Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.

Steve Golf33 Long

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

quote:

I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

But
"Quoting an authority is not evidence. Quoting a majority opinion is not evidence. Any argument that starts with, "According to Einstein..." is not based on objective evidence. Any argument that starts with, "Most biologists believe..." is not based on objective evidence. Saying, "The Bible says..." is not evidence. Authorities and majorities can be wrong and frequently have been."

Having statements, backed by facts, is not "I believe". It IS objective evidence.

We are talking about History, not religion or evolution. . .

And, having an authority, such as a General, write a paper about Patton, DOES carry weight, because he is in a position, based on education and military experience to be able to evaluate Patton's qualities and military abilities.

If you have ever written a paper in university, then you must provide facts to back your assertions. Posting these well researched articles is my proof of the assertions I make about Patton.

The papers I post contain a great deal of research with proof backing them up. They are not just my opinion.

I have posted several well researched papers that have proved that Patton used Combined Arms with great mastery.

Prove that Patton did NOT use Combined Arms.

Give us your definition (not a website article to wade through) but your definition of combined arms. Just a few short sentences would suffice. A good example of this (perhaps from Patton) would help illustrate your definition. (Again please, if you're going to copy from a website, precis it and just give us the para or two that explains it. if I have to wade through all those quotes again...) Alternatively, you can say "I have posted lots of articles that make it clear what my definition is" (or words to that effect) and we can avoid discussing it. This isn't about Patton, I just want to know what your working definition of Combined Arms is so we know what it is you mean when you say "Patton was good at combined arms".

To prove he didn't do it, you need to tell us exactly what you mean by the term. Is it a tactical term, an operational one or a strategic one. How would you recognise good combined arms?

IronDuke

Oh, I feel bored. . .

BTW, Ironduke, aren't you going to give us that in-depth analysis of early German Blitkrieg victories from Sept/39 to Jan/42, like you promised?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.

You know, I think a reasonable policy is not to expend more effort on reading a post than the poster put into producing it. Since it's only going to take about five seconds to press Ctrl-C and then Ctrl-V, that's about how long I'm going to spend reading long-winded articles culled off some .mil website.

It seems like a common courtesy when posting to a thread to quote the relevant passage - as in, the relevant few sentences - and to give a brief precis of the background of the article and any other relevant detail. Reproducing the whole thing in the expectation that someone else is going to read through it - just to discover, as in the account I queried, that it doesn't even touch on the subject at hand - doesn't seem like an approach worth the time to dissect.

Regards
33

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

quote:

I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

But
"Quoting an authority is not evidence. Quoting a majority opinion is not evidence. Any argument that starts with, "According to Einstein..." is not based on objective evidence. Any argument that starts with, "Most biologists believe..." is not based on objective evidence. Saying, "The Bible says..." is not evidence. Authorities and majorities can be wrong and frequently have been."

Having statements, backed by facts, is not "I believe". It IS objective evidence.

We are talking about History, not religion or evolution. . .

And, having an authority, such as a General, write a paper about Patton, DOES carry weight, because he is in a position, based on education and military experience to be able to evaluate Patton's qualities and military abilities.

If you have ever written a paper in university, then you must provide facts to back your assertions. Posting these well researched articles is my proof of the assertions I make about Patton.

The papers I post contain a great deal of research with proof backing them up. They are not just my opinion.

I have posted several well researched papers that have proved that Patton used Combined Arms with great mastery.

Prove that Patton did NOT use Combined Arms.

Give us your definition (not a website article to wade through) but your definition of combined arms. Just a few short sentences would suffice. A good example of this (perhaps from Patton) would help illustrate your definition. (Again please, if you're going to copy from a website, precis it and just give us the para or two that explains it. if I have to wade through all those quotes again...) Alternatively, you can say "I have posted lots of articles that make it clear what my definition is" (or words to that effect) and we can avoid discussing it. This isn't about Patton, I just want to know what your working definition of Combined Arms is so we know what it is you mean when you say "Patton was good at combined arms".

To prove he didn't do it, you need to tell us exactly what you mean by the term. Is it a tactical term, an operational one or a strategic one. How would you recognise good combined arms?

IronDuke

Oh, I feel bored. . .

BTW, Ironduke, aren't you going to give us that in-depth analysis of early German Blitkrieg victories from Sept/39 to Jan/42, like you promised?

So, you don't have a working definition of combined arms yet feel able to tell us Patton was good at this thing you don't have a working definition of. Interesting....It suggests you have read the things that Patton was supposed to be good at, but perhaps not fully understood them. This contradicts your assertion that these sites merely represent what you have been thinking all along. Of course, I may be wrong, and you may have a definition up your sleeve.

I too am bored, although I guarantee my boredom on early German victories (the word Blitzkrieg doesn't really mean anything) will lift allowing me to post about them, seconds after your boredom re explaining what you mean about combined arms lifts, and you stop dodging the question.

I repeat. Do you know what combined arms means, and will you briefly explain to discerning, critical forum members what your definition is? Otherwise, how can we believe that Patton was good at something, when we do not know what this "something" actually entails?

Ironduke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

It will be produced, in time. However, since you have issued the challenge I expect to see 'your' analysis (not just a series of lengthy 'cut and paste' articles which is your usual modus operandi) first.

You know, I think a reasonable policy is not to expend more effort on reading a post than the poster put into producing it. Since it's only going to take about five seconds to press Ctrl-C and then Ctrl-V, that's about how long I'm going to spend reading long-winded articles culled off some .mil website.

It seems like a common courtesy when posting to a thread to quote the relevant passage - as in, the relevant few sentences - Regards
33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

This is my last try at getting a direct answer to this direct question.

Regards
33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

quote:

I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

But
"Quoting an authority is not evidence. Quoting a majority opinion is not evidence. Any argument that starts with, "According to Einstein..." is not based on objective evidence. Any argument that starts with, "Most biologists believe..." is not based on objective evidence. Saying, "The Bible says..." is not evidence. Authorities and majorities can be wrong and frequently have been."

Having statements, backed by facts, is not "I believe". It IS objective evidence.

We are talking about History, not religion or evolution. . .

And, having an authority, such as a General, write a paper about Patton, DOES carry weight, because he is in a position, based on education and military experience to be able to evaluate Patton's qualities and military abilities.

If you have ever written a paper in university, then you must provide facts to back your assertions. Posting these well researched articles is my proof of the assertions I make about Patton.

The papers I post contain a great deal of research with proof backing them up. They are not just my opinion.

I have posted several well researched papers that have proved that Patton used Combined Arms with great mastery.

Prove that Patton did NOT use Combined Arms.

Give us your definition (not a website article to wade through) but your definition of combined arms. Just a few short sentences would suffice. A good example of this (perhaps from Patton) would help illustrate your definition. (Again please, if you're going to copy from a website, precis it and just give us the para or two that explains it. if I have to wade through all those quotes again...) Alternatively, you can say "I have posted lots of articles that make it clear what my definition is" (or words to that effect) and we can avoid discussing it. This isn't about Patton, I just want to know what your working definition of Combined Arms is so we know what it is you mean when you say "Patton was good at combined arms".

To prove he didn't do it, you need to tell us exactly what you mean by the term. Is it a tactical term, an operational one or a strategic one. How would you recognise good combined arms?

IronDuke

Oh, I feel bored. . .

BTW, Ironduke, aren't you going to give us that in-depth analysis of early German Blitkrieg victories from Sept/39 to Jan/42, like you promised?

So, you don't have a working definition of combined arms yet feel able to tell us Patton was good at this thing you don't have a working definition of. Interesting....It suggests you have read the things that Patton was supposed to be good at, but perhaps not fully understood them. This contradicts your assertion that these sites merely represent what you have been thinking all along. Of course, I may be wrong, and you may have a definition up your sleeve.

I too am bored, although I guarantee my boredom on early German victories (the word Blitzkrieg doesn't really mean anything) will lift allowing me to post about them, seconds after your boredom re explaining what you mean about combined arms lifts, and you stop dodging the question.

I repeat. Do you know what combined arms means, and will you briefly explain to discerning, critical forum members what your definition is? Otherwise, how can we believe that Patton was good at something, when we do not know what this "something" actually entails?

Ironduke

I repeat - I'm bored. . .

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Whatever you say. . .

Patton knew nothing about battle; he didn't study military history; he didn't devote his life to his country; he and Third Army didn't capture more territory than any other army; he didn't train, inspire and lead his troops; Third Army got all its leadership and training tips from cards it found in Cracker Jack boxes. . .

Why, Patton was just a couch potato. . .

Now back to your regularly scheduled program. . .

Steve Golf33 Long

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

quote:

ORIGINAL: Frank
For Western - Allied leaders, he is a good one. For German leaders he was average IMHO.

I was never that impressed with the average German General when it came to leadership ability.

Interesting. I always have. The situations within the respective armies were different, but I always thought the superior training of the pre-war German Officer Corp, allied with greater attrition rates which meant more officers got the chance to command, meant generally they were a more competent bunch than anything the Allies possessed.

Would Any German commander have kept his post if roles had been reversed at Messina etc, or they had taken three months with naval and air supremacy to breakout from Normandy? Ultimately, since only success guaranteed continuing employment, better officers gravitated to the surface in the Wehrmacht.

Regards,
IronDuke

Here again, is another one your lop-sided opinions.

Patton can do no right no matter what he does.

However, everything German officers did is brilliant no matter the circumstances.

Let's take a look at the so-called "brilliant" BlitzKrieg of the early German years, shall we?

The Germans surprise-attacked the unprepared Poles, bombing poor defenceless Warsaw. The Poles attacked German tanks with cavalry. Quite the achievement

Next, came poor little neutral Belgium. A surprise attack forced its surrender - another brilliant military move.

Next on the agenda was poor, defenceless Denmark - yes quite the military victory.

Then there was Holland - the technique of bombing defenceless Rotterdam is still studied today. . .

Then of course, there was the surprise attack through the Ardennes at Sedan, when German tanks basically raced for the channel, hardly encountering any opposition. The Germans faced divided, inexperienced, and poorly led Allied forces.

And at Dunkirk, the Germans couldn't even capture all the defenceless Allied soldiers trapped on the beaches

Yes, yes, all brilliant.

Then of course, the Germans attacked Russia in a surprise attack, surrounding and defeating a poorly led rabble. All those encirclements meant that those German officers encountered very little opposition. And the opposition they did encounter, was carried out by troops with low morale, poor clothing and weapons, and with very poor leadership.

Yes, what stunning successes. . .

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

This is my last try at getting a direct answer to this direct question.

Regards
33

33,
The section on Hammelburg in D'Este's (excellent work) provides some evidence for you. He makes it clear that a personal letter written home was at odds with other things Patton was writing and saying at this time about the incident. Two letters home, one three days before the incident and the other after the raiwas launched make it clear Patton knew who was there. In War as I knew it Patton tells us that he launched the raid to free 900 prisoners (no mention that he knew who was there) and to keep the enemy off balance as to his true intentions. Even more revealing is D'Este's description of the press conference at which Patton was asked to explain this action.

He recounts how Patton waved his Diaries and personal letters in the air insisting he had known nothing of the presence of his son in law. D'Este pretty conclusively shows that he did, using pesonal correspondence to his wife as the evidence. The correspondence pre-dated the raid, and specifically mentions the son in law as being at the camp.

These daries clearly omitted any mention of the true reason for the raid, which suggests they are not as reliable as has been claimed. Many military figures used their diaries whilst writing memoirs after the war, and I believe Patton (as War as I knew it demonstrates) would have written at length after the war about his role, as the other senior commanders did. Diaries are also published, I've seen AlanBrookes for example. Knowing this, he would have to have been careful when writing anything that it fit what he was publicly pronouncing at the time.

Still, this just means we have to treat Patton's diaries with the same caution as we treat any first peron account, not that they are useless. I think there is much in there that is useful.

regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Whatever you say. . .

Patton knew nothing about battle; he didn't study military history; he didn't devote his life to his country; he and Third Army didn't capture more territory than any other army; he didn't train, inspire and lead his troops; Third Army got all its leadership and training tips from cards it found in Cracker Jack boxes. . .

Why, Patton was just a couch potato. . .

Now back to your regularly scheduled program. . .

Straw man. You haven't addressed my argument, you've manufactured an argument I didn't make in order to tear it down, in the hope that others will be fooled into thinking you've actually answered my point.

In fact if you read what you've posted above, as your 'summary' of my argument, then read what I actually did post, you'll see you have misrepresented my argument so seriously that it's hard to think it isn't deliberate. If you like I can quote my post, then your version of my post, to prove this.

Regards
33

quote:

ORIGINAL: warhead2

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

quote:

ORIGINAL: Frank
For Western - Allied leaders, he is a good one. For German leaders he was average IMHO.

I was never that impressed with the average German General when it came to leadership ability.

Interesting. I always have. The situations within the respective armies were different, but I always thought the superior training of the pre-war German Officer Corp, allied with greater attrition rates which meant more officers got the chance to command, meant generally they were a more competent bunch than anything the Allies possessed.

Would Any German commander have kept his post if roles had been reversed at Messina etc, or they had taken three months with naval and air supremacy to breakout from Normandy? Ultimately, since only success guaranteed continuing employment, better officers gravitated to the surface in the Wehrmacht.

Regards,
IronDuke

Here again, is another one your lop-sided opinions.

Patton can do no right no matter what he does.

However, everything German officers did is brilliant no matter the circumstances.

Let's take a look at the so-called "brilliant" BlitzKrieg of the early German years, shall we?

The Germans surprise-attacked the unprepared Poles, bombing poor defenceless Warsaw. The Poles attacked German tanks with cavalry. Quite the achievement

Next, came poor little neutral Belgium. A surprise attack forced its surrender - another brilliant military move.

Next on the agenda was poor, defenceless Denmark - yes quite the military victory.

Then there was Holland - the technique of bombing defenceless Rotterdam is still studied today. . .

Then of course, there was the surprise attack through the Ardennes at Sedan, when German tanks basically raced for the channel, hardly encountering any opposition. The Germans faced divided, inexperienced, and poorly led Allied forces.

And at Dunkirk, the Germans couldn't even capture all the defenceless Allied soldiers trapped on the beaches

Yes, yes, all brilliant.

Then of course, the Germans attacked Russia in a surprise attack, surrounding and defeating a poorly led rabble. All those encirclements meant that those German officers encountered very little opposition. And the opposition they did encounter, was carried out by troops with low morale, poor clothing and weapons, and with very poor leadership.

Yes, what stunning successes. . .

My God,I have yet to get to the end of this "debate",but I must chime in here and say you sure do have a simpleton's view of the "blitzkrieg". Reading thus far has been like an instruction on how to lose a debate..you're getting your *ss handed to you,and you don't even realize it.

Cheers!

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, why must everything be 'black and white' to you? You seem to think that if we don't regard him as the greatest general of recorded history then we believe him to be a worthless individual who just happened to 'luck out' and land the command of an American army. It just makes debate impossible.

Anyway, regarding Metz I thought I'd kick in with this:-

From http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/990530.shtml

" Rickard, John Nelson. 'Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944.' Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999

For most students of World War II, General George S. Patton, Jr. holds a special place among US Army generals as the master of the American version of blitzkrieg. This reputation -- earned largely by his conduct of operations on Sicily in 1943 and in the pursuit from Normandy in 1944 -- was popularized in the mass market with the eponymously titled, and not always wholly accurate, film of the 1970's (starring George C. Scott) and solidified in more scholarly fashion by Carlo D'Este's 1995 biography.

Author John Nelson Rickard points out in his new book that previous treatments of Patton's military career have tended to ignore or minimize Third Army's bloody head-butting campaign in Lorraine from September to December 1944. In those months, after Patton's headlong pursuit of shattered German formations had outrun the Allied supply pipeline -- and the critical gasoline spigot in particular -- and reached a halt at Metz and Nancy, the series of frontal assaults and battles of attrition no more resembled Patton's preferred strategy of mobile warfare than the Battle of Stalingrad resembled the classic German blitz.

The book commences with a review of Patton's philosophy of battle, notes about his tactics in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1941, a brief comparison of the opposing armies of 1944, and a synopsis of the events leading up to the Lorraine campaign, notably the "cavalry-like" exploitation of Patton's Third Army following the breakout at St. Lo which Rickard praises but places in perspective.

It has also been suggested that Patton's opportunistic operational method did not prevent him from "meticulously" planning anticipated campaigns. Yet there was nothing "meticulous" about Patton's preparations for operations in Lorraine. In the fall of 1944 he was exuberant about his August successes where his tactical formula had worked to perfection. He would never cease in his attempt to impose the notions of the old cavalryman on the battlefield in Lorraine even when the circumstances demanded new methods.

Rickard examines with heavily footnoted detail the action in Lorraine mostly from the perspective of Patton's conduct of operations and carefully analyzes -- within the framework of friendly forces and capabilities, enemy forces and capabilities, terrain, weather conditions, logistics, and orders and limitations imposed by higher headquarters -- how Patton performed in an unfamiliar environment.

Indeed, the book is less an account of what happened, and more an analysis of Patton's role in making it happen, with an emphasis on evaluating -- almost second-guessing -- his options and decisions. Readers looking for a comprehensive account of the campaign itself might be somewhat disappointed as Rickard seems to assume that his audience will be familiar with earlier works (such as Hugh Cole's The Lorraine Campaign from the US Army official history series) which focus on the nitty-gritty of maneuver and combat.

Rickard quotes Cole liberally as well as presenting information and opinion from authors (such as Kemp, D'Este, Wilmot, Blumenson, Gabel, Nye, Weigley, and others) who have plowed the same ground, even if not so deeply or carefully. In that respect, Patton at Bay, in its attention to previous works and its constant measuring and weighing of the opinions and conclusions of other writers, sometimes seems more like a doctoral thesis (or even a "compare and contrast" assignment) than a piece of original scholarship. In the end, though, Rickard's approach proves thorough and satisfactory and he is not shy about offering his own point of view.

On the 17th, Patton sent his Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh J. Gaffey, to hurry Eddy in his preparations. Though Gaffey was a highly capable officer and enjoyed the full confidence of the army commander, it was Patton who needed to be at the front with Eddy, pushing him to make sure that XII Corps attacked on schedule. Patton justified his decision to send Gaffey by stating "I have been going to the front so much and kicking so much about delay that I have the generals jittery so I am spending a Sunday in the truck with Willie." This may not have been the best time to play with his pet dog.
Although this might sound a little catty, Rickard's thoroughness pays off with, for example, tables listing all visits by Patton and his senior staff officers to subordinate headquarters.

Rickard acknowledges Patton's strengths and often highlights occasions on which Patton's perception of the larger campaign -- and his plans for exploiting the situation -- made more sense than the plans of superiors. Still, in what is mostly a fair and balanced analysis, Patton receives considerable criticism for his handling of the Lorraine campaign and the costly, clumsy initial attacks against Metz in particular. Among Rickard's verdicts:

· Patton failed to heed intelligence warnings of enemy capabilities
· He continued to rely on failed plans after they had proved unworkable
· On a number of occasions he failed to clearly state his intentions and coordinate his subordinates
· He neglected to take into account his own shortages of manpower, equipment, and air support
· He incorrectly maintained his focus on assaulting Metz rather than masking it

In summary:
Patton was still on probation [after the slapping incidents in Sicily] when he entered Lorraine... Eisenhower still deemed it essential that he be kept under control. Bradley was Patton's greatest restraint....
The result was caution on Patton's part....

Although he regained some of his swagger after the success of the Normandy campaign, Patton certainly never brought his full improvisational style to bear in Lorraine. But excuses cannot be made for his failure to make sound tactical decisions. His difficulties were produced by a failure to sometimes face the obvious but also due to the incompatibility of his established battle philosophy with battle conditions in Lorraine, particularly his concepts of minimal interference and utilization of speed. However, had he not abandoned his most cherished concept, that of avoiding the enemy's main strength, his operations might have been far more successful.

Rickard's is a very analytical, somewhat dry account of Patton's decision-making in Lorraine. Some readers who consider Patton a genius and a hero might feel he is unfairly tarnished here, but most students of the war will welcome this detailed re-evaluation of a less spectacular aspect of the general's career. Also features some very comprehensive order of battle information plus data on casualties, replacements, and equipment losses in the appendices.

Recommended.

Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Praeger.
Thanks to Praeger for providing this review copy.
Reviewed 30 May 1999
Copyright © 1999 by Bill Stone
May not be reproduced in any form without written permission of Stone & Stone"

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

quote:

I post these articles because they contain exactly what I believe and what I have read over the years. Many of these articles are written by Generals, Ph.D.'s, etc, and contain VERY relevant information.

But
"Quoting an authority is not evidence. Quoting a majority opinion is not evidence. Any argument that starts with, "According to Einstein..." is not based on objective evidence. Any argument that starts with, "Most biologists believe..." is not based on objective evidence. Saying, "The Bible says..." is not evidence. Authorities and majorities can be wrong and frequently have been."

Having statements, backed by facts, is not "I believe". It IS objective evidence.

We are talking about History, not religion or evolution. . .

And, having an authority, such as a General, write a paper about Patton, DOES carry weight, because he is in a position, based on education and military experience to be able to evaluate Patton's qualities and military abilities.

If you have ever written a paper in university, then you must provide facts to back your assertions. Posting these well researched articles is my proof of the assertions I make about Patton.

The papers I post contain a great deal of research with proof backing them up. They are not just my opinion.

I have posted several well researched papers that have proved that Patton used Combined Arms with great mastery.

Prove that Patton did NOT use Combined Arms.

Give us your definition (not a website article to wade through) but your definition of combined arms. Just a few short sentences would suffice. A good example of this (perhaps from Patton) would help illustrate your definition. (Again please, if you're going to copy from a website, precis it and just give us the para or two that explains it. if I have to wade through all those quotes again...) Alternatively, you can say "I have posted lots of articles that make it clear what my definition is" (or words to that effect) and we can avoid discussing it. This isn't about Patton, I just want to know what your working definition of Combined Arms is so we know what it is you mean when you say "Patton was good at combined arms".

To prove he didn't do it, you need to tell us exactly what you mean by the term. Is it a tactical term, an operational one or a strategic one. How would you recognise good combined arms?

IronDuke

Oh, I feel bored. . .

BTW, Ironduke, aren't you going to give us that in-depth analysis of early German Blitkrieg victories from Sept/39 to Jan/42, like you promised?

So, you don't have a working definition of combined arms yet feel able to tell us Patton was good at this thing you don't have a working definition of. Interesting....It suggests you have read the things that Patton was supposed to be good at, but perhaps not fully understood them. This contradicts your assertion that these sites merely represent what you have been thinking all along. Of course, I may be wrong, and you may have a definition up your sleeve.

I too am bored, although I guarantee my boredom on early German victories (the word Blitzkrieg doesn't really mean anything) will lift allowing me to post about them, seconds after your boredom re explaining what you mean about combined arms lifts, and you stop dodging the question.

I repeat. Do you know what combined arms means, and will you briefly explain to discerning, critical forum members what your definition is? Otherwise, how can we believe that Patton was good at something, when we do not know what this "something" actually entails?

Ironduke

I repeat - I'm bored. . .

Fair enough, although a recent change in the law in the UK means that although someone is entitled to
say nothing (I believe the US refer to it as taking the 5th???) the jury are now allowed to draw whatever conclusions they see fit from such silence.

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, why must everything be 'black and white' to you? You seem to think that if we don't regard him as the greatest general of recorded history then we believe him to be a worthless individual who just happened to 'luck out' and land the command of an American army. It just makes debate impossible.

Anyway, regarding Metz I thought I'd kick in with this:-

From http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/990530.shtml

" Rickard, John Nelson. 'Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944.' Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999

For most students of World War II, General George S. Patton, Jr. holds a special place among US Army generals as the master of the American version of blitzkrieg. This reputation -- earned largely by his conduct of operations on Sicily in 1943 and in the pursuit from Normandy in 1944 -- was popularized in the mass market with the eponymously titled, and not always wholly accurate, film of the 1970's (starring George C. Scott) and solidified in more scholarly fashion by Carlo D'Este's 1995 biography.

Author John Nelson Rickard points out in his new book that previous treatments of Patton's military career have tended to ignore or minimize Third Army's bloody head-butting campaign in Lorraine from September to December 1944. In those months, after Patton's headlong pursuit of shattered German formations had outrun the Allied supply pipeline -- and the critical gasoline spigot in particular -- and reached a halt at Metz and Nancy, the series of frontal assaults and battles of attrition no more resembled Patton's preferred strategy of mobile warfare than the Battle of Stalingrad resembled the classic German blitz.

The book commences with a review of Patton's philosophy of battle, notes about his tactics in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1941, a brief comparison of the opposing armies of 1944, and a synopsis of the events leading up to the Lorraine campaign, notably the "cavalry-like" exploitation of Patton's Third Army following the breakout at St. Lo which Rickard praises but places in perspective.

It has also been suggested that Patton's opportunistic operational method did not prevent him from "meticulously" planning anticipated campaigns. Yet there was nothing "meticulous" about Patton's preparations for operations in Lorraine. In the fall of 1944 he was exuberant about his August successes where his tactical formula had worked to perfection. He would never cease in his attempt to impose the notions of the old cavalryman on the battlefield in Lorraine even when the circumstances demanded new methods.

Rickard examines with heavily footnoted detail the action in Lorraine mostly from the perspective of Patton's conduct of operations and carefully analyzes -- within the framework of friendly forces and capabilities, enemy forces and capabilities, terrain, weather conditions, logistics, and orders and limitations imposed by higher headquarters -- how Patton performed in an unfamiliar environment.

Indeed, the book is less an account of what happened, and more an analysis of Patton's role in making it happen, with an emphasis on evaluating -- almost second-guessing -- his options and decisions. Readers looking for a comprehensive account of the campaign itself might be somewhat disappointed as Rickard seems to assume that his audience will be familiar with earlier works (such as Hugh Cole's The Lorraine Campaign from the US Army official history series) which focus on the nitty-gritty of maneuver and combat.

Rickard quotes Cole liberally as well as presenting information and opinion from authors (such as Kemp, D'Este, Wilmot, Blumenson, Gabel, Nye, Weigley, and others) who have plowed the same ground, even if not so deeply or carefully. In that respect, Patton at Bay, in its attention to previous works and its constant measuring and weighing of the opinions and conclusions of other writers, sometimes seems more like a doctoral thesis (or even a "compare and contrast" assignment) than a piece of original scholarship. In the end, though, Rickard's approach proves thorough and satisfactory and he is not shy about offering his own point of view.

On the 17th, Patton sent his Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh J. Gaffey, to hurry Eddy in his preparations. Though Gaffey was a highly capable officer and enjoyed the full confidence of the army commander, it was Patton who needed to be at the front with Eddy, pushing him to make sure that XII Corps attacked on schedule. Patton justified his decision to send Gaffey by stating "I have been going to the front so much and kicking so much about delay that I have the generals jittery so I am spending a Sunday in the truck with Willie." This may not have been the best time to play with his pet dog.
Although this might sound a little catty, Rickard's thoroughness pays off with, for example, tables listing all visits by Patton and his senior staff officers to subordinate headquarters.

Rickard acknowledges Patton's strengths and often highlights occasions on which Patton's perception of the larger campaign -- and his plans for exploiting the situation -- made more sense than the plans of superiors. Still, in what is mostly a fair and balanced analysis, Patton receives considerable criticism for his handling of the Lorraine campaign and the costly, clumsy initial attacks against Metz in particular. Among Rickard's verdicts:

· Patton failed to heed intelligence warnings of enemy capabilities
· He continued to rely on failed plans after they had proved unworkable
· On a number of occasions he failed to clearly state his intentions and coordinate his subordinates
· He neglected to take into account his own shortages of manpower, equipment, and air support
· He incorrectly maintained his focus on assaulting Metz rather than masking it

In summary:
Patton was still on probation [after the slapping incidents in Sicily] when he entered Lorraine... Eisenhower still deemed it essential that he be kept under control. Bradley was Patton's greatest restraint....
The result was caution on Patton's part....

Although he regained some of his swagger after the success of the Normandy campaign, Patton certainly never brought his full improvisational style to bear in Lorraine. But excuses cannot be made for his failure to make sound tactical decisions. His difficulties were produced by a failure to sometimes face the obvious but also due to the incompatibility of his established battle philosophy with battle conditions in Lorraine, particularly his concepts of minimal interference and utilization of speed. However, had he not abandoned his most cherished concept, that of avoiding the enemy's main strength, his operations might have been far more successful.

Rickard's is a very analytical, somewhat dry account of Patton's decision-making in Lorraine. Some readers who consider Patton a genius and a hero might feel he is unfairly tarnished here, but most students of the war will welcome this detailed re-evaluation of a less spectacular aspect of the general's career. Also features some very comprehensive order of battle information plus data on casualties, replacements, and equipment losses in the appendices.

Recommended.

Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Praeger.
Thanks to Praeger for providing this review copy.
Reviewed 30 May 1999
Copyright © 1999 by Bill Stone
May not be reproduced in any form without written permission of Stone & Stone"

Ok, fair enough as it stands.

It's just a book review and is quite general in the details. But as a start - OK.

I take it you haven't read the book? So you really don't know what it says and how the author puts his argument together.

What else do you have?

What else have you read about Metz that makes you feel about the battle the way you do? Surely you didn't come to this conclusion just from reading this one book review?

Where are the other books you have read? Where are the articles?

Surely, just reading this one book review couldn't have made you so determined to defend the critics' belief that Patton was not at his best at Metz?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Now for the reader's review:

Reviewer: A reader from Kansas City, Missouri USA

I found the book to be an exercise in academic deconstructionism. For example, the author assumed a lack of strategic flexibility on the part of Patton to deal with the static battle line. An interesting assumption but confusing tactics with strategy, especially grand strategy, is always a problematic tendency of academics.

A career military professional will see through the rather weak argument and see the authors attempt to lable the Lorraine campaign as a "defeat". The author predicates his argument of the assumption that the Ruhr was more important than it turned out to be, that Patton was wrong concerning his belief that, if supplies had not been redirected, he could have pressed the Rhine and misses the opportunity to see the creative flexibility of the 3rd Army as it relieved Bastogne, a feat which no other allied commander believed could be done in less than 30 days.

When viewed against the exploits of the 1st, 9th, and 5th Armies, it seems that the author is simply looking to write a book that will cause a stir about an American icon. Patton was rude, crude and certainly a primodona. He was wisely never choosen as a group commander, in my opinion. However,Patton, unlike Napolean, never lost and that is sometimes hard for "fair" minded American academics to take in light of his anti-academic approach to killing the enemy. Unlike Eisenhower and Bradely, who were overjoyed at the taking of territory, Patton, in his and his subordinates writtings, knew that to win wars you must engage and destroy the enemy not hold territory.

Steve Golf33 Long

quote:

Surely, just reading this one book review couldn't have made you so determined to defend the critics' belief that Patton was not at his best at Metz?

quote:

The Lorraine campaign, which began in September with the promise of imminent victory, ended in December with Third Army rushing north to help avert disaster in the Ardennes. What conclusions can be drawn from this costly and frustrating campaign?

Historians and analysts have often critized yhe American commanders in the Lorraine campaign. One shortcoming that they have identified was a tedency toward overoptimism, criticized an understandable development given the great victories won in July and August and the information generated by Ultra. The successful conduct of the operational level of war requires the commander to look beyond the immediate battlefield and project himself forward in space and time, but this trait was carried to excess in Lorraine at the echelons above corps. From September to December, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton had their sights set firmly beyond the Rhine. Consequently, they underestimated the obstacles and opposition that their soldiers would have to overcome along the way. Thus, a difference in outlook arose between the higher commanders who drew large arrows on maps and the tactical units fighting for yards of muddy ground.

General Patton can also be faulted for neglecting to practice economy of force. We have noted several instances in which Third Army's forces were spread out on a broad front in an attempt to be strong everywhere with the result that they were decisively strong nowhere. In retrospect, the important battle in September was XII Corps' fight around Nancy, and in November, the main effort was XX Corps' assault against Metz. And yet Patton failed to concentrate Third Army's resources in reinforcement of the corps engaged in decisive operations. Furthermore, Patton never made an attempt to punch through the German defenses with divisions in column, even though he received approval for such an operation from his superior, LTG Bradley. One rule of thumb for mechanized forces that emerged from World War II was to march dispersed but concentrate to fight. In Lorraine, Third Army fought dispersed. (See Map 15.)

A similar criticism can be made of Patton's corps commanders. Walker and Eddy tended repeatedly to disperse their divisions and assign them missions beyond their means. We have seen several examples of important operations undertaken by divisions or parts of divisions without adequate planning or support, even though other forces could have been obtained to augment the effort by practicing economy of force. The corps commanders were trapped between Patton, who continually urged aggressive action, and the grim realities of terrain, weather, and a determined enemy. Perhaps it is not surprising that at times Walker and Eddy became preoccupied with local problems and lost sight of the broader issues. As a result, at the corps level the Lorraine campaign was a disjointed affair, with little cooperation between corps, and little continuity from one operation to the next. However, such operations as the tank battle leading to Arracourt and the 90th Division crossing of the Moselle at Koenigsmacker demonstrated that the American corps commanders were not incapable of applying force in a flexible and decisive manner.

.............

The American armored elements were not at their best in Lorraine either. Much of this can be attributed to the weather, but some of the blame must be given to the army commander for binding his armored divisions into infantry-heavy corps. Patton's reluctance to mass his armor came as a pleasant surprise to the Germans, who believed that their panzer divisions were just as useful in creating breakthroughs as they were in exploiting them. At a lower level, the combat command concept provided great tactical flexibility through decentralized control, but it also tempted Patton's corps commanders to break up the armored division and parcel it out by combat commands, a policy that further diluted Third Army's armored punch. Organizationally, the Armored Division of 1944 proved to be weak in infantry, a shortcoming often made good by detaching battalions from infantry divisions and assigning them to armored combat commands.

.............

Finally, the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be. In the August pursuit that brought Third Army to Lorraine, General Patton daringly violated tactical principles and conducted improvised operations with great success. He discovered, however, that the violation of logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter. Sooner or later, every improvisation and shortcut taken must be repaid. Third Army's logtstical shortcuts included burning up gasoline reserves to keep an advance going and then neglecting ammunition supply to bring up gasoline. The slowdown that affected all of the Allied forces in September and October was the inevitable price to be paid for gambling logistically that the war could be ended in August. Moreover, in spite of the logistical mobility afforded by motorization, remember that the trucks running the Red Ball Express consumed a greater and greater proportion of their cargoes as the advance progressed, forcing Third Army to turn to two time-honored methods of supply--railroad transport and local requisition.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Now for the reader's review:

Reviewer: A reader from Kansas City, Missouri USA

I found the book to be an exercise in academic deconstructionism. For example, the author assumed a lack of strategic flexibility on the part of Patton to deal with the static battle line. An interesting assumption but confusing tactics with strategy, especially grand strategy, is always a problematic tendency of academics.

A career military professional will see through the rather weak argument and see the authors attempt to lable the Lorraine campaign as a "defeat". The author predicates his argument of the assumption that the Ruhr was more important than it turned out to be, that Patton was wrong concerning his belief that, if supplies had not been redirected, he could have pressed the Rhine and misses the opportunity to see the creative flexibility of the 3rd Army as it relieved Bastogne, a feat which no other allied commander believed could be done in less than 30 days.

When viewed against the exploits of the 1st, 9th, and 5th Armies, it seems that the author is simply looking to write a book that will cause a stir about an American icon. Patton was rude, crude and certainly a primodona. He was wisely never choosen as a group commander, in my opinion. However,Patton, unlike Napolean, never lost and that is sometimes hard for "fair" minded American academics to take in light of his anti-academic approach to killing the enemy. Unlike Eisenhower and Bradely, who were overjoyed at the taking of territory, Patton, in his and his subordinates writtings, knew that to win wars you must engage and destroy the enemy not hold territory.

Wow. A review from someone who can come up with a term like "academic deconstructionism" but doesn't know how to spell Bradley or even Napoleon - let alone "primodonna". If I was Rickard I'd be laughing.

Regards
33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

Surely, just reading this one book review couldn't have made you so determined to defend the critics' belief that Patton was not at his best at Metz?

Au contraire (check the spelling) I have more!

From - http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp

quote:

The Lorraine campaign, which began in September with the promise of imminent victory, ended in December with Third Army rushing north to help avert disaster in the Ardennes. What conclusions can be drawn from this costly and frustrating campaign?

Historians and analysts have often critized yhe American commanders in the Lorraine campaign. One shortcoming that they have identified was a tedency toward overoptimism, criticized an understandable development given the great victories won in July and August and the information generated by Ultra. The successful conduct of the operational level of war requires the commander to look beyond the immediate battlefield and project himself forward in space and time, but this trait was carried to excess in Lorraine at the echelons above corps. From September to December, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton had their sights set firmly beyond the Rhine. Consequently, they underestimated the obstacles and opposition that their soldiers would have to overcome along the way. Thus, a difference in outlook arose between the higher commanders who drew large arrows on maps and the tactical units fighting for yards of muddy ground.

General Patton can also be faulted for neglecting to practice economy of force. We have noted several instances in which Third Army's forces were spread out on a broad front in an attempt to be strong everywhere with the result that they were decisively strong nowhere. In retrospect, the important battle in September was XII Corps' fight around Nancy, and in November, the main effort was XX Corps' assault against Metz. And yet Patton failed to concentrate Third Army's resources in reinforcement of the corps engaged in decisive operations. Furthermore, Patton never made an attempt to punch through the German defenses with divisions in column, even though he received approval for such an operation from his superior, LTG Bradley. One rule of thumb for mechanized forces that emerged from World War II was to march dispersed but concentrate to fight. In Lorraine, Third Army fought dispersed. (See Map 15.)

A similar criticism can be made of Patton's corps commanders. Walker and Eddy tended repeatedly to disperse their divisions and assign them missions beyond their means. We have seen several examples of important operations undertaken by divisions or parts of divisions without adequate planning or support, even though other forces could have been obtained to augment the effort by practicing economy of force. The corps commanders were trapped between Patton, who continually urged aggressive action, and the grim realities of terrain, weather, and a determined enemy. Perhaps it is not surprising that at times Walker and Eddy became preoccupied with local problems and lost sight of the broader issues. As a result, at the corps level the Lorraine campaign was a disjointed affair, with little cooperation between corps, and little continuity from one operation to the next. However, such operations as the tank battle leading to Arracourt and the 90th Division crossing of the Moselle at Koenigsmacker demonstrated that the American corps commanders were not incapable of applying force in a flexible and decisive manner.

.............

The American armored elements were not at their best in Lorraine either. Much of this can be attributed to the weather, but some of the blame must be given to the army commander for binding his armored divisions into infantry-heavy corps. Patton's reluctance to mass his armor came as a pleasant surprise to the Germans, who believed that their panzer divisions were just as useful in creating breakthroughs as they were in exploiting them. At a lower level, the combat command concept provided great tactical flexibility through decentralized control, but it also tempted Patton's corps commanders to break up the armored division and parcel it out by combat commands, a policy that further diluted Third Army's armored punch. Organizationally, the Armored Division of 1944 proved to be weak in infantry, a shortcoming often made good by detaching battalions from infantry divisions and assigning them to armored combat commands.

.............

Finally, the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be. In the August pursuit that brought Third Army to Lorraine, General Patton daringly violated tactical principles and conducted improvised operations with great success. He discovered, however, that the violation of logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter. Sooner or later, every improvisation and shortcut taken must be repaid. Third Army's logtstical shortcuts included burning up gasoline reserves to keep an advance going and then neglecting ammunition supply to bring up gasoline. The slowdown that affected all of the Allied forces in September and October was the inevitable price to be paid for gambling logistically that the war could be ended in August. Moreover, in spite of the logistical mobility afforded by motorization, remember that the trucks running the Red Ball Express consumed a greater and greater proportion of their cargoes as the advance progressed, forcing Third Army to turn to two time-honored methods of supply--railroad transport and local requisition.

I'd recommend anyone taking the link I've provided above. I've 'cut and pasted' the relevant sections but the whole article includes a good overview of the campaign in Lorraine as well as plenty of useful maps and ToEs.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom



If you have read that article carefully, then just cutting and pasting those few paragraphs from it, does both a great disservice to the author of the article, to the reader here, and to your so-called "analysis."

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom



If you have read that article carefully, then just cutting and pasting those few paragraphs from it, does both a great disservice to the author of the article, to the reader here, and to your so-called "analysis."

How? You've just made a sweeping assertion regarding a lengthy article that you don't agree with. Now explain yourself. If you cannot provide evidence to back your comment then I suggest you fold.

quote:

All of the information contained in this post is from the article Kevinugly posted above.

quote:

On 10 September, 12th Army Group (Bradley) ORDERED Third Army to advance on a BROAD FRONT and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Don't try and pretend that you lifted that from the site I linked to.

quote:

All of the information contained in this post is from the article Kevinugly posted above.

1) Eisenhower is not mentioned as ordering Patton to take Metz.

2)

quote:

On 10 September, 12th Army Group (Bradley) ORDERED Third Army to advance on a BROAD FRONT and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz

The full text of that section reads as follows:-

"Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move."

Selective editing to try and show that the decision was Bradley's alone.

Seems you are flailing about trying to prove that poor Patton was merely following orders, To do this you will use whatever tactic, no matter how underhand.

quote:

With so little going for it, why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine. Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of 12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were ordered to press ahead on a broad front. In late August 1944, with the Lorraine gateway so invitingly open, it was unthinkable to Patton that Third Army should be halted in midstride.

quote:

Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

This is my last try at getting a direct answer to this direct question.

Regards
33

33,
The section on Hammelburg in D'Este's (excellent work) provides some evidence for you. He makes it clear that a personal letter written home was at odds with other things Patton was writing and saying at this time about the incident. Two letters home, one three days before the incident and the other after the raiwas launched make it clear Patton knew who was there. In War as I knew it Patton tells us that he launched the raid to free 900 prisoners (no mention that he knew who was there) and to keep the enemy off balance as to his true intentions. Even more revealing is D'Este's description of the press conference at which Patton was asked to explain this action.

He recounts how Patton waved his Diaries and personal letters in the air insisting he had known nothing of the presence of his son in law. D'Este pretty conclusively shows that he did, using pesonal correspondence to his wife as the evidence. The correspondence pre-dated the raid, and specifically mentions the son in law as being at the camp.

These daries clearly omitted any mention of the true reason for the raid, which suggests they are not as reliable as has been claimed. Many military figures used their diaries whilst writing memoirs after the war, and I believe Patton (as War as I knew it demonstrates) would have written at length after the war about his role, as the other senior commanders did. Diaries are also published, I've seen AlanBrookes for example. Knowing this, he would have to have been careful when writing anything that it fit what he was publicly pronouncing at the time.

Still, this just means we have to treat Patton's diaries with the same caution as we treat any first peron account, not that they are useless. I think there is much in there that is useful.

regards,
IronDuke

I now know why I'm bored.

The level of debate here has entered the realm of Mush. . .

Why does it feel like I'm reading a page of gossip from the National Enquirer or watching an episode of Jerry Springer?

I guess when Great Men like Patton, MacArthur, Ike, Kennedy, Caesar and Napoleon dare to do Great Things, they can also make mistakes.

But never fear, there is always an Oswald or a Booth standing nearby to take a shot at them. . .

I have read the accounts of the Hammelburg Incident in D'Este and Blumenson as well as a few other places, and the general consensus is this:

D'Este says that the evidence that Patton knew that Waters was in Hammelburg is circumstantial. In other words, Patton might have known Waters was in the POW camp, but then again, he might not have know.

Blumenson adds that when Waters saw Patton he asked him if he knew he was in the camp, and Patton replied: "I didn't know for sure."

What is known for sure is that a POW camp containing American POWs was in Hammelburg and that Waters might be there. Apparently the POWs in a camp in Poland were moved to Hammelburg. The belief was that Waters might have been in that Polish camp as well. But no one knew if he was even alive.

In Patton's two letters to his wife, he mentions that "he" (Waters) is in the camp. But this may have been Patton being overly optimistic to his wife about rescuing their Son-In-Law. Many men will tend to put on a brave, optimistic face for their wives, if something bad might happen. Also, Patton suffered from Dyslexia, so he may not have written it the way he had intended to.

Even after the incident was over, the only thing Patton regretted was not in sending a larger rescue force as he had originally intended.

As it stood, the rescue force freed 700 Russian POWs, and liberated the POW camp in Hammelburg that was holding 5,000 POWs, including Waters. However, this rescue attempt ultimately failed.

A short time later another rescue party liberated the camp.

The verdict?

Patton maintains he did not know for sure if Waters was in the camp. No one really did. He felt since there were 5,000 POWs there anyway, it was worth liberating. He also felt that it would cause a diversion and draw German forces away from his main thrust of attack.

Personally, I feel it has been made into a big deal for two reasons:

1) Patton's critics can feel all warm and fuzzy inside because they have found a chink in the armour of the Great Patton; and

2) The fact that the original operation failed. If Patton had sent a larger force as he had originally intended, and had it been successful, the whole operation would just be a footnote in history.

Therefore, those who dislike Patton will continue to ring the Bell of Hammelburg, while fair-minded people, when considering Patton's Great Accomplishments, will place this incident in the proper perspective as it should be. . .

Incidently (and it comes as no surprise to me) that Charles Whiting has written a book about this incident called "48 Hours to Hammelburg: Patton's Secret Ghost". No doubt he will be fair and objective about Patton.

quote:

Von Rom
I now know why I'm bored.

The level of debate here has entered the realm of Mush. . .

Why does it feel like I'm reading a page of gossip from the National Enquirer or watching an episode of Jerry Springer?

quote:

Von Rom
I guess when Great Men like Patton, MacArthur, Ike, Kennedy, Caesar and Napoleon dare to do Great Things, they can also make mistakes.

But never fear, there is always an Oswald or a Booth standing nearby to take a shot at them. . .

quote:

Von Rom
I have read the accounts of the Hammelburg Incident in D'Este and Blumenson as well as a few other places, and the general consensus is this:

quote:

Von Rom
D'Este says that the evidence that Patton knew that Waters was in Hammelburg is circumstantial.

quote:

D'Este: Pg 714.
However, General's aides do not just go along on combat missions. Clearly, Stiller seemed to be there for another purpose.

quote:

Patton:
I promise I'll replace every man and every vehicle you lose.

quote:

D'Este:
As historian John Toland reveals:"...Stiller explained in a low voice that the 'Old Man' was absolutely determined to free the prisoners at Hammelburg-and revealed that John Waters, Patton's son in law, was one of the prisoners.

quote:

Patton
We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved if he is moved he had better escape or he will end up in Bavaria.

quote:

Patton
Last night I sent an armoured column to a place 40 miles east of Frankfurt where John and some 900 POWs are said to be...everyone but me thought it was too great a risk.

quote:

Von Rom
In other words, Patton might have known Waters was in the POW camp, but then again, he might not have know.

quote:

Blumenson adds that when Waters saw Patton he asked him if he knew he was in the camp, and Patton replied: "I didn't know for sure."

quote:

D'Este
Those involved in the raid, Hoge, Baum, Stiller and Creighton Abrams, were convinced that Patton had mounted Hammelburg to save his son in law. All, however, chose to remain silent in deference to Patton.
Not until 1967, when he was himself a four star General did Abrams write that Stiller had admitted he made the trip "only because General Patton's son in law, Colonel Waters, was in the prison camp."

quote:


Von Rom
In Patton's two letters to his wife, he mentions that "he" (Waters) is in the camp. But this may have been Patton being overly optimistic to his wife about rescuing their Son-In-Law. Many men will tend to put on a brave, optimistic face for their wives, if something bad might happen. Also, Patton suffered from Dyslexia, so he may not have written it the way he had intended to.

quote:

Von Rom
But no one knew if he was even alive

quote:

D'Este
Patton's dyslexia generated a lifelong writing problem manifested by mis-spelled words, and the frequent omission of punctuation and capitalisation.

quote:

Patton
We are headed right for John's place

quote:

Von Rom
Even after the incident was over, the only thing Patton regretted was not in sending a larger rescue force as he had originally intended.

quote:

D'Este
The only certainty in the entire tragic affair is that Bradley would have forbidden Patton to undertake the Hammelburg raid if he had known of it in advance.

quote:

D'Este
Patton attempted to put a brave face on an unjiustifiable act.

quote:

D'Este
Patton perpetuated the fiction of Hammelburg at a press conference, in which he baldly deceived the correspondents by waiving his personal and official diairies in the air and claiming he had known nothing of Water's presence in Hammelburg until 9 days after the raid.

quote:

D'Este
Patton later blamed Bradley. He also blaimed Eddy and Hoge. In fact he blaimed everyone but himself.

quote:

D'Este
This version is as self serving as his earlier complaint that Bradley had denied him the necessary force to mount the raid.

quote:

D'Este
His denials notwithstanding, the raid not only branded Patton a liar but tarnished the very fabric on which his fame lasted-that his troops came first, and everything possible must be done to insure their survival. Instead, he had sent 307 men on a mission whose implicit purpose was the rescue of his own son-in-law.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: warhead2

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

quote:

ORIGINAL: Frank
For Western - Allied leaders, he is a good one. For German leaders he was average IMHO.

I was never that impressed with the average German General when it came to leadership ability.

Interesting. I always have. The situations within the respective armies were different, but I always thought the superior training of the pre-war German Officer Corp, allied with greater attrition rates which meant more officers got the chance to command, meant generally they were a more competent bunch than anything the Allies possessed.

Would Any German commander have kept his post if roles had been reversed at Messina etc, or they had taken three months with naval and air supremacy to breakout from Normandy? Ultimately, since only success guaranteed continuing employment, better officers gravitated to the surface in the Wehrmacht.

Regards,
IronDuke

Here again, is another one your lop-sided opinions.

Patton can do no right no matter what he does.

However, everything German officers did is brilliant no matter the circumstances.

Let's take a look at the so-called "brilliant" BlitzKrieg of the early German years, shall we?

The Germans surprise-attacked the unprepared Poles, bombing poor defenceless Warsaw. The Poles attacked German tanks with cavalry. Quite the achievement

Next, came poor little neutral Belgium. A surprise attack forced its surrender - another brilliant military move.

Next on the agenda was poor, defenceless Denmark - yes quite the military victory.

Then there was Holland - the technique of bombing defenceless Rotterdam is still studied today. . .

Then of course, there was the surprise attack through the Ardennes at Sedan, when German tanks basically raced for the channel, hardly encountering any opposition. The Germans faced divided, inexperienced, and poorly led Allied forces.

And at Dunkirk, the Germans couldn't even capture all the defenceless Allied soldiers trapped on the beaches

Yes, yes, all brilliant.

Then of course, the Germans attacked Russia in a surprise attack, surrounding and defeating a poorly led rabble. All those encirclements meant that those German officers encountered very little opposition. And the opposition they did encounter, was carried out by troops with low morale, poor clothing and weapons, and with very poor leadership.

Yes, what stunning successes. . .

My God,I have yet to get to the end of this "debate",but I must chime in here and say you sure do have a simpleton's view of the "blitzkrieg". Reading thus far has been like an instruction on how to lose a debate..you're getting your *ss handed to you,and you don't even realize it.

Cheers!

Ohhhh, yes it's quite shocking, isn't it. . .

When people can fault Patton for victories against supposedly inferior forces, then I can compare and find fault of early German Blitzkrieg victories against inferior forces.

Did you catch that?

Or am I being too simple for you?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Err, Eisenhower ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine. That cannot be inferred that Ike ordered him to take Metz. Metz could have been bypassed and 'left to wither on the vine'. Find me the order from Ike specifically asking General Patton to take Metz by storm. In any case this is in direct conflict to General Bradley's order to seize Mainz and Mannheim.

Secondly, all the the Allied generals were well aware of the logistics problems, Patton included.

"Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move."

This is from that site, note the date of the order and the fact that 3rd Army was already on the 'move'

A few paragraphs beforehand we have the fact that even before the campaign in Lorraine began, Patton was aware of the logistics problem.

"Thus, it was not surprising that on 28 August, with Patton's spearheads in the vicinity of Reims, Third Army's gasoline allocation fell 100,000 gallons short of requirements; and since all reserves had been burned up in the course of the pursuit, the pace of Patton's advance began to suffer almost at once. The simple truth was that although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, there was no way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. On 31 August, Third Army received no gasoline at all. With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River."

Put into proper date order it can be clearly seen Ike ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine as part of his 'broad front' strategy. Bradley ordered Patton to take the Rhine crossings at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton was already moving at this time in full knowledge of the dire logistical situation yet still agreed that this was the correct strategy.

'Nuff Said

quote:

Err, Eisenhower ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine. That cannot be inferred that Ike ordered him to take Metz. Metz could have been bypassed and 'left to wither on the vine'. Find me the order from Ike specifically asking General Patton to take Metz by storm. In any case this is in direct conflict to General Bradley's order to seize Mainz and Mannheim.

quote:

"Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move."

This is from that site, note the date of the order and the fact that 3rd Army was already on the 'move'

quote:

Put into proper date order it can be clearly seen Ike ordered 3rd Army into Lorraine as part of his 'broad front' strategy. Bradley ordered Patton to take the Rhine crossings at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton was already moving at this time in full knowledge of the dire logistical situation yet still agreed that this was the correct strategy.