Chickenboy
Posts: 24520
Joined: 6/29/2002 From: San Antonio, TX Status: offline
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ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote:
ORIGINAL: Chickenboy It's not about who's got the bigger ***** at all, but a reasonable comparative of two examples where a similar leadership approach resulted in vastly different outcomes. And it's an interesting historical parallel to the quandry faced by Chamberlain regarding his failed appeasement of Hitler before the outbreak of the Second World War. warspite1 Well I have no interest in warfare post Hiroshima – hence I haven’t bought into this aspect of the debate and will simply let those who wish to comment do so. As such I certainly pass no comment on whether the Cuban Missile Crisis was appeasement, successful appeasement or not appeasement at all. Having said that no, I don’t think it is a reasonable comparative to the build up to WWII. There is a not very subtle difference that differentiates negotiations, treaties etc in the pre and post nuclear ages, not to mention that Khrushchev (the Stalin denouncer) was not Adolf Hitler. So to return to the main purpose of this thread: I think you've made the discussion here too restrictive. If you want to start a retrospective analysis of whether Chamberlain 'Did the right thing', you need to be able to embrace modern learnings of the event, historic parallels, lessons learned and so forth. Unearthed arcana about Chamberlain per se are germane, but so are other tidbits post-war that have come to light. Chamberlain's association with failed appeasement is a fact of life. Failed. Appeasement. Don't like the moniker or yoke of that? So sorry. Why is his name inextricably associated with failed appeasement? Because of what we've learned about the situation since 1938. But you're saying that we can't use information or parallel analogies post-Hiroshima (BTW, why Hiroshima and not Nagasaki?) to argue our case in this thread? That's just confusing and unnecessarily stultifying IMO. Perhaps you should have retitled your OP to 'Did the Neville Chamberlain do the right thing in realtime, using only sources and foreknowledge or information gleaned from 1937-1939.' quote:
ORIGINAL: Chickenboy Perhaps appeasement was never feasible with Adolph Hitler. warspite1 Why perhaps? We KNOW that unless Hitler got what he wanted he would resort to the one thing that sane democratic leaders try and avoid; war. Where does perhaps figure? Perhaps figures because Hitler wasn't offered everything that he wanted. So he took that which he wanted but was not freely given. Perhaps had he been served up Poland and a free path to the Soviet Union and liebenstraum he may have left the UK and France alone. Of course, doing that would be an unpardonable British offense to the Poles, but it was a possibility. A wholly unpalatable one, but still worthy of a mention. That's what I mean by 'perhaps'. quote:
ORIGINAL: Chickenboy Again a historical what if: If Chamberlain had written off the Poles (assuming he was asked to), could war between the UK and Germany been forestalled before Barbarossa kicked off in June 1941? If so, would that have been a better outcome postwar for the UK than the historical state of events? Much depends on how Hitler / if Hitler would have honored said agreement post-signature. And, of course, whether Chamberlain would have politically survived at home-having given such a betrayal to the Poles. warspite1 So in this scenario Britain and France have told Hitler that so long as Germany respected the French and British Empires he could go fill his boots in Poland and all areas south (except Greece) and east? If Germany and the Soviet Union go to war then it would be prudent to assume that one side wins. One side – either side, Soviet Russia or Fascist Germany – proving the victor and occupying an area from the Rhine to Vladivostok and all the oil and other resources within, would be a pretty terrifying prospect for the rest of Europe….and the US – especially if its Germany. So no I don’t think that was a starter. Yeah, that's the gist of it. I don't know what 'fill his boots' means, but that's the upshot. And, since we're limiting discussions to realtime realpolitik of the moment (circa 1938), I don't think it's fair to bring up how the rest of Europe would look post-war. For all we know, if Hitler had accepted the 'boot filling' of Poland and left France and the UK alone, there may not have been a war with the Soviet Union in 1941. The certainty of war with the Soviet Union was not in the cards in 1938, 1939, 1940 or the first half of 1941 as far as the British were concerned. So granting Chamberlain clarity of foresight which he did not have is disingenuous. quote:
ORIGINAL: Chickenboy So, I guess it depends on what you mean by "the right thing". Did he avert war? No. warspite1 But what does that tell us? We KNOW now that averting war was not possible (unless, as said, he gave Hitler free reign in the east and that just kicks the can down the road). That is not what the discussion is about. The discussion is about whether Chamberlain took the right decisions, at various times between 1937-1939, based on the information available together with an appraisal of Britain’s (and of course all this applies to France) position at the time. See, I thought the discussion was about if Chamberlain 'did the right thing'. To me, 'the right thing' involves weighing the merits of kicking the can down the road versus possible global warfare. Historically weighed and with a massive leavening of hindsight and lessons learned. Your call for discussion in your OP is unclear on the restrictions of what can be used in the discussion. So you must also restrict the outcome of any European conflict post 1938 from your discussions about whether he did the right thing or not. Because we *don't know* what would have happened differently on the continent had appeasement been successful or the Poles been hung out to dry early and often. It's akin to multivariate analysis of an equation: change the variables apriori and you have a massively different outcome. quote:
ORIGINAL: Chickenboy Perhaps it was attempted too late (what if Chamberlain had tried it in 1936-1937?). warspite1 Sorry I've no idea what this means. Attempt what? Are you suggesting he offers up Austria and Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1936-1937? One of the criticisms of Chamberlain is that in trying to come to a compromise through appeasement he only made Hitler bolder. But are you suggesting Chamberlain should have given up 'stuff' unilaterally earlier? And then when Hitler states he wants the Soviet Union then what? Mind you Chamberlain wasn’t Prime Minister until May 1937, and the Rhineland had happened in 1936 so.... But regardless, what is it you are suggesting Chamberlain should have done or reacted to in 1937 – in fact, what actually happened in 1937 he could have appeased? No, not 'should have done'. But 'could have done'. In my world, retrospective analysis of Chamberlain's actions / inactions must include what he could have done as well. And he could have offered up Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. And when Hitler says he wants the Soviet Union (3 years later mind you), he could have shrugged and said 'have at it'. I'm not saying that it was the right thing to do in hindsight. It would have been unfathomable for the mindset at the time and almost Evil. But the mindset at the time was clearly that there was a continental line in the sand for which Britain was willing to endure another world war. And that that line in the sand was clearly 'Poland'. Knowing what we do now, a stark choice in this discussion that should be addressed is this: If Chamberlain had known that over a million Brits (and Commonwealth soldiers) would perish as a result of the war and that the nation would largely be bankrupted post-war and lose many of its overseas colonies, would he have been such a stickler to defend Poland? Was it worth it? Could he have done something different and could that have forestalled such a butcher's bill? Possibly. quote:
Really? Was it? You see there is a limitation even with hindsight. Abject failure? Well if we accept that Britain and France weren’t going to invade Germany pre 1936 (for regime change), if we accept that Britain and France were not going to go against world public opinion and genuine sympathy for Germany (Versailles revision) and invade Germany in 1937/38 (up to September), then the only time for doing so realistically was instead of Munich. That is the point that – albeit with absolutely no guarantee of the outcome (although only on the Czech side is there any real unknown) – the British and French could have gone to war. They didn’t. They took one last (responsible and reasonable) stab at peace and it failed because Hitler then showed his true colours and….. So was it a failure? Just examine for a few minutes what happened next. Now whatever one may think of any leader, Chamberlain and Daladier no different, they can only do so much. They are not the military men. Just as Stalin (eventually) and Roosevelt realised they needed to leave fighting to the military, just as Hitler didn’t and Churchill sort of did but didn’t, all a leader can (or should) do is give the fighting men the best conditions possible (through all the usual mechanics of government) and then it’s up to them. Well it’s very easy to look at the French/British collapse in France and Belgium 1940 and – because of that military debacle, decide that everything else was rubbish. But that is too simplistic. Look at what happened – what series of military incompetence’s – allowed for that situation and then look at how it should have played out based purely on the numbers, the equipment (and indeed some of the quality). Then look at just how lucky the Germans got in Case Yellow..... Then look at the ability of the Western Allies to out-build the Germans. May be the plan was actually pretty sound. The execution was for **** but that is not the politicians fault. Abject failure? Depends what you’re talking about, whether you want to do an analysis or just grab the quick wins. The colossal balls up that was France 1940 quite naturally colours everything around it. The Allied armies were rubbish so mirroring the politicians blah blah. Well yes, that's a simplistic view but not necessarily the correct one. For purposes of this discussion, and Chamberlain's decision in realtime, we can't color the logic with what happened in France in 1940. For all he knew, the Maginot line would hold and France would present a continental bulwark against the Germans much as it had in 1914-1918. Chamberlain's choice was whether to go to war or to give up the Poles, not the nuanced vagaries of military fighting. He made up his choice without knowing what would come next. But he had to know that a continental war on the scale of WWI was a distinct possibility. And still he chose diplomatic ties to Poland and international support for his political decision over the cost of embroiling his country in another titanic global war. To summarize: If you are going to limit the discussion to Chamberlain's realtime realpolitik data, then you can't include what actually happened post-1939. To suggest that the fall of France in 1940 was presaged by Chamberlain's decision making process is fallacious logic. He 'could have' done a number of things that may have resulted in massively different outcome. We'll never know. All of his choices in realtime would have been fraught with difficulties because he didn't know what he didn't know. Possibly acceptable alternatives (e.g., hanging out the Poles to dry) were not explored more fully, but could have been sufficient to forestall another continental war. But they were heinous and dishonorable choices all. I'm not surprised that he avoided them, but whether it was 'the right thing' to do in hindsight is still a philosophical unknown.
< Message edited by Chickenboy -- 11/16/2019 4:20:54 PM >
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