Adnan Meshuggi
Posts: 2220
Joined: 8/2/2001 Status: offline
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ORIGINAL: IronDuke Hello, Adnan. quote:
ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi Well, here i think is the difference of opinion I doubt any chance for the brits to land and risk 2 divisions and do significant damage in 1941. Sure, they could do land em, but a.) they need the troops to do so and they have not the trained troops for this in 1941 b.) they need the will to kill these troops in a sucide action. Cause there is no hope for them to stay and live. c.) you cut only the british supply line with such action. The germans transported their supply by sea. The brits were untill the end of the war unable to cut off the german troops in northern norway. I don't think the Allies did too badly in 1940 when invading. They were defeated, but I don't think they had a problem getting troops ashore. The Kriegsmarine lost 10 destroyers (if memory serves) off Narvik and I seem to remember a Cruiser or two going down as well (Blucher?). I don't think the RN would have had a problem securing the sea approaches to wherever they chose to land. The Bismark was sunk in May 41, so was no longer a threat. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were too lightly armed, and Tirpitz was still in training in the middle of 1941, although at a pinch could have been committed. More imprtantly, Churchill had form. I agree a British attack was unlikely in mid-41, but it was certainly feasible. Churchill had form in the Aegean and with most of the Wehrmacht committed in Russia, I think it was correct to be prudent. quote:
d.) IMPORTANT is, that i did not say the germans withdraw all troops. I said they withdraw the troops that are there cause hitler had his trousers wet. And this are the 4-5 divisions. Hitler did send the subs AGAINST the will of the navy to northern noway, they wanted them in the northern atlantic, with better weather (yeah, everything is relative ) and more time to hunt down british ships... Does anyone have an OOB for the Occupation Army in Norway? Looking at Ellis's WWII databook, I can only trace 7 divisions in Norway in June 41: The 69th, 181st, 196th, 199th, 214th, 702nd, 710th, and from September 1941, 5th Mountain. I think 4-5 would have left just 2-3 divisions covering an awful lot of coastline. I also don't think it is too feasible to think you can lighten the numbers of men on the understanding you can take it back if it is captured. It doesn't make military sense to lightly guard anything, as casualties will be incurred and resources wasted in any attempt to re-invade. quote:
e.) narvik and norway was a sideshow, important only in the winter (frozen baltic sea, no iron ore transports for around 6 months) and without the strong proallied attitude of the norwegian i doubt that the germans had tried to conquer it. The brits had this plan and because of the altmark-thing and the lax reaction of the norwegians, hitler made a fast decision. So he beat the brits for 1 day ! f.) norway in 1941 was more like france 1941... a conquered country, but you could live really good there. No much partisan activity, the people wanted no more war... No iron ore transports for around six months makes Narvik rather crucial, I think. I don't think sideshow does it justice. The Reich needed that iron ore. quote:
So, you would be 100% right if the germans would need a lot time and ressources and men to remove a landing of brits in norway, but 1.) the brits have no capacity to land 2.) the brits have no men to land 3.) the brits have no material they could spend 4.) the brits could have landed at any time in the war at any location in norway. To prohibe an invaion of norway, you need a lot more troops as the germans ever had in norway. But to HOLD the country against german counterattacks you need a lot more troops as it is worth. So the brits never did an invasion but they bluffed hitler... I think the British actually had the capacity to do all these things, but chose to do other things instead (chiefly in the Med). The recources and capacity was there but sent elsewhere, but Hitler could not have known this. He knew Britian could make trouble, but could not know where. quote:
Finally, to come back to the original point there would be no british invasion in 1941 in norway, so these troops used in russia could have done better there. How big the chances of an "winning point at leningrad" are with these men (one or anohter way used), is the interesting thing. If sucsessfull, you can send the whole 18.Army to norway... more as enough to reconquer norway against the brits in 1942... As I mentioned above, I don't think you could get that many troops out of Norway, but Leningrad was left alone for good reasons. I don't think these infantry troops would have made any difference. Ultimately, German offensives in the east were usually led by mobile formations. These divisions were not mobile. They would not have been able to decisively affect any of the major campaigns. Even if produced at Operation Typhoon, they would not have been able to help the German armoured and motorised formations make the encirclement. They would have been a help in reducing any subsequent pocket, but since it was never formed, then their use would only have been as extra troops to fight the counteroffensive that followed Typhoon. quote:
But, maybe you can dig out some sources about a possible landing in norway by the brits - my idea is, this would be the best, the bris could have done - for the germans. Brits had no battleship ready worth the name, they lacked a lot ships (so they urgently needed the landlease-destroyers from the americans) and had virtually no more battletroops ready to fight (all the good stuff was first in greece, crete and then in africa - loosing africa would have hurt the brits more as the temporally loss of the norwegian iron ore transport route... my opinion. So, in short, the brits would have lost ten time more as the germans and this wasn´t worth the risk. With or without 5 extra divisions.... but this is still the sideshow... I don't think the British needed much after Bismarck was sunk. they could still have mustered a number of Battleships in mid 1941, and 2-3 small Carriers. The American lend lease escort destroyers were primarily for the north atlantic convoy routes, but the British could have mustered a good number of Destroyers for a temporary operation in Norway. Again, it might have meant a lessoning of operations in Africa, but it was certainly on, and Hitler couldn't be sure, without hindsight, what would happen. quote:
do you have any idea what effect the surplus of these 5 divisons worth of men had had on the Leningrad scenario ? I honestly don't think any. The encirclement of Leningrad ended when motorised formations were stopped in their tracks. I don't think extra infantry (if not motorised) would have affected the situation that much. At least not in an offensive capacity. As I mentioned above, foot infantry reduced pockets, mobile infantry supported the Armour in creating them. Extra infantry would not have won the war in the east in 1941, only extra armour and mobile infantry would. Regards, John. Hi Duke, well, as mentioned earlier - the numbers (5) was raised by somebody else. I didn´t dig too much into the strength of troops in norway, but i have tjhe german KTB, so i could look into it. For the british capabilities... look - we speak about spring 41. At this stage of the war, the brits had zero chance do do anything significant in norway (but i welcome any discussion with material for a "what if" scenario) I belive this, cause a.) the brits throw into the med everything they had (that was worth something), so i doubt the brits could do simultanous greece/africa in Sumer/Autum 41 AND in norway. b.) if the speak "Before" Bismark, i agree the brits would underestimate the german navy, cause they sunk 3 cruisers and 10 detroyers in 1940. On the other side, without the huge failures of the german torpedos, the brits had lost around 40.000 men by drowning... also at last one battleship. In 1941, the germans had more subs, better working torpedos and way more experience. So any british landing (at any place in norway) had been really costly. More costly as the brits could effort at this stage of the war. if we speak about "Post-Bismark", i belive the brits would have done nothing until Tirpitz is sunk. They overestimated him and never had risked the invasion forces against him. Cause no british ship was (and in the opinion of the british navy not even a bunch of such ships were) able to hold back him. So risking troops or important ships for a short break in summer is not realistic. But just let us think about the plan to do so. If the brits land in norway, say in the middle of the coast, to cut of narvik and the german iron ore convoys (in winter), the brits need to feed and supply these troops. Germany had a surplus of troops, but did not use em properly (so we discuss this event ) So again i miss the importance of a short break of supply (just remember, the germans get their iron ore all the time from sweden through the baltic sea... it is NOT winter). The brits can´t hold norway (Not even a very small area) AND hold in africa. The loss of africa would hurt the empire much more as the germans a 6 months convoy stop in summer 41. The brits used anything they had in the med and partly in the pacific. Sure, they had troops in england, but they still had to stay em there and also these unexperienced troops would have been just prey. For a sucsessfull operation the brits need a lot ships, they have to withdraw from other areas. Also the concentration of important ships in the "german" sea make them very vulnerable to sub/air attacks. So, if catched in summer 41 by german forces (and remember, to withdraw air forces you do not need a lot time) they brits would get slaughtered, cause everything is outside the british fighterscreen. This operation was way too risky and the jackpot was nil. Even in 44 they did not this, cause it would not bring a huge impact. In 44 they had the material to do so, but not in 41 or 42. For the russian impact of say 2 divisions. I remember some phases of the advance in that even one single inf-division could have bring the decision. Esp. in July and august, as the russians counterattacked, one inf-division could bring a huge bonus, save armored equippment and hold the advance forces in better shape. This would bring the fall of leningrad, not the troops itself as an advance force. For the importance of Leningrad - Hitler had a strong reaction because of the explosive traps in kiev. But if the german troops had taken it (even if suffering HUGE losses through this traps) the improvement would be 1000x times better. So many troops would have been freed for other operations that any risk should have been taken. THe reduce of troops in norway would be a great beginning. About the Strength in Norway... i look and find: 3.9.1941 (2 months in the russian operation): III. finns corps with 3.finn.Div, parts of SS "N" (i bet against the russians in northern norwa) H.Kdo XXXVL. corps with 6.finn , 169, and the other Part of SS "N" (dito) Geb. Korps Norwegen with 2,3, Geb. DIV (again northern norway) Abschnitts-Standort Nord-Norwegen (occupationforce northern norway) 792, + 199 ID XXXIII. Corps: 196. and 181. ID LXX Corps: 69., 214, 710. ID Reserve: the 6. Geb.Div (i bet for northern norway against the russians), also the 163. ID After looking about certain lists, i think the problem was not the "overloading" of norway in 1941, but this behaviour in france... here they hat the 15. Army wih 17 ID-Div, the Group NL with 2 Div, the 1 Army with 2 Panzerbrigaden /100 and 101 + 5 ID) and the 7. Army with 1 Panzerdiv + 14 ID (summary of 44 ID-Divisions.. So i would change the theory of "too much troops in norway (maybe one division (the 169. ID) could have withdrawn) but from france the germans could have withdraw easily 10 Divisions... if a landing in norway was not doable in 1941, a similar operation for france was not even something the brits plan. Soi would suggest, for our "what if" we withdraw 5 Inf-Div. or 1 Panzer-Div and 2 mot.ID (by taking most trucks from the other divisions and 2 extra art-regs) in sumer 41 as an replacemet of losses in HG North. For norway, if i overlook the numbers (and there are still tonns of special units that are not listed) the norwegian borders are still ultra-thin. So the question is, why do the brits not risk such operation. I bet, cause the risk was way to high. But you are welcome for any what-if. Well, a last comment: the 3 british carriers can do virtually nothing. The planes are not worth something against landbased fighters... so they could do something against the german surface-vessels, but realistic they would just die. But maybe we could muster such invasion force... what do you belive, how many troops do the brits need ? how many support ships ? how long to take the journey? what date would be the best? what losses do you calculate for them? what impact would this had on the overall war ? positive or negative for the allies..?
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Don't tickle yourself with some moralist crap thinking we have some sort of obligation to help these people. We're there for our self-interest, and anything we do to be 'nice' should be considered a courtesy dweebespit
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