TIMJOT
Posts: 1822
Joined: 4/30/2001 Status: offline
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl "Amatures debate tactics..., Professionals study logistics." -------------------------------------------- Logistics is useless without good strategy, which is useless without good tactics. They are not mutually excusive. True proffessionals study are three. (quote) --------------------------------------------- OK. So the second the 16th army finishes the conquest of the East Indies, you pull out all the troops and stick them on trans- ports again. To them you add the Theatre Reserve, and maybe a Division or two from Malaya. That puts more men "afloat" than at any time so far in the war, but let's say you found enough shipping somewhere. And you've taken another couple hundred thousand tons of shipping out of the civilian economy in Japan and loaded them with the munitions, rations, and POL to supply this Army for a while. And a good size chunk of the Navy needs to come along to protect this massive commitment of effort, and their supporting oilers. -------------------------------------------- Really? Lets see 3 Divisions for Malaya, two more for the PI and an equivilent of 1 more for Guam, Wake, and Mindanao. That Makes 6 Divisions that were more or less transported simutaneously. You would be takeing no more shipping away economy than was historically for the entire Centrifugal Offensive or the later SOPAC campaign. A good chunk of the Navy was already in the Indian ocean at the time. It would have been better for them do something actually consequential than the historically inconsequential raid. (quote) ------------------------------------------- First of all, you've totally stripped the Dutch East Indies of a garrison---and they (and their oil) were the biggest prize of your opening offensives. You've made a "Midway-sized" commitment from your dwindling National Oil Reserve at the same time you abandon the very area you hope to replenish it from. And at the same time I imagine you are trying to move the bases of your land-based aircraft forward into Burma to support this army---and while the planes can fly, their support crews, munitions, and tanker loads of avgas have to come by ship (The Burma RR hasn't been built yet) ------------------------------------------- First of all you make a lot of assumptions, Who said anything about stripping the DEI? FYI, the Japanes did not generally use front line troops for garrison duty. they used 2nd tier Square divisions and indep. reservist Bgds. for that purpose. Historically the 16th Armies Divisions did not stay in Java. The 2nd and 38th Divisions were sent to South Pac and the 48th was sent to Timore. The 25th Army's 18th Div. 56 Div. were immediately sent to Burma on completion of the Malaya Campaign. The 38th Div. went immediately to Sumatra after the capture of HK and the 48th went to Java after secureing Manila. Useing Divisions successively from one operation to the next was standard IJA procedure. Logistically the 16th Army had enough supplies in train for a projected 3 months campaign Java, that actually lasted less than a week. So enough supplies were undoubtedly available for at least an initial assault. The Burma campaign would require little more than was historically alocated to that operation. (quote) ------------------------------------------ And for all this effort, and major dislocation of the National Economy, you put 100,000 troops with a couple weeks of supply ashore in the Ganges Delta. ----------------------------------------- Who said anything about 100,000 troops? I projected 3-4 divisions landing in the area of Calcutta, supported by the 3 divisions overland from Burma. (quote) ----------------------------------------- Now you're right, the 200,000 troops the British had in Egypt have their own concerns with Rommel---but the British had over a half a million troops in their Middle East Theatre (which ran from the Turkish-Persian border all the way down to East Africa), so if your Japanese can totally abandon the East Indies they finished overrunning only a week before, then it wouldn't seem unrealistic for the British to scrape up 100-150,000 of their troops from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Arabia, and East Africa to be sent to reinforce the Indian Garrisons. And India DOES have arsenals. They were turning out "India Pattern" Brown Bess Musket during the Napoleonic period. I own a Mark III Enfield Rifle built in the Bangalore Arsenal in 1943. ---------------------------------------- A half a million troops? I dont know where you are getting your numbers, but you should go back and recheck them. They had no where near that much. The reality is that in the spring of 42 the 6th and 7th Aussie Divisions were in the process of returning home and was replaced in Palestine by the 9th Aussie which was also designated to eventually return home. Hell would freeze over before any of those divisions would be allowed to be sent to India. It took major arm twisting and a lot of bribery for PM Curtain to acquiese to the 7th Aussie temporarily disembarking at Ceylon, dureing the crisis of March/April 42. True in Iraq you had the 6,7,8,10th Indian divisions, but they were there for a reason. To keep the pro-axis Iraqis inline and act as a bulwork against the Axis was driving toward the Caucuses. Besides these were so called all Indian Divisions were considered 2nd tier. They were not even considered in the crisis of spring 42. In Africa you had the East and West African Divisions that can not be considered more than garrsion or LOC levelstroops and for that reason were never used in front line combat operations as far as I know.. Eventually they were sent to rear areas Madagascar, Ceylon and LOCs in Burma. Historically the only division that was able to be spared from the Mideast during the hieght of the crisis was the 70th Brit division from Cyprus and even this was done with much agony and sole searching because the Brits fully expected the Germans to land there. Regarding arsemals, A few India Army light arsenals hardly translates into a military industrial complex. To state that the India army was anything less than uterly depependent of the Brits for munitions and equipement is an overstatement. (quote) -------------------------------------------- So the Japanese are going to face an extended Campaign in India, which will require constant re-supply. And with India on the scales, the British would almost certainly send Tanks---which the Japanese proved throughout the war to be less than well- equipped to deal with. And for this you get the "CHANCE" that India "MIGHT" revolt----a revolt that would require Japanese assistance and troops to continue. ------------------------------------------- Show when in 1942 the Brits could spare any tanks. It was all they could do to make up the losses against Rommel even with US help. Besides we are not talking of the central plains of India, we are talking NE India, where the terrain and lack of infrastructure is not exactly conducesive to large scale tank warefare. (quote) ----------------------------------------- Realistically, I don't see that such a campaign is even possible. But even if it were, I don't see how the cost and effort could possibly be justified by the potential gain. The Japanese were anything but altruistic in their plans of conquest. They already couldn't conquer or occupy China---what good do another 500 million revolting Asians do them? And a fair-sized percentage of those revolters would be anti-Japanese given the usual conduct of their troops. Yes, it would embarress the British---but it wouldn't save the Empire from the Wrath of the Americans. ----------------------------------------------- First no one said the Japanese were altruistic, I said there was some thought or at least some hope among Asians, that they would be in the spring of 1942. Second a India revolt would not be the goal it would be an added plus but certainly not the reason to invade India. The reason for doing it at all is to deny the Allies the NE India Airfields. Without which there can be no "HUMP" flights. No hump flights no Chang. No Chang no KMT. No KMT no organized nationalist front. No organized nationalist front and you get the good possibilty of a negotiated face saving settlements among the various warlords that be. Resulting most likely in a status quo agreement with Japan in conrol of the coastal regions and the warlords in control of the interior. The reason you invade India is to end the war in China.
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