ChezDaJez
Posts: 3436
Joined: 11/12/2004
From: Chehalis, WA
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Actually, strategic bombing in both theaters was far less effective than first thought.
B-17s at 18,000 ft, even with vaunted Norden bombsight, had a 50% CEP of 1000 yards. That means 50% of the bombs dropped would miss the target by more than a 1000 yards. B-17s weren't able to put enough bombs within the confines of an airfield often enough to justify the loss rate. That's why the tasks of bombing airfields was given to tactical bombers. They were much more accurate at lower altitudes, and were able to to get in and out of the target area quicker.
The following comes from the study "Determination and Effectiveness of WWII Strategic Bombing Strategy" written by T.T. Goetz, US Arny Retired:
Quote: "The strategic bombing campaign in the Pacific Theater was different in nature. At the beginning of the war, the United States lacked a bomber with the range to reach Japan. With the exception of a high-profile raid on Tokyo in April 1942, led by Jimmy Doolittle, there were no bombings on Japanese cities until the capture of the Marianas Islands near Japan in late 1944. From the Marianas, the new B-29 Superfortress could reach Japan. But precision bombing failed in Japan, which had erratic weather patterns and poor visibility. During the winter, bombs were so poorly aimed that the Japanese joked that the Americans were going to starve them into surrendering by killing all the fish in Tokyo Bay.
In January 1945 the command of the American XX Bomber Command in the Pacific passed to Major General LeMay. He recognized the problems, and in February began to introduce incendiary bombs, which could be dropped in any weather and which produced an intensely hot fire. The crowded Japanese cities became firestorms, aided by heavy winds and wooden buildings. The heat could get so great that glass would melt. In the midst of the fires, there was a good chance that the target would burn as well. The first incendiary raid occurred on February 3, 1945, in Kobe, where 159 tons of incendiaries burned more than a thousand buildings. The raids became so frequent that by early summer LeMay began to run out of supplies, and soon, of targets as well. LeMay also continued conventional precision bombing during that period when weather permitted but the results were often disappointing. " Unquote.
Most of this deals with Japanese cities, but if B-29s didn't have the accuracy to hit factories in cities, I highly doubt that the B-17 did. Remember, most targets in Germany had to be hit time and again before they were effectively destroyed.
Chez
< Message edited by ChezDaJez -- 12/17/2004 11:05:16 AM >
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