Charles2222
Posts: 3993
Joined: 3/12/2001 Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl quote:
ORIGINAL: el cid again quote:
Japanese Fire Control certainly doesn't seem to have impressed the US Seacoast Artillery Research Board that analyzed it after the War. "Obsolescent" is the most prevelant word in their study of the subject. They are much kinder than the board studying Japanese military electronics, who described it as being composed of the kind of materials that anyone could have bought in a radio shop in the States in the 30's. This reminds me of a long standing argument between me and an academic named John W Dower. He writes - in proper documented scholarly fashion - that Japan deliberately destroyed almost all its records. Then he goes on to argue there was no important technology at all of the sort we debate (which is atomic technology) - because we cannot cite the documents he says were destroyed. [When some of them turn up, he says "it is a deception" because he knows, in advance, it cannot be true! But I submit that a classified document in wartime intended for a tiny, official audience was not written to decieve us decades later.] These boards had very little to study - and what they did have was the stuff regarded as not particularly important to destroy. I do think their views of what they saw are valuable. But to assume this is anything like a complete picture is pretty unwise. Over time a good deal of material - written and testimonial and physical - has come to light - and these conclusions do not stand up well against the test of time. There was nothing at all wrong with Japan's air warning system - air raid sirens routinely gave two hours notice - according to many sources - including American POWs. Japan's effective state of air defense was affected by that most basic of military sciences: logistics. A lack of fuel for fighters or a lack of ammunition for guns does not mean that the fighters or the guns were not effective. We have specific examples that show the opposite. Had Japan not been so constrained in fuel and munitions, and had it not decided NOT TO USE BOTH in order to have stocks for an anticipated major battle, we would have suffered worse casualties. You are confusing operational factors with capability. Not the same thing. I would say offhand that your Mr. Dower sounds like a bit of a putz. Won't be the first or last you meet in the academic world either. The board I refered to had free access to EVERYTHING concerning Japanese Coast Artillery. The war was over, the Japanese had lost, and they were being quite cooperative. While they might have destroyed evidence concerning Germ Research in Manchuria and the like, they had nothing to hide regarding Coast Artillery or AAA or Radar and other regular weapons. With the whole country living from hand to mouth on whatever the US brought in after the war, failure to cooperate might bring starvation. Why risk that to hide the range-finding gear on your unused CD guns? And I can't buy your arguments about the Tokyo AAA. With the whole city and 100,000+ of their countrymen going up in flames around them, what would they be saving the ammunition for? To defend the rubble? Sometimes you just have to look at things from the viewpoint of common sense. Japanese AAA wasn't very goodl Their Fighters were OK when they had trained pilots and fuel, but their AAA just didn't cut the mustard. They didn't have nearly enough of the one "good to excellent" AAA gun they designed (the 100mm/65) and their fire control lagged behind as well. They HAD to resort to Kamikazes just to have a chance to get through US CAP and Flak. We had trouble with their CAP once in a while, but never with their AAA. You might want to be careful that you don't venture into the "the USA AA was weak too, as PH proves". The Tokyo bombing at 6000 was every bit as much as surprise move as PH was in that they were so radically low and at night. Who would expect it? So why didn't they wipe all of Tokyo out then? You talk abotu saving ammo, and what better time to use it, right? Only problem is, if they were reacting poorly for that reason, what makes you think they knew it was such a great raid before it happened? Just like with PH being largely asleep at the time of that attack, isn't it possible that the AA crews were asleep or some such, resting up for the expected day attacks? Remember too, the USAAF wasn't doing night bombing in Europe by 4E's, so surely it's a big surprise, yes? The attack was planned as to achieve the maximum surprise and the maximum effectiveness. If this were any indicator of USAAF strategy, the reaction of the post-Schweinfurt raids would have been for the Germans to double up on night operations. I don't think either the Germans or Japanese had any idea whether the USA considering their raids successes or not. Sounds pretty reasonable aye?
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