TIMJOT
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Timjot -
The a/c stats are necessary because other posters have suggested that the Japanese fielded a/c that were comparable or better in performance than allied a/c. Those stats were not directed at you in particular, as I am sure you are somewhat aware of them. I'll post a/c performance stats whenever someone makes a claim that I can verify is false. I'm sure it is commonly the case that such folks are working from memory, or from one source. I typically use 4 a/c sources as general references, the one I cited above being the most portable.
As to the rest of your post.
"You really have been quite hypocritical on this point."
Let's not get "personal," shall we.
"On the one hand you say combat expirence and lessons learned from it were insignificant in developing successful tactics in the Pacific war. On the other hand you site examples of Spain and BOB were combat expirence did have a significant impact on tactics and training."
I think we have a failure to communicate. "Experience" in the broadest sense has consistently driven the design *goals* of aircraft designers. Experience has shown repeatedly that, all other things being equal, speed wins. Increasing aircraft speed was the principle design goal of designers in WW1, and again starting in the mid 1930s. It was the design goal of the major post WW2 superpowers, and it remains a desirable advantage today, although there are some problematic structural limitations to the maximum sustainable airspeed for a/c currently in production. The advent of the a-a missile also has changed combat towards a more balanced equation of speed and maneuverability, IMO, because a-a missiles are generally faster than the targets at which they get launched.
Over the years, even in the 1930s, some a/c tactics were consistently worked on to give pilots with speedy a/c the advantage. So, when I say "boom and zoom" was a premium starting in the late 1930s, I'm saying that pilots knew (and were trained to know) where the main strengths of their a/c lay. These points were debated beginning about the time of teh Spanish Civil War, when it became apparent that high speed interceptors were catching up to the speeds of mulit-engined bombers. Some other tactical considerations were worked out in combat, and fairly quickly I might add, for example the change from the 3-plane Vic resulting from the BOB that you and I agree occurred.
USAAF guys studied the BOB with the advise and consent of the UK. That's why the USAAF and USN were flying 4-plane two element sections prior to US entry. Other tactics that specifically gave the F4F a distinct advantage over the A6M, specifically the weave that came to be called the "Thach Weave" were developed situationally. But weaves in general and weaves in support of wingmen were generally known from WW1. (*A note on the Thach Weave. First really implemented in a widespread fashion at Santa Cruz, the F4Fs ate veteran A6M pilots for lunch. Prior to that tactic, the F4F+pilot was the Zeke's equal. Afterwards, Japanese attrition rates soared, and the F4F+pilot became a better instrument of aerial warfare than the A6M+pilot).
"Wasnt it Chenaults expirence in China that led to the tactics used so successfully by the "Flying Tigers" early in the war?"
No it was not. The AVG did not see combat until 1942. Chennault and other army instructors were talking about mutually supporting wingmen and boom and zoom tactics in 1941, long before the first engagement between any Allied and Japanese pilot happened.
"You tend to rely on performance specs and tactical theory to make your points, where I rely on actual personal accounts. "
See: Fire in the Sky by Eric Bergerud that includes brief discussions of the relative merits of the early war a/c, and also includes "personal accounts" of P40 drivers that support almost everything I've said in this forum. See also Frank's Guadalcanal, and look at a/c losses. I posted an analysis of the losses a long long time ago in the GGPW forum and it has probably been archived. At Guadalcanal, USMC/USN pilots achieved the following: 1.6:1 Japanese losses to US losses, all a/c, all types, all missions. 1.2:1 American losses to Japanese losses including only fighters (reasonably, since bombers were apt to be shot down in surface attack). 1.1:1 Japanese losses to American losses when only F4Fs are counted (because there are *no* accounts of a P39 shooting down a Zeke over the canal in 1942 and because P39s were used primarily in ground support mode and because I would never argue that the P39+pilot combination was a better *fighter* than the A6M+pilot. It's a technical specs thing.)
"You state that; "The AVG guys pretty much knew how to fly boom and zoom" Well yes, all pilots know how to dive and climb their aircraft and that its advantageous to have altitude on your foe. Thats a far cry from actually developing combat tactics specifically utilizing this technique."
Mmm. You seem to be saying that a person does not train to fly their a/c to its strengths until after they've seen some of their friends shot down in combat as a result of not flying their a/c to their strengths. Until they've been in combat, they tend to fly their a/c according to what rules, then? Either I'm not following your argument (probably), or your argument is, uh, reducible to the statement that 'pilots train to fly their a/c to maximize their opponent's abilities.' This can't be what you mean.
"Is it just coincidence that the AVG faired considerably better than there PI, and DEI counterparts under similar circumstances and odds?"
The circumstances and odds were not remotely comparable. The vast majority of AVG fighter opponents were Oscars, and planes that were even less airworthy, and the vast majority of AVG kills were bombers, who were on many occasions unescorted. The PI pilots in late '41 and early '42 had no logistical support, very little early warning, and faced an opponent that had more airbases and more aircraft in easy range of their airfield than they had. As to the NEI groups, I'm still waiting for your OOB listing the P40 a/c groups stationed tehre, and a detailed breakdown of their losses. Like I said, Sakai's recollection on the matter is pretty worthless to me with respect to allied losses.
"You like to speak of the importance of "Situational Awareness" which I grant you is very important in combat. But how does one maintain situational awareness when one does not know the "SITUATION" "
It comes down to this. From a P40 driver's perspective in 1941, the best tactic is to keep the airspeed up. Period. Whether your opponent is an ME109, an A6M2, an F4F in interservice wargames, a Hurricane, a P36, or a rumoured aircraft with high maneuverability and low speed, the answer is the same. Speed and safety and the ability to control an air combat go hand in hand. Less speed means less safety and less ability to control the combat. Period.
Since air to air combat bleeds energy, it is easy for a fellow in the heat of battle to lose situational awareness. One aspect of the latter is airspeed. If a P40 pilot, or any other pilot of a speed-maximized plane (like the ME109, or even a lowly Crate) lets his airspeed drop, he cedes control of the battle to any opponent who has not let his airspeed drop. It tended to happen to all combatants in all theaters that new pilots were more likely to lose airspeed in this way and to neglect it, often, to unfortunate ends. Vis the A6M *specifically* this was very bad, because losing airspeed played to the A6Ms strengths to a greater degree than say, losing airspeed in combat with a slowly turning ME109.
The point in all cases remains the same. Against any opponent it is always better to have a speed advantage if you can get it. US pilots did not need to be trained specifically to fight the Zero and they did not have to have fought Zeros to know what the right thing to do with a P40 was. The Zeros simply made the same lessons that were instilled in training "more real" if you will.
The Zeke guys had the same relatinoship between doctrine and combat experience. Their plane was *not* a speed demon. They were trained to fly to its strengths, principally low-speed maneuverability. The Zeke pilots learned that it was unwise to try to turn with a fast moving P40, or a diving F4F, and that in a face-to-face head on approach run, the enemy planes were better. Unfortunately for the Japanese, knowing not to try to keep pace with a P40 does not solve the immediate problem of winning (or even escaping) an air to air combat. If you let the P40 outrun you, the P40 can return at will in circumstances that favor the P40. It happened all the time. (See, again, Fire in the Sky for some of those pilot accounts). The faster plane controls the fight. Period.
"Thats why the US rotated combat experience pilots back to the states to be instructors. Thats why the US consistently turned out superior pilots throughout the war. Conversly thats why the inabilitly of the Luftwaffe and the unwillingness of Japan to do the same resulted in a severe drop in their respective pilot quality."
Japanese pilot quality dropped because Japan could not train pilots fast enough. Even if it could have done so, it could not build capable a/c fast enough. That the Japanese failed to rotate their veterans contributed to the decline, both by failing to move front line "wisdom" to rear areas, as you suggest, and because all pilots needed to be rotated or their flying skills deteriorated.
"he fact that zekes were present isnt necessarily significant because most of them were quite busy straffing the airfields at the time."
IIRC. Welsh was credited with 1 Zeke and two bombers confirmed at PH. You can do your own web poking (I don't mean that negatively) to verify. The P40s fought with Zekes and around Zekes at PH. It's hard to see how much more detail you want, or how much effort is really justified in dismissing results because circumstances were momentarily exceptional. In most a/a combat, circumstances are momentarily exceptional. [/B][/QUOTE]
Hi Mdiehl
Sorry about the "hypocrite" remark. Nothing personal intended. Maybe "contridictory" would be a better word.
On the one hand you state that
A)The Germans gained invaluable combat experience in Spain, which helped them to develope superior tactical doctorine.
B)The British learned from their expiernces in France 40 and early BOB, that their tactical doctorine was flawed.
C)The US learned from studying both the Luftwaffe and RAF in the BOB.
All of which I agree with, but on the other hand you
Totally discount the value of combat expirence in the pacifiic theater. In regards to developing effective tactics and pilot efficiency.
Now down to business....
Mdeihl says: "All things being equal speed wins" ;
True but all things were not equal in 41 and would not be equal in 43 either if there is no war in 42. The Japanese army and navy rotated their pilots into the china theater to get combat expirence. So most of their pilots had at least some compat expirence in 41/42. Not to mention the combat expirence they would gain from their attack south in 42.
Mdeihl says: Hmm...you seem to saying that a pilot doesnt fly his a/c to its strengths until he flies in combat.......ect :
No Im saying that strengths are all relative to what your opponents strengths are. A p-40s strength against a zero wouldnt neccessarily be a strength against a 109. The US pilots didnt know what there strengths were relative to the zero initially. They had been told that their a/c were superior to anything the Japs had.
Mdeihl: "No it was not, the AVG didnt see combat until 1942"
Yes, Mdiehl, but Chenault had been in China as an intructor and observer for the Chinese Nationist AF, since 1937. He was responsible for the first combat reports on the zero and oscars and proceeded in developing combat tactics to fight them.
Qutoe: "Flying Tigers"pg76; "Chenault instructed us to forget what we had learned from the US services. He told us not to engaged the enemy unless you have altitude avangtage. Never try to turn with the Jap fighters or climb from it. Use your superior dive speed to make a pass then climb away to regain altitude and to make another pass. Most impotantly keep your air speed up at all times"
Mheihl says: "The circumstances were not even remotely similar"
Actually they were pretty similar. The AVG at least initially had little if any logistical support, Their only warning system were a bunch of chinese peasants looking in the sky. Where as the USAFFE had radar in the PI. They faced an oponent with more airbases and aircraft, in easy striking distance to there airfields; just like in the PI. True they faced mainly Oscars, but the truth is so did USAFFE in PI. The only Zeros were with the IJN 11th Air Flottila, which was withdrawn in January.
RE: allied OOB in Java; I posted it earlier, you must of missed it. Basically 48 RAF Hurricans Flown of HMS Indomitable. The US flew 4 flights of P-40s via Darwin,Timor,Bali,Java air route. The first flight of 13 made it without incident. The following 3 flights all suffered losses in transit. The numbers are a bit scetchy, but at the most an estimated 25-30 US P-40s were operational in Java at one point. Plus 3 squadrons of Dutch Buffalos, 12 Dutch Curtiss 75s(P-36s) and a small number of Dutch P-40s and Hurricans.
Mdiehl: "Read Fire in the Sky"
I did. First "Fire in the sky" covers the NG-Solomons campaign, roughtly July 42 and on, 8 months after the start of the war. But if you insist.
Quote: "Fire in the Sky" Pg.167; pp;US pilots PI tried to dogfight with the Zero with tragic results
Quote "Fire in the Sky"pp;cp5; "By July,allied pilots had pretty much thrown away the book on tactical doctorine and had developed tactics to deal with the circumstances that faced them".
Quote:"Fire in the Sky" The zero in capable hands remaind dangerous...... (example)pp. "The RAF sent a Spitfire wing to Australia,These were BOB vets and didnt want to listen to the advice of there American and Australain counter parts. Unfortuanely they tried to use the tactics that were effective for them in the BOB; they suffered heavy losses. Gradually they learned how best to fight the zero and the losses declined."
What ya know; Your own source kinda refutes your assertion that the US learned the tactics neccessary to combat the zero by studying the BOB.
Mdiehl: "See Also Franks Guadacanal losses"
Guadacanal was fully 10 months after the start of hostilities, Maybe thats where we differ. When I say early in the war I mean roughly the first 6 months of initial combat. During and after of which, it stands to reason that allied pilots through experence would have figured out how best to combat their enemy.
Mdiehl: "Welsh was credited with 1 zeke and 2 bombers."
One zeke hardly constitutes proof that the US knew how to combat the zero on equal terms. It just proves there are always aberations in the realm of combat.
Mdiehl: I respect your body of knowledge on this subject, particularly on the combat performance of WWII aircraft. However I dont really understand how you can continue to argue the insignificance of combat experence; when even your own sources and statements suggest otherwise.
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Regarding the PI, NEI and NG. The P40 series performed pretty credibly in New Guinea in many engagements (see "Fire in the Sky" ... by, uh, Eric Bergerud IIRC). The P40 had a couple of other strengths including that it was faster (max speed, level flight) and had a higher roll rate. The problem with the early engagements in NG (through April) was Port Moresby itself. The A/F there were in a very primitive state. Moreover, in the radar shadow of the major mtn range that separated it from the Japanese airbases, the lead time for getting aloft and in a position to use those a/c strengths against the Zekes was pretty short. The result was that the Japanese could attack in circumstances that gave the P40 drivers the choice between duking it out at slow speed in a turning duel (the Zeke's forte) or running away. They *ought* to have run away... at least initially, long enough to gain an altitude and speed advantage. So in a sense I'm not disputing you about learning from combat experience, but there were circumstances that (as in any air to air combat situtation) mitigated against success in early 1942 in New Guinea. Supply was another problem at the time.
The PI is a different circumstance, I hope you might agree, because the logistical rope was completely broken, the USAAFFE were completely outnumbered, and many of their a/c were destroyed in the initial Japanese raids. Not because of poor combat tactics, but because on 8 December many of them were caught on the ground refueling after a protracted CAP patrol initiated by a false warning of an incoming raid. When you're outnumbered 5:1 or more, you're going to eventually get bounced or just ground down. You can call that bad strategy or poor communication or whatever, but it was much less an issue of pilot training than an issue of upper level management.
Very few P40s saw combat in the NEI. IIRC, Langley was sunk ferrying crated P40s because the local colonial AF had so few first line a/c. Fokkers, F2s, and early US twin engined export bombers. I don't recall the models. If you search the web there are a couple of sites that give OOBs for the Netherland East Indies a/f in Dec 1941. Pretty shocking. IIRC there were a few brief engagements in the island barrier. In some of those circumstances the P40s dealt out considerably more punishment than they received and in others they were on the losing side.
A whole lot seems to have depended on initial conditions in combat, and the pilots ability to recognize that the initial conditions were bad, and his willingness or ability to exit stage left under such circumstances. I think this is the area where Allied pilot wisdom and experience improved the most throughout the war. The ever increasing supply of better a/c, better radar, and better logistics increasingly put them in circumstances where they could control the initial conditions. Or they could run away and "reset" the conditions to be more favorable.
Bear in mind that the USAAF was already heavily invested in the analysis of the results of A/A combat in the ETO by the end of 1940. The quality of US pilot training was very very good in 1941 and 1942. As the veterans were rotated into training duties (the forerunner to the USN Top Gun
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