Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
1) Well, I find it hard to believe that thinning the centre lines would not have been made at the highest command levels. You are making conjecture here by leaving it to the subunit commanders. In such an important battle, this would not have been left to the subunit commanders.

quote:

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
Well, Herodotus did not witness any of these events. It's all second hand information. He condenses a lot of info and leaves out a lot of info.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH HERODOTUS:

All scholars agree that Herodotos' account contains "not a few patent contradictions." Bury regrets that at the time of Marathon there was not "a contemporary historian lice Thukydides to ask searching questions and record the truth." (44)

Macan declares that the story of the Athenian advance against the Persians is "probably genuine," as long as we assume that it was a march at double speed and not a race, but "the rest is distortion, exaggeration, inconsequence, glorification." (45)

Most scholars are only somewhat less critical than Macan. A group that is more radical than Macan claims that actually it was the Persians who went to the attack; their argument is that, since Herodotos does not mention the participation of the Persian cavalry in the battle, it can be inferred that the Persians had decided to attack the Athenians on the hills.

Several other explanations for the failure of the Persian cavalry to participate in the battle have been offered. Grote suggested that the Athenians caught the Persian horsemen by surprise so that they did not have time to get on their mounts. Among the recent writers, H. G. L. Hammond claims that the cavalry was pasturing further north and did not arrive in time for the beginning of the battle. By the time it arrived, it could not be deployed because the armies were fighting at close quarters. (46)

Some scholars claim that the Persian cavalry had not yet arrived from Eretria, even though Herodotos states that the Persians had landed at Marathon a few days after the capture of Eretria and that the battle took place on the eleventh day after the landing. In order to explain why the cavalry was still at Eretria, Munro adds the further suggestion that the Persians had landed at the same time at Karystos, Eretria, and Marathon with the result that their forces were scattered in three separate actions. (47)

I have already mentioned the opinion that Herodotos is completely wrong when he states that the expeditionary forces sent to Greece included horsemen. At the opposite extreme there are the critics, such as Johannes Kromayer (48) and Hans Delbrueck, (49) who claim that Herodotos is in error when he assumes that the Persian cavalry did not participate in the battle. (50)

Among the minority of scholars who do not assume that the Persians were wanton in their military actions and that Herodotos is fanciful in his report, there prevails the opinion that the cavalry was absent from the battle because it had been embarked, since the Persians were planning to withdraw from Marathon and to land at the Phaleron, the outer harbor of Athens. (51)

The withdrawal of the Persian cavalry is mentioned in the dictionary of Suidas where he explains the meaning of the idiom xwris ippeis "without cavalry, the cavalry is off": "As Datis who had landed in Attica was retiring, the Ionians by climbing on trees signalled to the Athenians the cavalry is off." "As Miltiades learned in this way of their withdrawal, he engaged battle and won. Hence, this expression is used proverbially to refer to those who are breaking their military formation." According to this text the Ionians who were serving in the Persian fleet betrayed their Persian commander by informing their fellow Greeks; the withdrawal must have taken place at night because otherwise the Athenians encamped above Marathon would have seen by themselves what was taking place.

We may disregard the opinion of those, such as Schachermeyr, who question the account of Herodotos by claiming that the Persians never planned to land at the Phaleron after the withdrawal from Marathon (fantaisies had said Hauvette of this [52]).

An opposite position is taken by Anton E. Raubitschek who claims not only that the Persians planned to land at the Phaleron, but actually landed and were defeated there in a battle with the Athenians; (53) neither Herodotos nor any other Greek source hints at the occurrence of this repetition of the battle of Marathon.

Among the other more recent writers on the subject, A. W. Gomme was willing to accept Herodotos' account as having some value. Gomme gave an explanation of what happened at Marathon that to my mind is convincing and in agreement with the texts; but, since to assume that Herodotos said something sensible is a serious offense for modern scholarship, before presenting his views Gomme engaged in elaborate expiatory rites. He began his article thus:
Everyone knows that Herodotos' narrative of Marathon will not do. Many improvements have been suggested: some good, some bad. . . . My theme is rather this: if we reject Herodotos, are we justified at all in correcting, or adding to, his narrative, or ought we just to sit back, and say nothing, because correction is arbitrary? (54)

http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/persian_wars4.php

quote:


Oh but it would. As I mentioned above the Strategus would have had no commanding power over the individual subunits from different cities (except perhaps for his own, and even then this is not certain). His obligation was solely to decide when and where to engage (which in itself proved ahuge problem in this type of coalition, even if it was just Athens and her allies), and exhort his men to fight bravely.

quote:

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

In other words: No footnotes, no sources=No value.

19th Century notions of historicistic scholarship has long since gone the way of the Dodo. I wouldn´t attach any particular value to it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

quote:


Oh but it would. As I mentioned above the Strategus would have had no commanding power over the individual subunits from different cities (except perhaps for his own, and even then this is not certain). His obligation was solely to decide when and where to engage (which in itself proved ahuge problem in this type of coalition, even if it was just Athens and her allies), and exhort his men to fight bravely.

The battle formation was decided before the battle began - ie the middle ranks were thinned out. This would have bene decided by the overall commanders before the battle began. . .

quote:

quote:

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

In other words: No footnotes, no sources=No value.

19th Century notions of historicistic scholarship has long since gone the way of the Dodo. I wouldn´t attach any particular value to it.

You're joking, right?

He has all the footnotes and sources, but the publisher, because of the exacting nature of the scholarship, didn't need to put them in the book. In fact all his work is based on primary sources.

Creasy, to any scholars in the know, is THE authoritative source. I would accept his exacting scholarship over Herodotus any day. For 150 years Creasy's book has stood the test of time against the close eye of scrutiny.

Congressman Ike Skelton states that of the top 50 books worth reading, Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World; From Marathon to Waterloo, is THE most important book on the list. Skelton mailed copies of the list to hundreds of people, including chiefs of all the military branches, war college officials, various military officers, and every member of the U.S. House. In the first week alone, his office mailed out over 600 copies of the 50-book National Security List.

http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/2003/sept03/military-expert.shtml

Herodotus, on the other hand, is full of errors and omissions.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
It is interesting that the Battle of Cannae is still studied in military academies today. I wonder how our modern age could use the same tactics used back in Hannibal's time?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

quote:


Oh but it would. As I mentioned above the Strategus would have had no commanding power over the individual subunits from different cities (except perhaps for his own, and even then this is not certain). His obligation was solely to decide when and where to engage (which in itself proved ahuge problem in this type of coalition, even if it was just Athens and her allies), and exhort his men to fight bravely.

The battle formation was decided before the battle began - ie the middle ranks were thinned out. This would have bene decided by the overall commanders before the battle began. . .

Well, it would have been decided by the commanders of the different contingents before the battle, so in a sense, yes

quote:

quote:

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

In other words: No footnotes, no sources=No value.

19th Century notions of historicistic scholarship has long since gone the way of the Dodo. I wouldn´t attach any particular value to it.

You're joking, right?

He has all the footnotes and sources, but the publisher, because of the exacting nature of the scholarship, didn't need to put them in the book. In fact all his work is based on primary sources.

Creasy, to any scholars in the know, is THE authoritative source. I would accept his exacting scholarship over Herodotus any day. For 150 years Creasy's book has stood the test of time against the close eye of scrutiny.

Congressman Ike Skelton states that of the top 50 books worth reading, Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World; From Marathon to Waterloo, is THE most important book on the list. Skelton mailed copies of the list to hundreds of people, including chiefs of all the military branches, war college officials, various military officers, and every member of the U.S. House. In the first week alone, his office mailed out over 600 copies of the 50-book National Security List.

http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/2003/sept03/military-expert.shtml

Herodotus, on the other hand, is full of errors and omissions.

You can´t possibly claim that a secondary source take presedence over a primary one. Creasy is a secondary source, Herodotus is primary. End of story.

quote:

ORIGINAL: dinsdale

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
It is interesting that the Battle of Cannae is still studied in military academies today. I wonder how our modern age could use the same tactics used back in Hannibal's time?

Double envelopment by a smaller force is so unique that there are lessons for today. Just as Tzun Szu's principles are still relevant, so are the exploits of Hannibal, Caesar and other military genius.

As for "modern" war, couldn't some of Rommel's maneuvers be deemed similar to Hannibal? I can't remember the specifics or battle names off the top of my head but didn't he ignore the British centre and envelop both flanks at the start of his last great offensive?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
Incidently, when the first Gulf War (1991) took place, General Schwarzkopf had a copy of Rommel's biography on his nightstand. It's interesting that the"Hail Mary" military maneuver the Allies put into practice was very similar to many of Rommel's tactics.

Cheers!

quote:

ORIGINAL: dinsdale

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
Incidently, when the first Gulf War (1991) took place, General Schwarzkopf had a copy of Rommel's biography on his nightstand. It's interesting that the"Hail Mary" military maneuver the Allies put into practice was very similar to many of Rommel's tactics.

Cheers!

The book is Panzer Battles by Von Mellenthin. It's one of the most engaging books I've read and I'd recommend it!

I agree the Hail Mary was an interesting and thoroughly successful maneuver, the feat of moving that many troops to one wing of the theatre while the enemy believed an attack was to be directed from the coast has been ignored because it was too successful: the ground campaign looked too simple to be worthy of greatness, which is a shame.

quote:

ORIGINAL: tiredoftryingnames

I went and saw this over the weekend. Great movie. The person that told me there was alot of matrix flipping around in the fighting must have saw a different troy movie or they are just a complete idiot. i thought the fighting was well done. Achilles uses his speed to rush and jump into the air some to bring a forceful blow upon his enemy. He jumped no higher than an average man could. I think what might throw people is the camera angle, to add a dramatic touch, is from the ground so maybe people think he's flying through the air above people's heads.

quote:

ORIGINAL: tiredoftryingnames

I went and saw this over the weekend. Great movie. The person that told me there was alot of matrix flipping around in the fighting must have saw a different troy movie or they are just a complete idiot. i thought the fighting was well done. Achilles uses his speed to rush and jump into the air some to bring a forceful blow upon his enemy. He jumped no higher than an average man could. I think what might throw people is the camera angle, to add a dramatic touch, is from the ground so maybe people think he's flying through the air above people's heads.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

quote:

ORIGINAL: tiredoftryingnames

I went and saw this over the weekend. Great movie. The person that told me there was alot of matrix flipping around in the fighting must have saw a different troy movie or they are just a complete idiot. i thought the fighting was well done. Achilles uses his speed to rush and jump into the air some to bring a forceful blow upon his enemy. He jumped no higher than an average man could. I think what might throw people is the camera angle, to add a dramatic touch, is from the ground so maybe people think he's flying through the air above people's heads.

It lies in the nature of "Homeric Warfare" that it´s partcipant "Heros" are able to do things just a lttle bit out of the ordinary (though not flippantly so). Otherwise it just wouldn´t be "Homeric" nor heroic.