ChezDaJez
Posts: 3436
Joined: 11/12/2004
From: Chehalis, WA
Status: offline
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quote:
What possible reason would a US CV have for being 250-500 miles NORTH of Oahu? There is nothing there except bad weather and rough seas (exactly why the Japanese came that way).
Who knows why a US carrier would operate there. Maybe for training, maybe taking the northen route to ferry aircraft to Midway. Who knows, who cares. The fact is that it was possible and not unreasonable for a US carrier to be operating north of Hawaii. Maybe not likely but most certainly possible.
As far as the Japanese taking the northern route to PH, they took it because it was clear of the commercial shipping lanes and had a reduced liklihood of detection, not a zero chance of detection.
quote:
But the Japanese DIDN'T send scout planes to Oahu (they didn't want to give the American's any warning)
And under radio silence what Jap sub is going to file a "sighting report"---
Why wouldn't they attempt to recon PH if their presence is already known through their attack on a US vessel? What's left to hide? Nagumo surely would have broken radio silence to inform Combined Fleet of the attack and it would be an easy enough task for Combined fleet to order the subs to report any ship movements immediately regardless of the consequences.
quote:
No matter what kind of "spot" you speculate on, the chance of "shadowing" KB is unlikely (planes go home at night, subs couldn't keep up when the high speed run south began, and a surface ship would likely have been sunk). So Kimmel couldn't strive for a night or dawn intercept (The Ideal solution from the US side). With no air support, and no probability of intercepting the Japanese, there are two possibilities remaining. Either stay in port with all defenses manned and trust to army and marine air cover..., or escape to the open ocean and be unfindable until the rest of the fleet can join up.
I think that's what I said.
Out of curiosity, just what do you think Nagumo would have done had KB been detected 24 hours prior to the attack? Turn tail and go home?
BTW, you asked how the Japanese knew where the Saratoga was. Try this website: Japanese Intel Reports
Here's a n example of what Tokyo was receiving from her consulates in the States:
quote:
[111]
From Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Seattle
October 16, 1941
J-19
Cir. #2187
Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the movement of warships as follows:
1. As long as there are no great changes in the movement and basing of warships, report on them at least once every ten days. In the event of priority intelligence, report such on each occasion.
a. The arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or scouting force.
b. Should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time.
c. The arrival or departure of warships of countries other than the United States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class of ------).
2. Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once.
ARMY 24117 Trans. 10/29/41 (S)
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From: Seattle (Sato)
To: Tokyo
October 22, 1941
J-19 (Priority)
#150
The following warships entered Bremerton Naval Yard on the 21st: The Warspite "repairs are to be made to her bridge), the Maryland and a vessel which seems to be a cruiser.
Relayed to and Los Angeles.
ARMY 24316 Trans. 11/4/41 (7)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[112]
From: Seattle (Sato)
To: Tokyo
October 28, 1941
J-19 (Priority)
#150
In commemoration of Navy Day, the 27th, fifteen Coast Guard vessels sailed through the harbor here in single file. Their names were as follows: The Kane, Ciruma, [a] the Brooks, the Fox (the above listed
Page 310
vessels have had their four-inch guns replaced by five-inch guns; all of these were brand-new ones), the Frigate Bird, the Crow, the Pintail, the Eagle 57, Batukei, [a] the Butternut, the Amber, the YP 83, 87, 89, and 90.
ARMY 24997 Trans. 11/19/41 (2)
[a] Kana spelling.
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From: Seattle (Sato)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
J-19 (Priority)
#165 (Message to Washington Circular #80.)
Vessels anchored in Brementon on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.
Relayed to ----- and Los Angeles.
ARMY 24990 Trans. 11/19/41 (2)
[113]
B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941
From: Seattle
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#184 (Urgent intelligence.)
1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.
2 The Saratoga sailed the same day.
ARMY 25876 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
So the Japanese had plenty of intel on ship movements on the West Coast.
Chez
_____________________________
Ret Navy AWCS (1972-1998)
VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78
ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81
VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87
Patrol Wing 10, Mt View, CA 1987-90
ASW Ops Center, Adak, Ak 1990-92
NRD Seattle 1992-96
VP-46, Whidbey Isl, Wa 1996-98
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RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? - 
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