mind_messing
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Joined: 10/28/2013
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Okay thanks, but I’m still not getting the ‘flawed’ understanding reference.
Well, read on and see.
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Re post #10, there is simply no underestimation whatsoever. I fail to see how it could be argued that the Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a surprise to the Western Allies. It caught the German (and their would-be allies) and Soviet populations by surprise (and disgust), so it’s hard to see how such a pact would not be surprising to Daladier and Chamberlain (or their would be allies). I don’t follow where you think post #10 even refers to this, let alone underestimates this.
I don't follow you here at all. You contradict yourself by saying that you cannot see how an argument could be made for the M-L catching the Western Allies by surprise, then say that it's hard to see how the pact would not surprise Daladier/Chamberlain.
Clarification would be helpful.
More widely wrt post #10, the point on the strategic surprise of the M-L pact partly (but not completely) explains the strategic listlessness of Britain and France. Put it more simply, what worked in the last war was now no longer an option and the landscape geopolitically had changed to be quite different from 1914.
You can ascribe this strategic inertia to Hitler "being lucky" if you wish. He certainly rolled a few double-sixes. However in terms of academic study, you'll find that there's generally a more rational approach to looking at the matter.
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Equally I’ve no idea where you think I’ve suggested that the actions of the British and French, as regards Poland, were either within, or indeed without, the spirit of the guarantee to Poland or, for that matter, what that specifically has to do with my post.
You've not mentioned it, which seems a glaring omission. It certainly seems relevant to the original topic (Western Allied attacks on the Soviet Union), given the agreements between Poland with France and Britain.
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You seem to have created a ‘debating point’ for no apparent reason.
No, I have my reasons - mainly as I felt the discussion was going down the line of "History Channel diplomacy" (and not from the "good" days).
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For the avoidance of doubt, the NS Pact shocked and surprised the world and so was therefore a shock and surprise to Britain and France. The Poles believed that the British and French would attack in the west. There are reasons why this never happened, but the Poles were right to feel they were left in the lurch.
That clarifies things. Related to my point above wrt treaties, the absence of a British and French reaction to the Soviet invasion of Poland certainly fuelled those notions.
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Re post #14, I am not sure what you expected to come from talks of an alliance with the Soviet Union. Sure, you can ignore Poland if it helps your argument, but that doesn’t make it right. Neither side – British/French and the Soviet Union - trusted the other or ideally wanted each other as allies – in fact they hated each other. It was exactly the same with Germany and the Soviet Union. But there was of course some vital differences in the two situations that meant a deal between the dictators could be done, but not with the Western Allies.
This section highlights what I was referring to by a flawed understanding.
At this level of diplomacy, emotions are kept to the side. Ideology, likes, dislikes, political inclination, all of this is subordinated to diplomatic pragmatism.
In this arena, the British and French simply had less to offer the Soviets.
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Re #25, I have not ignored Munich at all. Your comment suggests I think Stalin wrong to have signed the pact. Looking at the pact from a Soviet perspective I think nothing of the sort. Stalin was, quite rightly, looking out for Stalin and the Soviet Union. It’s what all leaders do; they seek first and foremost to protect their own. My post does not seek to ignore Munich. Munich had happened, the British and French were tooling around, and Stalin was offered a deal. Why did he take the deal? Well I set that out in Post #25.
Glad to see that the above chimes with my comments regarding pragmatism.
There's more than one view of Soviet foreign policy for this timeframe. On the one hand, the trajectory of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland has a distinct eastward trajectory - effectively putting German ambitions on the Soviet doorstep. An alternative view is that it was all a ploy to embroil the western powers in a war.
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Yes but how is that relevant to anything? Adolf Hitler didn’t come to power until 1933 and if the USSR was a political football to the west, then what on earth do you imagine it was to Nazi Germany? The inter-war years were a fast moving feast. The length of time two countries had had diplomatic relations meant absolutely nothing; if there was a deal to be done and both sides thought it expedient to do so, it got done.
I would have thought that would have been obvious.
If you've only established formal diplomatic relation less than ten years previously, there's only so much progress you can make in terms of thawing the relationship. Granted, the earlier commercial agreements would have helped.
There's also significant benefits associated with having established, long-standing diplomatic relations with countries in terms of efficient communication, understanding who the important players are and their motivations, and a whole host of other benefits.
While you're correct in that pragmatism rules the roost when it comes to getting deals done, there needs to be sufficient understanding to be able to identify the potential for a deal - before any deal can be agreed, common ground needs to be identified and that's where long-standing relations can contribute best.
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I don’t see there is anything I’ve said that has suggested otherwise.
That's correct - because I didn't make that comment with you in mind. Not always about you, warspite 
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Sorry but I still don’t understand the relevance of this comment. Comfortable allies for who? Germany? Well the NS had been signed and so the moves mentioned were as expected in the secret protocols (it was Stalin’s moves further south that really unnerved Hitler - in Besserabia - I don’t think he read what he signed off on…. attention to detail Adolf! and Northern Bukovina – cheeky Josef, who agreed that?!). The Soviet Union were never likely to be ‘comfortable allies’ to Germany (and so it proved during that almost 2-year period). Britain and France? Well they weren’t allies were they – and as we know, they weren’t going to be until the Soviet Union were at war with Germany? And once they were allies? No, Stalin continued to be an uncomfortable bedfellow….
I was referring to the "Great Game" in the context of the tensions between Great Britain and the then Russian Empire in Central and South Asia, but I made the comment thinking more generally around the 1924 elections and the challenging post-war political and social landscape in the UK.
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RE: OT: WW2 Documentary - 
At that point Germany looked unbeatable. 
.... 
Exactly my point. You've given perfect examples of what you call listnessess and I call something else - and what do you notice? They are all before the signing of the NS Pact - but your argument is that the signing of the pact caused Anglo-French 'listlessness'. 
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