Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Lemurs!

2ndACR,
I think the total squads for an engineer battalion(seperate) in the Japanese OOB is accurate.
In other words remember that 12 squads in a battalion are infantry and 27 squads or so are support.

Mike

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Now having said all that, I dimly recall seeming something in the 'War in the Far East: Volume V' Official history on this. I'll check when I get to work. So this may have organisational detail. I'll report back (add to list of things to do).

Now the long range bomber force is much more viable and the Americans requested that 617 Squadron (Dambusters) be used with Tallboy 12,000lb bombs to drop the bridges between Tokyo and Shimonoseki as well as the Kammon tunnel linking Honshu and Kyushu, in advance of Op OLYMPIC. Chokes away Biggles!! Now the Tallboy would be a fun device to add to the database...

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ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

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Do your sources have details on the proposed composition of "Tiger Force" -- the British air command slated to reinforce the Pacific? One source says that it was to include over 500 Lancasters -- half of them to be used as transports. Any information on the assets the US 8th 8th Air Force was planning to move to the Pacific in 1945 is also appreciated.

Blackhorse,

Alas, I have very few books on the RAF.

I have only one source with any lengthy discussion of TIGER FORCE. The section that follows is drawn from: Probert, Air Commodore Henry (1995)The Forgotten Air Force: The Royal Air Force in the War against Japan 1941-45(London: Brassey's) pp291-295

I apologise for a post that is long on narrative and short on hard OOB facts, but I think it illuminates where the 500 Lancaster story comes from. Basically it goes like this:

1) In October 1944, the Air Ministry in the UK starts planning for a 'politically driven' RAF contribution to the direct assault on Japan. Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd ('energetic and enthusiastic')was appointed Force Commander Designate, and until April 1945 he and his staff were co-located with Bomber Harris' HQ, where Bomber Command gave them planning ideas and help.

2) By early 1945, AM Lloyd and the Air Ministry had developed plans including a force of 20 squadrons (400+ aircraft, I guess) of bombers and 3 squadrons of support aircraft based in Northern Luzon. This would mean 2,000 mile round trips to Southern Japan, and 3,500 miles as far as Tokyo. Chief of the Air Staff Portal 'hoped 3,000 mile flights with 6,000lb would be achievable'. This force would be built around Lancasters and its successor the Lincoln (sorry, I'm not an aircraft buff so I don't know much about this aircraft). Trials of in-flight refuelling had been conducted, in an attempt to solve the range/payload trade off problems, ' but it was becoming increasingly clear that this offered no realistic solution in relation to the technology of the day'. AM Lloyd's staff based these plans on the assumption that the US would build the airfields for the British in Luzon, while it was supported logistically all the way from the UK (14,000 miles).

3)In February 1945, Chief of Air Staff Portal meets with General Kuter (USAAF Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistical Planning) who quickly filled him in on the reality that the Americans couldn't even meet all their own construction needs, and therefore the Brits would have to do it alone and be respondable for all development from ' from tide water to aircraft'. At the same time, AM Lloyd was in Washington for detailed discussions and he got the same message, that while the USAAF were welcoming of a Brit bomber force, there was no getting away from the hard fact that the British would have to build and maintain the force all by themselves. When Lloyd got back to London he told Portal that the plans that would now have to be developed for a self-supporting force might show the difficulties were too great and the cost too expensive.

4) Indeed in April 1945, the detailed report of the British Principal Administrative Officers (PAO) Committee (made up of the administrative heads of the three services the Fourth Sea Lord, the Quartermaster General and the Air Member for Supply and Organization) showed that in their view, the whole project was impracticable. To build a base for 20 heavy bomber squadrons in the Cagayan Valley in North Luzon would require 71,500 RAF and 34,500 Army personnel (note - not sure if this is construction phase only or operational as well), and the first airfield wouldn't be ready until February 1946.

5) Despite this, when the Brit Chiefs of Staff discussed the PAO Committee report in mid-April they weren't prepared to abandon the idea of having a bomber force participating in the final assault on Japan.

6) Meanwhile, events had moved on. With the invasion of Okinawa at the beginning of April, the American thoughts also turned to a plan to invade the island of Miyako (in the Sakishima Gunto), to the south, which they would offer to the British as a base for the RAF. This would be 450 miles closer to Japan than the proposed bases in Luzon. AM Lloyd was back in Washington having talks and when this was offered, was unsurprisingly enthusiatic. (Note - the Brits would have to build the bases as there was a shortage of American airfield construction troops at this stage).

7) Even though this offer had been made, Lloyd wrote at the end of April 1945, ' the future of TIGER FORCE did not look promising.' He still felt the logistical problems were insolvable:

• The Army had made no provision for a committment to support and defend an RAF force in the Pacific;
  
• There were inescapable Army and RAF committments in NW Europe and SE Asia that couldn't be cut;
  
• Attempts to persuade the Canadians to provide engineering support (alongside operational squadrons had got nowhere;
  
• There was a serious shortage of shipping
  

The planners in London believed that there was a straight choice between TIGER FORCE and Op Zipper (the invasion of Malaya scheduled for late 1945). This reinforces the view that an expanded Pacific committment and major amphibious operations in the Indian Ocean were mutually exclusive - and the British Pacific committment was supposed to take priority.

8) Then on 5 May the Americans cancelled the assault on Miyako...

...and then...

9) In May 1945 General Marshall told Chief of Air Staff Portal that it might be possible to host TIGER FORCE on Okinawa itself. AM Lloyd went back to Washington and at the end of May he found the Americans 'increasingly enthusiastic'; General Eaker told him that the initial deployment would have to be restricted to 2 squadrons, unless the British could give firm reassurances on the level of logistical support they could provide. AM Lloyd returned to London with an American proposal for 10 squadrons (200+ aircraft, including Mosquitos) to be based in Okinawa under American control; 10 more squadrons may follow later.

10) The British Chiefs of Staff accepeted this proposal and in mid-June Churchill told Marshall of his strong support for this plan. Meanwhile, the PAOs had evaluated the logistical problem and that only 15,000 RAF operational personnel would be needed, supported by 7,500 constructors and 12,390 Army personnel. The Chiefs of Staff accepted this and dispatched the first convoy of constructors from Liverpool to the Pacific via Panama (this was called SHIELD FORCE).

11) Meanwhile, South East Asia Command just woke up to the fact that this would mean that yet again, that their plans for amphibious offensives would be retarded. Mountbatten and his air commander Air Chief Marshall Park, complained to London, but were told firmly to wind their necks in as it was long agreed policy that the Pacific had priority!

12) In July, AM Lloyd and his team visited Guam, Okinawa and Manila and laid plans with the Americans. It was agreed that the British construction troops would work within the overall American plan and under their orders (as opposed for the originally independent force planned for Luzon); many of the supplies for construction and operation would be provide by the Americans and that a staging post would be established in Manila. Meanwhile, the second convoy (VACUUM FORCE) had been dispatched from the UK.

13) Detailed planning decided that 5 Group from Bomber Command would be the first formation to deploy from Europe (to be commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Hugh Constantine) and would be based in Okinawa alongside 8th US Air Force, and would operate directly under Strategic Air Forces HQ.

14) Spaatz (Commanding General Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific) asked if two Tallboy squadrons could be made operational by 15 October 1945. These were to be used to drop 12,000lb bombs on the transportation choke points highlighted in my previous post in advance of the invasion of Kyushu planned for 1 November.

15) The Brits agreed and No 9 and No 917 squadrons were selected (Lancasters), preparations started and shipping chartered in late August, by which time the SHIELD FORCE convoy had reached Okinawa and VACUUM FORCE wasn't far behind (total in both convoys of 2,500 airbase engineers/constructors and 500 representing elements of base and force HQs).

15) I then checked my Ehrman, John (1956) Grand Strategy Volume VI on TIGER FORCE, and as well as confirming the above (well, it would as it would have been written from the same source, albeit while the files were still closed), it shows that the original offer was made in October 1944 and provisionally included forty squadrons of long-range bombers, of which twenty would act as tankers in flight. As mentioned, in-flight refuelling was found not to work.

So there you have it - the first 10 squadrons of No 5 Group were probably all that would have been there in time for CORONET.

Now all the stuff in the above post is based on Probert (1995) and this in turn is drawn primarily from Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyds despatch in the National Archives/Public Record Office at this reference

Link - Lloyd's despatch

If someone can give you the 5 Bomber Group orbat in May 1945, that may do it, otherwise when I'm next in the Public Record I'll have a look at the Despatch.

I hope this is of some value, or at least of interest as to the origins of TIGER FORCE and its force structure.

Regards,

Philip Bass

(in reply to Blackhorse)

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ORIGINAL: Blackhorse


The UK's contribution -- the 3rd Division -- also seems to be firmly grounded in reality. One battalion had already been deployed to the US for re-equipping and training when the war ended.

Phil, your points about the lack of command enthusiasm for the Commonwealth Corps and the logistics strain are well taken. Re: logistics -- British air and fleet units would be moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific in late '45. Could enough amphibious transport come from the ETO to meet the need?

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Overall, I'm tilting strongly towards the conclusion that a "Commonwealth Corps" could not have been organized, trained and equipped in time to participate in the early phases of a March 1946 invasion of Japan. The British 3rd Division, and Canadian 6th, would at least be available as a reinforcement. Australia's mysterious Division "X" could also appear as 1946 reinforcements -- if enough soldiers were willing to volunteer to fill it out.

Is there any material suggesting that other Commonwealth LCUs were going to transfer to the Pacific after VE Day?

• one brigade group to the Solomon Islands;
  
• one brigade group to New Guinea;
  
• one division of three brigades to New Britain;
  
• one division to the operations against Japan
  
• probably one brigade to SE Asia

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ORIGINAL: Philbass

I apologise for a post that is long on narrative and short on hard OOB facts, but I think it illuminates where the 500 Lancaster story comes from. Basically it goes like this:

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So, yep you could have the Aussie's Division 'X'.

But don't we have a huge problem as we can't really do wholesale LCU reorganisations or withdrawals? (Unless you are planning this as a stand alone CORONET scenario). I hope this helps

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ORIGINAL: Blackhorse
A couple of clarifying questions:

Did the first ten squadrons of No. 5 Group include the No. 9 and No. 917 Squadrons, or were they in addition to them?

Did the book identify which British ground units composed SHIELD and VACUUM force?

The original "Tiger Force" plan called for all the involved squadrons to use the Lancaster/Lincoln bomber. Your source mentioned Mosquitos. Did it mention how many?

The original "Tiger Force" plan was for three commands, each with 22 squadrons. One command was going to consist solely of RCAF squadrons. The Canadians had started squadron conversions / Lancaster training when the war ended. Does Probert mention anything about the Canadian role?

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ORIGINAL: Philbass
The Canadians were asked to provide 5,000 to 6,000 engineers in March 1945, but according to Ehrman (p234), ' but the situation was still too fluid for the Canadian Government to take an immediate decision'. I take this as being coded speak for no! But assuming it was reversed, then you could add these Canadians to the OOB.

Information about my WitP map, and CHS, can be found on my WitP website

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ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

I have a question about LCU nomenclature:

When did the USA use the term "Regiment" and when did they use the term "RCT"? Are they interchangeable or are they distinctly different terms? Did the terms change with time, or were they used for particular units or situations?

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Also a general question - many LCUs have names that include their nationality, including US units, but many do not. I think the names should be consistent, so what do people think is the best way to use unit names to identify units? Include a national designation (like USA or US)? OR leave it out (like ships)? I lean towards the former.

Andrew

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ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
I personally omit nationality from many land unit names as I am very familiar with them. I use historical nomenclature as much as possible.

USMC regiment will be: 1st Marines, 5th Marines, etc.
USMC Division will be: 1st Marine Div, 2nd Marine Div
US Army Units are designated by branch with US assumed: 24th Infantry Div, 147th Infantry Reg, 148th FA Reg, 46th Engineer Reg
British/Australian/Indian/New Zealand Units are designated WITH nationality due to identical naming structure: 2nd British Division, 2nd Aus Div, 3rd NZ Div, etc.. Those units with obviously unique names omit the nationality (1st Independent Co, 2/15 Punjap)
Dutch Units are designated KNIL
Philippine Units are designated as "Regular" or "Reserve": 1st Regular Division, 21st Reserve Division
Chinese and Russian are unchanged because I know better than to get involved in a land war in Asia.
Japanese units are unchanged because they are just targets to me.

Information about my WitP map, and CHS, can be found on my WitP website

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ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
An Infantry regiment is a single branch unit with only light support. Mortars, MGs, and a few light or SP guns. A RCT is a regiment reinforced with a share of the division's additional assets: medium and heavy artillery, engineers, AA, maybe some armor. The artillery allotment of a U.S. Infantry Division has such a split in mind, with 1 medium FA battalion for each infantry regiment (and one heavy FA battalion for support).

Information about my WitP map, and CHS, can be found on my WitP website

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Now to see if we can have 3 Commando Brigade, a Gurkha parachute battalion, Ramree Island and a worn-out/ramshackle British Pacific Fleet train added!

Information about my WitP map, and CHS, can be found on my WitP website

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ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

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Now to see if we can have 3 Commando Brigade, a Gurkha parachute battalion, Ramree Island and a worn-out/ramshackle British Pacific Fleet train added!

I have just done a bit of reading about Ramree island. An airstrip was built there by the Japanese, and the Allies took it in a division sized assault in early 1945. I am inclined to add in a base for Ramree Island, perhaps something like a 1(0) port and 0(1) airfield rating.



Any thoughts for/against?

Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

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ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

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ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
An Infantry regiment is a single branch unit with only light support. Mortars, MGs, and a few light or SP guns. A RCT is a regiment reinforced with a share of the division's additional assets: medium and heavy artillery, engineers, AA, maybe some armor. The artillery allotment of a U.S. Infantry Division has such a split in mind, with 1 medium FA battalion for each infantry regiment (and one heavy FA battalion for support).

So just to confirm, does this mean that all independently operating US regiment sized units in the game should be designated as RCT? I think that they are already, except for Para, glider and Cavalry formations.

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ORIGINAL: Tankerace
For the US in the Pacific In WW2, I don't believe that any Army Regiments served. To clarify, no unattached Army Regiments served. The Main types of units in the Pacific Were the Division (USA and USMC), the Regimental Combat Team (USA Only), and then the Regiment, which is USMC and USA Cav. only. Thus, I do believe that all indepedent USA Regiments (except those in the PI at the start) should be RCTs.

I believe that the USA RCT in the PI at the beginning of the war (the 31st), and all of the PS RCTs should in fact be relabeled regiments. I don't think the Regimental Combat Team (although I could be wrong) evolved until 1942-1943.

Information about my WitP map, and CHS, can be found on my WitP website

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ORIGINAL: Tankerace

I may be wrong, but I believe that they should be Regiments.

Information about my WitP map, and CHS, can be found on my WitP website

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ORIGINAL: Tankerace

For the US in the Pacific In WW2, I don't believe that any Army Regiments served. To clarify, no unattached Army Regiments served. The Main types of units in the Pacific Were the Division (USA and USMC), the Regimental Combat Team (USA Only), and then the Regiment, which is USMC and USA Cav. only. Thus, I do believe that all indepedent USA Regiments (except those in the PI at the start) should be RCTs.

I believe that the USA RCT in the PI at the beginning of the war (the 31st), and all of the PS RCTs should in fact be relabeled regiments. I don't think the Regimental Combat Team (although I could be wrong) evolved until 1942-1943.

I know in the 20s and 30s (War Plan Orange era), the standard US Land unit organization was the Regiment of 3-4 battalions, the Brigade of 2 Regiments, and the Division of 2 Brigades. The Regimental Combat team has around 3/4 the strength of a Brigade, or roughly 1 and a half regiments. A Regimental Combat Team and a Regiment are NOT the same thing. RCTs also sometimes have tank units attached and inherent, of which an Infantry Regiment does not.

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ORIGINAL: DoomedMantis

Any intention to increase the support ratio?

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ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

Blackhorse also calls them Regiments, which is what got me wondering in the first place. I think I will contact him and ask him (unless he reads this message and replies first).

It gets tricky if they start the war as Regiments and later convert to RCT or get redesignated, but I have no idea of that is the case.

Seems like a lot of time spent on something as obsure as unit name RCT vs Regiment, doesn't it?

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ORIGINAL: Blackhorse
Sorry for the long delay in responding . . . Real Life intruded. I confess that I do not know the genesis (or TO&E) for RCT's. But I am confident that the Regiments in Alaska in December, 1941, were Regiments and *not* Regimental Combat Teams. To the best of my knowledge they never converted / had their name changed to RCT.

Information about my WitP map, and CHS, can be found on my WitP website