DesertWolf101
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Alfred
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ORIGINAL: DesertWolf101
quote:
ORIGINAL: Alfred
Grr, even at this early stage in the planning process I see some fundamental errors being baked into the plan.
Of course there is a possibility of success but it is a high wire exercise where certain usual military assumptions have to be discarded because of the specific "facts on the ground".
Cutting Soviet supply lines is not the war winning strategy. At least no how that term is commonly understood and applied. Why is this the case? The answer lies in the abstracted logistical system in AE. It is almost impossible to completely cut the LOC and fully starve the enemy. In the case of the Soviet Union, with the huge expanse of Siberia, advice to cut the LOC invariably means intersecting the Trans Siberian railway. But the impact of doing so in AE is anemic compared to doing so IRL. The main effect of cutting the Trans Siberian in AE is to impede the rapid transfer of LCUs. The AE effect of doing so in 1942 is quite limited for two fundamental reasons:
(a) Soviet troops are already in situ. There isn't that much in the way of additional LCUs coming into the theatre and capable of deploymengt (which they can't be moved anyway whilst the Soviets remain inactive). The huge Soviet LCU reinforcements come in 1945. There is no emergency Soviet reinforcement package in ther event of an early Soviet activation, and
(b) supply generation is largely concentrated into discrete "industrial" zones which are not dependent on inputs from outside their own zone. These industrial zoners happen to be where the in situ Soviet forces are found.
In short, the only effective way to interdict and destroy the Soviet supply lines is to actually capture these industrial zones. Cutting the Trans Siberian ain't gonna do it.
Consider the Vladivostok Industrial Zone which consists of Vladivostok itself, Suchan and Voroshilov both only 1 hex from Vladivostok and Spassk-Dalny which is 2 hexes from Vladivostok. There is no LOC to be cut here, unlesszx the actual bases are invested and ultimately captured. Yet within the Vladivostok Industrial Zone, there are 380 Resource Centres which is far in excess of what is required as feedstock for the 80 Heavy Industry and 80 Light Industry Centres. Granted the Heavy Industry needs the fuel from Komsomolsk (which in turn needs the oil from Okha) but overland moving to Komsomolsk takes you well away from the Trans Siberian and the Japanese supply depots, plus let us not forget the strong Soviet forces you are leaving behind in your rear. Actually, if the idea is to cut off this LOC, the correct idea is to prosecute it by either a naval blockade of Sakhalin and Kamchatka (where the oil for the mainland refineries is sourced) or better still capturing both Soviet bases on Sakhalin and Petropavlovsk. Are IJN assets best deployed in the Sea of Okhomst or elsewhere countering the USN and the RN. Which brings us back to actual capture of Soviet bases as the only reliable means of cutting the supply lines.
The next most important Industrial Zone is the Lake Bikal line. Here again the quantum of Resource centres found in Ulan-Ude, Petrovsky, Irkutsk, Cherenkhovo, Kansk and Krasnoyarsk is several times more than is needed as feedtock of the local Heavy and Light industries. This Induxstrial Zone is close enough to the off map Soviet Union base that the excess Resources can easily flow to feed the off map Light Industry, and the off map auto daily fuel production will flow to feed the local Heavy Industry. To successful interdict this LOC requires conquest of the Lake Baikal line. Any Japanese player that is doing that well that this becomes a realistic option should probably have already landed on the American West Coast and captured every city west of Salt Lake City. And before you get to the Lake Baikal line, you first have to neutralise the Borzya/Chita line and the useful in situ Soviet forces in the Gobi Desert region (where again there is a great surfeit of Resource Centres.
You also better have all of northern China captured, and garrisoned before you attack the Soviet Union for once the Soviets become active, surplus supply can flow from the USSR to Chinese bases. The Soviet base Alma Ata has a large daily auto supply production. Once activated this supply can flow, along the good tranportation network, to the nearby Chinese bases Wasu and Urumchi. What flows into those Chinese bases can also flow out of them. Urumchi oil and fuel is notoriously difficult to shift to the southern Chinese bases which possess Heavy Industry. However the transportation network to the Soviet industrial zones (via Alma Ata) is far superior than that to the southern Chinese bases.
Timing of the attack is very important. Soviet airframe production is extremely limited until 1945. This, the trickle of modern airframe replacements is the real achillies heel of the Soviets. You need to carefully consider whether you can capture the Komsomolsk aircraft factory before it comes online in May 1942. It's loss is a major blow to Soviet pre 1945 aircraft production. But capturing it, as mentioned previously, is not an easy task.
The bottom line is very simple. You must follow the Colin Powell Doctrine; "go big or don't go at all". Cutting the LCO is not going big, it is fiddling at the edges and consumes valuable time. There is no room for subtlety when it comes to dealing with the Soviet bear. You have to go big and direct, use overwhelming force to capture the key industrial zones where the bulk of the extensive Soviet forces are found anyway. That is a very tough assignment. Forget any idea of capturing a large buffer zone, Soviet tanks move much faster than do Honshu rice growers. Besides you won't have the forces to overwatch all the potential Soviet counter attack axes.
Keeping with the Colin Powell doctrine, my last comment is this. Unless the two Sakhalin bases and the Kamchatka bases are captured within 5-7 of launching the offensive, the Japanese will be with their backs against the wall within 6 months. Japanese homeland industry will need to be protected from Allied strategic bombing. Soviet submarines will present a major threat to Japanese shipping in the Sea of Japan for as long as Soviet ports remain (and they retain access to the oil/fuel from Sakhalin/Kamchatka). Don't overlook the important Soviet navigable river which allows Soviet naval units to be safe from IJN task force port bombardment. The CD guns at Nikolaevsk are much more destructive than the pop guns guarding Manila Bay. As IJA/IJN naval and air assets are redeloyed to the exisxtential threat to the Homeland, what will remain to counter the western Allies. They won't even need to deploy Essex carriers.
Alfred
Thank you for your detailed response Alfred. If you don’t mind, I will lay out my thoughts some more and pose some questions that would benefit from your deep understanding of how the game works. I will start off with some of my larger, perhaps flawed, assumptions with regards to an offensive on the Soviets in the game and I will follow with the rough outline for my initial plan for Operation Siberian Winter. Finally I will posit some questions.
Assumptions:
On the constraints side I have the following:
Taking the key Soviet bases in the Vladivostok region in a direct assault is not possible in a short time frame, and will require very high casualties and heavy expenditures of supply.
Given extensive Soviet coastal defenses, direct amphibious assaults on all the Soviet coastal bases (with the exception of Alexandrovsk and Okha) are extremely difficult affairs that require extensive forces and will result in very high casualties.
On the strengths side I have the following:
Fairly high confidence that I will be able to assemble enough air power (qualitatively and quantitatively) to overwhelm the Soviet Air Force.
High confidence that I will be able to transfer the Japanese forces in China to the north with the exception of those forces needed to meet garrison levels.
Very high confidence that I will completely secure the Chinese bases in the north from Wasu down to Lanchow.
My initial rough plan for Operation Siberian Winter is as follows:
The veteran China Army, bolstered by reinforcements from the Kwantung Army and whatever other ground forces I can spare, will launch an offensive into Mongolia towards the Lake Baikal area. I have some ideas about how to do this with some degree of success, but the key thrust of the opening phase of this offensive will be through Ulan Bator and onwards towards Kyakhtah with overwhelming force. Secondary thrusts will go from Hailar towards Borzya and Chita. More on this in due time, but this is planned to be the main effort.
The Moho base will be built up before the offensive and Mogocha and Skovoridino will be seized by blocking detachments, thereby separating the Soviet Far East Command from the Trans Baikal Front.
The Kwantung army will adopt a primarily defensive role against the Soviet Far East Command until the moment of decision occurs in the Trans Baikal Zone. Limited offensives will occur in this area to further isolate the Vladivostok region. More on this later.
Japanese forces, with the assistance of an amphibious invasion against Okha, will attempt to take Soviet held Sakhalin.
The intent here is to initially push forward against non-built up bases and in favorable terrain wherever possible. Anticipating Japanese air superiority, the attempt is to draw Soviet forces into clear or at most rough terrain where my bombers can better assist. It may be ambitious, but I intend to push forward towards the source of Soviet supply (i.e. Krasnovarsk), as much as is possible with the main thrust. The main offensive will isolate as many USSR forces as possible, much as I have done thus far in Chian to great success. Once June 1943 arrives, I can then bomb Soviet industry (per our HRs) in the Vladivostok area which will deprive the Far Eastern Command from local supply, hopefully allowing for future offensives against Vladivostok once they are sufficiently weakened.
Some clarification questions that were triggered by your comments Alfred:
My assumption was that Non-Soviet air forces could not be based out of USSR airfields. If that is a flawed assumption, then I do fear this may be a disaster. Last thing I need is USAAF heavy bombers hitting the home islands from Petropavlovsk. Or Allied fighter squadrons coming to deny me air superiority later on. I think this is the key variable for me now in how much of a disaster this will turn out to be.
Assuming Mogocha and Skovoridino are seized and held. Can supply from the Trans Baikal front make it to the Vladivostok region? I know Vladivostok and its surroundings have local supply generation, but it seems to me that the 80 light industry and 80 heavy industry is fairly low for the armies in situ and I intend to bomb that industry come June 1943.
Assuming I fail to take Okha, do you think there is a feasible way for my opponent to get enough supply to Sakhalin and Petropavlosk to rebuild the oil wells there and then transfer it back to the mainland given Japanese air superiority?
They are reasonable assumption but ....
1. An important point in my previous commentary was that no bar on strategic bombing existed. You now mention you can't strategic bomb the Soviets before June 1943. If a similar bar applies to the Soviets bombing Japanese home island industry, then a very big concern has been removed. But not entirely removed as I will address below.
2. You are correct that western Allied forces can't operate out of Soviet bases. But (you knew there would be a but didn't you), there are two ways the Allies can get around this game mechanism. Firstly, the rule doesn't apply to non native USSR bases. The soviets can capture a Japanese base in Korea or Manchuria and flip it over to western Allied control. Voila, the 14th USAAF can operate out of say Heiho instead of the inferior Chinese bases. Does it appeal having Liberators operating from Korea? Secondly, the western Allies can "gift" certains assets. Prominent to mind are all those under utilised Liberty ships. Send them to Soviet ports, naturalise them as Soviet ships, and presto any concerns about native Soviet sealift capability disappears.
3. Your assumption that you will achieve Japanese air superiority is, as Sir Humphrey would term it, courageous. The Soviets start off with:
1048 Fighters
64 Heavy Bombers
676 Medium Bombers
64 Recon
242 Patrol aircraft
By the end of May 1942 an additional 5 Sturmovik and 1 recon unit arrive in theatre. The Soviet air unit build up in the theatre then steadily ramps up.
Even with the anaemic aircraft production before Dec 1944, that is still a substantial Soviet airforce to defeat, made more difficult by the following facts:
(a) Soviet air units are usually much bigger than Western Allied air units. None of these 12 plane fighter squadrons, instead you are up against mostly 32 plane fighter units. No longer will Japanese air be facing a very limited number of 12 plane Chinese fighter squadrons. Size does matter in AE and the usual Japanese size advantage doesn't exist against the Soviets.
(b) look carefully at the MiG-3 stats. Sure, no Soviet fighter unit starts off equipped with them on 7 December 1941, and their production run is only from 12/41 till 12/42 at a monthly rate of 16. But look at that speed, that climbing rate, that Service Rating, that range, that durability rating. Even the maneuver ratings are good when you take into account the speed. Try finding in January 1942 a western fighter as good. Do you think Japanese Nates, Oscars, even Zeros, are going to easily get on top of this greyhound.
(c) have you looked at Soviet flak? The dedicated anti-aircraft units are very powerful. Even the internal flak found within Soviet divisions is not shabby. Those Japanese bombers accustomed to no meaningful Chinese flak when bombing Chinese LCUs are going to suffer substantial degradation to their bombing results plus suffer substantially higher operational losses. Is Japanese industry up to the task of meeting the increased aircraft losses?
(d) Siberia is a huge expanse. Considering your intended axis of advance, you are not going to have much in the way of airfields to house your airforce intended to provide air cover to the advancing Japanese LCUs. Whereas look at the already significant soviet airfields on the direct path or flank of your main and secondary thrust.
Bottom line re air superiority, the only thing you definitely will have in your favour is the initial pilot quality. However your opponent knows in advance that the USSR will be invaded early so he would be a fool to not focus on pilot training and forts before then. By the time the invasion is launched that pilot qualitative edge may not be as pronounced as you believe it will be. The best fighter involved in combat will be Soviet and even though its numbers will be limited the other Soviet fighters remain competitive against Nates and early Oscars. Nor are Soviet LCUs sitting ducks if caught in the open by Japanese bombers. Their flak will provide serious protection and exact a heavy toll. Meanwhile, marching Japanese LCU will remain very vulnerable if they are caught in the open. The Soviet medium bombers DB-3M and SB-2 carry 10 and 6 100 kg bombs respectively at normal range. That is arguably a more useful bombload against Japanese LCUs caught in the open than the Mitchell's bombload.
Yes Japanese air superiority is possible, but the cost will not be cheap. Meanwhile how will the rest of the Japanese air be faring against the Western Allies, will their supply expenditure need to be curtailed? Will they still have access to adequate airframe replacements?
4. There are several Soviet bases within range of important Japanese industrial centres. Even if strategic bombing of the Home Islands is prohibited until June 1943, there will be nothing preventing all other air missions. Port bombing will not be covered by any strategic bombing ban but it can have a strategic consequence. Damaging the port will reduce the speed of unloading/loading cargos. It can reduce the special adjacent port "ferry" capacity. It can of course make repairing ships a very dangerous operation. It can also destroy fuel stocks, not to forget the common garden supply stocks. Of course any flak answering Soviet port strikes will increase Japanese supply consumption.
Then there are airfield attacks to factor in too. Destroyed on the ground Japanese aircraft. Their replacements cost supply. Pilot training programs can be interrupted by Soviet sweeps. I doubt very much you will be conducting pilot training on frontline models; how well do you think a rookie flying an obsolete fighter will fare against an experienced Soviet pilot flying a Mig-3 on a sweep? Of course if you decide to remove air units from these vulnerable airfields, how long do you think before an American Carrier Task Force decides to pay a visit to the area. Plus without strong Japanese airpower in the Home Islands, how long before the Sea of Japan is renamed the Sea of Russia with Japanese convoys having to pay a toll to traverse the Sea of Russia in order to pick up the goodies deposited on the Asian wharves by the magical highway. Again strategic factors come into play indirectly.
5. Let's turn our attention to Soviet sea lift. It won't be a lack of Soviet sea lift capacity that will prevent shipping supply to Sakhalin. On D-day +1, the Soviet navy materializes out of the fog in these numbers.
12 DD
21 xAK - with cargo capacity ranging between 2000 and 5500
14 xAKL - all with a 1750 cargo capacity
8 TK - all have a 1725 liquid capacity
46 SS - (yes with working torpedoes, practically all positioned in the newly renamed Sea of Russia)
7 AM
Substantial numbers of LST and LCM start arriving in mid 1943. Some additional combat ships, including 2 CA arrive later, but depending on when D-day actually is might form part of the materializing navy. In any case, if this sea lift is inadequate, the west can gift to make up the shortfall.
6. You intend to build up the Moho base prior to invading. In the words of Sherlock Holmes, any competent Allied player, will be able to see the game is afoot particularly as the Allied player already forewarned that the USSR will be invaded. I don't think you are going to get much in the way of strategic surprise.
More significantly will be the build up for the main advance towards Ulan Bator. The most direct (and quickest) route to Ulan Bator is from Mangan. It is 9 hexes from the border to Ulan Bator, 10 hexes from Mangan. That means a minimum traverse of 414 miles (from the border). Assuming no land combat en route, no marching slow down caused by Soviet bombers operating from much closer airfields than the Japanese airforce, a march all in the clear, it will take a minimum of 14 days to reach Ulan Bator. It will take the Soviets much less time to move substantial forces to Ulan Bator, after all once you set out on the Gobi desert, there aren't that many alternative targets to march to. How certain are you that the substantial Soviet forces located at Ondoorhaan (plus Choybalson) re going to meekly remain in barracks and not hit you in the flank (same applies to the secondary thrust against Borzya/Chita) or decide to lengthen your own supply lines by capturing Mangan/other Japanese border bases. I certainly wouldn't be relying on Japanese air superiority in this area.
Don't assume the Borzay/Chita thrust will be quicker just because the distance to travel is less. Directly in front of Borzay are Soviet Fortress units which are already at level 3 fortification on 7 December 1941. What fortification level will they have by the time you attack? At least you know it won't be above level 6.
7. From the Soviet POV, the beauty of Alma ATA is that it is an off map base. It cannot be touched in any way by Japan. Yet it isn't too far from Wasu and Urumchi. The entire Alma Ata garrison can be moved out on D-day +1 and quickly march to Wasu. Are you planning on leaving an entire IJA division behind to defend Wasu.. Based on your own timing, how big do you think the soviet build up of forces in northern China will be. Enough to overpower the defenders whilst still retaining adequate forces in Siberia? Soviet artillery is going to make mincemeat of your defending infantry and not far behind the artillery will be tanks. Just imagine the havoc which Soviet tank armies finally can be equipped with the T-34. They'll be having fun long before hand, aided by the Sturmoviks.
8. Cutting the Trans Siberian at Mogocha and Skovoridino still leaves most of the railway open for strategic redeployment of Soviet LCUs if the Allied player decides to go down that path. It would not take long before a Soviet force was assembled to recapture those two bases. Probably in less time than it will take you to reach Ulan Bator. Whilst that force is being assembled, the Soviets can cross the Amur at several points which are weakly held by Japan. In any case, by the time you invade, Vladivostok will probably be swimming in supply, easily able to absorb the impact of the temporary cutting of the Trans Siberian.
Of course one can adjust one's plans to take the above into account but it isn't an easy task. It s a long way, to Tipperary, sorry, Krasnoyarsk for Japanese troops. Remember their logistical difficulties in 1919-20. I think you will find AE does a good job in being faithful to the conditions. This time the Japanese won't have the benefit of the Czech Legion coming the other way and Admiral Kolchak being focused on looking towards Moscow rather than Vladivostok.
Alfred
Thanks Alfred. You are confirming a lot of my key concerns and adding some food for thought on some other salient points. I will direct the Imperial Japanese Staff to start planning the operational details of Operation Siberian Winter (maybe more apt to call it Operation Bear Eats Wolf  ).
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