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Norden Bombsight - 10/9/2004 8:16:21 AM   
Halsey

 

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How is the Norden bombsight modeled into this game? What are its effects on combat, and at what altitude should they have the greatest value?

Does anyone know if all of the newest US med and hvy bombers carried it?
B-17
B-24
B-26
B-25
B-29
Any others?

< Message edited by Halsey -- 10/9/2004 12:16:49 AM >


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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/9/2004 8:33:37 AM   
juliet7bravo

 

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Bottom of the page has a table for bombing accuracy using the Norden sight in the ETO by B-17's and B-24's.

http://www.ww2guide.com/bombs.shtml

"In any case the accuracy achieved in high level bombing missions over Europe proved less than was hoped for, mainly due to the pressures of intense combat and the often poor weather over the continent. But the Norden was good, at least five times more accurate than most RAF bombsights."

"Bombing Accuracy
During the summer of 1944, 47 B-29s raided the Yawata steel works from bases in China; only one plane actually hit the target area, and with only one of its bombs. This single 500 lb general purpose bomb (which hit a powerhouse located 3,700 ft from the far more important coke houses that constituted the raid’s aiming point) represented one quarter of one per cent of the 376 bombs dropped over Yawata on that mission."

"In the fall of 1944, only seven per cent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000ft of their aim point; even a fighter-bomber in a 40 degree dive releasing a bomb at 7,000 ft could have a circular error (CEP) of as much as 1,000 ft. It took 108 B-17 bombers, crewed by 1,080 airmen, dropping 648 bombs to guarantee a 96 per cent chance of getting just two hits inside a 400 by 500 ft area (a German power-generation plant.)"

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/9/2004 9:43:04 AM   
Central Blue

 

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juliet7bravo...

interesting figures when you consider the success of the big carpet bombing to launch Cobra --- after which the big bombers went back to "strategic" assignments.

best regards
Scott Gibbs

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/9/2004 12:15:12 PM   
Belisarius


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You get similar numbers for the pre-Overlord bombings over the Normandy coastal defenses.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/9/2004 7:56:37 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

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The truely strange part of all this is that the British went rather quickly to Night Bombing to avoid
casualties, then found they were lucky to be able to put bombs on the right Province of Germany
and spent the rest of the war working on improving their accuracy. In this they were eventually
successful, and by 1944 their night raids on French Marshalling Yards were actually more accurate
(and devastating) than US Daylight efforts. But the Germans had been working hard too, and by
mid 1944, the British were losing more bombers at night than the US was during the day---94 at
Nuremburg being the record.

The US opted for Daylight Bombing to achieve accuracy, then had to toss it out the window and go
with "formation drops" because if the Bombers split up to bomb individually and accurately they were
dog meat for the German fighters. So they were forced to develope and produce long ranged
fighters to get the bombers through. But the heavies still had to maintain formation, which limited
their potential accuracy right to the end. On the other hand, the US Escort Fighters "broke the back"
of the Luftwaffe and pretty much won the daylight skies, reducing most bomber losses to those caused
by flak towards the end of the war.

So the US went in Daylight for accuracy, wound up having to forgo it to survive, but eliminated the
Opposition in the process of trying to make it work. The Brits went to Night for security, still wound
up taking large losses by war's end, but also wound up being pretty accurate. The Germans made a
good effort, fouled up a lot of planning and thinking, but in the end just weren't able to keep up with
all the leaks their dike was springing.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 1:31:51 AM   
juliet7bravo

 

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Bombing accuracy...Saw a study which "proved" that both the Allies could have used Mosquitoes for all strategic bombing in Germany due to the difference in accuracy rates, i.e. a few medium bombers with high accuracy rates eliminated the need for "Thousand Plane Raids" of heavy bombers. Thus saving the Allies thousands of lives, millions of dollars, and the Germans tens (hundreds?) of thousand lives. Made a reasonable case...Mossies were accurate enough that's what they used alot for precision raids, Pathfinders ect., fast enough they could get in/out, and pretty survivable. Going by the accuracy rates between the two, a raid that required a hundred or more 4 -engined bombers to maybe get a bomb in the general area could have been accomplished with a dozen or so Mosquitoes with well trained crews. Of course, that'd eliminate the need for carpet bombing entire cities, and all the "Big Bomber" Generals ect.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 3:03:30 AM   
Charles2222


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quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

Bombing accuracy...Saw a study which "proved" that both the Allies could have used Mosquitoes for all strategic bombing in Germany due to the difference in accuracy rates, i.e. a few medium bombers with high accuracy rates eliminated the need for "Thousand Plane Raids" of heavy bombers. Thus saving the Allies thousands of lives, millions of dollars, and the Germans tens (hundreds?) of thousand lives. Made a reasonable case...Mossies were accurate enough that's what they used alot for precision raids, Pathfinders ect., fast enough they could get in/out, and pretty survivable. Going by the accuracy rates between the two, a raid that required a hundred or more 4 -engined bombers to maybe get a bomb in the general area could have been accomplished with a dozen or so Mosquitoes with well trained crews. Of course, that'd eliminate the need for carpet bombing entire cities, and all the "Big Bomber" Generals ect.


Sounds appealing if it would work, only problem is what do you lose by doing so? You lose the terror factor of big formations and no fire-storms (which Speer said 10 Hamburgs would have made them surrender). You also lose the attention they needed, which if true were less damaging towards the intended targets than Mossies. By less attention I'm suggesting that the Germans could've put up better defenses against mere fighter-bombers and probably do so with half the resources, thus sending more attention elsewhere. I just can't imagine that they could've used enough imagination to make that effective, because given the climate before such a thing could've been even slightly considered seriously you already had a large armada of heavies bombers built, and then if you stopped building them and built Mossies instead, you achieve maybe triple the Mossie numbers built? Were most fighter pilots really that capable of flying low for that long, bomb accurately and still make it back for the deeper strikes?

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 3:27:03 AM   
pasternakski


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quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

Bombing accuracy...Saw a study which "proved" that both the Allies could have used Mosquitoes for all strategic bombing in Germany due to the difference in accuracy rates, i.e. a few medium bombers with high accuracy rates eliminated the need for "Thousand Plane Raids" of heavy bombers.


Must have been the same people who decided that Do-17s and Ju-88s were sufficiently heavy to bomb Britain into submission...

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 3:53:05 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

Bombing accuracy...Saw a study which "proved" that both the Allies could have used Mosquitoes for all strategic bombing in Germany due to the difference in accuracy rates, i.e. a few medium bombers with high accuracy rates eliminated the need for "Thousand Plane Raids" of heavy bombers. Thus saving the Allies thousands of lives, millions of dollars, and the Germans tens (hundreds?) of thousand lives. Made a reasonable case...Mossies were accurate enough that's what they used alot for precision raids, Pathfinders ect., fast enough they could get in/out, and pretty survivable. Going by the accuracy rates between the two, a raid that required a hundred or more 4 -engined bombers to maybe get a bomb in the general area could have been accomplished with a dozen or so Mosquitoes with well trained crews. Of course, that'd eliminate the need for carpet bombing entire cities, and all the "Big Bomber" Generals ect.


Mosquitos served with the Lancasters in the Pathfinder units that eventually improved
British accuracy. By 1944, with improvements in Airborne Radars and target marking
the Brits were able to take advantage of the inherently more accurate individual bom-
bing of their "stream" tactics. If the Mosquitos could "mark" the target well, the tre-
mendous bomb loads of the Lancasters could really do a job on it.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 4:03:19 AM   
juliet7bravo

 

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Did the heavy bombers bomb anyone into submission? They nuked Japan into submission, not sure if that counts. Germany's industry was still going strong until lack of materials started choking it down, and was finished off once the medium bombers and F/B's got into range and destroyed anything that moved. Couldn't hit the targets in either the ETO or the PTO, so in both cases they went to carpet bombing, terror raids, and saturation bombing.

But, you can argue that if destroying specific industrial targets in order to cripple Germanys capability to wage war was the goal, then "surgical strikes" (LOL) using proven platforms with a high degree of accuracy would have been the preferred method. The Mosquito's accuracy rate delivering ordnance against point targets a relatively proven quantity. As was its abilities as an intruder and pathfinder.

"Germans could've put up better defenses against mere fighter-bombers and probably do so with half the resources, thus sending more attention elsewhere."

I'm not certain if any Mossies were ever shot down by a German Night-Fighter through the entire war, none of them could catch one. Resources...Germans invested alot into defences against bombers. Hundreds of thousands of men, and thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of high velocity guns that could have been employed elsewhere (like the Eastern Front) as AT guns.

So, considering the abysmal performance of heavy bombers, was forcing the Germans/Japanese to invest into air defense, and terrorizing the populations worth the loss of tens of thousands of aircrew and the expense pumped into heavy bombers? Heck, look at the anemic bombload of the B-17. The fighter escort might have broken the back of the Luftwaffe...but did they need to drag a bunch of bombers along to do it? And if the real objective was to cripple the German war machine by hitting key components of their industry, why didn't they send in precision bombers to do it, regardless of whatever else they did?

I'm just throwing this out for conversation BTW.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 4:07:28 AM   
juliet7bravo

 

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"If the Mosquitos could "mark" the target well, the tremendous bomb loads of the Lancasters could really do a job on it."

Lancaster was a very good machine by all accounts. Only complaint I recall hearing about it was the rifle calibre MG's. Really a tremendous bomb load IIRC.

If the Mosquitos could mark the target well, why couldn't they take it out? i.e. a dozen Mossies vs. 100 heavy bombers?

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 4:41:07 AM   
pasternakski


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quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

Did the heavy bombers bomb anyone into submission?


I'm not asserting that they did, my friend. All I'm saying is that light bombers never proved themselves to be adequate for accomplishing strategic missions. Heavy bombers did not bomb Germany or Japan into submission, of course (the nukes were just a "last straw" kind of thing, I think), but they were not intended to do so. The idea at first was to attrit the enemy's heavy industry and related logistical operations. This was never accomplished, either, although significant damage was done. Eventually, strikes against population centers for morale effect became de rigeuer, and there is no conclusive evidence that this did much more than immolate a lot of civilians.

To this day, the formula for success in strategic bombing is a mystery. Korea showed that international politics can interdict any attempt at isolating a combatant from its primary supplier of munitions and other support. Vietnam demonstrated that heavy bombers are ineffective when the enemy has no concentrated, identifiable strategic targets. The wars in the Middle East reveal that even smart bombs and ASMs are not smart enough when the enemy is dispersed in a civilian population (where casualties become an international incident).

Hell, even the Cold War showed that - showed that - showed that we cannot afford a mineshaft gap...

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 5:31:25 AM   
madmickey

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: pasternakski

quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

Did the heavy bombers bomb anyone into submission?


I'm not asserting that they did, my friend. All I'm saying is that light bombers never proved themselves to be adequate for accomplishing strategic missions. Heavy bombers did not bomb Germany or Japan into submission, of course (the nukes were just a "last straw" kind of thing, I think), but they were not intended to do so. The idea at first was to attrit the enemy's heavy industry and related logistical operations. This was never accomplished, either, although significant damage was done. Eventually, strikes against population centers for morale effect became de rigeuer, and there is no conclusive evidence that this did much more than immolate a lot of civilians.

To this day, the formula for success in strategic bombing is a mystery. Korea showed that international politics can interdict any attempt at isolating a combatant from its primary supplier of munitions and other support. Vietnam demonstrated that heavy bombers are ineffective when the enemy has no concentrated, identifiable strategic targets. The wars in the Middle East reveal that even smart bombs and ASMs are not smart enough when the enemy is dispersed in a civilian population (where casualties become an international incident).

Hell, even the Cold War showed that - showed that - showed that we cannot afford a mineshaft gap...


Kosovo was an all air operation trying to kill Milosevic.
This strategy was used when moving troop for an invasion was unsuccessful.
Of course some people complain about fighting a war at 10,000 feet but it did work in this one particular case.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 5:34:26 AM   
Belce


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One of the things about using only mosquitos, while a very good airplane, it was hand built of wood and not something you could just crank up in production like other bombers.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 6:03:46 AM   
pasternakski


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Speaking of the Norton bombsight, here's a rare photo of its inventor (second from the right). The initial version involved some kind of protocol that required the bombardier to address the ball - "Hello, ball":




Attachment (1)

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 10:19:00 AM   
Apollo11


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Hi all,

quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

I'm not certain if any Mossies were ever shot down by a German Night-Fighter through the entire war, none of them could catch one. Resources...Germans invested alot into defences against bombers. Hundreds of thousands of men, and thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of high velocity guns that could have been employed elsewhere (like the Eastern Front) as AT guns.


Oh there were shoot down at night... Germans had some outstanding (albeit very small units) fast and deadly night fighters...


Leo "Apollo11"

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 10:51:23 AM   
pauk


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

I'm not certain if any Mossies were ever shot down by a German Night-Fighter through the entire war, none of them could catch one. Resources...Germans invested alot into defences against bombers. Hundreds of thousands of men, and thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of high velocity guns that could have been employed elsewhere (like the Eastern Front) as AT guns.


Oh there were shoot down at night... Germans had some outstanding (albeit very small units) fast and deadly night fighters...


Leo "Apollo11"


Actually there some Mosqitos were shot down in the sky during night battles over the german sky. Apollo was right, however the numbers of destroyed Mos. are pretty low - main Lufftwaffe night fighters were Me-110. They were just enough for british Wellingtons and others earlier British bombers, but their lack of the speed makes almost impossible shooting down Mosquitos.
Later on war, Germans introduced "normal" (daily) fighters (Me-109, FW 190) as night fighters (they served on day and night missions at the same time), which resulted with some Mos. going down, but at all -numbers are pretty low. Unfortunatly, havent got numbers right now, i borowed exellent book "German night fighters" (yeah, i know i'm very stupid - YOU BORROW THE BOOK???).
i think it's about 50 or so Mosquitos lost in the night bombing, but i will check ASAP

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 11:07:19 AM   
Twotribes


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Kosovo was no great success. The Serbs offered terms before the bombing began, the Nato forces rejected them, do a little research and you will find out that in the end, the Nato forces, after bombing for how long? accepted nearly verbatem the original Serb terms.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 3:06:17 PM   
Howard Mitchell


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"According to reliable estimates a total of 50 Mosquito bombers, recconaisance aircraft and night fighters were shot down by German night fighters."

From Appendix 9 of Gerbhard Aders, 'History of the German Night Fighter Force", ISBN 0 947554 21 1. He lists the dates and causes of all claims backed by documentary evidence as well.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 3:31:16 PM   
Honda


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Don't move Pauk! Or the book gets it. I have scissors and I'm not affraid to use 'em...
Good thing you reminded me about the book. About time I return it. Exam fever...

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 3:36:03 PM   
Halsey

 

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To Pasternakski,
Reference: Norton bombsight

How sweet it is!

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 7:07:44 PM   
pauk


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Honda

Don't move Pauk! Or the book gets it. I have scissors and I'm not affraid to use 'em...
Good thing you reminded me about the book. About time I return it. Exam fever...


aagrh, here you are! you, you......!


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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 10:03:00 PM   
juliet7bravo

 

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Err...Norden Bombsight...

Any of the US medium/heavy bombers could use it, and it was "standard" equipment. It wasn't always used, in special cases they removed it...Doolittle's Raid comes to mind. Also low level high speed attacks...that sort of thing. Didn't need it.

I've never seen a table showing the accuracy of the Norden at various altitudes under perfect conditions. Optimum altitude probably around 12-15,000 feet. Too low you don't need a fancy bombsight...too high, wind sheer, speed over ground, ability to acquire the target, ect. would all increasingly effect accuracy. You can extrapolate from the overall accuracy ratings, but the late war values are going to be skewed from using radar, less flak, and less enemy fighters I imagine.

In game terms...high altitude (15,000'+) level bombing should have minimal results, with low level bombing having increased effectiveness. The effects of heavy flak and CAP/intercepters/weather/experience should also greatly impact the effectiveness of level bombing...probably more than it does now. Even massed B-29 bombing should have little effect on industry until altitudes are dropped below 10,000'.

Mosquitoes...okay, 50 or so lost throughout the entire war to night interceptors.

"it was hand built of wood and not something you could just crank up in production like other bombers"

IIRC, it was scoffed at so much to start with because it was made largely of wood, the only reason it got into production at all was because there were alot of skilled cabinet makers more or less out of work due to the war.

So...we have an aircraft, with very high survivability, that carried a decent bombload, used for precision attacks (day and night) against specific "High Value" targets. The precision targets it was used on were apparently all either political or tactical. One Mosquito could deliver the same amount of bombs on target, that it was taking 100+ heavy bombers to deliver.

< Message edited by juliet7bravo -- 10/10/2004 3:04:04 PM >

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 10:29:28 PM   
pauk


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quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

In game terms...high altitude (15,000'+) level bombing should have minimal results, with low level bombing having increased effectiveness. The effects of heavy flak and CAP/intercepters/weather/experience should also greatly impact the effectiveness of level bombing...probably more than it does now. Even massed B-29 bombing should have little effect on industry until altitudes are dropped below 10,000'.


i agree here

In fact, B-29 (which are built for high attitude level bombing) bombed from high attitude only at begining air offensive against Japan.
The reason why B-29 later switched to lower attitude was little effect of bombing from high attitude caused by the jet stream.

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RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 10:49:09 PM   
madmickey

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Kosovo was no great success. The Serbs offered terms before the bombing began, the Nato forces rejected them, do a little research and you will find out that in the end, the Nato forces, after bombing for how long? accepted nearly verbatem the original Serb terms.

Did a little research to confirm you opinion, I am not saying Clinton was a great war president (he should have pursued terrorist with more vigour) in my initial post I made it clear that it was mismanaged and Milosevic gave in because he was a chicken.
It should also be pointed out that the claims of mass execution of Kosovoo Muslim was greatly exaggerate
here is a discription of the war
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Kosovo%20War

"The Rambouillet talks began on February 6, 1999 and were intended to conclude by February 19; in the event, they went on until March 19 before they broke up with no agreement reached. In the view of some of those present, neither the Serbian nor the Albanian side went to Rambouillet with any real intention of reaching an agreement. The Albanian delegation was very senior but was chronically unable to agree a position, perhaps not surprisingly given that it represented a spectrum of opinion that included the pacifist Rugova and the hardline Demaci. The Serbian delegation was led by then president of Serbia Milan Milutinovic, while Milosevic himself remained in Belgrade. This was in contrast to the 1995 Dayton conference that ended war in Bosnia, where Milosevic negotiated in person. The absence of Milosevic was interpreted as a sign that the real decisions were being taken back in Belgrade, a move that aroused criticism in Serbia as well as abroad; Kosovo's Serbian Orthodox bishop Artemije traveled all the way to Rambouillet to protest that the delegation was wholly unrepresentative.

The biggest problem for both sides was that the Contact Group's non-negotiable principles were mutually unacceptable. The Albanians were absolutely unwilling to accept a solution that would retain Kosovo as part of Serbia. The Serbs did not want to see the pre-1990 status quo restored, and were implacably opposed to any international role in the governance of the province. The negotiations thus became a somewhat cynical game of musical chairs, each side trying to avoid being blamed for the breakdown of the talks. To add to the farce, the NATO Contact Group countries were desperate to avoid having to make good on their threat of force - Greece and Italy were strongly opposed to the whole idea and there was vigorous opposition to military action in every NATO country. Consequently, when the talks failed to achieve an agreement by the original deadline of February 19, they were extended by another month.

In the end, on 18 March, 1999 the Albanian, American and British delegation signed what became known as the Rambouillet Accords while the Serbian and Russian delegations refused. The accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia; a force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. The American and British delegations must have known that the new version would never be accepted by the Serbs or the Contact Group. These latter provisions were much the same as had been applied to Bosnia for the SFOR (Stabilisation Force) mission there. However, the Albanians had very nearly refused - and did refuse in February, prompting a two-week break in the talks - before the KLA hardliners finally caved in. Their motives for signing are still somewhat murky. Some analysts believe they signed the agreement only because they knew that it would not be put into effect and that they truly would not settle for anything other than full independence. Another factor may have been the dramatic appeal made to them by the foreign minister of Albania, Paskal Milo, who warned the delegates that Kosovo faced "extinction" if agreement was not reached, and the heavy pressure applied by United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Albanians may also have gambled that the Serbs would not sign under any circumstances.

If the accords did not go far enough to fully satisfy the Albanians, they were much too radical for the Serbs, who responded by substituting a drastically revised text that even the Russians found unacceptable. It sought to reopen the painstakingly negotiated political status of Kosovo and deleted all of the proposed implementation measures. Among many other changes in the proposed new version, it eliminated the entire chapter on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, removed virtually all international oversight and dropped any mention of invoking "the will of the people [of Kosovo]" in determining the final status of the province. Even the word "peace" was deleted. The Serbian delegation must have known that the new version would never be accepted by the Albanians or the Contact Group. It was immediately apparent that Milosevic had decided to call NATO's bluff, believing that the alliance would either not make good on its threat or would do no more than launch a few pinprick raids that could easily be absorbed. Perhaps most fundamentally, Milosevic appears to have calculated that he had more to lose by making peace than waging war - although the KLA was undefeated, its defeat was nonetheless just a matter of time in the face of the far more powerful Serbian and Yugoslav security forces.

Critics of the Kosovo war have claimed that the Serbian refusal was prompted by unacceptably broad terms in the access rights proposed for the NATO peacekeeping force. These would allow (in the words of the agreement's Appendix B) "free and unrestricted access throughout [Yugoslavia] including .. the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training and operations." This was based on standard UN peacekeeping agreements such as that in force in Bosnia, but would have given broader rights of access than were really needed, and onto the entire territory of Yugoslavia, not just the province. It has been claimed that Appendix B would have authorised what would amount to a NATO occupation of the whole of Yugoslavia, and that its presence in the accords was the cause of the breakdown of the talks. "



...............(several pargraph about war)

"By the start of June, the conflict seemed little closer to a resolution and NATO countries began to think seriously about a ground operation - an invasion of Kosovo. This would have to be organised very quickly, as there was little time before winter set in and much work would have to be done to improve the roads from the Greek and Albanian ports to the envisaged invasion routes through Macedonia and northeastern Albania. At the same time, however, Finnish and Russian negotiators continued to try to persuade Milosevic to back down. He finally recognised that NATO was serious in its resolve to end the conflict one way or another and that Russia would not step in to defend Serbia. Faced with little alternative, Milosevic accepted the conditions offered by a Finnish-Russian mediation team and agreed to a military presence within Kosovo headed by the UN, but incorporating NATO troops"




can you you supply me with your discrpition

< Message edited by madmickey -- 10/11/2004 1:26:46 AM >

(in reply to Twotribes)
Post #: 25
RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/10/2004 11:53:18 PM   
steveh11Matrix


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Talk of Lancasters and Mosquitos brings me back to 617 Squadron.

Later in the war after the Dams raid, when they were using Tallboys, the Squadron Commander - I think it was Leonard Chaeshire at this stage, but I'm not sure - flew a Mossie to mark the target and direct the raid. the rest of the quadron rolled in, Line astern, bombing individually from high altitude - iirc at least 15,000 feet, maybe higher - and each dropped his single bomb. A 12,000lb bomb produces an interesting crater if it misses, and extremely interesting effects if it hits. Ask the captain of the Tirpitz.

One raid on a bridge or viaduct, in one of the early uses of the Grand Slam (the 22,000lb 'grown up' version) resulted in simultaneous hits at each end by Tallboys, lifting the bridge into the air, and then a GS hit in the centre. Bye Bye bridge.

BTW if a GS missed the target it would penetrate deep enough into the ground to produce a 'camouflet' - the whole crater would be produced underground, then the earth would collapse into it. This produces interesting effects on any structures close by! :)

Given that 617 and other similar squadrons were due to transfer to the Far East in late 1945, I'm surprised they don't make it - with their equipment - into the game database.

(Oh, and their were B29's undergoing adaptation to carry TWO Tallboys each. I read recently that experiments with these extra-heavy bombs continued after the war and went up to around 30,000lb...)

Steve.

_____________________________

"Nature always obeys Her own laws" - Leonardo da Vinci

(in reply to madmickey)
Post #: 26
RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/11/2004 1:19:56 AM   
mikemike

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: pasternakski

quote:

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

Did the heavy bombers bomb anyone into submission?


I'm not asserting that they did, my friend. All I'm saying is that light bombers never proved themselves to be adequate for accomplishing strategic missions. Heavy bombers did not bomb Germany or Japan into submission, of course (the nukes were just a "last straw" kind of thing, I think), but they were not intended to do so. The idea at first was to attrit the enemy's heavy industry and related logistical operations. This was never accomplished, either, although significant damage was done. Eventually, strikes against population centers for morale effect became de rigeuer, and there is no conclusive evidence that this did much more than immolate a lot of civilians.



That´s a pretty accurate assessment. However, the British bomber offensive was from the beginning aimed not at industrial targets, but squarely and exclusively at the civilian population, to kill off the industrial workforce and undermine the morale of the German armed forces by killing off their families. On their big night raids, industrial or military targets were generally hit only by accident, as the aimpoints were invariably the densely-populated inner cities that "burned best". Their own experience with the Blitz should have told them that it wasn´t so easy to make civilian morale collapse by that kind of raids, especially when the German rulers had the Gestapo as morale boosters.

Bombing industrial targets wasn´t the solution, either. The USAAF did a lot of that in 1944 and 1945, and if you look at the production numbers, that had only limited effect. What really brought the German war machine to its knees was lack of fuel and the almost complete paralyzation of the transport network, which was achieved without killing off hundreds of thousands of civilians (and, not to forget, causing about 50,000 RAF Bomber Command casualties).

WW2 was a brutal war, and not all the Nazis in it were fighting for the Axis.

_____________________________

DON´T PANIC - IT´S ALL JUST ONES AND ZEROES!

(in reply to pasternakski)
Post #: 27
RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/11/2004 2:47:56 AM   
pasternakski


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quote:

ORIGINAL: mikemike
WW2 was a brutal war, and not all the Nazis in it were fighting for the Axis.


Would you mind explaining this comment, please?

(in reply to mikemike)
Post #: 28
RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/11/2004 3:07:20 AM   
Twotribes


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From: Jacksonville NC
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He is one of those people that think the allies went to far. Never mind we didnt start it, never mind that we didnt round up civilians and gas them.

(in reply to pasternakski)
Post #: 29
RE: Norden Bombsight - 10/11/2004 3:10:22 AM   
Twotribes


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From: Jacksonville NC
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Whos side again were the Russians on? And exactly what were the conditions of the Russian deal?

(in reply to Halsey)
Post #: 30
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