ChezDaJez
Posts: 3436
Joined: 11/12/2004
From: Chehalis, WA
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quote:
For example, escorting bombers was an advantage in most cases because it did not change the Zero pilots' mission one iota. With or without the bombers, the Zeroes' job was to down Allied fighters. Having the bombers in company often allowed the Zeroes to get at Allied fighters while their attention was diverted to attacking a bomber. The presence of Japanese bombers made the Allied pilots' job more complicated, not the Japanese pilots. This is particularly supported by the observation that when the Japanese tried "fighter sweep" raids the F4Fs did consistently better than when the Japanese tried mixed Betty and Zero raids. The Allied defenders' best day (for downing Zeroes) occurred on just such an occasion.
Tell that to Me-109 pilots in the BOB that escorting bombers was to their advantage. The fighter is at its best as a hunter of planes, not a defender of them. Fighter pilots by nature are offensive minded. The last thing they want is to be tied down by a bomber formation.
Actually you have that turned around, it was the presence of Japanese fighters that made the allied pilots job more complicated. The allied job was to shoot down the bombers not go after fighters.
Your conclusion is correct but for the wrong reason. The Zeros had a reduced loss rate when escorting fighters only because they weren't the primary target. When they conducted a sweep, they were the primary and only target. And with the US advantage in early warning, the Wildcats were often up there waiting for them. But the Japanese also had success with sweeps. They conducted effective fighter sweeps throughout the Philippines and the SRA. Remember Darwin? The Japanese conducted a fighter sweep before the bombers came in.
There is one other point you mentioned in an earlier post concerning the quality of training of US pilots early in the war. try reading a history of the 49th FG upon its arrival in Australia and decide what their level of experience was.
From "The Army Air Forces in World War II", Part 1 "Plans and Early Operations Janaury 1939 to August 1942", Chapter 11, "Defense of Australia". You can find it at that section here.
quote:
The last of the three pursuit groups assigned to Australia, which was the 8th, had disembarked at Brisbane on 10 March, but only the 49th Group, which had come in early in February, was considered ready for combat. The explanation for this and similar delays in preparing other units is readily revealed by a glance at the level of experience of the 49th's 102 pilots at the time of their arrival in the theater. Lt. Col. Paul B. Wurtsmith, its commanding officer, and his executive, Maj. Donald R. Hutchinson, were veteran pilots with 4,800 and 2,600 hours of pursuit time, respectively. Five other pilots had more than 600 hours, and nine were credited with about 15 hours, but the remaining eighty-nine pilots had no pursuit time at all. As for the 35th, its more experienced pilots had been drafted for service with the provisional squadrons hurriedly organized for operation in the Netherlands East Indies, and such of them as had survived had been assigned to rest and recuperation in the hope that their battle experience might soon be put to use in the training of other pilots.
The "Australia at War" website says pretty much the same thing except they also report that 75 of the pilots were fresh from flight school and joined the group as the transport ship was getting ready to leave San Francisco, giving credence to the above claim that the majority of pilots had no pursuit time. This website also gives great detail on the operational and combat loss rates this squadron incurred. If you have any data that disputes this, please indicate your sources.
Another point. You claim that the Zero bonus doesn't capture the "feel and flavor" of the early war. Let's not forget that we should also model allied airgroups that arrived without either aircraft, mechanics or support equipment. Shouldn't we also model the problems created when Australian longshoremen refused to unload the American ships? Shouldn't we also model the huge operational loss rates that the P-40 and other aircraft experienced. I'd be more than willing to lose the Zero bonus if you were willing to accurately model these ops loss rates. Seems only fair doesn't it? The point here is that the early American effort was basically a shoestring operation, beleagured by massive supply, equipment, aircraft and crew shortages. I'm all for historical accuracy but let's make sure that BOTH sides are modeled accurately. Of course, it really doesn't matter, does it. You don't own the game so what do you care?
Chez
< Message edited by ChezDaJez -- 12/17/2005 12:40:31 PM >
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Ret Navy AWCS (1972-1998)
VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78
ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81
VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87
Patrol Wing 10, Mt View, CA 1987-90
ASW Ops Center, Adak, Ak 1990-92
NRD Seattle 1992-96
VP-46, Whidbey Isl, Wa 1996-98
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RE: Proposal for CHS - Remove the Zero bonus. Any opini... - 
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