Major Tom
Posts: 525
Joined: 4/8/2000
From: Canada
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Regarding the defence of the Philippines in 1941-42.
MacArthur believed that his Philippino reservists were able to hold off a strong Japanese landing at Linguayan.
Only arund 1/3 of these soldiers had ever fired a gun, and those that did, only fired off a few rounds.
http://www.freeport-tech.com/WWII/013_usa/philippines/_usaffe.htm
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/index.html
Divisions were composed of only 7000 men. Japanese Divisions were of 13 000. Wherever the Japanese landed (with the 48th Division) they would be of a superior force.
These divisions had virtually no artillery.
So MacArthur believed that his under-equipped, ill trained soldiers could defend a flat plain against a superior force? This was just bad planning. He changed his plan at the last minute, and never adequately prepared a contingency plan. The only real formation was the Philippine (12th) Division, of 1 regiment US troops, 2 regiments Philippine Scouts. These were professional soldiers, but still saw no service. There were not comitted until the later stages of the Battle of Bataan.
The main problem experienced by the Americo-Philippino forces was by the time of capitulation, they were so undernourished (due to no food or medical supplies) that a greater number died on the Death March that would had they have been adequately supplied. MacArthur refused to set aside enough transport to move the stockpiles from Clark Field and Fort Doneldson to their original depots in the Bataan peninsula. MacArthur even refused to confescate stockpiles from private storage, and downdressed officers who proposed such actions. MacArthur ordered Bataan defended to the last man, and was furious with General King (commander of Philippine forces on Bataan after Wainwright took over command at Corregidor) when he finally surrendered at Bataan when the Japanese broke through the last defensive perimeter.
He was disliked by many soldiers on Bataan (Dougout Doug), since, unlike during the later part of the war, he NEVER toured the front, and led from behind.
The defeat WAS inevitable, but it could have been less deadly to the defenders.
In regards to the loss of the Air Force. MacArthur REFUSED to give Bereton permission to launch an attack on Formosa. The best thing Bereton could do was to keep the bombers in the air (which they were all morning, and landed only to refuel and eat lunch, which was the wrong time!). In fact, had they launched a B-17 attack on Formosan fields, the result probably would have been that the Japanese suffered horrendous casualties because an early morning fog cancelled actions (and aircraft were on the ground, even after the fog cleared, which was about the time the planned strike would have arrived!).
Corregidor was defended by 2 battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment, plus 2000 soldiers who escaped from Bataan. The remaining 10 000 were rear-area troops and Coastal Artillery troops. There WERE anti-tank guns, 37mm in fact, fully capable of taking out Light Tanks. However, Wainwrigt had enough sense to realize that holding out will only result in the garrison getting weaker and weaker, and more deaths and wanted to avoid a repeat of the Bataan death march.
I saw a documentary on the Canadian History channel comparing what happened to Admiral Kimmel and General MacArthur, which directly stated that MacArthur refused to take any action for 10 critical hours, even after repeated requests by his air and land commanders to do something! There was nothing more that Bereton could do, other than sending the strike out without permission! Going directly against the order of his direct commander!
Leaving Corregidor, to me, is not an issue, neither was Bennett leaving Singapore an issue. These Generals had gained VALUABLE combat experience (as seen in MacArthur since it was not until the 1950's when he repeated his errors of overconfidence in his troops, and severely underating his opponents). It is a pitty Bennett was not offered a chance to use his knowledge in the battles of New Guinea.
80% desertion of the Australian 8th Division? I think not. This has been a comon misconception. Many people judged that any soldier seen with the tilly hat was an Australian soldier. This is not true. Most British soldiers in the theatre were issued this hat in Malaya. There were many British battalions in the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions, as well as the 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigades. These were not professional first line troops. The Australians and the British 18th Division were the best units in the field. The Australians had 2 VERY understrength Brigades, which during the time of the Singapore landings was slated to defend an area that only 2 full divisions could. Chances are, most of the deserters seen were from the 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigades (which saw action only late in the battle, and were very green), or from the remnants of the British battalions of the 11th and 9th Indian Divisions.
50 000 Indian soldiers
30 000 British soldiers
15 000 Australian soldiers
Only about 50% of the British soldiers who were in the theatre were a part of the 18th Division, the remaining 15 000 were in the Malayan Brigades and Indian Divisions.
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I agree with you, after a shakey start, MacArthur and the brave soldiers on PI acquited themselves well.
Even the Japanese commander respnsible for 
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