Ian R
Posts: 3420
Joined: 8/1/2000
From: Cammeraygal Country
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Platoonist
quote:
ORIGINAL: RangerJoe
But the Luftwaffe really got shot up later in the US bombing campaign. Some of the problems with the daylight raids was the lack of coordination which resulted in a strung out bomber formation.
It took some time to accept the dictum laid down decades earlier by Mitchell, that air superiority was an essential condition for a strategic bombing campaign. Doolittle seems to have been one of the earliest of American bomber commanders to accept this fact.
So, what really cinched the bombing victory was the P-51. Once long-range fighters began escorting American bombers, casualties soared among the defending German fighter pilots. Even Goering admitted it was over. The Mustang was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Luftwaffe in the West and the success of the Anglo-American invasion of France. When the Allies could finally focus their strategic bombing on synthetic fuel plants and other petroleum facilities, early in 1945, the Germans quickly ran out of fuel. This was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Wehrmacht. However, the Russian capture of the oilfields in Romania and Hungary probably didn't hurt either.
My understanding (most recently reinforced by Richard Overy) is that Dolittle, from late 1943, decoupled the escorts from closely escorting the bombers. In effect, the bombers were used as bait, with the fighter groups sweeping ahead of them, and permitted to chase down the Luftwaffe interceptors rather than stick with the bombers. The new doctrine included shooting up the interceptors on their own airfields on the way home. This campaign kicked into high gear in about February 1944 as more P51s became available and the weather opened up a little. By about late April the USAAF had achieved air supremacy (in daylight) over Western Europe.
On another question raised in this topic - Overy in Why the Allies Won argues persuasively that the allies did not conduct a "clean war", not after 1942 anyway (and up to then in the limited western European theatre). In order to defeat their immoral enemies, they adopted their trait of casual immorality - with the only difference being in degree. The Soviets had no qualms about it. General Lemay once observed that if the US had lost the war, he would likely have been tried as a war criminal and executed.
I don't agree with revisionist hand-wringing now, as to whether different decisions ought have been made 76-7 years ago. The decisions made at the time were made in the conditions of the time - where defeating the criminal axis regimes that were busy slaughtering eastern European, Soviet, and Chinese citizens by the multi-millions was urgent, & necessary, by whatever means were available (although they didn't, as they might have, use chemical weapons).
Interesting debate:
Intelligence squared debate on city bombing in WW2
< Message edited by Ian R -- 8/17/2020 4:21:58 AM >
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