esteban
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Joined: 7/21/2004
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Mogami
Hi, Now I'm not understanding all this. If the map is incorrect it will be ifxed. But even if we cut the lines to Darwin completly it will not alter any of the Allied ability to use Darwin exactly the same way you suggest.
I do not conncur in your assement about allied convoys being able to evade interception but that does not change anything. (no matter how round about you go you eventually have to go to a base to unload. If that base or the local route to that base is in range of enemy LBA then you've only moved the hex you are attacked in)
I don't doubt the value of Darwin after mid 1943. I advocte such use. My only point on entry into this discussion was that the effects of the mistaken rail connection were being inflated beyond what they actually would do. 300 allied aircraft at Darwin bother me not a whit as long as I can find via recon/probes where aircover is lacking as a result of such concentration at Darwin. Japan has in excess of 300 long range medium (heavy to Japan) bombers. The most pressing issue for Japan after the SRA is finding a place to base them that provides targets worth risking them prior to the Allies attaining air equality in numbers and superioty in quality. Darwin in this period is ideal for the Japanese.
I also think the actual supply generation in Australia independant of imports is being inflated. Offensive operations required much more supply then do defensive. Oz can support it's own defense. Darwin cannot be used without a large influx from outside. Karachi is not my first choice because as the ALlies I have a massive supply demand in India/Burma/China (only a trickle gets through to CHina but this trickle is vital)
Re: Convoys avoiding detection:
The range from bases in Sumatra to the Western map edge is 17-20 hexes. At that range, a large convoy, or several running at once, would probably be spotted, but would could only be attacked by land-based air at extended range, so the damage to the convoys would be pretty acceptable, unless Kido Butai was kept in Singapore/Surabaya. If the Royal Navy or a couple escort carriers were sent in the convoy(s) the bomber losses would probably be severe. If I were Allied, I would not run a whole lot of convoys from India anyway. India needs doesn't possess anything in real excess (except maybe fuel from the dropoffs at Bombay and Karachi), and would be pressed by fighting in Burma, especially if that fighting can keep the supply route to China open.
The range from Suva and Noumea to the south map edge is 22 hexes. So unless you had Kido Butai steaming around the south map edge, or several of your submarines with Glenn float planes on them in the area, you would never even see them passing by. Even if you did see them, these convoys would be entirely out of LRA range. The only way to reliably close the U.S./Aussie link is to take Noumea, and then jump from there to take and hold large portions of New Zealand. Otherwise, there is too much space between available bases and the map edge to interdict the convoys. Plus, the bases that are taken should be tough fights.
The U.S. produces excess oil, which is what Australian industry needs most, and tons of supplies. This, and available long ranged air groups, base forces and a few infantry divisions, would be what I would send to Australia. I would reserve the bulk of U.S. fuel production for the naval war to keep the U.S./Aussie supply line open.
You mention LRA attacks on supply convoys. Thats pretty much the whole point of my argument. With the rail lines where they are, you would never have to venture into LRA range of New Guinea/Timor to get supplies and troops to North Australia. You can land them in Brisbane and Perth and march them north. If you want to save some supplies and marching time, you can enter LRA range and land them at Townsville. However, Townsville is outside fighter range from New Guinea, so your bomber losses would be severe.
Build up Norht Oz this way for until mid-42, then start island hopping. In the meantime, you consolidate the Aussie/U.S. and India/China links.
Here is the geography of the current North Oz area:
There are 4 north Oz bases. Darwin, Broome, Wyndham and Derby. All of these can support size 7+ ports and/or airfields. They are all connected by rail. (realistically, this should be road or even trail connections) Another rail line runs from Broome down to Perth, and another line from Darwin to Townsville. (these rail lines never existed, and still don't exist today)
There is also a +- 10 hex road connection from the Darwin/Townsville rail line to Alice Springs, which is connected to the rest of Australia by rail. This road link was only upgraded with a rail link in the last year, 60 years after the war ended. The wartime road link was often washed out in the rainy season, so should probably be filled in with a hex or two of trail to show that it wasn't a real, reliable road in the sense we think of.
Without this ahistorical infrastructure, North Oz would have to be supplied principally by ship. That means a lag time of a couple weeks between when supply is sent and when it arrives. With the current rail links, supply can be sent immediately, upon demand, with little loss along the way. Supply at one North Oz base can be pretty much immediately moved with almost no loss to another North Oz base.
The only approaches to the North Oz bases by sea are along the coast, North from Perth, or West from Townsville. The Townsville route is just plain deadly, even in 43/44 with long range, high quality allied fighters, the portion of the route between Thursday Island and Darwin (about 20 hexes) would be run with practically no air cover. Japanese LRA from bases on the north shore of New Guinea can cover the whole of the route. Most of the route is in fighter range from North New Guinea as well. This route could only be safely used by committing several fleet carriers to an escort.
The Perth route is safer, though not completely safe. There are no bases between Perth and Broome, so there would be little or no early warning against a Japanese task force attacking the convoys. As the convoy neared Broome, you would be within both fighter and LRA range of Kupang. In 42/early 43, with a shortage of long ranged fighters, there would be a gap of 3-4 hexes between when a convoy would enter torpedo bombing range of Kupang, and when it would be in fighter cover range from Broome. From Broome, it is another 15 hexes or so to Darwin, but you would be within fighter and LRA range of Timor the whole way. Over this stretch, the Allies would have fighter cover from the various bases.
If the ahistorical rail links between the four northern bases, and the northern bases and south Oz were removed, to get supplies to Darwin, with some risk, you would have to pretty much transport them (or the oil to make them) from the U.S., and then move them in a big hook around the south and east coast of Australia, and then halfway across the north coast as well. Then the ships carrying the supplies would have to return the same way they came, because running east from Darwin takes you into the "no air cover" zone that makes the Townsville run so dangerous.
Without the changes, the allies do not have to run supply or LCU reinforcement convoys at all. They will need fuel convoys once they start island hopping. By the time Allied offensive operations outstrip their supply/LCU rail movement to North Oz, and then to island bases, it will be sometime in mid/late 1943. Their offensive will have drastically reduced the effectiveness of, or taken, the Japanese bases on Timor, rendering the Perth supply convoy route much safer. The Townsville route will probably still be inadvisable at that time
Current distance between bases in North Oz area:
Broome to Darwin: +-15 hexes (currently all but 1-2 hexes of this is rail, the rest is road)
Broome and Derby to Kupang: 8 hexes (extended B-25/Beaufort VIc/P-38 range, normal range for B-24/17)
Wyndham to Lautem ( east Timor): 9 hexes
Darwin to Lautem: 8 hexes
Darwin to Bulla (60 pt. resource center): 9-10 hexes (normal B-17/24 range)
Darwin to Amboina/Sorong (50 pt oil centers/10 point resource centers): 11 hexes (extended B-17/24 range)
Darwin to Tenimbar Island (capable of size 3 AF): 3 hexes (normal fighter/dive bomber range)
Tenimbar to Aru Island (second size 3 AF): 2 hexes
Tenimbar to Lautem: 4 hexes (extended fighter range)
Aru to Kai Island (capable of size 5 AF): 2-3 hexes
Kai Island to Bulla: 2-3 hexes
Kai Island to Amboina: 4-5 hexes
With the railroads in place, the North Oz bases are a huge threat to the SRA. Yes, you can night bomb the North Oz bases, you can even day bomb them with fighter escort from Timor. But the supplies lost would be replaced almost automatically, via rail. I am not talking about retaking Manila in 42, or even 43. I feel that I could certainly do it in 44 though, given the infrastructure in North Oz. In 45, if the Japanese player didn't concede because nearly all his oil is in my hands or bombed into dust, I am confident that I could seize all or nearly all the high victory value sites within and bordering on the SRA, open a sea supply route to China, and win a decisive victory without using the A-bomb.
Sure, things can go wrong. My carriers could get a reverse Midway somewhere, but even though the first couple islands in the campaign would make substandard bases, in general, I like the odds. I wouldn't even have to use my carriers for most of the Darwin-based campaign, because so much of it would occur within land-based air cover range.
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RE: Can the map of Australia be improved? - 
Road, rail to Darwin - 
. As I see it, the main trust of the argument is: 
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