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RE: Kitikami and Oi

 
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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/28/2004 3:54:48 AM   
grumbler

 

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From: Falls Church VA USA
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quote:

ORIGINAL: SpitfireIX

First of all, I haven't seen any evidence that the radar was operational any significant portion of the time--as I mentioned, it could have been down for modification or repairs a lot, and operators might have needed a lot of on-the-job training. In fact, the one source we've seen so far states that it was "experimental."
True, but many aircraft appear when they were still "experimental." Japanese LCU values are based on what they achieved in spite of the fact that their tactics in 1941 were "experimental." Lacking evidence that the radar sets were not, in fact, operational, i would say the burden is on you.

quote:

But even if it does turn out that the radar was operationally effective by the end of 1941, this still goes to the issue of whether the Japanese high command could realistically have assigned these units to escort the carriers.
Not an issue, because I AM the Japanese High Command!

(in reply to SpitfireIX)
Post #: 31
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/28/2004 8:54:35 AM   
SpitfireIX


Posts: 264
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From: Fort Wayne IN USA
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quote:

ORIGINAL: grumbler

quote:

ORIGINAL: SpitfireIX

First of all, I haven't seen any evidence that the radar was operational any significant portion of the time--as I mentioned, it could have been down for modification or repairs a lot, and operators might have needed a lot of on-the-job training. In fact, the one source we've seen so far states that it was "experimental."


True, but many aircraft appear when they were still "experimental." Japanese LCU values are based on what they achieved in spite of the fact that their tactics in 1941 were "experimental."


Your analogies are specious. Which aircraft appear while they are still "experimental?" In fact, the P-38 doesn't even begin to arrive until late 1942, when several earlier marks had already been produced by the hundreds and entered service (even in the Pacific theater). The B-29 first flew in 1942, and so did the first Hellcat. The first Avenger flew in the summer of 1941. I could go on and on.

Exactly how were the Japanese tactics "experimental?" Are you possibly alluding to an alleged lack of combat experience? If so, you are forgetting that the IJA had been fighting in China for years. And even if your claim of "experimental" tactics had any merit, to liken the success of untried army units against the even greener, ill-supplied, ill-equipped units the Allies had in the field early in the war to the development of a radical new technology is absurd.

quote:

Lacking evidence that the radar sets were not, in fact, operational, i would say the burden is on you.


I have given my evidence--the web page referenced in this thread states that the Type 13 radar was deployed "experimentally" in 1941, but not "operationally" until March 1943.

It further states that the "Oi, Kitagami [sic] " received the Type 13 radar in 1941 "month unknown."

The burden is now on you to either show that a) my evidence is incorrect, or b) that "experimental" radar should have similar capabilities to "operational" radar in game terms. Your two fatuous analogies do nothing to advance your argument.

quote:


quote:

But even if it does turn out that the radar was operationally effective by the end of 1941, this still goes to the issue of whether the Japanese high command could realistically have assigned these units to escort the carriers.
Not an issue, because I AM the Japanese High Command!


I reiterate what I told Twotribes: If you want to modify the database to give your favorite side ahistorical advantages, or pursue ahistorical strategies, and your opponent is amenable, knock yourself out. But I'm talking about making the unmodified database as historical as possible.

Furthermore, if you want to argue that as the Japanese high command you can do anything you want, then I will argue that as the Allied Pacific theater commander, I order all units to full alert at 12:30 a.m. Hawaii time on December 7, because I can use my hindsight. I also want to order that all faulty torpedoes be immediately fixed. I'll also argue that I should be able to have free setup, because I could have used my hindsight to reorganize all the Allied forces in the Pacific during November 1941.

_____________________________

"I know Japanese. He is very bad. And tricky. But we Americans too smart. We catch him and give him hell."

--Benny Sablan, crewman, USS Enterprise 12/7/41

(in reply to grumbler)
Post #: 32
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/28/2004 3:35:29 PM   
Feinder


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From: Land o' Lakes, FL
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Boy, this little cat-fight has is almost interesting.

And FYI
quote:

Which aircraft appear while they are still "experimental?"


The Tojos that are based next to Hong Kong on 12-07-41 were "experimental". There is only one sqdn in-game. It did indeed exist historically, even tho it was the only squadron, and was deployed to the China theater for further "refinement". The Tojo was not deployed operationally (throughout the Pacific), until late '42 or early '43 however.

You may now resume your regularly scheduled bickering.

-F-

_____________________________

"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me


(in reply to SpitfireIX)
Post #: 33
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 10/4/2004 9:51:03 PM   
Onime No Kyo


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If I may be so bold, I submit that you guys are going off on tangents. First of all, the employment of radar (whether it was actually effective or not) with the carrier forces was a doctrinal issue. The KB was tasked with finding enemy carriers and had its own search and warning capabilities. The battle line was tasked with finding the enemy battle line. Having the radar-equiped ships with the battle line actually makes more sense than having them with the KB (provided the radar actually worked).

Secondly, there is enough coroborative evidence to argue that neither the Japanese, nor in fact the USN, managed to successfully mate a decent radar set with competent operators with a command structure that could appreciate and use these advantages correctly until well into 1943.

Thus, I think having 2 CLs equpped with radar should really not give the Japanese any great advantage.

_____________________________

"Mighty is the Thread! Great are its works and insane are its inhabitants!" -Brother Mynok

(in reply to SpitfireIX)
Post #: 34
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 10/4/2004 10:24:15 PM   
Feinder


Posts: 6589
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From: Land o' Lakes, FL
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

If I may be so bold, I submit that you guys are going off on tangents



On these boards? Never!
.
.
.
.
I do believe you are correct sir!

-F-

_____________________________

"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me


(in reply to Onime No Kyo)
Post #: 35
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 10/16/2004 5:06:37 PM   
asdicus

 

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From: Surrey,UK
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I would like to 'stir the pot' a bit regarding the scenario 15 installation of Type 13 radar on Kitakami and Oi in late 1941.

Without seeing this post I have already mentioned in the OOB comments thread that this radar installation is almost certainly wrong. To summarise type 13 airsearch radar was only developed mid 1943 and fitted from early 1944. It was a more reliable supplement to the Type 21 airsearch set. To support this view see the nakagawa and lacroix and wells books. Nakagawa interviewed many of the radar development technicians - the lacroix and wells book is wellknown for its impecable list of sources. The star-games.com japanese radar website offers no references to support the information presented.

If radar installations are important to the setting of CAP etc on carriers then this oob issue is important - otherwise how are the americans supposed to have the chance to surprise the japanese eg at midway ?

(in reply to Oznoyng)
Post #: 36
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 10/16/2004 7:49:21 PM   
esteban


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The American airstrikes didn't surprise the Japanese at Midway, they were prepared for the attacks that came from Midway itself, and the American torpedo bombers. The problem was, all the torpedo bombers drew the Japanese fighters down to low altitudes, and then the dive bombers flew in over the top of the CAP.

I guess that in WitP terms, you could say that the torpedo bomber attacks came initially, against "full" CAP, wore out the CAP, as you see in WitP, and then the dive bombers got through against almost no opposition.

(in reply to asdicus)
Post #: 37
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 10/16/2004 8:21:40 PM   
asdicus

 

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I would prefer not to get into a heavy debate on the meaning of surprise re the midway airstrikes.

The usa divebomber attack was able to land bombs on flightdecks covered with rearming aircraft and sundry aircraft munitions. If the japanese had any prior knowledge of attack they would have tried to avoid such a situation ! By contrast the japanese strikes were well spotted in advance by us radar allowing aircraft to flyoff and fuel systems to be drained etc. Airsearch radar allowed this to happen - this option should not be available to the japanese so early in the war.

In game terms on the older dos based pacific war I have seen usa surprise air attacks make all the difference in carrier battles - a nice feature I would like to see repeated in witp. This is why I mentioned the oob issue in the first place.

(in reply to esteban)
Post #: 38
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 10/25/2004 2:28:19 PM   
Desertmole


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The problem, as I see it, is that the Japanese admirals have even less appreciation for, or even mistrust of radar than the US admirals did. It was probably thought of as a novelty, and not taken seriously.

One thing that I always was surprised by was the lack of employment of the Oi and Kitakami with other surface forces in the Solomans. They would have been naturals in the various engagements throughout 1942 and 43. Always seemed like a waste of a valuable asset. Did either ever launch a Long Lance in anger?

(in reply to asdicus)
Post #: 39
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 11/8/2004 6:15:02 AM   
Tanaka


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Joined: 4/8/2003
From: USA
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Interesting that the refits gradually reduce the torp battery to zero. Who will allow this refit??? Especially as the second converts it into a kaiten hen. No kaitens in the game.



I dont see this in the ship database. The torps stay the same with the upgrades.

< Message edited by Tanaka -- 11/7/2004 11:24:08 PM >


_____________________________


(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 40
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 11/16/2004 5:10:11 AM   
spence

 

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From: Vancouver, Washington
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The issue of "operational" rather than just "installed" is important. The American air search radars were installed and an operational doctrine was in use which attempted to analyze radar data in a timely fashion and pass the information and analysis to the commander. The doctrine was not well developed but it was in place.

I would submit that the Japanese had no such doctrine until much later in the war and that it hardly advanced out of its infancy before there was no Navy to use it. I don't have the data handy right now but think that even a truly hardcore IJN Fanboy would have to admit they aren't too impressed by the AA armament of the HIJMS Kitakami/Oi in Dec 1941. If these ships were envisioned to contribute to air defense it only makes sense to arm them with air defense weapons systems and lots of them. Now take a look at the IJN's air defense destroyer (Akitsukis or something like that): they've got 8 of the IJN's best heavy flak gun but huh? what's missing??
AN AIR SEARCH RADAR. Clearly evidence that the IJN didn't even envision a role for radar in 1941.
The Player may be the Supreme Commander but he starts with the situation as of 12/07/41. Although the player is a farsighted and indeed brilliant commander he has not been allowed rewrite the history of the IJN for the past few years to include his fight with the bureaucrats in the IJN BBUSHIPS to spring for all the expense of selecting a vendor, contracting for mass production of the systems, establishing training facilities and programs to make this a part of IJN warfighting. Nope - what he's got is a couple of electronic gizmos that usually light up and make a kind of hmmmmmmmmm noise on the bridge or in the chartroom of HIJMS Kitakami/Oi and some poor Ensigns' signatures who promised not to break it.

(in reply to Tanaka)
Post #: 41
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