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RE: Port Moresby - 4/15/2004 12:37:15 AM

neuromancer

Posts: 627
Joined: 5/30/2002
From: Canada
Status: offline

On the weekend while talking with my brother the basic fundamental flaw with all these games was pointed out. And that flaw is simply that we know the actual state of affairs, either because we know the historical situation, or anyone can look at the scenario.

Historically the real 'players' did not have that luxury.

The Japanese didn't know they actually had dominance in the Coral Sea theatre. The Americans didn't really know what the Japanese had.

In the Battle of Britain, the British basically bluffed out the Germans. They made sure that any time the Germans showed up, the entire Fighter Command was there to meet them. The reason they could do this was a variety of factors, not the least of which was the Luftwaffe Enigma had very poor security, and rarely altered it (the Kreigsmarine Enigma - basically the sub fleet - on the other hand was a code with excellent operational security and they altered and improved the code as they went, which is why it was so important to catch U-Boats with their code books intact).

Goering and his staff never figured out what the Brits were up to, so always concluded that the Brits had a huge fighter fleet that was going to be impossible to beat. They never realised that the Spitfires they saw intercepting their bomber wings were always the same Spitfires.

But in these games the German player would know that they have dominance, and so would fight an attrition battle to destroy those fighters. They also wouldn't be faked out by a bombing run against the German cities (some speculate that Hitler changed from attacking the RAF airfields as much from a belief that it was futile, as from a desire for revenge for the bombing).

The Doolittle Raid (the irony of that name never ceases to amaze me) is something that would never work in a game, because we know the logistics of it the game, and know it is something that would be very difficult to pull off more than once. The planes were basically on a one way trip, required two fleet carriers to really stick their necks out where they could get them cut off with ease, and had almost zero actual impact.
But the Japanese didn't know that. The psychological effect of an attack on Tokyo was very significant, and they diverted resources to preventing it from ever happening again, even though - in retrospect - it is seriously doubtful a second attempt would have been made.

In these games as the Japanese player you know EXACTLY what the Allied player has available to him at the start. You even know where it starts! With that knowledge you can calculate exactly what you can get away with, and how long you can get away with it.

As the Allied player you know that the 'Death Star' will show up before you have your carriers in strength, you know the superiority of the Japanese air power. And you know that what you really need to do is simply delay until you inevitably have overwhelming force. As long as you can hold out until then, all is good. So the allies don't do Watchtower, don't do the Battle of Coral Sea, don't do anything except 'turtle' until 1943.

And then the Japanese player is likely to just quit because he knows that he is now going to be beat up, and there is nothing he can do to prevent it.

Heck, it could be argued the game should end on Jan. 1, '43 - period. If the IJN has Noumea and Brisbane, they win, if they don't, they lose.

The games between experienced players sound more like Chess in that regard. Once you've done X number of turns they can say "oh, you'll win in X turns", and quit. Sounds dull.

At least us n00bs - who while we know the theory, don't know how to execute it - will do silly things that can throw the theory in the garbage (like lose 3/4 of their starting naval combat strength inside the first 3 weeks of the game

).

I really don't know how this can be corrected in games, but it is kind of a frustrating element when dealing with historical games.

I suppose its the only thing that gives the Axis a chance in these games. They know they have almost total dominance early in the game, and they had better exploit it for all its worth while they can.

But to me it takes a lot of the real strategy out of the game. Sure we have Fog of War, but it is only FoW of detail - where things are exactly - but we have far more general information than we have any right to.

< Message edited by neuromancer -- 4/14/2004 5:34:58 PM >

(in reply to madflava13)

Post #: 31

RE: Port Moresby - 4/15/2004 1:05:39 AM

pasternakski

Posts: 6565
Joined: 6/29/2002
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This post reveals an absolute lack of understanding of historical simulation games.

Historical hindsight has only as much applicability as the initial game situation allows you. From the first command on, you are moving into unexplored territory. That is why they are called "simulations," not "recreations."

The fact that you start with a given historical and military situation is not a "flaw." The major combatants in World War II had a pretty good idea of where they stood, and a good simulation game presents the players with that same degree of knowledge, with design elements that create as much uncertainty as the historical situation contained (one of the techniques for this is called "fog of war." There are many others used by designers).

For example, WitP, like so many Pacific war simulations before it, will present not only a rational depiction of the Pearl Harbor situation, but also a means of creating alternative history by the Japanese player declining to make this attack.

What you need to bring to the wargaming table (or computer, for that matter) is an interest in playing the game within the context presented. Games that are enjoyable to me are the ones that are designed to put you into a situation where you are presented with historical conditions, then proceed to demonstrate your genius (or incompetence) by commanding the elements provided for you to accomplish your game-established objectives.

_____________________________

Put my faith in the people
And the people let me down.
So, I turned the other way,
And I carry on anyhow.

(in reply to neuromancer)

Post #: 32

RE: Port Moresby - 4/15/2004 1:15:22 AM

bilbow

Posts: 741
Joined: 8/22/2002
From: Concord NH
Status: offline

Neuromancer, I have to agree that as gamers we have too information, and that is probably unavoidable at least if the game is to be fairly balanced. The scenario designer could perhaps introduce random elements to a side's OOB so it is not really known, but how would that affect balance? If for instance the IJN got in a random way 2 additional CVs, if would perhaps simulate better the unknown nature of what our historical counterparts faced. But it would not be a balanced game, which is what UV is after all, a game. Many simulation elements to be sure, but fundamentally a game.

I disagree that verteran players have games that are boring. My PBEM games 2 years after release are if anything more exiting than they were at the beginning. What is different in veteran games is we have a much better idea of how to implement our strategy, and do it without screwing it up. Strategies will vary in veteran games more so than in noob games because we have mastered the system and can with confidence consider new approaches. A noob will be wrestling the system more than he will considering strategies. We make the system work for us, not against us. UV is one of those rare games that no matter how much you have played it there's still something more to explore.

This doesn't hve anything to do with Axis or Allies. The style of play is different, but winning as either side is equally possible. Some people say The IJN can't win on points in 17- well I have. That's why balance is important, and understanding each sides strengths and weaknesses.

_____________________________

An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile- hoping it will eat him last
- Winston Churchill

(in reply to neuromancer)

Post #: 33

RE: Port Moresby - 4/15/2004 2:00:19 AM

neuromancer

Posts: 627
Joined: 5/30/2002
From: Canada
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: pasternakski
This post reveals an absolute lack of understanding of historical simulation games.

Gee, thanks a bunch.
Love you too.

Don't stick your nose up so high, you'll walk into things.

Incidentally, I have played quite a few historical games, although I would never claim to be a Grognard. The basic difference is that I am willing to forgive historical inaccuracies for the sake of playability or game limitations, I find that your average Grognard will go balistic over the slightest historical inaccuracy.

And also while I am saying that this is a problem in these games - for the reasons I've already stated - I'm not saying these games suck for it. But if you ever find a patently 'unhistoric' result in a game, and if you cannot point to either a piece of brilliant (or amaxingly stupid) strategy, or rotten/ amazing luck, the odds are you'll find that it was because of the game itself, and the knowledge we have because of it.

quote:

Historical hindsight has only as much applicability as the initial game situation allows you.

Yes, this is true. I will grant you that for hindsight. But I also said that knowledge of the scenario is a big issue - probably a bigger one than hindsight.
That was poor wording on my part.

When you know that the Allies will get Enterprise and Hornet in mid to late June, Saratoga a few weeks later, Wasp a few weeks after that, and then no more carriers of note until late in '42, and meanwhile the Death Star will be in place in June, this means that both players are using information far beyond what they should have access to. You know when army units can be expected - and thus that in the first three months the IJN has extreme dominance. You know when LBA units can be expected. Heck, you even know when the plane upgrades can come in.

quote:

From the first command on, you are moving into unexplored territory.

Only partially true. I would say that 75+% of the strategies I have seen for the IJN and Allies are all based on the knowledge of 'hidden' information. Basically centered around knowledge of reinforcements.

quote:

That is why they are called "simulations," not "recreations."

Disagree. This is why they are called 'games'. You could call them 'simulations', but with the caveat of 'loosely based'.

quote:

The major combatants in World War II had a pretty good idea of where they stood, and a good simulation game presents the players with that same degree of knowledge, with design elements that create as much uncertainty as the historical situation contained (one of the techniques for this is called "fog of war." There are many others used by designers).

No, that one you won't convince me of.
For starters, I don't think the combatants had as good an idea of where 'they stood', as you imply. Your spies might be able to tell you when a ship is in harbour, but once it left, they were gone, particularly if they didn't want to be found.

The CV group that attcked Pearl did that. They went silent, and suddenly no one had any clue where they were. It was argued that this should have been a warning that something was up, but it didn't necessarily mean a darn thing.

But in UV if you lose an enemy CV group, you know it is still there. And it is probably going to attack somewhere. Where is unclear of course, but it isn't going to leave.

Historically they didn't have that knowledge. If high command had suddenly come up with an idea that they wanted one or more of those carriers for - after all there was the possibility of diverting the carriers from the Coral Sea for Midway - then those would have left. And as apparently the IJN ships don't get upgrades of note, thereis no real point in even sending them home for upgrades.

UV has what I would call 'tactical FoW', once in theatre you don't know where things are. But you have very good knowledge strategically.

A game like UV is actually much worse for a lack of strategic FoW than something with a much broader scope. In something like WitP, because of covering the entire Pacific, knowing that the New Jersey becomes available in '44, isn't really that helpful. The IJN player could divert a carrier from the Coral Sea region for a Midway like attack, and the Allied player would know that the CV is only in the Pacific.

Not much help.

quote:

For example, WitP, like so many Pacific war simulations before it, will present not only a rational depiction of the Pearl Harbor situation, but also a means of creating alternative history by the Japanese player declining to make this attack.

Yes... unless of couse you start the game with an Allied turn. In which case you would get all your ships out of Pearl.

Yes, a stupid way to set up the scenario, but its been done.

quote:

What you need to bring to the wargaming table (or computer, for that matter) is an interest in playing the game within the context presented.

I think you're asking a lot of the average gamer.

That isn't so much wargaming as Role Playing. Its tough enough to keep your knowledge as a player seperate from what your character knows when playing something like an RPG, but doing it as a wargame is something else.

In UV, as the IJN you know that automatic victory comes by having X supplies at base Y by date Z. As long as you do that, you can lose your entire fleet and still win the game. So that is what most gamers will try to do. They will try to win the game.

Understandable really.

But really, if you lost everything in the process of 'winning', in reality ou would lose.

I've seen that quite a bit - and done it. You can meet the scenario conditions and win the game, but you know that if the battle hadn't magically ended at that point, your opponent would have proceeded to hand you your butt on a platter over the next turn or two.

I think my point is that these are all things that inherent limiations in games. They aren't bad per se, it just means that we shouldn't pat ourseles too hard on the back for our strategic brilliance. It means we can win the game, but I wouldn't suggest any of us run off to Washington to offer their strategic brilliance to the Pentagon.

(in reply to pasternakski)

Post #: 34

RE: Port Moresby - 4/15/2004 2:25:33 AM

neuromancer

Posts: 627
Joined: 5/30/2002
From: Canada
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: bilbow
Neuromancer, I have to agree that as gamers we have too information, and that is probably unavoidable at least if the game is to be fairly balanced.

True enough.

quote:

The scenario designer could perhaps introduce random elements to a side's OOB so it is not really known, but how would that affect balance?

I think you would have to have large and fairly complex random OOBs that balance out. For example, if the IJN got an extra CV or two at some point, then there would be a table of things that could also show up around the same period for the Allies, but neither side would necessarily know that the CV would show up, and thus that the other units would show up for the Allies. And if the IJN got his CV, he would be thinking "I got that, but what did the Allies get in exchange?"

Of course that would be a real bear to set up and balance. And yes the IJN would know that the Allies got something, but as said, its a game.

Totalier Krieg has an interesting way of handling this. The game does not have production rules in the conventional sense. Instead you have a deck of cards, and you select a card to play for every production turn. Some cards require other events or cards first, others will cause one or two other cards to be removed from play (you gain this, you lose that). You know the Germans have a few 'big cards', and they'll probably aim for the summer turns to play them for maximum benefit, but the order, and which alternates, are another matter. I've even seen 'summer' cards played in the winter, which can really throw off the whole shootin' match.

The Russians are the same way, and in fact more so. They could play their big cards in the winter, when the Germans are weakest, or perhaps go for the summer instead, and face the Germans head on. A risky tactic, but it could work.

quote:

Many simulation elements to be sure, but fundamentally a game.

Exactly.
I'm not actually a fan of true simulations. And most 'simulationists' I've dealt with are a pain in the butt.

In fact, a proper simulation would probably not be balanced. For example, a proper simulation of the battle of the Alamo would usually result in Texas losing. So would you really want to play it knowing you are going to lose? Of course a good simulation would have different victory conditions - you'll lose the battle, but you can still in the scenario (hold out for X days, kill Y Spanish, whatever).

Actually, I saw a recent show that claimed that the Alamo was not as cut and dried as that, this historian felt that the Alamo could have been held. I'm not sure I agreed, but I suppose the defense could have been better.
But that is neither here nor there.

quote:

I disagree that verteran players have games that are boring.

Fair enough.
Its just that I've just been reading this discussion and the Allied tactics being described did sound dull. Turtle, don't do Coral Sea, don't do Watchtower, don't come out until October, etc. It all sounds rather 'gamey', and quite frankly, dull.

That is why I was saying noobs would have more fun. We will try the weird things, they probably won't work, but we'll have fun. But hey, if the game is still fun after 2 years, more power to you.

(in reply to bilbow)

Post #: 35

RE: Port Moresby - 4/15/2004 12:06:55 PM

LordHawke

Posts: 80
Joined: 2/12/2004
From: Singapore
Status: offline

Whoa big war happening here...

Jumping in with my 2cts

The 'real players' in history actually had quite a fair bit of info to munch on. The strengths of both US and Japanese fleets were well known to both sides and they had been keeping an eye on each other for the past 20 years. Fleet strength was the object of a naval arms race between the US, Britain and Japan (with France & Italy as minor players), and the subject of debate at the London and Washington Treaty talks in the 30's. The Japanese and Americans both exchanged Naval attaches for years leading up to the war, and pre-war planning was predicated on what they believed were the strengths and weaknesses of either side.

An operational example of this would be Midway. When Yamamoto was planning Midway, he knew he could expect Enterprise and Hornet, maybe Saratoga (but not Yorktown). The fatal flaw was of course, expecting that they would appear only AFTER he struck, a difference of a few days. Similarly, Nimitz knew he was up against the "Death Star". But still he gambled his last remaining CVs, and by the grace of God, he won. If the Japanese were playing counter-intelligence games with him, Point Luck would have been really ironic (and I would not be writing this today).

Of course, there were some things that only came to light later on, which we now take for granted in any game covering the Pacific War. The Americans assumed the Japanese were poor pilots, had lousy planes, and equipment. Pearl Harbor, the Zero and the Long Lance blew those myths away. Similarly, the Japanese expected the Americans to fold after a few sharp defeats. They also held the Marines in contempt. We know better, don't we?

Ok so knowing when a/c upgrades and ships arrive is ahistorical. The truth is, we can NEVER simulate the exact conditions under which our historical alter-egos fought. Wargamers in the US Naval Staff College have tried for years to simulate Midway, but the Japs would always win! The reasons should be obvious. Nagumo operated under assumptions which we would never have (though we may encounter similar situations, see my case below). The Japanese were essentially blind to the fact that they could never beat the US, just as it took time for the Allies to understand their true strengths and use them well. We have 20/20 hindsight, so perfect historicity is an illusion, though we can come close to experiencing the command dilemnas and operational tensions faced by the two sides. And that's why I love playing wargames.

From UV's point of view, I'm with bilbow. There are still many unpredictable things. It's not all cut-and-dried. Let's examine a few myths.

1. The Allies should Turtle till 10/42 then attack. A passive defense strategy is open to attack by an aggressive player. With good planning and intelligence, the IJN player can aim his schwerpunkt at a weak point of his choosing and crack the defenses. The defender's state of mind, focussed on trying to defend everything, in effect, defends nothing. Watchtower marked a definite change in Allied attitude from defense to offense. It forced the Japanese to attempt to retake it, sucked up all their naval and ground resources, and resulted in a humiliating retreat. IMO, the Allied player should always be on the lookout for a similar opening in UV. In game terms, Watchtower happens on turn 99 (7 Aug 42). Anything can happen in 99 turns. A careless Japanese player can have his Midway in the South Pacific, for one.

2. PM cannot be defended against an aggressive Japanese player. I nearly came to grief over this one. I see neuromancer is still beating himself up for losing Lady Lex and Yorktown in our Coral Sea battle.

But he took 3 of my cruisers with him, and he did manage to launch a strike against my CVs. If he had been luckier, Shok and Zuik would've been out of action and my APs would have no cover. What he couldn't have know then, was how close I was to the breaking point.

If he had been more careful (and kept his carriers further away), he could have stretched my airgroups out, then hit me when I was too fatigued, refuelling, or otherwise occupied. I always had to watch my back for his carriers and LBA (much like Nagumo at Midway).

Even the invasion proper was nearly botched. He had managed to fly down Kanga Force from Wau. My 2 regts were enough to handle the PM garrison, but with KForce, the odds were less than 2-1. This meant I had to launch a reinforcement effort in late May. You can't imagine the headaches that caused me, not to mention the ill-effect of a single bomb on Zuikaku's deck (irony of ironies, from the Lex's orphans on PM).

A June-July effort against a stronger PM is always possible. But the USN would then have 4 carriers against the 'Death Star', and that's even less of a sure thing. The commitment of 1 of the only 2 IJA Divisions would curtail Japanese offensive operations for some time. If PM is held by 2.5 regiments, you'll need both 2nd and 38th together. This is a grave overcommitment for the Japanese and gives the Allies much more room to manoeuvre in the Solomons. In effect, Australia and Noumea are safe from direct invasion. The Americal can then be deployed en-masse even as the Marines arrive. Can you say Watchtower?

3. The 'Death Star'. The IJN CV fleet is not omniscient. In fact, there were some comparisons made to it in the forum about it being a single-shot shotgun. To make the Death Star, the CVs need to stay to together. To counter that, the Allies need to hit 'em where they ain't. Try sinking all the IJN TKs, say. Now, that will REALLY cook his goose. Or play like Halsey did (aggressive attrition). Whittle away the fragile Kates, say. The Vals aren't half as valuable as the Kates, IMO, and Kates die like flies under heavy flak. To stay effective, the Death Star needs time in port (to rest and replenish), fuel, escorts, planes (fighters and strike) and pilots. Remove any of these elements and you have a chink in its armour which can be exploited. All the more reason, I believe for the Allies to risk Coral Sea.

4. USN wins for sure by '43. I haven't been there yet, but from what I've read in the UV 'Classics' (aka AARs), there's a plethora of possibilities here as well. If the IJN has built up diligently and made the most of Yamamoto's 6 months, there's no certainty he'll lose. This is of course, distinctly different from saying the Japanese may win the war. We know, and it's a historical fact, that they can NEVER win the war (a matter of logistics). But in UV, it's about the price the Allies have to pay to win it.

5. IJN CVs never get sent home. I think I saw this happening in one AAR, where the IJN player sent them to Tokyo to avoid losing more points to the (then) resurgent Allied CVs. Gamey, but somewhat historical, as it was what the IJN did before Leyte Gulf.

So much for myths. IMHO, a good wargame is not so much about playing it in context, as much as it is about it helps you recreate the context of the original 'players', through its rules, environment and presentation. In 50 turns, UV has given me sleepless nights, sweaty palms and the (unholy) pleasure of sinking 2 enemy CVs. I actually keep a copy of Agawa's fascinating biography of

Yamamoto (The Reluctant Admiral) at my side for inspiration when I make my turns against neuromancer. Now that's a good wargame.

< Message edited by LordHawke -- 4/15/2004 6:06:26 PM >

_____________________________

Lord Hawke

Qui desiderat pacem, preparet bellum.
"He who desires peace, prepares for war."

(in reply to neuromancer)

Post #: 36

RE: Port Moresby - 4/15/2004 9:35:17 PM

neuromancer

Posts: 627
Joined: 5/30/2002
From: Canada
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: LordHawke
Whoa big war happening here...

Wasn't supposed to be. It was just supposed to be a minor comment.

The same brother pointed out another thing this weekend that has also shown to be true. Off hand, minor, flippant, etc. such comments are very dangerous to make. People tend to latch onto them and run with them, even though they aren't really meant to be a big deal.

quote:

The 'real players' in history actually had quite a fair bit of info to munch on.
<snip>

Agreed. Again, I think the main point I am saying is the difference between the sort of broad informational/ intelligence difference like that, and the kind of detail that we can have simply by knowledge of the scenario.

Historically there was actually a fair amount of effort spent on keeping strategic movement of assets secret. Hornet and Enterprise while off on the 'Doolittle Raid' were being extremely secretive, and were basically 'off the radar' for a while. And no one could even say they were in an operational theatre.

Same with the carrier group that attacked Pearl. They were somewhere in the Pacific, which is a pretty big area.

Heck, when the Washington sank Kirishima, they weren't even 100% sure that they were even shooting at a Battleship, let alone which one (it was later determined to be Kirishima). This is clearly indicated in her AAR where the captain recorded under 'fired upon and apparently sunk': "1 large cruiser or BB".

quote:

An operational example of this would be Midway.

Yes... but if the Americans hadn't broken the Japanese codes, they wouldn't have necessarily been in the right area. They had to know where the attack was going to happen, the Pacific is a pretty big place.

I think actually Midway is a very helpful example, particularly in context of UV. UV practically assumes that the only thing going on is Coral Sea. There is no Midway (unless you play the post Midway scenarios), there are no pushes elsewhere and so on. As I said before, this means that there are no resources diverted elsewhere for any other action, or losses elsewhere either.

And so it comes back to my basic point that the players can say X, Y, and Z will be available sometime in June, then A, B, and C in July and August. So with that knowledge I can...

All I'm saying is that it is a level of predictability that the real commanders of the era couldn't count on. Even with 'variable reinforcement' on, the arrival times are still moderately predictable. As Bilbow correctly indicated, that is because of the necessity of game balance, and as I pointed out, any ideas on really randomizing the reinforcements without tossing game balance out the window would be hideously complex to do on a computer.

So I think really all I was trying to say was:
A. The real war wasn't "balanced". The world is not set up to be 'fair', or to give everyone a chance to win.
B. The real world isn't particularly predictable. Production schedules can slip. Disasters can occur. Politicians can make strange demands (case in point, a commando raid by the Brits in Norway caused Hitler to divert a disproportionate amount of resources North, which made sure they weren't doing anything useful). And generally Murphy's Law will apply.

With that in mind, a really good wargame - more of a simulation than a game - would throw that same level of uncertainty in. So when talking about taking Port Moresby - for example, as the original topic here - you would say "the IJN can expect to have dominance in the Coral Sea for a while, so they can X, Y, and Z. But of course nothing is ever certain, so you have to be careful not to stretch yourself to far, because if it turns out the Allies have more resources in the area then you expect, or if High Command decides the Coral Sea isn't as important as you do and thus start diverting reinforcements elsewhere, you might find yourself with your butt hanging out in the wind, and the Allies getting ready to give it a good kick!"

But as we said, that isn't really practical. And that is all I am really trying to say. That this relative predictability and certainty allows us to employ strategies in this game that would simply have been insane in the real world.

I really never intended this to become a huge debate. See comment near beginning of this post.

quote:

Wargamers in the US Naval Staff College have tried for years to simulate Midway, but the Japs would always win!

Curiously enough, the Japanese wargamed Midway before the battle. And they lost. They had to keep on altering conditions until they won. Whereupon they declared victory certain and sailed off into history.

quote:

The Japanese were essentially blind to the fact that they could never beat the US.

Although Yamamoto is quoted as saying after Peal that they had "awoken the sleeping giant". I think he understood the sheer industrial might of the US. Coupled with the fact that he understood that the 'sneak attack' on Pearl (which wasn't supposed to be, it was supposed to be a surprise attack, but while at war, not an sneak attack on a nation at peace - which is dishonourable under Bushido anyway) would really piss off the Americans.

I suspect that the goal of the Japanese was never to conquer the US, unless they were insanely naive. Probably just beat them up in the Pacific, and encourage them to go further into their shell (up until WW2, the US was extremely isolationist). And thus with the US out of he Pacific, the Japanese would be free to do as they wished. Pearl Harbour ensured that the US would do no such thing.

quote:

though we can come close to experiencing the command dilemnas and operational tensions faced by the two sides. And that's why I love playing wargames.

Exactly. And I do enjoy UV - particularly our game (I don't play the AI any more, it just isn't the same). I also acknowledge that my favourite table top wargame - Totalier Krieg - is a somewhat less than accurate recreation of WW2 (Alexandria Express anyone? London to Alexandria in less than a month!) it is reasonably close, creates the right feel, and is a load of fun.

And that is really all we can ask of a playable wargame, that it create the right feel, and be fun.

quote:

1. The Allies should Turtle till 10/42 then attack. <snip> The defender's state of mind, focussed on trying to defend everything, in effect, defends nothing.

Ho boy, now the vets are going to be all over you!

I am not going to directly comment as it could affect our game!

quote:

2. PM cannot be defended against an aggressive Japanese player.

I think the argument here is that if the allies commit too many resources to P.M., a 'hyper aggressive' IJN player will jump straight on Noumea or Brisbane. The IJN taking P.M. is annoying, and possibly more of a pain for the IJN in the long run (I'm still experimenting with that as you can see by my frequent bombing runs), but losing Brisbane or Noumea is a disaster (being where all your reinforcements arrive).

Some of the vets indicate they have pulled it off too.

quote:

I see neuromancer is still beating himself up for losing Lady Lex and Yorktown in our Coral Sea battle.

And I will for some time!

quote:

If he had been more careful (and kept his carriers further away), he could have stretched my airgroups out, then hit me when I was too fatigued, refuelling, or otherwise occupied. I always had to watch my back for his carriers and LBA (much like Nagumo at Midway).

Plain and simple, I screwed up. And I knew it almost as soon as I did it. All I had to do was run my carriers directly away from you, I could have danced back and forth as I had room to manoeuvre, and as long as you were in Catalina range of Australia, I would probably always know where your carriers were. So we could have had a nice little attrition battle, or with rested groups close for a 'mini-Midway'.

But I went the wrong direction. And I paid for it.

The Shortland Island debacle was a straight out error. I had the group with the wrong setting, that was all.

Avoidable/ Stupid mistakes are the ones I hate the most. And those are the ones I beat myself up over.

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Even the invasion proper was nearly botched. He had managed to fly down Kanga Force from Wau.

I had actually thought I had a chance of holding for a while, but your reinforcements tipped it. Too bad I didn't damage more APs on that one.

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3. The 'Death Star'. <snip>

Hmm... interesting.

"What good are snub fighters against that thing?"

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4. USN wins for sure by '43. I haven't been there yet, but from what I've read in the UV 'Classics' (aka AARs), there's a plethora of possibilities here as well.

Me neither, I'm just working on what I've read from the vets.

I suppose I should know better. In games where I'm more experienced, I've seen other veterans make claims to which I will readily say 'B.S.!'

quote:

5. IJN CVs never get sent home. I think I saw this happening in one AAR, where the IJN player sent them to Tokyo to avoid losing more points to the (then) resurgent Allied CVs. Gamey, but somewhat historical, as it was what the IJN did before Leyte Gulf.

Hmm. Actually it isn't even really 'gamey'. Being the important assets they are, the IJN would declare the Coral Sea a 'lost cause' and withdraw the carriers so they can 'live to fight another day', in another theatre.

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the (unholy) pleasure of sinking 2 enemy CVs.

I hope to somehow return that favour. If you are up to what I think you are, I might get the chance.

Or I might lose horribly.

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I actually keep a copy of Agawa's fascinating biography of Yamamoto (The Reluctant Admiral) at my side for inspiration when I make my turns against neuromancer. Now that's a good wargame.

No question that UV is a good wargame. think there is some misunderstanding as to what my point was. But I've covered that a couple times now.

< Message edited by neuromancer -- 4/15/2004 3:05:24 PM >

(in reply to LordHawke)

Post #: 37

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