Greg Wilmoth
Posts: 50
Joined: 2/18/2001
From: Scottsdale, Arizona, USA
Status: offline
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
[B]Well, I would differ with you both on some of the finer points of detail. IMO most of the powers (possibly even Japan) knew exactly what they were getting after the first or second design go-round, with respect to durability, speed, diving/climbing characteristics, roll rate, and all that. The real question is whether or not they a) could produce a/c with different characteristics, and, b) wanted to.
I think until the aircraft were actually flown an element of uncertainty remained. For example, R. J. Francillon in his book Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War states the Japanese Army was disappointed the Ki-61 did not reach the expected speed. This was after a considerable investment of time, talent and resources. And then there is the problem of bugs, like the tendency of the B-29's engines to catch fire on takeoff. I don't think this could have been forseen, except in the general sense that the development was rushed and something was likely to cause trouble. With regard to "a," I don't think there was a problem with the ability of the Japanese to design higher performance aircraft, but building them was a problem. Regarding "b," I think the issues are more complicated than just "wanting to," if for no other reason that there are always tensions regarding design between the military, the engineers, and the industrialists. Richard Overy makes the point in The War In The Air that the military in Japan and Germany had the final say in these questions, and the result was too many different designs and too many modifications to existing designs at the expense of new improved designs. The governments of the US, Britain, and in its own way the Soviet Union, insisted that the viewpoints of the engineers (design) and the industrialists (production) received equal consideration.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
Consider the P38... everyone knew from the YP38 platforms that they had a pretty good a/c. It was *very* (very very!!) fast for its, uh, design window (1940-ish for the YP variants). Likewise, the Japanese knew that the A6M had control problems at higher speeds (problem of having a thin-skinned a/c and huge control surfaces) but made no efforts to alter it until the A6M5.
According to the Zero designer (whathisname) in Eagles of Mitsubishi, the IJN kept insisting on upgrades to the Zero (I don't remember which ones) which absorbed the available engineering talent and delayed development the A7M. But then maybe this is a strategy choice that ought to be included in the game.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
I for one do *not* view the US/European focus on speed and hitting power as a design strategy that evolved by accident or through, say, some kind of selective pressure induced by combat losses (though I'm not sure that you implied that, grumbler, I may just be reading your post wrong). All the Euro/US and even the Soviet designers were going that way. Japan took a turn down a different path in the 1930s and it was just the wrong path.
Actually, I did imply that, but on the basis of relative differences. In other words, they had to tailor their tactics to handle more maneuverable Japanese aircraft in a way they wouldn't have to against some other country's aircraft that might be equally or less maneuverable. To me that is a tactical improvisation based on specific circumstances and different from the deliberate design decisions you mention. I basically agree with you that the US and the European powers opted for speed and hitting power, although only late in the 1930s. Experience in Spain was important, especially to the Germans, in deciding speed was more important than maneuveablity. The Italians were not so discerning. What I've read suggests the Japanese designers of the period were pushing designs with more speed when the pilots wanted more maneuverability. Japanese designs seemed to be based on their experience in China, which was very different from Spain. And the technology was expensive and changing very fast. Let's not forget the US still had biplane fighters on some carriers in 1939.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
One reason for the Euro/US/USSR focus on speed and hitting power may have been the perceived threat from strategic bombers and high-speed medium bombers. And though it was known by all that the US was making efforts there, no one (outside of the USAAF) expected the development of a really long range bomber. So maybe Japan simply saw no threat in the vast reaches of the Pacific and from the ultra-underdeveloped nations in close proximity to the home islands. And of course, the analyses of the Spanish Civil War already pointed to the importance of speed in "pursuit" a/c.
Agreed, although the RAF was pushing bombers too. Designers in different countries tried to come up with specialized interceptor types of fighters (Japanese J2N "Jack" for instance), but the arrival of radar made this approach less important.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
Greg, it is just *not* true that US pilots learned hit and run tactics as a result of attrition in 1942. Jimmy Thach was devising tactics for using the F4F against more maneuverable forces in 1940 and put his tactics to the test in Army-Navy trials (P40s vs F4Fs) in mid 1941. Zoom and boom was the tactical doctrine for the USN/USMC thereafter. The USAAF and Commonwealth forces were all thoroughly retrained beginning in late 1940 based on UK analyses of tactics and results from 1940 (resulting in the abandonment of linear formations and big sections in favor of 4-plane sections divisible as two mutually supporting units of 2 a/c.)
This is news to me, although I can't dispute it. Of course there is always the problem of dissemination and indoctrination of doctrine. Certainly many an allied pilot in the first year of the war succumbed to the temptation to mix it up with a Zero or Oscar and paid dearly for it. The Brits must have moved very fast in their retraining since I believe they fought the Battle of Britain in the fall of 1940 using fighter tactics based on the three plane "vic."
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
It shows too. I posted a brief analysis of Frank's loss list on the "a/c attributes" section in the GGPW discussion (blown away by the recent web-reset). F4Fs in 1942 typically shot down as many or more A6Ms in combat than they lost at Guadalcanal. (Claims that the Zekes were lost in surface attack, or that the numbers are affected by a/c losses due to CV loss are incorrect since both were excluded from that analysis).
Sorry I didn't get to see that.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
More than that, there are plenty of sources describing huge IJN losses at Coral Sea as a result of a/a combat.
I wonder how well the US Navy and Army shared tactical lessons.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
What I'd like to see is a good assessment of USAAF a/c vs IJN/IJA a/c for the period from January through April 1941 that excludes US a/c destroyed on the ground. I think that what you will find is that US a/c were only badly trounced when they had little warning of an incoming raid (& were at a tactical disadvantage at the onset of combat). The only consistent losers in the non-Chinese Allied a/c pool will be Hurricanes, F2s and P39s.
Don't know. I'd like to see that too.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
(A shame that last one. With a decent supercharger the P39 would have wiped the slate against any Japanese a/c built through 1943).
Reading Eric Bergerund's Fire In The Sky, a lack of warning of an incoming raid was responsible for a lot of the P-39 losses at Port Morseby. The development of engines and superchargers is a whole other story and interesting in its own right. I've read partisans of the P-38 and P-40 who felt the same sense of shortchange regarding superchargers.
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