group. From Sabang, Netaji and Yamamoto left for Tokyo by plane, stopping en route at Penang, Manila, Saigon and Taiwan. The plane landed in Tokyo on 16 May. All throughout his submarine voyage from Germany and for about a month after his arrival in Tokyo, Netaji's identity and presence was kept a secret. He was supposed to be a Japanese VIP named Matsuda. Although he remained incognito during the first few weeks in Japan, Netaji did not waste any time by just waiting. From 17 May onwards, he met Japanese Army and Navy Chiefs-of-Staff, Navy Minister and Foreign Minister in rapid succession. However, he had to wait for nearly three weeks before Japanese PrimeMinister Tojo granted him an interview. But Tojo was so impressed with Netaji's personality that he offered to meet him again after four days. Two days later, on 16 June, Netaji was invited to visit the Diet (the Japanese Parliament) where Tojo surprised him with his historic declaration on India:

We are indignant about the fact that India is still under the ruthless suppression of Britain and are in full sympathy with her desperate struggle for independence. We are determined to extend every possible assistance to the cause of India's independence. It is our belief that the day is not far off when India will enjoy freedom and prosperity after winning independence.[24]

It was not until 18 June that Tokyo Radio announced Netaji's arrival. The news was reported in the Tokyo press the following day. At this announcement, the atmosphere was electrified overnight. The Axis press and radio stressed the significance of the event. The INA and the Indian independence movement suddenly assumed far greater importance in the eyes of all. On 19 June, Netaji held a press conference. This was followed by two broadcasts to publicize further his presence in East Asia, and during the course of these he unfolded his plan of action. As Ghosh describes, Bose's plan stood for the co-ordination of the nationalist forces within India and abroad to make it a gigantic movement powerful enough to overthrow the British rulers of India. The assumption on which Bose seemed to have based his grand scheme was that the internal conditions in India were ripe for a revolt. The no-cooperation movement must turn into an active revolt.[25]

And to quote Netaji's own words during the press conference: "Civil disobedience must develop into armed struggle. And only when the Indian people have received the baptism of fire on a large scale would they be qualified to achieve freedom."[26] Netaji then embarked upon a series of meetings, press conferences. radio broadcasts and lectures in order to explain his immediate task to the people concerned, and the world.

Accompanied by Rashbehari Bose, Netaji arrived at Singapore from Tokyo on 27 June. He was given a tumultuous welcome by the resident Indians and was profusely 'garlanded' wherever he went. His speeches kept the listeners spellbound. By now, a legend had grown around him, and its magic infected his audiences. Addressing representatives of the Indian communities in East Asia on 4 July he said:

Not content with a civil disobedience campaign, Indian people are now morally prepared to employ other means for achieving their liberation. The time has therefore come to pass on to the next stage of our campaign. All organizations whether inside India or outside, must now transform themselves into a disciplined fighting organization under one leadership. The aim and purpose of this organization should be to take up arms against British imperialism when the time is ripe and signal is given.[27]

At a public meeting where Netaji spoke these words, Rashbehari Bose formally handed over to Subhas Chandra Bose the leadership of the III, and command of the INA. The hall was packed to capacity. In his last speech as leader of the movement Rashbehari Bose said:

Friends! This is one of the happiest moments in my life. I have brought you one of the most outstanding personalities of our great Motherland to participate in our campaign. In your presence today, I resign my office as president of the Indian Independence League in East Asia. From now on, Subhas Chandra Bose is your president, your leader in the fight for India's independence, and I am confident that under his leadership, you will march on to battle and to victory.[28]

In that meeting Netaji announced his plan to organize a Provisional Government of Free India.

It will be the task of this provisional government to lead the Indian Revolution to its successful conclusion … The Provisional Government will have to prepare the Indian people, inside and outside India, for an armed struggle which will be the culmination of all our national efforts since 1883. We have a grim fight ahead of us. In this final march to freedom, you will have to face danger, thirst, privation, forced marches-and death. Only when you pass this test will freedom be yours.[29]

The next day, on 5 July, Netaji took over the command of the Indian National Army, now christened Azad Hind Fauj (Free India Army). Tojo arrived from Manila in time to review the parade of troops standing alongside with Bose. Addressing the soldiers, Netaji said:

Throughout my pubic career, I have always felt that, though India is otherwise ripe for independence in every way, she has lacked one thing, namely, an army of liberation. George Washington of America could fight and win freedom, because he had his army. Garibaldi could liberate Italy because he had his armed volunteers behind him. It is your privilege and honor to be the first to come forward and organize India's national army. By doing so you have removed the last obstacle in our path to freedom… When France declared war on Germany in 1939 and the campaign began, there was but one cry which rose from the lips of German soldiers- "To Paris! To Paris!" When the brave soldiers of Nippon set out on their march in December 1941, there was but one cry which rose from their lips-"To Singapore! To Singapore!" Comrades! My soldiers! Let your battle-cry be-"To Delhi! To Delhil" How many of us will individually survive this war of freedom, I do not know. But I do know this, that we shall ultimately win and our task will not end until our surviving heroes hold the victory parade on another graveyard of the British Empire-Lal Kila or the Red Fortress of ancient Delhi.[30]

On 27 July, Netaji left Singapore for a 17-day,tour of the East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. The prime objective of this tour was to enlist moral and monetary support for his movement from other countries, as well as the resident Indian communities. He was given a rousing reception in Rangoon, where he attended the Burmese independence on 1 August; from Rangoon Netaji went to Bangkok and met Thai Prime Minister Pilbulsongram. He won the moral support of Thailand and tumultuous ovation from the Indian community. He then flew to Saigon and addressed Indians there. Returning to Singapore for a brief rest, he flew to Penang to address a rally of 15,000 Indians. Everywhere, he held his audience spellbound for hours with his superb oratory, and at the conclusion of his speech the people raced to reach the platform and pile up all they had before him-a total of two million dollars. This scene was repeated over and over in towns and cities all over Southeast Asia, when Netaji stood before thousands of people like a prophet, addressing them for the cause of India's freedom. Merchants, traders, businessmen and women came forward everywhere and donated their wealth and ornaments in abundance, to enable their leader to fulfill his mission. In his plan for total mobilization, Netaji had outlined a grandiose scheme for an army of three million men. However, the immediate target was set at 50,000. The Major part of this number would be from the Indian POWs and the rest from civilian volunteers. According to Bose's plan there would be three divisions from thirty thousand regulars and another unit of twenty thousand mainly from civilian volunteers. The Japanese authorities informea Netaji at that time that it could provide arms for thirty thousand men only. However, by 1945, it was authoritatively known that the actual strength of the INA rose to not less than 45,000 men. After completing the task of reorganizing the Indian Independence League and launching preparations for revolutionizing the army, and after conducting a successful campaign to mobilize the support of the Indian communities throughout Southeast Asia-a phase which lasted from July to OctoberNetaji turned toward formation of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind (Free India). This had to be done before the army could be sent for action in the battlefield. This government was officially proclaimed in Singapore at a mass rally on 21 October 1943 where Netaji was unanimously elected as the Head of the State and The Supreme Commander of the Indian National Army. While taking the oath he said:

In the name of God, I take this sacred oath that to liberate India and the three hundred eighty million of my countrymen, L Subhas Chandra Bose, will continue the sacred war of freedom till the last breath of my life. I shall remain always a servant of India, and to look after the welfare of three hundred eighty million of Indian brothers and sisters shall be for me my highest duty. Even after winning freedom, I will always be prepared to shed even the last drop of my blood for the preservation of India's freedom.[31]

The Provisional Government of Free India had five Ministers with Netaji as the Head of the State, Prime Minister and Minister for War and advisers representing the Indian communities in East Asia. The first momentous decision which the new government took was its declaration of war on Britain and the United States, which was decided on the night of 22-23 October. Toye writes: "The Cabinet had not been unanimous about the inclusion of the U.S.A. Bose had shown impatience and displeasure- there was never any question then or later of his absolute authority: the Cabinet had no responsibility and could only tender advice.,,32 Recognition of the Provisional Government came quickly from nine countries-the Axis powers and their allies. They were: Japan, Burma, Croatia, Germany, the Philippines, Nanking China, Manchuto, Italy and Siam (Thailand), but for some unknown reasons, Vichy France withheld its recognition. The Japanese Army promised all-out support for the provisional government.

Toward the end of October, Netaji flew to Tokyo again to meet Tojo and to attend the greater East Asia Conference. Since India technically did not fall within this sphere, he attended as an observer. He made an impressive speech at the conference, stressing the creation of a new Asia where all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism would be eliminated. The Japanese navy had captured the Andaman and Nicober islands in the Bay of Bengal during the early months of war. As a result of Netaji's requests, Prime Minister Tojo announced at the conference that Japan had decided to place the two islands under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government of Free India, thereby giving it its first sovereignty over a territory. The ceremonial transfer took place in December, and Netaji named Lieutenant-Colonel Loganathan, an officer in the Medical Services, as the chief commissioner in charge of the civil administration of the islands. Soon thereafter, preparations began for sending the army to the front and moving the provisional government headquarters to Rangoon, in Burma. In the meantime, Netaji announced the formation of a women's brigade within the INA, and named it "Rani of Jhansi Regiment," after the celebrated queen of Jhansi, Laxmibai, who had led her soldiers against the British in an uprising during the First War of Independence in 1857. Coincidentially, another Laxmi, Lieutenant-Col. Laxmi, was placed in charge of this regiment by Netaji. In November it was agreed between Netaji and the Japanese militay headquarters, that the INA first division and the civil and military headquarters would move to Burma in January 1944.

The Imphal Campaign

The Imphal Campaign, including the battle of Kohima - the first major town to be captured by the INA inside India - will perhaps go down as one of the most daring and disastrous campaigns in the annals of world military history. General Mutaguchi, commander of the Japanese forces in North Burma since 1943, had been convinced that Imphal should be attacked. The objects of such an offensive were to forestall any invasion of Burma in 1944 and to establish the Japanese defenses on the frontier mountains. The idea would be first to overwhelm the British in Arakan, involving all their reserves in battle for Chittagong and the gateway to eastern Bengal. Then, by April, Kohima and Imphal could be conquered at leisure, without danger of their being reinforced. The monsoon, beginning in May, would postpone operations, and after the rains were over, in the absence of a new British defense posture east of the river Brahmaputra, the entire Assam and East Bengal would lie open to the Indian National Army and the Japanese.

Imphal, the capital of the state of Manipur, lay on a flat, nearly treeless plateau just inside the Indian border. Its elevation was about 3,000 feet, surrounded on all sides by impassable mountains. The mountain range in the east with 2,000-4,000 foot peaks above the plateau stretches some five hundred miles. To the West and South are the Chin hills of the Arakan range, a formidable stretch of inhospitable terrain. The jungle surrounding this basin is hostile to human habitation. The northern access to the plain from India and Assam lay through Dimapur and the steep Kohima Road. From Dimapur, a single track railway swept through Assam and Bengal and was an important military objective to both armies. For the INA the importance of the Imphal campaign was that it was the only major battle in which it would participate with the object of achieving freedom for India. As Salto and Hayashida writes:

The Imphal Operation was the final offensive of the East Asia War, mounted by three Burma-based Japanese divisions, and one INA division. The campaign lasted from 15 March to 9 July 1944. The operation has often been compared to the operation Wacht am Rhein or the Battle of the Bulge, which was the final all-out drive launched by Germany towards Ardennes on the Western Front, from December 1944 to January 1945. Both operations al most succeeded and both are termed "gambles" by historians today. If the German push towards Ardennes was Wacht am Rhein, the Japanese-Indian thrust against Imphal might be called "Wacht am Chindwin" although the official Japanese code-name for the action was most prosaic: Operation "U".[33]

River Chindwin lay across the Indo-Burmese border, and its crossing from the east by an army would signal an invasion of India.

Execution orders for Operation U became operative on 7 January 1944, coinciding with completion of the shifting of the Provisional Government headquarters in Rangoon. In the evening of the same day, Lt. General Masakazy Kawabe, commanding the overall Burma headquarters, held a welcome party in honor of Netaji and his staff officers. Netaji spoke, and concluded his speech with these words. "My only prayer to the Almighty at this moment is that we may be given the earliest opportunity to pay for our freedom with our own blood.',34 One INA Division, named after Netaji as Sublias Regiment, was readied for action at the front with the Japanese. Toye writes.

… He spent the whole days… with the Subhas Regiment, reviewing, watching it at exercises and on parade, talking to its officers, exerting his magic on it in a way that he had not attempted before. These were his comrades, the men by whose means he would uphold the rights and honour of India. Everything depended on their achievement in battle; they must absorb all his feelings of confidence, feel the whole of his personal force. On 3 February he bade them farewell: "Blood is calling for blood. Arise! We have no time to lose. Take up your arms. There in front of you is the road. our pioneers have built. We shall march along that road. We shall carve our way through enemy's ranks, or, if God wills, we shall die a martyr's death. And in our last sleep we shall kiss the road which will bring our Army to Delhi. The road to Delhi is the road to Freedom. On to Delhi!"[35]

Mutaguchi set 15 March as the D-day for the beginning of the Imphal campaign. The deployment of well over 120,000 troops along the Chindwin river, a front of some 200 kilometers, went on smoothly and undetected by British spies planted in the area. In the meantime, Netaji received some good news. The Arakan offensive, launched on 4 February, had cut off the 7th Indian Division of the British Army in Mayu valley. Contributing to this success was the reconnaissance and subversion of an Indian outpost position by Major Misra, the INA Commander in Arakan. At the same time, he received messages from the underground network working inside India under his direction, whose selected trained spies had been sent by submarine. On D-day, Mutaguchi assembled the war correspondents at his headquarters in central Burma and declared: "I am firmly convinced that my three divisions will reduce Imphal in one month. In order that they can march fast, they carry the lightest possible equipment and food enough for three weeks. Ali, they will get everything from the British supplies and dumps. Boys! See you again in Imphal at the celebration of the Emperor's birthday on 29 April."[36]

The Japanese-Indian offensive took the British by complete surprise. The Japanese and INA troops literally galloped through mountains and jungles routing the enemy on the way. Prior to the Imphal offensive, an INA detachment under Colonel Saligal had created a breach through the British lines in the Arakan sector. Now the INA's deployment was extended to the Imphal sector. As the INA under Netaji's command set foot on the Indian soil, the main Japanese force also defeated the obstinate resistance of the enemy on 22 March, broke through the India-Burma border, and advanced from the north and west to encircle Imphal. The initial success of the INA at the Arakan front generated much enthusiasm. In a Special Order of the Day, Netaji referred to the "Glorious and brilliant actions of the brave forces of the Azad Hind Fauj."[37]

On 8 April, Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued a communique which said: "Japanese troops, fighting side by side with the Indian National Army, captured Kohima early on 6 April.[38] A jubilant Netaji at this time started talking with the Japanese about the administration of the liberated and soon-to-be-liberated territories in India. In response to a call by Netaji, Prime Minister Tojo made an announcement clarifying that all areas of India occupied as a result of Japanese advance would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government. This was followed by Netaji's announcement that he was appointing the Finance Minister of his cabinet, Major-General A.C. Chatterjee, as the governor of the newly liberated areas. Netaji described the march of the INA into India as the event of the century. He had also just declared the Legion in Europe to be part of the INA and had appointed Nambiar to be a Minister in the Provisional Government; his Chief Commissioner had been installed in the Andamans, his first heroes from the Arakan front had been decorated, and the, INA troops had raised the national standard of free India in Kohima; and now, the fall of Imphal seemed very near.

Did the Imphal Campaign come almost two years too late? What would have happened if Netaji had arrived in East Asia a year earlier? by the end of 1942, the Axis had scored successes everywhere.

Rommel was in Egypt, the German invasion of Russia had gone smoothly, Nationalist China was on her knees, and India and Australia were expecting a Japanese invasion. Prospects for the Allies were dark in the Pacific and the Rising Sun was at its zenith from Japan to the Bay of Bengal … Britain was unable to dispute with the Japanese Navy, and there were not enough British and Indian troops in India to assure its defense. Even air protection was inadequte … Japanese forces had not pursued retreating British troops beyond the Chindwin river in Burma in May 1942, allegedly because "an invasion was likely to arouse ill-feelings amongst the Indian masses." … So the Japanese remained east of the Chindwin river, leaving British Indian forces to build up their strength in the Imphal plain.[39]

But above all, in that moment of a golden opportunity, the towering leadership of Netaji, a provisional government, and an Indian national army worthy of its name - all these were non-existent in East Asia. Japan by itself simply lacked the motivation for extending war into India, let alone think of its independence. The fact remains, however, that the Imphal campaign was indeed first conceived in 1942, right after the conquest of Burma. According to the official history of the British Armed Forces in the Second World War,

Soon after the completion of the Japanese conquest of Burma in June 1942, a certain Lt. Col. Hayashi had advocated an attack on Imphal. He considered that the Japanese should strike against India without giving time to the defenders to recuperate from their disastrous retreat, and Imphal's capture would rob them of the best base for launching a counter-offensive against Burma … 18th division argued that the jungles of Burma were impassable for large bodies of operational troops and that any attack on Indian territory would provoke anti-Japanese feelings in India. About December 1942, therefore, the plan was abandoned.[40]

Lieutenant-General Kuroda Shigetoku, Southern Army Chief of Staff, stated later that if the operation had been carried out in 1942 when first conceived, rather than in 1944, it would have succeeded. According to Lebra, "General Tojo stated in the spring of 1945 that he regretted Japan had missed the opportunity in 1942."[41]

As the INA and the Japanese forces continued to lay siege on Imphal, the Allied air superiority gained strength and the enemy was preparing for counterattack. Shah Nawaz, commanding two battalions of the Subhas Regiment in the Chin Hills, told of the hardships his men were suffering as a result of disease and of supply and transport difficulties. However, owing to communication problems, the news of difficulties his men were undergoing at the front did not reach Netaji in detail. While there was a stalemate in the front and the offensive came to a halt, there were meetings and jubilations at Rangoon where Netaji collected money and donations in other forms for the conduct of his campaign. He offered to send additional INA regiments to the Front and more troops were despatched. For about a month Operation U went according to plan. Enemy forces were successfully encircled in the Imphal area. Suddenly, in the middle of April, the military balance began to shift against Japan and the INA. Wingate's airborne unit had already been attacking from air over Burma supply routes. British forces were being supplied by airlift into the besieged Imphal, and reinforcements began to flow in. British forces were being sent to Kohima to the north by both rail and air. Japan had no matching air power to strike back at enemy air operations. By the end of April the battle strength of Japanese and INA divisions was decreased forty percent. Time for success by surprise attack had already passed and gradually the offensive turned into a defensive battle. The monsoon that followed, brought the ultimate disaster. As roads became impassable, all supply routes were cut off. Muddy streams flooded roads and valleys, and rivers swelled to sweep away tanks and ammunition. In the wake of the monsoon, disease became rampant. Cholera, malaria, dysentery, beriberi and jungle sores began to take their toll. The INA and the Japanese started living on rations consisting of rice mixed with jungle grass. The 33rd Division had fought desperately for forty days without being able to penetrate the British lines at Imphal. And now that vast amounts of military supplies were reaching the beleaguered garrison at Imphal, there was virtually no hope for a renewed offensive. On 8 July, on the recommendation of top-ranking Generals including Kawabe and Mutaguchi, Prime Minister Tajo issued the order to halt the operation.

The story of retreat from Imphal is one of the greatest tragedies of World War II. It is a story of misery, hunger and death. Japanese and INA troops, bottled up in the Kawab valley between the Chin Hills in the west and the Chindwin river in the west, began their long trek back through jungles and mountains, headed by division commanders and guards in jeeps and horses. Officers, supply, communication and medical units followed. Behind them marched thousands of stragglers: rain-soaked, emaciated with fever and malnutrition. Soon, corpses began accumulating along the trek, and they had to be left unburied. Of the 220,000 Japanese troops who began the Imphal Campaign, only 130,000 survived, and of these only 70,000 remained at the front to retreat. INA casualties were over fifty percent. It was a disaster equal in magnitude to Dunkirk and Stalingrad. Lebra writes:

When Bose heard the order to retreat he was stunned. He drew himself up and said to Kawabe in ringing tones: "Though the Japanese Army has given up the operation, we will continue it. We will not repent even if the advance of our revolutionary army to attain independence of our homeland is completely defeated. Increase in casualties, cessation of supplies, and famine are not reasons enough to stop marching. Even if the whole army becomes only spirit we will not stop advancing toward our homeland. This is the spirit of our revolutionary army." In an article in Azad Hind on 6 November 1944, after the retreat from Imphal, Bose was reported to have "reiterated his firm conviction that final victory in this war would belong to Japan and Germany … that a new phase of war was approaching in which the initiative would again lie in the hands of the Japanese.-"[42]

Each Japanese commander gave his own analysis of the causes of the failure of Operation U, like the problem of the chain of command, lack of air power, on dispersal rather than concentration of forces. However, Netaji thought it was timing, with respect to the monsoon. He felt that the only chance to take Imphal was before the rains came, and most strategists agreed on this point. From the historic perspective, however, Fujiwara perhaps was the most correct. According to him, the Imphal disaster could have been avoided had the operation been undertaken a year earlier, at a time when the British power in the region was weak. The delay in launching the Imphal offensive was no doubt due to Netaji's late arrival from Europe to East Asia. The Imphal campaign should have been undertaken at a time when the Axis victories had reached their zenith and the Allied forces were on retreat everywhere.

During the last three months of 1944, Japanese forces had withdrawn to the banks of the Irrawaddy in Burma, where they intended to make a stand. Netaji enthusiastically offered the reorganized INA First Division, when the Japanese 15th division was ordered to oppose the British. Subsquently, the 2nd Division was also readied for action. In February 1945, the INA held some positions in the region of Mandalay in Burma, giving battle to the advancing enemy. This was the second campaign of Netaji's army, and it held out tenaciously at Nyaungu for some time. However, allied troops later crossed the Irrawaddy at several points and the Japanese and INA units were surrounded. There were some desertions. Despite unique examples of heroism and Netaji's presence in the battlefields, risking his own life in the face of enemy attacks, the second campaign of the INA (which was purely a defensive one) finally had to give way to the gradual reconquest of Burma by the British.

The end of this campaign was followed by a chain of events that included the final Japanese defeat, an alleged plane crash in Formosa in which Netaji reportedly perished, the surrender of the INA to the allied forces and the trial of their leaders at the Red Fort in Delhi, staged by the British. However, all these fateful events, occuring during the final phase of World War II and its aftermath, should be considered parts of an altogether different episode relating to Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army. In the present episode we have examined the historical tasks fulfilled by Netaji and his army in Europe and Asia during World War II, and their significance. In recognition of Netaji's historically significant role as a war leader, Guy Wint pays him a rare tribute with these words: "He played … an extraordinarily decisive part. By accident, and by seizing an exceptional opportunity, he was able to cut a figure which made him outstanding among the comparatively small number of men who influenced the course of the war by their individual qualities."

http://www.vho.org/GB/Journals/JHR/3/4/Borra407-439.html


And this:-

A most hazardous journey was undertaken by him under water, covering thousands of miles, crossing enemy territories. He was in the Atlantic, the Middle East, Madagascar and the Indian ocean. Battles were being fought over land, in the air and there were mines in the sea. At one stage he traveled 400 miles in a rubber dingy to reach a Japanese submarine, which took him to Tokyo. He was warmly received in Japan and was declared the head of the Indian army, which consisted of about 40,000 soldiers from Singapore and other eastern regions. Bose called it the Indian National Army (INA) and a government by the name "Azad Hind Government" was declared on the 21st of October 1943. INA freed the Andaman and Nicobar islands from the British and were renamed as Swaraj and Shaheed islands. The Government started functioning.
Bose wanted to free India from the Eastern front. He had taken care that Japanese interference was not present from any angle. Army leadership, administration and communications were managed by Indians only. Subhash Brigade, Azad Brigade and Gandhi Brigade were formed. INA marched through Burma and occupied Coxtown on the Indian Border. A touching scene ensued when the solders entered their 'free' motherland. Some lay down and kissed, some placed pieces of mother earth on their heads, others wept. They were now inside of India and were determined to drive out the British! Delhi Chalo (Let's march to Delhi) was the war cry. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed the history of mankind. Japan had to surrender. Bose was in Singapore at that time and decided to go to Tokyo for his next course of action. Unfortunately, there was no trace of him from that point. He was just 48 and his death or disappearance is still a mystery.
The Indian people were so much enamored of Bose's oratory and leadership qualities, fearlessness and mysterious adventures, that he had become a legend. They refused to believe that he died in the plane crash. The famous Red Fort trial wherein Bose's generals and the INA officers were tried, became landmark events. Initially, the British Government thought of a court-martial, but there was a countrywide protest against any kind of punishment. For common Indians, Axis and Allied powers hardly mattered, but they could not tolerate punishment of fellow countrymen who were fighting for freedom. The British Government was in no position to face open rebellion or mutiny and a general amnesty for INA soldiers was declared.
While Bose's approach to Indian freedom continues to generate heated debate in the Indian society today, there is no denying of his burning patriotism, his tireless efforts to free India from inside and outside and his reckless adventures in trying to reach his goals. His exploits later became a legend due to the many stories carried by the disbanded INA soldiers who came from every nook and corner of our great country. Had he been around, Subhas Chandra Bose could have given a new turn to Independent India's political history. But he lives on eternally in the Indian mind.

This article is in courtesy of Dr. Jyotsna Kamat, a historian from Bangalore.

http://www.calcuttaweb.com/people/netaji.shtml

And this:-

During the Second World War, the emergence of the Indian National Army (INA) from the ranks of Indian Army prisoners with the Japanese, under the leadership of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, to fight for Indian independence became a major development. In military terms, the contribution of the Indian National Army was limited but its political and psychological impact was tremendous.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1765/Overview.html

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Post #: 10
- 5/23/2003 10:45:03 PM   
Yamamoto

 

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I really hope to see this modeled in WitP, although I know I should have brought it up earlier. I would like to see extra INA units arrive every time the Japanese capture a British position. This would represent the deserters and prisoners being recruited.

There should also be a major impact on India’s moral as Japanese forces get closer to India. Eventually, India would go into complete revolt unless MAJOR British forces were used to keep the civilian population under control.

Japan can’t conquer a country with India’s population (hundreds of millions) but they wouldn’t have to. All they would have to do is have enough victories to inspire the Indians to rise up and overthrow their colonial masters.

Yamamoto

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Post #: 11
- 5/23/2003 11:13:30 PM   
mdiehl

 

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The assessment of the contribution or potential contribution of the INA seems quite overblown. And the good Indian Professor seems to have an exaggerated view of Axis conquests by the end of 1942. The Axis campaign in Russia was not going "smoothly." (Stalled in the South with 6th Army being encircled.) Rommel was not in Egypt. He was in Libya and heading for Tunisia. Japan had just suffered a series of stunning defeats in night actions around Guadalcanal and was about to lose a division (rescued at the last minute) to starvation.

Frankly, I see no need for an INA contingent in the Axis force pool. But if one wants to model every penny ante insurgent force, certainly the INA should be countered by Allied insurgents in Indonesia, the PI, and Burma, as well as sabotage and insurgency organizations in mainland China in the areas occupied by the Japanese.

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Post #: 12
- 5/24/2003 6:39:25 AM   
Yamamoto

 

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Perhaps instead of having them as a military frce they could affect India's status. If the Japanese get close enough with enough forces then India could go neutral to represent civil strife. Think of it as an auto-win condition that only applied against India, similar to the auto-win conditions in UV.

Another way would be to have them act as partisans and sabatours in India.

Yamamoto

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Post #: 13
- 5/24/2003 1:26:46 PM   
Raverdave


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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]

Frankly, I see no need for an INA contingent in the Axis force pool. But if one wants to model every penny ante insurgent force, certainly the INA should be countered by Allied insurgents in Indonesia, the PI, and Burma, as well as sabotage and insurgency organizations in mainland China in the areas occupied by the Japanese. [/B][/QUOTE]

I dissagree....I think that to simply write off a force of some "50,000" INA troops is silly. Sure have them in the game, and have them modelled on what their true fighting abillty really was. The size of the INA "demands" that it be put into the game.

However, I do agree with you on the subject of insurgents, mainly because this is going to be a "Divisional" level game.

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Post #: 14
INA - 5/24/2003 11:04:51 PM   
norsemanjs

 

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I agree that you cannot realistically ignore a sizable contingent of trained men working in large organized units. They will need to be accounted for.

The quality of the force can of course be debated.

There is no doubt that on more than one occasion the INA forces played a role in the fighting occuring in the Burma theatre.

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Post #: 15
- 5/24/2003 11:11:01 PM   
mdiehl

 

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I don't see any concrete evidence for the INA having 50,000 troops of any kind, not even the garden variety conscript + commissar dregs used by the USSR. Half a division of untrained, barely-armed, poorly led irregulars might be useful for garrison duty -- maybe. But if the INA is in anybody's mind a "real" military force then the Phillippine Army Divisions should each be comparable to the INA with respect to unit training, quality, and OOB.

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Post #: 16
insurgents - 5/24/2003 11:27:12 PM   
wpurdom

 

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For once I agree with mdiehl (in operational terms). I expect that the effect of the Indian National Army on the fighting was less than that of the Allied insurgents in China, Philippines, etc.
On the other hand, are the insurgents a net plus or minus for the Allies outside of the Philippines? In the Philippines, the communist portion of the insurgency gave post-war trouble, but supporting and nurturing the insurgents probably contributed to the ability to counter them and the U.S. had no desire to remain as a colonial power. The insurgents in Burma also probably contributed to British aims although they never penetrated the main ethnic group or became large enough to help establish a friendly post-war government. In China, growth of insurgents probably contributed to CCP success in the subsequent civil war and in Indonesia led to Dutch defeat. Finally we all know how helpful Vietnamese guerillas were to Allied post-war fortunes. Thus, growth of Allied guerillas outside Burma and the Philippines, if modeled, would logically cost the Allies victory points!
On a related point, why should the Allied player have any control over any non-air forces in China? Once the US was in the war and survival against the Japs seemed likely, Chiang and Mao were more concerned about their contest with each other than with any war against the Japanese. Chinese ground troops should be computer controlled unless released to the Burma front.

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Post #: 17
- 5/25/2003 8:16:32 AM   
Raverdave


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Indeed I also would say that the amount of 50,000 is on the high side, but feel that that two divisons of abour 12,000 each is more in order however, figures are hard to come by. But the fact remains that there were large numbers of INA troops available, and two divisions would not be unrealistic, coupled with the fact that they are "only" good for garrison, and not front line use.
At the end of the day it is going to be the designers call.

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Post #: 18
- 5/25/2003 9:58:20 PM   
TIMJOT

 

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I also recall reading that the INA was approximately 2 divisions, not sure how many troops constituted an INA division though. I do think their numbers warrant inclusion in the game, but they should be very low quality, suitable for only garrison or LOC troops. As for insurgents in Burma, PI ect... these were small guerilla bands and should probably be modeled abstractly somehow.

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Post #: 19
- 5/26/2003 2:13:14 AM   
mdiehl

 

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I am unable to find any internet source that puts the INA at either "two divisions" or "50,000" soldiers. I'll get my Burma book back and see what it has to say. All the sources I've ever read on this mention the INA as a propaganda force of ZERO military value that fielded about 7,000 volunteers. Most of these were taken prisoner at Singapore and "volunteered" as a reasonable alternative to starvation in prison. Of those, most went awol when the INA elements were moved into Burma.

The common, repeated hard number mentioned on web sites is 7K scrubs. For example:

http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/india.htm

The only sites that I've found with numbers in the ballpark 45K range attribute the number to unattributed "authoritative sources." There is an easily findable website by some fellow named Borrhas whose florid prose in praise of Nazi and Imperial Japanese "wars of liberation" (in France, China, and elsewhere) pretty much marks the tool as a latter day nationalist axis fanboy propaganda paper hanger.... less credible than your average toothpaste advertisement.

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Post #: 20
INA - 5/26/2003 2:32:56 AM   
Highlander

 

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Take a look here http://www.carbinesforcollectors.com/jap.html .
The INA was numbered 43.000 volunteers.

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Post #: 21
- 5/26/2003 7:53:14 AM   
TIMJOT

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]
http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/india.htm

The only sites that I've found with numbers in the ballpark 45K range attribute the number to unattributed "authoritative sources." There is an easily findable website by some fellow named Borrhas whose florid prose in praise of Nazi and Imperial Japanese "wars of liberation" (in France, China, and elsewhere) pretty much marks the tool as a latter day nationalist axis fanboy propaganda paper hanger.... less credible than your average toothpaste advertisement. [/B][/QUOTE]

Actually, your link sites a source that quotes around 45,000 as the number recruited. I doubt that many were deployed. Perhaps your 7000 is the number that actually saw combat in burma.

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Post #: 22
ENOUGH ALREADY.... - 5/26/2003 7:38:52 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

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Can we simply reccognize the INA for what it actually was?
A Public Relations and Propaganda Coup for the Japanese, and
a Political "Black Eye" for the British. Militarily they were not
much more than a nusiance for both sides. Put them in the game
as a couple of under-strength Brigades with Division Symbols,
give them a defensive role as garrisons with an offensive
strength ONLY in India, and be done with it. If you want to go
all-out, allow them to upgrade to "real" Divisions if they can
spend a month in supply in Calcutta.

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Post #: 23
- 5/26/2003 8:50:46 PM   
TIMJOT

 

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ok by me. Frankly I dont care one way or the other, but weak garrison level troops sounds reasonable for both sides. Its really just a matter of chrome anyway. Its a non issue IMO

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Post #: 24
- 5/26/2003 10:17:40 PM   
Luskan

 

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Raver would just use them as suicide cannon fodder anyway.

In fact, come to think of it, I'd do the same thing ;)

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Post #: 25
- 5/26/2003 10:27:59 PM   
mdiehl

 

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IMO a couple of Battalion strength units with low morale would do a fair job simulating their capability. If they spend 20 months in Calcutta they become "real divisions" ... not "1 month."

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Post #: 26
INA - 6/5/2003 3:25:02 AM   
mogami


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Hi, The Japanese handed over control of the Andaman and Nicobar islands to the INA (Their Indian Government was located there.)


Subhash Brigade, Azad Brigade and Gandhi Brigade were formed by Oct 43. (Total strength of these "Brigades" appears to be around 20k) They were part of the battles around Impal. By 1945 the had INA marched through Burma and occupied Coxtown on the Indian Border. The Japanese surrender ended the attempt to invade India. These 3 Brigades were completly Indian (No Japanese )
This Bose fellow appears to remain a legend to Indians. The British were forced (by fear of uprisings) to grant amensty to INA
members

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Post #: 27
- 6/5/2003 9:36:29 PM   
Yamamoto

 

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You guys really discount the Indians’ potentials. They HATED living under the British. I would think that if the British had suffered a few more setbacks and the Japanese had driven a little deeper, or maybe invaded that island instead of just air striking it (forgot the name) then there was a serious possibility of revolution. Once an independence movement gained speed it would take all of the British forces in the area and more just to keep those 800 million Indians suppressed.

I would like to see some stat like “National Will” where after enough combat losses and enough territory taken India would go into revolt. The same should apply to any other territory that was under the heel of a European colonial power but it hardly matters in those other cases because Japan conquered them all anyway. I don’t count Australia because they were, for the most part, transplanted Europeans and not indigenous population.

Yamamoto

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Post #: 28
INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. - 6/5/2003 9:58:32 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Yamamoto
[B]You guys really discount the Indians’ potentials. They HATED living under the British. I would think that if the British had suffered a few more setbacks and the Japanese had driven a little deeper, or maybe invaded that island instead of just air striking it (forgot the name) then there was a serious possibility of revolution. Once an independence movement gained speed it would take all of the British forces in the area and more just to keep those 800 million Indians suppressed.

I would like to see some stat like “National Will” where after enough combat losses and enough territory taken India would go into revolt. The same should apply to any other territory that was under the heel of a European colonial power but it hardly matters in those other cases because Japan conquered them all anyway. I don’t count Australia because they were, for the most part, transplanted Europeans and not indigenous population.

Yamamoto [/B][/QUOTE]

If the Japanese had had the where-with-all to actually mount
a serious invasion of India (which they never had), you could
certainly speculate that the population might have risen up as
the Fillipinos did when the US invaded in '44. But as Japan's
actual ability to land several supported Divisions in India is about
as far-fetched as their ability to land them in San Diego, it's
probably not worth worrying about in game terms. 2by3 has
plenty of other problems to worry about.

By the time the Japanese even managed a "border raid" at
Imphal in '44, most of the population of Asia had heard enough
horror stories about Japanese occupation and co-operation
to make "the Devil they knew" seem a better bet than the
"greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere"---where all the pros-
perity seemed to go to Japan. In several hundred million Indians
they would certainly have found SOME supporters---but their own
record makes a "mass movement" unlikely.

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Post #: 29
Re: INTERESTING.., BUT IRRELEVANT. - 6/5/2003 10:26:08 PM   
TIMJOT

 

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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl
[B]If the Japanese had had the where-with-all to actually mount
a serious invasion of India (which they never had), you could
certainly speculate that the population might have risen up as
the Fillipinos did when the US invaded in '44. But as Japan's
actual ability to land several supported Divisions in India is about
as far-fetched as their ability to land them in San Diego, it's
probably not worth worrying about in game terms. 2by3 has
plenty of other problems to worry about.

By the time the Japanese even managed a "border raid" at
Imphal in '44, most of the population of Asia had heard enough
horror stories about Japanese occupation and co-operation
to make "the Devil they knew" seem a better bet than the
"greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere"---where all the pros-
perity seemed to go to Japan. In several hundred million Indians
they would certainly have found SOME supporters---but their own
record makes a "mass movement" unlikely. [/B][/QUOTE]

Mike,

Japan had the wherewithall and shipping to land at least 4 Divisions on the Northeast coast of India in the spring of 42. Certainly at the expense of any further movement in the south Pacific, but nonetheless it was quite capable of doing so if it so chose (ie; the IJA and IJA agreed). This would not of course be enough to conquer India, but along with the 15th army pushing overland from Burma, it would be sufficient to secure Calcutta and the Bangledesh region. I agree that this wouldnt neccessarily provolk of general upriseing since too many minority sects owed their power to the Brit Raj, but localized revolts or at least ambivilence could be expected. In the spring of 42 there was some reason to believe that Asians would be better off as part of an Asian Empire, and Japan had some altruistic motives, however I agree these expectations were pretty much spent within a year.

BTW, Japan waited until 44 for the Imphal raid because they chose to. Burma was the planed extent of their advance.

(in reply to Yamamoto)
Post #: 30
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