Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

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ORIGINAL: fcooke

I don't know Zorch - I would take a few more fast BBs in the Pacific in 42.

Everyone is putting the German fleet as the sole reason for the deployment of USN fast BBs with the home fleet in 1942. There are a few other considerations:
- Operation Torch - the invasion of North Africa was planned for November 1942 and the fast BBs were needed to guard the invasion. Massachusetts is the only one I know of actually engaging during the invasion. I think CV Wasp was deployed for this too? Immediately after the Torch landings were deemed secure the USN BBs returned to the US for upgrades and Pacific deployment.

- the sudden expansion of the USN brought in a huge wave of raw recruits, and the veterans had to be scattered around the new ships coming to the USN. So overall crew experience was quite low and the deployment with the home fleet gave a chance to "work up" the crews in an environment of low air threat before they went to the Pacific.

- Pearl Harbour was still cleaning up the mess from December 7th, and may not have been ready to handle very many large vessels. Patching up the carriers alone must have taxed the shipyard a bit. Then there was all those cruisers that got banged up - Chicago, Honolulu, San Francisco, Portland, Minneapolis, Atlanta, etc.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: Orm

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

warspite1

Why is it important whether a strategic victory/defeat is called at the time or later? Are you suggesting that the Kriegsmarine - Raeder in particular - was unaware at the time that strategically the withdrawal from France was a withdrawal that adversely affected the German strategy of subduing the United Kingdom by interdiction of the sealanes?

Do you think that the fact that his ships did not end up at the bottom of the English Channel significantly lessened his disquiet about the turn the war was taking by the action?

Put it this way. The British - the RAF and the RN - would have been deeply embarrassed by Cerberus. But, after the shock, embarrassment and anger had subsided in the coming days, what do you think was their reaction to these ships no longer being based on the west coast of France where they could much more easily slip out into the Atlantic? Relief. This was a strategic defeat for Germany.

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ORIGINAL: Orm

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: Orm

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

warspite1

Why is it important whether a strategic victory/defeat is called at the time or later? Are you suggesting that the Kriegsmarine - Raeder in particular - was unaware at the time that strategically the withdrawal from France was a withdrawal that adversely affected the German strategy of subduing the United Kingdom by interdiction of the sealanes?

Do you think that the fact that his ships did not end up at the bottom of the English Channel significantly lessened his disquiet about the turn the war was taking by the action?

Put it this way. The British - the RAF and the RN - would have been deeply embarrassed by Cerberus. But, after the shock, embarrassment and anger had subsided in the coming days, what do you think was their reaction to these ships no longer being based on the west coast of France where they could much more easily slip out into the Atlantic? Relief. This was a strategic defeat for Germany.

First, I would like to point out that I didn't mention operation Cerberus. But if I am to comment it on the strategic level as you put it, then the British had won as soon as they decided to do the Channel Dash. Great Britain could have done nothing at all during the transfer and it would have been a strategic victory for them. May I suggest a what if here? What if Germany had changed their minds again and sortied out in the Atlantic? Then the Strategic Victory would disappear after the battle had been fought. This is the reason of my dislike of the term.

What if, after the Battle of Gettysburg, the South hade fought another major battle before withdrawing. The South didn't seek it but were forced to fight it anyway. And it was a bloody affair and the South held the field. A minor Southern win if you will. The Southern Army then decided to withdraw with plans to return next year. But were never able to do so. Then the Battle of Gettysburg wouldn't have been a Strategic Victory for the North. It would just have been called a undeceive Major battle. the last offensive battle would be the Strategic win. And this regardless of the battle outcome on the field.

Strategic victory is, in my humble opinion, more or less a meaningless way to describe the outcome of a battle. Or, in other words, one could win a strategic victory without ever firing a shot. Or by having an entire army annihilated.

Sorry for being off the topic.

BTW. Was Crete a Strategic Victory for the Allies?

With

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ORIGINAL: Orm

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: Orm

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

warspite1

Why is it important whether a strategic victory/defeat is called at the time or later? Are you suggesting that the Kriegsmarine - Raeder in particular - was unaware at the time that strategically the withdrawal from France was a withdrawal that adversely affected the German strategy of subduing the United Kingdom by interdiction of the sealanes?

Do you think that the fact that his ships did not end up at the bottom of the English Channel significantly lessened his disquiet about the turn the war was taking by the action?

Put it this way. The British - the RAF and the RN - would have been deeply embarrassed by Cerberus. But, after the shock, embarrassment and anger had subsided in the coming days, what do you think was their reaction to these ships no longer being based on the west coast of France where they could much more easily slip out into the Atlantic? Relief. This was a strategic defeat for Germany.

First, I would like to point out that I didn't mention operation Cerberus. But if I am to comment it on the strategic level as you put it, then the British had won as soon as they decided to do the Channel Dash. Great Britain could have done nothing at all during the transfer and it would have been a strategic victory for them. May I suggest a what if here? What if Germany had changed their minds again and sortied out in the Atlantic? Then the Strategic Victory would disappear after the battle had been fought. This is the reason of my dislike of the term.

What if, after the Battle of Gettysburg, the South hade fought another major battle before withdrawing. The South didn't seek it but were forced to fight it anyway. And it was a bloody affair and the South held the field. A minor Southern win if you will. The Southern Army then decided to withdraw with plans to return next year. But were never able to do so. Then the Battle of Gettysburg wouldn't have been a Strategic Victory for the North. It would just have been called a undeceive Major battle. the last offensive battle would be the Strategic win. And this regardless of the battle outcome on the field.

Strategic victory is, in my humble opinion, more or less a meaningless way to describe the outcome of a battle. Or, in other words, one could win a strategic victory without ever firing a shot. Or by having an entire army annihilated.

Sorry for being off the topic.

BTW. Was Crete a Strategic Victory for the Allies?

With

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

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ORIGINAL: Orm

My thinking in bringing Crete up was that it changed German doctrine in such sense that Germany didn't perform any major paradrop operations after that. And, it seems to me, that if a side changes doctrine after a battle historians seem keen on calling that battle a strategic win.

And who am I to say that it was, or wasn't. Perhaps, if the paras would have been available, then Germany might have used them to help Army Group South out in the Kiev region in 1941 instead of sending panzers from Army Group Centre. Changing the course of Barbarossa one way or the other.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

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ORIGINAL: Orm

I would say that the Channel Dash was a strategic retreat, or withdrawal, by the German side. Does a strategic withdrawal automatically transfer to a strategic win to the opposing side?

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

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ORIGINAL: John 3rd

That video was well done. Any good books on this subject? Would love a recommendation or two!

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

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ORIGINAL: Orm

... Does a strategic withdrawal automatically transfer to a strategic win to the opposing side?

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ORIGINAL: Alfred

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ORIGINAL: Orm

... Does a strategic withdrawal automatically transfer to a strategic win to the opposing side?

Why of course it does. How can you overlook the 1917 German strategic withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line as not constituting a strategic victory to the Entente. In fact just to ensure that the strategic victory was consolidated the Entente had to undertake the tactical defeats of the 1917 Nivelle and Passchendaele offensives. Luckily for the Entente the Germans cooperated with maintaining the strategic Entente victory by achieving their tactical victory in the 1918 Kaiser offensive to ensure that strategic German defeat remained on schedule.

But an even better demonstration is the considerable contribution to the strategic victory of the Entente provided by Italy. Why without those consecutive 11 Bsttles on the Isonso there is no guarantee that strategic victory over the Dual Monarchy would ever have come about. Mind you honourable mentions must be given to firstly Falkenhayen's success in tactically forcing Romania out of the war for that just ensured another strategic defeat on the Dual Monarchy, and secondly the 1916 Bruislov offensive which obviously gave strategic defeats to both the Dual Monarchy and Tsarist Russia.

Get with the program, one only ultimately wins when the opposing side experiences a large tactical victory (think of 1914 Tannenberg) which can only mean it becomes a strategic defeat for themselves and therefore a strategic victory for oneself.

Alfred

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PS forgot to mention. When in doubt as to whether a battle is correctly categorised as being a tactical/strategic victory/defeat, always rely upon the assessment provided by Capt. Blackadder. Now there is a man who truly recognises the true state of affairs.

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ORIGINAL: Alfred

Copyright infringement.  I think Baldrick might claim copyright on that.

Alfred

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ORIGINAL: fcooke

The Big Mamie is worth a visit if you are ever near Fall River. They still have marked out where I think a French 8 inch shell breached the hull. As to the German navy, I think the the fleet in being paid for itself in creating the dispersal of PQ17 and the ultimate carnage that ensued. And the pocket battleships were a very creative design. The B + T not so much. The heavy cruisers seemed to be good work. And the subs were obviously effective. The light cruisers seemed a little ehhh.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: fcooke

The Big Mamie is worth a visit if you are ever near Fall River. They still have marked out where I think a French 8 inch shell breached the hull. As to the German navy, I think the the fleet in being paid for itself in creating the dispersal of PQ17 and the ultimate carnage that ensued. And the pocket battleships were a very creative design. The B + T not so much. The heavy cruisers seemed to be good work. And the subs were obviously effective. The light cruisers seemed a little ehhh.

warspite1

But PQ17 was one convoy. Just one convoy. I don't think PQ17 can be considered an adequate return for all that manpower and resource spent on manning the ships, trying to keep them safe (Luftwaffe as well as Kriegsmarine), repairing the ships and keeping them supplied with fuel.

The pocket battleships may have seemed like a good idea - faster than any stronger ship and stronger than any faster ship - but they weren't. Aside from the fact that this wasn't true (the British BC's saw to that), when the Dunkerques came along the writing was on the wall. Having all their main armament in two turrets wasn't clever either - as shown when confronted with multiple targets.

The heavy cruisers suffered from temperamental engines, although Hipper made one reasonable sortie. I think the Bismarck and Tirpitz were decent enough for what they were (could have done with a dual-purpose secondary armament) and were more powerful than anything the RN had, but their problem was that time had moved on and BB's had had their day. As for the Scharnhorsts, they were simply under-gunned for the size of ship as the 15-inch gun was not at that time available.

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

I think the Bismarck and Tirpitz were decent enough for what they were (could have done with a dual-purpose secondary armament) and were more powerful than anything the RN had, but their problem was that time had moved on and BB's had had their day. As for the Scharnhorsts, they were simply under-gunned for the size of ship as the 15-inch gun was not at that time available.

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ORIGINAL: Shellshock

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

I think the Bismarck and Tirpitz were decent enough for what they were (could have done with a dual-purpose secondary armament) and were more powerful than anything the RN had, but their problem was that time had moved on and BB's had had their day. As for the Scharnhorsts, they were simply under-gunned for the size of ship as the 15-inch gun was not at that time available.

For whats it's worth the Bismarck's design is included among others in Anthony Preston's 2003 book The World's Worst Warships. She had a number of inherent design flaws including but not limited to:

Triple screw propulsion - an undesirable feature of her direct design ancestor, the 1913 Bayern Class battleships;

Twin main gun turrets - three triple turrets would have been about the same weight allowing fewer hull openings while providing an extra tube. the Bismarcks were the only capital ships designed post WW1 where the main battery was exclusively located in twin gun mounts.

The already mentioned single purpose secondary guns - The 15cm twin batteries were exclusively surface weapons whereas all Bismarck's counterparts (except the equally flawed Yamatos) had dual purpose secondary guns and so could dispense with the weight-wasting tertiary 10.5cm twin mounts.

Poor AA gun control and arrangement - the 10.5 cm batteries had separate forward/aft controls rather than port/starboard fire control. Although her only air targets were slow flying Swordfish and a Catalina and despite much shooting, she failed to swat down a single plane. The tired canard that the targets were too slow for the director settings lives on in myth but since the directors were actually dual purpose this excuse seems entirely bogus.

Although Bismarck proved difficult to sink, she proved very easy to disable and she had stopped firing within 20-minutes in her last battle. There is evidence that the design was too rigid and prone to internal shock damage and given her own guns knocked out her forward radar with the opening salvo against Norfolk and Suffolk and the loss of a couple of boilers from one of the non-penetrating torpedo hits from the first air attack this is certainly possible.

In the Battle of the Denmark Strait, the Hood was lost fighting a tactically mismanaged but doctrinally sound sea control battle, whereas Bismarck was ultimately destroyed chasing the fantasy of decisive raider warfare.

Bismarck (and Tirpitz) probably would have served the Germans far better had they been melted down and turned into U-Boats.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

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ORIGINAL: Shellshock

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

I think the Bismarck and Tirpitz were decent enough for what they were (could have done with a dual-purpose secondary armament) and were more powerful than anything the RN had, but their problem was that time had moved on and BB's had had their day. As for the Scharnhorsts, they were simply under-gunned for the size of ship as the 15-inch gun was not at that time available.

For whats it's worth the Bismarck's design is included among others in Anthony Preston's 2003 book The World's Worst Warships. She had a number of inherent design flaws including but not limited to:

Triple screw propulsion - an undesirable feature of her direct design ancestor, the 1913 Bayern Class battleships;

Twin main gun turrets - three triple turrets would have been about the same weight allowing fewer hull openings while providing an extra tube. the Bismarcks were the only capital ships designed post WW1 where the main battery was exclusively located in twin gun mounts.

The already mentioned single purpose secondary guns - The 15cm twin batteries were exclusively surface weapons whereas all Bismarck's counterparts (except the equally flawed Yamatos) had dual purpose secondary guns and so could dispense with the weight-wasting tertiary 10.5cm twin mounts.

Poor AA gun control and arrangement - the 10.5 cm batteries had separate forward/aft controls rather than port/starboard fire control. Although her only air targets were slow flying Swordfish and a Catalina and despite much shooting, she failed to swat down a single plane. The tired canard that the targets were too slow for the director settings lives on in myth but since the directors were actually dual purpose this excuse seems entirely bogus.

Although Bismarck proved difficult to sink, she proved very easy to disable and she had stopped firing within 20-minutes in her last battle. There is evidence that the design was too rigid and prone to internal shock damage and given her own guns knocked out her forward radar with the opening salvo against Norfolk and Suffolk and the loss of a couple of boilers from one of the non-penetrating torpedo hits from the first air attack this is certainly possible.

In the Battle of the Denmark Strait, the Hood was lost fighting a tactically mismanaged but doctrinally sound sea control battle, whereas Bismarck was ultimately destroyed chasing the fantasy of decisive raider warfare.

Bismarck (and Tirpitz) probably would have served the Germans far better had they been melted down and turned into U-Boats.

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ORIGINAL: Shellshock

There's a page at NavWeapons that goes into the pluses and minuses of various screw layouts.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-036.php

Advantages, allows increased power through narrow stern section.

Disadvantages. Inefficient power utilization, high noise and vibration levels. Severe design problems with regard to interaction of power train configuration with other parts of ship.

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ORIGINAL: fcooke
.

And HMS Vanguard was an interesting creature. Were those 15 inch guns left over from what? I think some WW1 project? Anyway a KGV with better guns. The 4/2 set-up did not really work well on the KGVs. And yes, the Hood was incredibly unlucky. But IMO should have have been in that position to start with. Nor the POW. I think she still had contractors on board working things out.

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IIRC the B was basically a somewhat improved Bayern.....a lot of hype about her and her sister. But odd luck aside I think any modern BB would have a good chance of taking her down 1 on 1.

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ORIGINAL: Shellshock

A lot of hype indeed. It's sometimes been my experience that posting anything negative about the Bismarck, the darling battleship of the Internet Forums is likely to result in accusations of trolling and flaming but it's a chance to take. For some, the myth of Bismarck seems to makes her into a super-ship in some sort of Wagnerian drama that came within a hair's breadth of winning the war at sea and changing the course of history. Go figure.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805