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RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged?????

 
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RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 10:01:21 AM   
Radzy

 

Posts: 86
Joined: 5/19/2004
From: Warsaw, Poland
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Fallschirmjager

Japanese troops hardly ever engaged the enemy on the beach. How will you lose all your troops when the landing goes unoppossed?


Well it is hard not to react to landing enemy troops when you are on atol..

Also it seems to be related with game rule of shock attack after landing. When you shock attack with few troops with high disruption they have to be destroyed.

_____________________________

"When they come a wull staun ma groon
Staun ma groon al nae be afraid
Thoughts awe hame tak awa ma fear
Sweat an bluid hide ma veil awe tears
Ains a year say a prayer faur me
Close yir een an remember me"
Sgt. MacKenzie

(in reply to Fallschirmjager)
Post #: 31
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 3:03:05 PM   
2Stepper


Posts: 948
Joined: 1/19/2003
From: North Burbs of Omaha
Status: offline 		I have to agree ColFrost... (by the by, While I live in Omaha, I'm from Minnesota too)

As to your point, I've always thought you had to at least "duke it out" with the IJN/IJA in smaller scale operations to at least keep things moving. I understand the process that can lead to "wasting" units in this game just as much as it was the case in the war.

However I hardly consider the holding, almost "tug of war" actions for Henderson field to be "wasting" troops. Once the IJA/IJN was finally booted off the island it gave the US a great staging base to start harassing Rabaul and eventually get the move north going.

Just my thoughts... but either way this'll all be REAL interesting once the game gets rolling.

_____________________________


"Send in the Infantry. Tanks cost money... the dead cost nothing..." :)

(in reply to ColFrost)
Post #: 32
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 3:23:53 PM   
Hoplosternum


Posts: 690
Joined: 6/12/2002
From: Romford, England
Status: offline 		I don't know whether the US would have negociated a peace after a Sitz at Pearl for the first year and half of the War. But I do know that it does not sound like an appealing game. I want to refight Guadalcanal, Midway and Coral Sea. Even if they occur in different places and times. The less than heroic fall of Singapore and the Marianas Turkey Shoot hold far less interest. Especially if there has been little fighting when the sides were evenly matched. Victories at Leyte will be all the sweeter if you once knew fear....

I shall certainly try and attack as the Allies long before the Hellcats and Essexes arrive. If that dooms me so be it. Waiting for the Essexes is a strategy that barely befits a timid school girl which I shall be sure to mention to any Allied opponent who's navy skulks around the US West Coast until he has overwhelming force

(in reply to 2Stepper)
Post #: 33
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 5:54:25 PM   
gunboat

 

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Status: offline 		Disclaimer: I do not have UV, so I will be completely new to the system.

It would seem to me that the number of prongs that work best depends on how the firebombing of japan is handled. If that is accurately modeled, then one prong to get the b29s in range, then p-51s in range, then a forward base to invade (if necesary/before abombs). This combined with subs cutting off japan's home islands should be enough I would think. (and just let the bypassed bases starve) Would this plan be viable?

(in reply to ctid98)
Post #: 34
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 6:32:41 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: ColFrost

I do hope that someone, anyone, has some grasp that it was unexceptable for the Allied forces to wait for 1943 for an offensive maneuver.

I know the game won't allow for this, but if the Allies had engaged in a sitzkreig and waited until all their carriers had Corsairs and Hellcats before beginning offensive action, not even the memory of Pearl Harbor would have prevented a negotiated settlement.


As long as you realize that the arguments for early Allied offensives are pure garbage,
and that it was not only considered "acceptable" to wait for 1943, but it was the Joint
Chiefs express plan and strategy to do so. That's what "Germany First" meant. What
got things going in the Pacific much earlier than Planned (or than the Allies were actually
ready for) was the unexpected triumph at Midway. This gave Ernie King (who was look-
ing for a campaign where his Navy could be the "big dog") and Doug MacArthur (who was
looking for a chance to re-shine his reputation) both a chance to push for "limited
offensive actions" in their areas. And both grew into gruelling, bloody, dragged-out
six month campaigns run on a "shoestring" with much higher losses than necessary.

It looks like the game's "victory points" are going to force much the same kind of
nonsense on the Allied Player (Midway or no Midway), so you should be pleased. But
please don't try to cloak it in any robes of "Historical Necessity". Original US strategic
planning would have had the war with Japan going into 1946 if necessary..., and no
one was worried about the Japanese "winning" in the interim.

(in reply to ColFrost)
Post #: 35
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 7:22:15 PM   
Mr.Frag


Posts: 13410
Joined: 12/18/2002
From: Purgatory
Status: offline 		Agreed Mike, frankly as long as Japan was not showing up off the Coast of the USA, who cares what they were doing?

The USA knew that there was never any real threat. China could not be subdued (Japan had been trying to years and failed). The Brits could take care of themselves in India. Oz, well, they are all criminals anyways...

The early battles where the USN really didn't come out looking too bright were a result in their lack of understanding that the art of war had changed. Once they got spanked, they regrouped and reeducated themselves for fighting a modern war that came out fighting and really never lost a battle from that point on.

The majority of the fighting that was remotely close happened before the USN had fully grasped how warfare had changed. By the close of '43, the USN had learned how to fight and use the new tools of the trade and Japan was just a matter of stepping stones.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 36
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 7:45:22 PM   
barbarrossa


Posts: 359
Joined: 3/25/2004
From: Shangri-La
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColFrost

I do hope that someone, anyone, has some grasp that it was unexceptable for the Allied forces to wait for 1943 for an offensive maneuver.

I know the game won't allow for this, but if the Allies had engaged in a sitzkreig and waited until all their carriers had Corsairs and Hellcats before beginning offensive action, not even the memory of Pearl Harbor would have prevented a negotiated settlement.


As long as you realize that the arguments for early Allied offensives are pure garbage,
and that it was not only considered "acceptable" to wait for 1943, but it was the Joint
Chiefs express plan and strategy to do so. That's what "Germany First" meant. What
got things going in the Pacific much earlier than Planned (or than the Allies were actually
ready for) was the unexpected triumph at Midway. This gave Ernie King (who was look-
ing for a campaign where his Navy could be the "big dog") and Doug MacArthur (who was
looking for a chance to re-shine his reputation) both a chance to push for "limited
offensive actions" in their areas. And both grew into gruelling, bloody, dragged-out
six month campaigns run on a "shoestring" with much higher losses than necessary.

It looks like the game's "victory points" are going to force much the same kind of
nonsense on the Allied Player (Midway or no Midway), so you should be pleased. But
please don't try to cloak it in any robes of "Historical Necessity". Original US strategic
planning would have had the war with Japan going into 1946 if necessary..., and no
one was worried about the Japanese "winning" in the interim.


Why would the US have risked almost the entire carrier forces afloat if they did not think they could win at Midway?

And why even attempt to thwart the Japanese at Coral Sea if the JCS could wait to take offensive until '43? The fact is they couldn't wait and events bore that out.

Not to mention Doolittle or the Rabaul raid.... It was for exact moral/political reasons that you offhandedly dismiss as "garbage".

The fact that the Japanese were building an airstrip on Guadalcanal forced the US to take action or have lines of communication with Australia threatened. Which is what the Victory Points kind of approximate, they force you to take some action as the Allied player and not hide in a shell.

The Japanese advance forced the hand of the Allies, who by winning (Midway), or coming to a draw with the IJN (Coral Sea), took the initiative in '42 and gained valuble experience and confidence that carried over to huge gains of '43.

It'll be up to the Allied player on how to respond to the IJN player.

And it's just a disingenous stab at someone to say that political considerations in the early part of the Pacific War were bunk.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 37
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:02:19 PM   
tsimmonds


Posts: 5498
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From: astride Mason and Dixon's Line
Status: offline 		The fact is that, following the undoing of two decades of British promises to the Dominions that they would defend Australia and New Zealand at Singapore, a power vacuum existed in the western Pacific. The reality was that Britain could not live up to her promises, so America would have to do so instead. From March 42 on, FDR and the JCS realized that the eastern approaches to Australia would have to be defended. This led directly to the deployment of the Americal division to Noumea, to 12 squadrons of bombers immediately being earmarked for OZ, and to the committment of carriers to the defense of Port Moresby. During the first 6 months of 1942, the Army rushed troops not to the ETO but rather to the Southwest Pacific and Australia, the place on the planet where they were needed the most. As an added political bonus, maintaining the supply line to Australia kept MacArthur at its far end rather than in Washington, where he might have played politics himself by exposing the bankrupt pre-war strategy of building up the Philippines....

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Post #: 38
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:05:53 PM   
mdiehl

 

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quote:

The USA built French Frigate Shoals into a Naval air station with a airstrip longer then the Island was before they began. (They enlarged the island)


I just LOVE the American way of fighting WW2.

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

(in reply to ColFrost)
Post #: 39
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:08:55 PM   
dwesolick


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Joined: 6/24/2002
From: Colorado
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quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

The USA built French Frigate Shoals into a Naval air station with a airstrip longer then the Island was before they began. (They enlarged the island)


I just LOVE the American way of fighting WW2.


I love this quote: "The American Army doesn't solve its problems. It overwhelms them."

_____________________________

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(in reply to mdiehl)
Post #: 40
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:10:45 PM   
kaleun

 

Posts: 5145
Joined: 5/29/2002
From: Colorado
Status: offline 		Had Japan won at Midway, and (unlikely) seized the Hawian islands, there is no question in my mind that the US would have had to: a: force them out ASAP ot b: achieved some kind of negotiated settlement, which is what Japan wanted.
The US government wanted a policy of "Germany first" but if you study the time period inmediately preceding, and just after the start of the war, US public opinion, and the opinion of Congress was not that. early in the war, after Roosevelt and Churchill's meeting in the White House, on December 1941, the English delegation was impressed by how unprepared the US was, and also by the US public opinion that massively wanted to do "Japan first". This was only natural, it was the japanese that attacked Pearl Harbor, not the Germans. I do not believe that the US Congress and public would have allowed a policy of sitting out the Japanese, if Midway, and a possibel invasion of Hawaii had been successful.
And that is my 2 cents worth.

_____________________________

Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you.
Sun Tzu

(in reply to barbarrossa)
Post #: 41
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:17:13 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline 		I think that "2c" worth is not based on any accurate data. The US public was pretty heavily anti-Axis in general by Dec 1941, and convincing the public that Germany was the greater threat would not have been too challenging (since they already believed that to be the case, even after Pearl Harbor). By December 1941 most Americans favored a war with Germany just to help save the UK.

Fortunately Japan was not capable of invading the HI with or without Kido Butai, Midway, or US CV-based opposition. Not in Dec 1941 and even less so by May-June 1942.

quote:

I love this quote: "The American Army doesn't solve its problems. It overwhelms them."


That's one of my favorites too. I first saw it in "An Army at Dawn." Any idea when the sequel is supposed to come out?

< Message edited by mdiehl -- 5/26/2004 6:22:47 PM >

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

(in reply to kaleun)
Post #: 42
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:19:14 PM   
barbarrossa


Posts: 359
Joined: 3/25/2004
From: Shangri-La
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: kaleun

Had Japan won at Midway, and (unlikely) seized the Hawian islands, there is no question in my mind that the US would have had to: a: force them out ASAP ot b: achieved some kind of negotiated settlement, which is what Japan wanted.
The US government wanted a policy of "Germany first" but if you study the time period inmediately preceding, and just after the start of the war, US public opinion, and the opinion of Congress was not that. early in the war, after Roosevelt and Churchill's meeting in the White House, on December 1941, the English delegation was impressed by how unprepared the US was, and also by the US public opinion that massively wanted to do "Japan first". This was only natural, it was the japanese that attacked Pearl Harbor, not the Germans. I do not believe that the US Congress and public would have allowed a policy of sitting out the Japanese, if Midway, and a possibel invasion of Hawaii had been successful.
And that is my 2 cents worth.


I don't think it was ever in the Japanese plan to occupy Hawaii. Midway was to have anchored, along with the Aleutian adventure, the first line of defense of thier sphere of influence.

"Germany First" was definitely what Britain wanted to get the US to agree to.

And it is precisely my point that politically the US needed to take some action in the Pacific because of popular US opinion.

(in reply to kaleun)
Post #: 43
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:20:27 PM   
barbarrossa


Posts: 359
Joined: 3/25/2004
From: Shangri-La
Status: offline 		Welcome back Mdiehl!

Join the fray!

(in reply to mdiehl)
Post #: 44
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:28:23 PM   
Mr.Frag


Posts: 13410
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From: Purgatory
Status: offline
quote:

Fortunately Japan was not capable of invading the HI with or without Kido Butai, Midway, or US CV-based opposition. Not in Dec 1941 and even less so by May-June 1942.


They could not have invaded period. The resources were already committed elsewhere. Really the only point in time they could have attempted it *was* Dec 7th. It would have taken most of the forces committed to Malaya/Burma and PI. I do not think at this point in time they had the fuel reserves to actually manage to pull it off even committing everything to the operation. This would mean they *maybe* grab Hawaii but have *nothing* else. Rather pointless. The goal to attacking PI was the removable of the USN that would interfere with Japan's *other* plans, not conquest. I seriously doubt anyone in Japan was *that* stupid.

(in reply to mdiehl)
Post #: 45
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:36:20 PM   
kaleun

 

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From: Colorado
Status: offline 		Actually, I don't think the Japanese plan included taking Pearl. (In the game, it might)
Then again, it did not include Midway until after the Doolitle's raid on Tokyo.
However, if Midway had been a decisive Japanese victory, would it have been totally irrational for Japan to take or threaten Pearl? Actually threatening might be better than taking it. It would have forced US to take Japan seriously. Part of their strategy, actually all of their strategy, was to present the US with the daunting task of having to recover the lost ground from far away, and at a great cost.
Faced with trying to get at Japan without Hawaii, a negotiated settlement thet perhaps returned Hawaii, Midway and the PI, but allowed Japan to keep the SRA and a free hand on China might just have worked.
I know Mdiehl will now have a long post on why this wouldn't work, but that's OK, I actually like his arguments, they are always well researched. (Since I'm at work I don't have references handy, nor are they as extensive as his, I'm sure)

_____________________________

Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you.
Sun Tzu

(in reply to barbarrossa)
Post #: 46
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:40:23 PM   
Becket


Posts: 1269
Joined: 3/15/2004
Status: offline 		The Midway plan developed out of the initial idea to invade Hawaii. I think it was Yamamoto who scaled the op back (I'll have to check tonight).

Definitely a crazy idea, but the funny thing about crazy ideas is that it's very hard to evaluate them as purely "what ifs", especially in WWII. In France, 1940, had Gamelin made different choices (not implementing the Dyle plan, putting different forces around the Ardennes), we might even now refer to the German plan to invade France as a "crazy idea" (esp. since the Germans themselves gave it less than a 10% chance of success).

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(in reply to Mr.Frag)
Post #: 47
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:46:27 PM   
tsimmonds


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From: astride Mason and Dixon's Line
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quote:

The Midway plan developed out of the initial idea to invade Hawaii. I think it was Yamamoto who scaled the op back (I'll have to check tonight).

Midway was Yammamoto's plan from the first page. He insisted on it, threatening to resign if Nagano and Toyoda didn't let him have his way. He wanted to lure the US fleet into decisive battle. Well, that much of it worked....

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Post #: 48
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:49:24 PM   
Becket


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quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

quote:

The Midway plan developed out of the initial idea to invade Hawaii. I think it was Yamamoto who scaled the op back (I'll have to check tonight).

Midway was Yammamoto's plan from the first page. He insisted on it, threatening to resign if Nagano and Toyoda didn't let him have his way. He wanted to lure the US fleet into decisive battle. Well, that much of it worked....


He did indeed threaten to resign. However, the initial concept of the plan that became Midway was design on Hawaii. It's covered by Fuchida & Okamiya in "Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan (the Japanese Navy's Story)". I'll find the citation tonight.

_____________________________


"The very word Moscow meant a lot to all of us....it meant all we had ever fought for" -Rokossovsky

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Post #: 49
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:53:32 PM   
barbarrossa


Posts: 359
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From: Shangri-La
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quote:

ORIGINAL: kaleun

Actually, I don't think the Japanese plan included taking Pearl. (In the game, it might)
Then again, it did not include Midway until after the Doolitle's raid on Tokyo.
However, if Midway had been a decisive Japanese victory, would it have been totally irrational for Japan to take or threaten Pearl? Actually threatening might be better than taking it. It would have forced US to take Japan seriously. Part of their strategy, actually all of their strategy, was to present the US with the daunting task of having to recover the lost ground from far away, and at a great cost.
Faced with trying to get at Japan without Hawaii, a negotiated settlement thet perhaps returned Hawaii, Midway and the PI, but allowed Japan to keep the SRA and a free hand on China might just have worked.
I know Mdiehl will now have a long post on why this wouldn't work, but that's OK, I actually like his arguments, they are always well researched. (Since I'm at work I don't have references handy, nor are they as extensive as his, I'm sure)


I agree with you that the Midway operation might have been undertaken with the "loss of face" created by Doolittle. I've read that in a few places.

The Japanese underestimated the resolve of the US after Pearl Harbor. They thought the US to be lazy and decadent with unwillingness to fight a long drawn out conflict. America's isolationism after the Great War had influence with this coupled with negotiated naval treaties the Japanese fudged on. They figured they could grab what they needed without too much interference from a Pacific Fleet in shambles and an American public with no stomach for war.

(in reply to kaleun)
Post #: 50
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 8:57:59 PM   
kaleun

 

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Status: offline 		That is correct.
I believe that the Japanese thought that the secret "Shangri-La" base was Midway, and that precipitated their lunge towards it.
But essentially yes, they totally misunderstood the US character and resolve.

_____________________________

Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you.
Sun Tzu

(in reply to barbarrossa)
Post #: 51
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 9:08:16 PM   
barbarrossa


Posts: 359
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From: Shangri-La
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quote:

ORIGINAL: kaleun

That is correct.
I believe that the Japanese thought that the secret "Shangri-La" base was Midway, and that precipitated their lunge towards it.
But essentially yes, they totally misunderstood the US character and resolve.


I don't think they believed the US had twin-engined bombers with that kind of range man

Plus they'd already spotted the Doolittle TF which precipitated the early launch of the raid.

(in reply to kaleun)
Post #: 52
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 9:12:43 PM   
kaleun

 

Posts: 5145
Joined: 5/29/2002
From: Colorado
Status: offline 		You are right, they had spotted the carriers, however the picket ships were sunk before the B25s took off, so I'm not that sure they put two and two together.
I agree they did not think the B25s had the range, but also they did not think they could take off from a carrier,
Now, I haven't read Fushida's Midway for a while, so I may be rusty in my memory.

_____________________________

Appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you.
Sun Tzu

(in reply to barbarrossa)
Post #: 53
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 9:18:10 PM   
j campbell


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Status: offline 		I would say that the Japanese IJA militarists misjudged American resolve and war capabilities but not the IJN (who would bear the greatest burden of the conflict). Yammamoto himself (who obviously held alot of clout within the Genreal staff) knew full well the US capabilities and thought Japan (due to her inferior material strength and resources) could only hold the Americans at bay for up to a year. They were unable to wear down the Americans because the Japanese were losing all the battles-technology being the most important one.

The US had to protect Australia -barring an immenent threat to them or Hawaii the US could afford to pursue a german first strategy. Mike is completely correct in his asessment of the military-political situation at the time -arguments to the contrary are groundless.

even with hindsight-if japan had been its most productive, efficient and militarily capable both tactically and operarationally (ala fought like germans on the land combats-not Banzai charging), pursued agressive ASW and submarine warfare- they STILL would have LOST. it was only a matter of time-Mac Arthur and King certainly sped up the timetable but not due to the threat of Japan grabbing some "high ground" in the Pacific where the US would repeatedly pound itself against like some WWI trenchline-that was just the "wishful" thinking of those that led japan to war and would not know when to quit.

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Post #: 54
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 9:21:38 PM   
tsimmonds


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From: astride Mason and Dixon's Line
Status: offline 		Combined Fleet began planning for Midway in March. At the same time IJN Plans division was working on several different plans: invasions of Ceylon, northern Australia, and New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. The army vetoed the first two but agreed to the southern Pacific operation. When the Plans division went to the Navy General Staff to present their case, they found the Combined Fleet staff there with their own plan for Midway. It was only Yamamoto's threatened walkout that carried the day in favor of the Combined Fleet's plan; the Plan Division's plan was far superior....

< Message edited by irrelevant -- 5/26/2004 2:28:01 PM >

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Post #: 55
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/26/2004 11:06:35 PM   
sven6345789

 

Posts: 1050
Joined: 3/8/2004
From: Sandviken, Sweden
Status: offline 		1) wlcome back mdiehl, i was starting to miss you !!

2)peace in 1943, after pearl? never. Germany first was the strategy. Some staff even believed the war in the pacific to last up until 1947 or 1948. didn't matter. Midway was necessary because , oh well.. it IS a little close to pearl, now isn't it. after midway, there was a chance for a counterattack (Lunga). no midway, no Guadalcanal. At least not in 1942.
in game terms, this means you will have to fight for the area close to pearl, the connection between hawaii and australia, Australia, India and China. Everything else depends on how well you can hold this line and on how much the japanese is willing to risk.

_____________________________

Bougainville, November 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9. It rained today.

Letter from a U.S. Marine,November 1943

(in reply to tsimmonds)
Post #: 56
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/27/2004 5:24:26 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
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From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline 		When I said GARBAGE, I meant that in the terms of the overall strategic planning and
outlook of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OFFENSIVE action was not a priority in the Pacific
Theatre. When the War broke out, certainly DEFENSIVE measures in the Pacific were
a priority (The Brits and Commonwealth at least had that covered in Europe and the
Atlantic, and would find some assets for India). Yes, most troops and equipment the
US shipped overseas in the first 18 months of the war went to the Pacific..., because
the Pacific was lacking such coverage. The object was to "hold the ring" and protect
"vital" areas like the route to Australia/New Zeeland, the Canal, Pearl, the Alaskan
Coast, etc. The Chiefs of Staff saw no need to start "re-taking" things from the Japs
any time soon. King and MacArthur "suckered" them into unnecessary "offensives"
for their own purposes.

The basis for the Japanese planning for the entire Midway Operation was to seek a
"decisive naval confrontation with the Pacific Fleet. Siezing a couple of worthless islands
in the Aleutians, and even Midway itself, were just "secondary" actions to the overall
concept. And from the Joint Chiefs position, none was a "vital" loss. What got Nimitz
his OK to fight at Midway was an "intelligence breakthrough" that promised a chance
to "trap and ambush" Nagumo. A "calculated risk" where the odds seemed pretty
favorable, and the opportunity to "break off" was open-ended if the "intelligence" didn't
pan out as forcast. It was a "defensive" operation.

Nobody at the higher levels of Allied command was particularly worried about the Japs
building and airstrip at Guadalcanal. They were building a number all over the Pacific.
What got Ernie King excited was that the Japanese position there looked vulnerable.
He had enough assets available in the theatre to do something about it, and it looked
to be a fairly quick and clean "victory" for the Marines and the Navy. And it was..., in
48 hours, the Marines held everything worth holding. What King (and Company) left
out was the ability to deal with Japanese reactions. Savo Island made it plain that hie
beloved Navy still had a lot to learn about Night Fighting, and his logistics were on a
"Shoestring" level. He had "sucked" the US into an offensive campaign it really wasn't
quite ready to engage in. MacArthur did much the same in Papua New Guinea. Began
unnecessary "offensive" action and then screamed for resources to back it up when he
got bogged down. None of this activity was NECESSARY or called for in the overall
strategic outlook of the Joint Chiefs. The threat of the Japanese to take Port Moresby
had already been dealt with (it WAS something the Joint Chiefs felt was vital), and
Guadalcanal was just another "stepping-stone" in the Japanese plans to "threaten" the
Australian pipeline (for which Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia were the "can't lose"
objectives).

Doolittle was a publicity stunt. Something Roosevelt could point to to show Americans
that their war production efforts were worthwhile. It was in no way "strategy", although
it did have some unlooked-for strategic results.

(in reply to sven6345789)
Post #: 57
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/27/2004 5:40:09 AM   
madflava13


Posts: 1530
Joined: 2/7/2001
From: Alexandria, VA
Status: offline 		Just to toss my two cents into the mix--
I primarily play as the Allies. My initial plans are going to be:
1. Save as much airpower as I can from PI
1A. Save ALL tenders from PI and as many other ships as possible
2. Save the Aussie divisions from Malaya
3. Reinforce the string of islands from Johnston - Canton - Baker - Suva, primarily with CD units, PBYs and some fighters. Also Marine Def Bn, if available.
4. Reinforce Midway with at least a regiment of troops, engineers and CD units. Fighters and PBYs
5. If possible, FT CD and Def Bn units to Wake.
6. Begin sending huge TFs of supply to Australia and points south in order to begin the build-up.
7. Reinforce Darwin
Thoughts?

< Message edited by madflava13 -- 5/26/2004 10:46:36 PM >

_____________________________

"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 58
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/27/2004 5:47:06 AM   
Mr.Frag


Posts: 13410
Joined: 12/18/2002
From: Purgatory
Status: offline
quote:

5. If possible, FT CD and Def Bn units to Wake.


Unless you luck out, Wake falls on Day 1.

(in reply to madflava13)
Post #: 59
RE: Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged????? - 5/27/2004 5:59:07 AM   
madflava13


Posts: 1530
Joined: 2/7/2001
From: Alexandria, VA
Status: offline 		Damn, scratch that then...

When testers reported they had reinforced Wake, was that with non-historical starts?

_____________________________

"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."

(in reply to Mr.Frag)
Post #: 60
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