Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (Full Version)

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Feinder -> Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 7:30:02 PM)

There has been much discussion about "What if USA knew, and sailed out to meet the IJN fleet..." Blah, blah, blah.

My question is, What if say, KB had been spotted by Lex (or some other CV in the area), a few days before 12-07? What were their orders? They were under radio silence, no?

"What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" Were their orders to attack BEFORE 12-07?



wworld7 -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 8:18:18 PM)

If I rememebr correctly KB was too far away to attack before 12/7.

I forget at what point they had orders to turn around if spotted prior to the attack.

Flipper



jwilkerson -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 8:24:49 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Feinder

There has been much discussion about "What if USA knew, and sailed out to meet the IJN fleet..." Blah, blah, blah.

My question is, What if say, KB had been spotted by Lex (or some other CV in the area), a few days before 12-07? What were their orders? They were under radio silence, no?

"What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" Were their orders to attack BEFORE 12-07?



Link to KB's orders.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html

In summary IJN forces were ordered to counterattack any enemy forces attempting to interfere with ( or attack ) their operations.



Feinder -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 8:52:37 PM)

It sounds like KBs orders are "Don't fire unless fired upon, until you bomb PH on 12-07."

Fine.

Let's say search planes from a USN CV stumbles across KB.

We'll even say that KB spots the USN CV. According to orders, KB increases CAP, and readies a strike (to fire if fired upon).

USN CV skipper radios Pearl, "Um. There's a really, REALLY, big TF with lots of carriers heading your way..."

What does the USN CV do then? The USN DDs at PH were on the footing of "shoot first, ask questions later" regarding subs in PH (but then again, not in international waters either).

-F-



Bobthehatchit -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 8:58:11 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Feinder

It sounds like KBs orders are "Don't fire unless fired upon, until you bomb PH on 12-07."

Fine.

Let's say search planes from a USN CV stumbles across KB.

We'll even say that KB spots the USN CV. According to orders, KB increases CAP, and readies a strike (to fire if fired upon).

USN CV skipper radios Pearl, "Um. There's a really, REALLY, big TF with lots of carriers heading your way..."

What does the USN CV do then? The USN DDs at PH were on the footing of "shoot first, ask questions later" regarding subs in PH (but then again, not in international waters either).

-F-


Considering it would be one/two on six, probaby shadow them with float planes or dauntlesses and keep a rotating cap up and prepare to get the hell out of dodge or die gloriously.

If that was a british TF they'd close with the enemy and prepare to carryout boarding actions!



Przemcio231 -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:00:01 PM)

Well from what you write here US CV attacks Japs but gets sloughtered... Kimmel send his fleet to intercept the Japs and Us BB's are sunk in deep water[:D]



mlees -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:11:31 PM)

Are you looking for actual historical records of orders, or are you asking for speculation?

The only "historical" info I remember on this point was when Halsey (in command of the Enterprise reinforcing Wake) asked Admiral Kimmel "what do I do if I spot a Jap?"

Kimmel replied "Use your common sense."

Speculation: If a single USN CV (Lexington or Enterprise) spots the KB as it is N to NE of Midway, shaping a course for Hawaii.

1. USN CV "shadows", and sends regular sighting reports to CinCPAC. CAP is at max, strike group readied. Carrier(s) would attempt to remain in shadow/contact until landbased air recce can take over these duties, then the CV's would withdraw beyond immediate strike range, but remain within 4-6 hours steaming distance of strike range in the event of a DoW.

2. Army troops and land based air in Oahu (and later PAC wide) are put on alert. Aircraft may be dispersed to outlying airfields on other islands. CAP, ASW, and search missions are dramatically stepped up. Leaves cancelled, all personnel return to units, ammo broken out. Strike aircraft prepped.

3. Pac Fleet units in port are sortied as soon as feasible. I would suggest that the slow BB force would be sortied away from the approaching KB. Subs would sortie into path of KB for scouting and, if in the case of a DoW, attack. Lexington and Enterprise would be ordered to conduct ops together. Saratoga (on west coast) would be ordered to Hawaiian area ASAP. Convoys in or near the Hawaiian area would be rerouted. If possible, Enterprise and Lex groups would wait until KB is in range of land based air out of Hawaii for max cooperation of air strikes.

4. Diplomatic messages would be fired off, including probably, an ultimatum for the KB to withdraw west of the Dateline.

This is about as far as my imagination takes me.

Edit: Sorry, I was answering this question:

quote:

What does the USN CV do then? The USN DDs at PH were on the footing of "shoot first, ask questions later" regarding subs in PH (but then again, not in international waters either).



jwilkerson -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:13:06 PM)

quote:

It sounds like KBs orders are "Don't fire unless fired upon, until you bomb PH on 12-07."


Not sure a reading of the various orders supports that interpretation. I'll quote several relevent excerpts below:


The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is empowered to use force in self-defense in case his fleet is challenged by American, British or Dutch forces during the process of carrying out military preparations.

2. The exercise of military authority cited in the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 5 will be effected in the event the American, British, or Dutch naval forces invade our territorial waters and carry out reconnaissance, or approach our territorial waters and their move is recognized to be threatening, or an aggressive act is taken to endanger us even beyond our territorial waters

JCW: so these two taken together (and the second is referring to the first) seem to authorize force to be used if threatening or endangering acts are taken ... were I the commander in question, I would not interpret this to mean only fire if fired upon, I would take this to mean, fire if as the commander on the spot, I mean enemy actions endanger the success of my mission. Such actions could include anything, movements, recon flights, anything that makes me as the commander believe my mission is threatened.

In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

JCW: again this third fragment, seems to indicate that counterattacks can be launched if there is danger of attack, no requirement is given that an enemy attack first be lauched. All, in all these sound like pretty liberal orders to me, essentially telling Nagumo, use your judgement, and if you see anything that threatens your force or your mission, you are free to destroy it.




niceguy2005 -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:14:10 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Feinder

There has been much discussion about "What if USA knew, and sailed out to meet the IJN fleet..." Blah, blah, blah.

My question is, What if say, KB had been spotted by Lex (or some other CV in the area), a few days before 12-07? What were their orders? They were under radio silence, no?

"What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" Were their orders to attack BEFORE 12-07?

Interesting Feinder

A. Knowing how the Japanese were during the war I doubt this was much in their minds. The Japanese would have convinced themselves the the US would be totally off guard, being too busy being decadent Americans to put up much of a fight...not far from the truth, but point is Japan seldom seemed to have a plan B.

B. The commander would probably have gone on with the attack anyway.

C. Had word gotten to PH about the fleet Kimmel would have dropped his golf clubs and gotten the fleet to sea. However, if smart he would have hung back away from PH and let the Army Air corp weaken the KB first, then sent in the fleet...which still would have been a futile effort, those slow BBs would never have closed with the KB, but it wouldn't have been as sever a whooping as charging a strong KB.



niceguy2005 -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:17:56 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

quote:

It sounds like KBs orders are "Don't fire unless fired upon, until you bomb PH on 12-07."


Not sure a reading of the various orders supports that interpretation. I'll quote several relevent excerpts below:


The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is empowered to use force in self-defense in case his fleet is challenged by American, British or Dutch forces during the process of carrying out military preparations.

2. The exercise of military authority cited in the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 5 will be effected in the event the American, British, or Dutch naval forces invade our territorial waters and carry out reconnaissance, or approach our territorial waters and their move is recognized to be threatening, or an aggressive act is taken to endanger us even beyond our territorial waters

JCW: so these two taken together (and the second is referring to the first) seem to authorize force to be used if threatening or endangering acts are taken ... were I the commander in question, I would not interpret this to mean only fire if fired upon, I would take this to mean, fire if as the commander on the spot, I mean enemy actions endanger the success of my mission. Such actions could include anything, movements, recon flights, anything that makes me as the commander believe my mission is threatened.

In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

JCW: again this third fragment, seems to indicate that counterattacks can be launched if there is danger of attack, no requirement is given that an enemy attack first be lauched. All, in all these sound like pretty liberal orders to me, essentially telling Nagumo, use your judgement, and if you see anything that threatens your force or your mission, you are free to destroy it.



I'd agree with you JW. I'd read this as "if someone gets in the way of your operation, sink 'em...but they probably won't."



jwilkerson -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:22:47 PM)

quote:

I'd agree with you JW. I'd read this as "if someone gets in the way of your operation, sink 'em...but they probably won't."


Based on Nagumo's subsequent performances, my guess would be, unless he was actually being attacked, he would be more likely to run. And note that these are reconstructed versions of the official orders, who knows what "informal" agreements he might have had with Yammamoto. Yammamoto, would likely not have wanted to fire the first shot, if negotiations were still possible, so it is plausible that he might have even unofficially authorized Nagumo to turn around, depending on how far he had progressed when spotted and depending on where the negotiations were. But that is all speculation, the question was "what were the orders" and TTBOMK these were the orders and they pretty much say shoot first and ask questions later.




niceguy2005 -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:36:36 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

quote:

I'd agree with you JW. I'd read this as "if someone gets in the way of your operation, sink 'em...but they probably won't."


Based on Nagumo's subsequent performances, my guess would be, unless he was actually being attacked, he would be more likely to run. And note that these are reconstructed versions of the official orders, who knows what "informal" agreements he might have had with Yammamoto. Yammamoto, would likely not have wanted to fire the first shot, if negotiations were still possible, so it is plausible that he might have even unofficially authorized Nagumo to turn around, depending on how far he had progressed when spotted and depending on where the negotiations were. But that is all speculation, the question was "what were the orders" and TTBOMK these were the orders and they pretty much say shoot first and ask questions later.



Well, I don't know the individual commanders personalities well. However, remember that political wheels were turning. Diplomatic relations were being severed and it is unlikely that IF the Japanese wanted to turn back at the last minute that A: they could call off any off thier other invasions and B: the morning of 12/7 Japanese diplomats were supposed to be handing the US an indirect declaration of war - it was actually several hours late being delivered. I suspect there was a predetermined point of no return on that voyage to PH and by the time the KB was getting near the base, it was already passed...just my suspicion, but it would almost be necessary considering the timing that had to occur with other attacks and with the diplomats. I doubt Nagumo could have turned aside even if he wanted to.



Feinder -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:45:51 PM)

quote:

Are you looking for actual historical records of orders, or are you asking for speculation?


I don't really have an agenda on this thread. I was simply curious what some of the leaned one here thought. Frankly, I don't really even have an opinion, because I didn't know what the orders were. I'm reading y'alls responses, before forming an opinion (for once [;)]).

-F-



mlees -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:46:20 PM)

quote:

This dispatch is top secret.
This order is effective at 1730 on 2 December:
***** Combined Fleet Serial) #10.
Climb NIITAKAYAMA 1208, repeat 1208!


So, on 2 December (Tokyo time), 6 days prior to the actual attack, the fleet was given the green light.

I suggest that the fleet would have attempted to carry out it's orders, as written, with preservation of the fleet as an unspoken assumption.

However, on the comments that Nagumo was a big chicken, I respectfully point out that in the battle of Midway, Naguma "charged" ahead (with only the Hiryu remaining) after at least two spotted USN carriers. His reports to Yamamoto that day indicated that he (Nagumo) thought that he was engaging anywhere from 2 to 6(!!) enemy carriers. Not the actions of a man who had no nads...



Terminus -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:48:04 PM)

Might have been the action of a man who thought that his bosses would fire him if he did something considered timid for a second time.



mlees -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:51:21 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Might have been the action of a man who thought that his bosses would fire him if he did something considered timid for a second time.


Hehe. Maybe. But I think that the actual man was not lacking in guts, but lacking in aviation experience. He relied on his staff to work out the details, and as such, has been seen as "less than ideally effective" as a CV TF commander.

Also, he seems to lack the ability to improvise on the spot, and to recognise when to depart from "the plan".



Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 9:58:31 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

quote:

I'd agree with you JW. I'd read this as "if someone gets in the way of your operation, sink 'em...but they probably won't."


Based on Nagumo's subsequent performances, my guess would be, unless he was actually being attacked, he would be more likely to run. And note that these are reconstructed versions of the official orders, who knows what "informal" agreements he might have had with Yammamoto. Yammamoto, would likely not have wanted to fire the first shot, if negotiations were still possible, so it is plausible that he might have even unofficially authorized Nagumo to turn around, depending on how far he had progressed when spotted and depending on where the negotiations were. But that is all speculation, the question was "what were the orders" and TTBOMK these were the orders and they pretty much say shoot first and ask questions later.


Even Halsey might have passed on attacking at odds of 1:6. Strikes me that the most likely event would be Nagumo turning around as he had been ordered to launch "a suprise attack" and that would undoubtedly be impossible once KB was spotted. The really interesting possibility would have been KB being spotted by a submarine as occurred to the Japanese in 1944 on their way to the Marianas. Then it would have been a matter of "when?" If it were Saturday, the Pacific Fleet wouldn't have had time to sortie...., but all the AAA would have been manned and the CAP fully prepared and in the air. If on Friday, the fleet could have sortied, either to run (likely without it's CV's to provide air cover) or intercept.

Probably the most likely UNTIL KB raised speed and turned South late Saturday would be to turn around if they knew they'd been spotted. After that point they might very well have gone ahead. They themselves weren't really expecting the degree of suprise they achieved, so trying to fight their way in is a feasible choice. It's lots of fun to speculate...



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/10/2006 10:54:33 PM)

quote:

In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

JCW: again this third fragment, seems to indicate that counterattacks can be launched if there is danger of attack, no requirement is given that an enemy attack first be lauched. All, in all these sound like pretty liberal orders to me, essentially telling Nagumo, use your judgement, and if you see anything that threatens your force or your mission, you are free to destroy it.


Assuming that Nagumo was within 24 hours of striking PH, I think that he would have launched against a US CV. Afterall, the CVs are what they were seeking.

Assuming KB sank the CV and was not significantly damaged in return, I think he would then still have attempted to strike Pearl Harbor, even if the US fleet had sortied. Potentially, this could have had far worse consequences than the historical attack as they would have had to concentrate on repair and fuel storage facilities instead. Pennsylvania would still have been in dry dock. The rest of the BBs would have sortied south if they were smart but it's possible that 1 or 2 may have still been close enough to port to be discovered and attacked.

Another option would have been to sail to a point where he thought the US BBs might sortie to and attempt to strike them there. This would have the benefit of avoiding the hornet's nest that would now surely be Pearl Harbor and sink many of the BBs in deep water.

Just a thought. "What ifs" can be fun to postulate on.

Chez



Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 12:14:54 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.

JCW: again this third fragment, seems to indicate that counterattacks can be launched if there is danger of attack, no requirement is given that an enemy attack first be lauched. All, in all these sound like pretty liberal orders to me, essentially telling Nagumo, use your judgement, and if you see anything that threatens your force or your mission, you are free to destroy it.


Assuming that Nagumo was within 24 hours of striking PH, I think that he would have launched against a US CV. Afterall, the CVs are what they were seeking.

Assuming KB sank the CV and was not significantly damaged in return, I think he would then still have attempted to strike Pearl Harbor, even if the US fleet had sortied. Potentially, this could have had far worse consequences than the historical attack as they would have had to concentrate on repair and fuel storage facilities instead. Pennsylvania would still have been in dry dock. The rest of the BBs would have sortied south if they were smart but it's possible that 1 or 2 may have still been close enough to port to be discovered and attacked.

Another option would have been to sail to a point where he thought the US BBs might sortie to and attempt to strike them there. This would have the benefit of avoiding the hornet's nest that would now surely be Pearl Harbor and sink many of the BBs in deep water.

Just a thought. "What ifs" can be fun to postulate on.

Chez


As long as we're speculating, let's speculate on something likely. We know where the US CV's were, where they were going to or coming from. And we know that Kido Butai was coming due South out of the poor weather they'd been using to screen their advance. So the chances of them meeting or even spotting each other is virtually nil. Given where the Japanese were coming from they might have been spotted by a stray steamer (which they would undoubtedly have sunk---the only question would be if a believable radio message had been gotten off); a submarine (which might or might not have been spotted by the Japanese); or possibly an aircraft patrol once KB had left the area of rotten weather ( would have required an unlikely coincidence, or a lost aircraft).

Now KB launched it's dawn strike at Oahu from 240 miles North. So if the Pacific Fleet had had warning and sortied Saturday Night, it would have been 125-150 miles South, East, or somewhere from Oahu. The assumption that KB would have found and sunk the Pacific Fleet "in deep water" is highly speculative.
Historically 5-7 US Pursuit Planes made it into the air during the raid, and shot down 7-12 Japanese A/C.
Had the entire American fighter force been up on CAP when the "suprise" attacks arrived it's fairly obvious that Japanese losses would have been pretty substantial. Especially losses of those irreplaceable veteran aircrews. The Japanese were going to make those strikes on the morning of the 7th..., they would have had no way of knowing their target wasn't there. And if the defense was ready, they were going to get hurt. Now the remnants have to fly back to the carriers, re-arm and re-fuel, and find Kimmel's Fleet..., knowing that the US CV's were still unaccounted for and out there somewhere. And that US submarines and long ranged bombers from Oahu would be looking for them. I don't see Nagumo sticking around under those circumstances.

Now given the number of Japanese subs in the area, Kimmel might have lost some ships "in deep water". But anything speculative is PROBABLY going to produce a result more favorable to the US.



niceguy2005 -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 12:28:56 AM)

I would assert again, I find it hard to believe that Nagumo would have turned away unless he was certain he was attacking a vastly superior force. The reason is that the attack on PH was absolutely crucial to Japanese strategy. Failing to carry out the attack, even for very good reasons would have been disastorous to Japanese plans and Nagumos career. Once they committed by sailing that far, they were committed. IF the US had discovered them it would have been considered an act of aggression and that was all FDR needed to declare war. IMO.



Speedysteve -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 12:49:13 AM)

Hi all,

Does anyone know how close any ship was in coming near to KB during it's voyage? Transports? Steamers? Subs? Neutrals etc?

Steven



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 2:15:35 AM)

quote:

But anything speculative is PROBABLY going to produce a result more favorable to the US.


I would agree in regards to losses of Japanese aircrews. However, they planned on taking far heavier losses than what they actually incurred.

However, I don't believe that any force at Pearl Harbor except several carriers had the means to inflict substantial damage on KB.

What Nagumo would have done after sinking a US CV is anyone's guess. But if I were Nagumo, I would rely upon my scout planes and subs to tell me where the fleet had gone. I then might select a course that would put KB in a position to cut them off if possible.

Without any tactical intel, I might take the fleet E/NE of PH in the hopes of finding any ships fleeing towards the West Coast. PH isn't going anywhere and once I've engaged the US fleet or ascertained that it can not be engaged, I can launch any necessary strikes against PH or retire. Assuming that I must strike PH, my first strike would target the airfields, specifically fighter airfields. If I'm able to gain air superiority, the repair and oil facilities would next be on the target list.

I should have been in charge!!!

Chez



mogami -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 2:59:38 AM)

Hi, Kimmel got in trouble for being surprised. However if he had advance warning and ran south rather then towards the enemy he would have been shot.
There were plenty of Admirals in the USN on Dec 6th 1941 who didn't think the Japanese could sink a USN BB by air. In fact the only USN BB sank in the war were sunk on Dec 7th at PH.

It might have led to a disaster. (unless it was a night action) But KB only has 2 Kongos against the USN battleline.
However I can't see anyone in the US Military running from the fight. The B-17's would launch as soon as they could be armed. (without escorts)

If KB was more then 2 days from PH and the contact had radio. Nagumo would have no choice but to turn around. If the contact was less then 24 hours from PH then he would have sped up and launched as soon as in range.



jwilkerson -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 6:41:09 AM)

quote:

However, on the comments that Nagumo was a big chicken


I did not mean to say that Nagumo was a big chicken ( if you were getting that from me ). Not too many Japanese admirals were chickens ! Nagumo was a bit more cautious than many ( which in general is probably more of a complement that not ) ... I used the words "run away" ... perhaps I should have said "reverse course boldly" !




Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 7:04:30 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

But anything speculative is PROBABLY going to produce a result more favorable to the US.


I would agree in regards to losses of Japanese aircrews. However, they planned on taking far heavier losses than what they actually incurred.

However, I don't believe that any force at Pearl Harbor except several carriers had the means to inflict substantial damage on KB.

What Nagumo would have done after sinking a US CV is anyone's guess. But if I were Nagumo, I would rely upon my scout planes and subs to tell me where the fleet had gone. I then might select a course that would put KB in a position to cut them off if possible.

Without any tactical intel, I might take the fleet E/NE of PH in the hopes of finding any ships fleeing towards the West Coast. PH isn't going anywhere and once I've engaged the US fleet or ascertained that it can not be engaged, I can launch any necessary strikes against PH or retire. Assuming that I must strike PH, my first strike would target the airfields, specifically fighter airfields. If I'm able to gain air superiority, the repair and oil facilities would next be on the target list.
Chez


I doubt this. Nagumo wasn't willing to stick around even when he had a terrific result in real life. Hard to imagine him staying in the area when his initial airstrikes came back minus 100+ A/C and a report that the fleet wasn't there and the defenses were ready. And while I agree that the Japanese were expecting and willing to take higher losses to achieve their goals they were also totally unprepared to replace them.
You know exactly what advantages the game will give you, exactly where the US Fleet starts, where the US CV's were. Nagumo knew none of this. He knew he had charge of a number of his nations irreplacable assets..., and that he was several thousand miles from support or safety.



Nikademus -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 7:39:37 AM)

Nagumo tends to get painted as somewhat overcautious and/or indecisive, but the recent literature from Shattered Sword painted a different picture. Nagumo (in the author's opinions) acted aggressively and quickly once he had all the info he felt was necessary (which wasn't enough of course) After the disaster if anything, he actually got overaggressive and sought a surface engagement with the enemy despite the futility of such a move.

Nagumo's primary fault was that he wasn't really carrier Admiral material and tended to go with the flow a bit too much. He didn't become what i'd term "cautious" until after Midway but then again, if you lost 4 precious carriers in one battle, you'd probably be a little hesitant too. [;)]

The lack of CV's present at PH was definately a major disapointment for Nagumo and co. If he and his staff thought there was a chance of catching one with 1st Air Fleet, i don't see why he wouldn't have acted as he did at Midway (once news of enemy flattops was confirmed)



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 8:35:58 AM)

quote:

You know exactly what advantages the game will give you, exactly where the US Fleet starts, where the US CV's were. Nagumo knew none of this. He knew he had charge of a number of his nations irreplacable assets..., and that he was several thousand miles from support or safety.


My "what if" has nothing to do with WitP and the locations of US forces.

The premise is: What if Nagumo was presented with a present in the form of a US CV on Dec 6, 41? What would he have done?

I think he would have attacked it and most likely sunk it. Then he has a choice. (1) Continue with the PH attack mission -or- (2) change his plans and attempt to engage any US ships that have sortied -or- (3) retire.

(1) PH is alerted and the US fleet has most likely sortied. Is PH still a worthwhile target? Worthwhile in terms of damage inflicted versus losses to aircrews or damage to ships? In the Japanese mind, probably not the best choice. They want an engagement with the fleet, hopefully sink the remaining carrier. They know Saratoga is on the West Coast. They know that 2 carriers have been operating out of Pearl. Now one is sunk. Where is the other? Do they search for it or go after the BBs that have left port? What about option (2)?

(2) So they think about going after the fleet. The question is: Which way do the US ships head? Will they attempt to engage KB based on limited intel as to exactly where KB is? Do they attempt to link up with the remaining carrier? Or do they make a break for safety. Nagumo has to answer that question to have a reasonable chance of success.

In my mind, the prudent thing for the US BBs is to head S, SE or E for safety or remain in Hawaiin waters where land-based air cover is available. The US really has little clue about what they are up against other than knowing a swarm of aircraft from an unknown number of carriers attacked and sank a US CV somewhere to the NW. By this time, the European war is showing that BBs without air cover are vulnerable. So sending the US BBs on a potential wild goose chase to the NW without air cover is a huge gamble, one that most likely would result in several BBs being added to Davy Jone's Locker. I seriously doubt that they would ever be able to close to gun range even if KB is firmly located. Jap scout planes are going to be airborne and most likely will detect them well before hand. Add to that any time required for them to fuel and arm, organize escorts and sail out of PH probably means a delay of at least 12-24 hours. KB has plenty of time to pursue their own plans.

But that still doesn't answer the question that Nagumo ponders. Where is the US fleet going and what are their intentions? With a bit of luck, the subs will give him enough info that will allow Nagumo to react accordingly. If not, he will have to guess.

Heading due south means passing close to PH, not really a good idea even though PH has only limited offensive air power and most of that is relatively short-ranged and obsolete. Plus if the US fleet remains in home waters it gains the benefit of land-based CAP and is now in a position to possibly intercept. Plus it puts him further from his oilers and he will need to refuel by the evening of 7 Dec as the attack of the US CV would have cancelled any scheduled refueling operations.

Does he head for a position ENE of PH? This covers the US retreat route but also puts PH and an unlocated carrier between him and home. Not the best of tactical positions. One little sub can ruin KB's whole day. Plus there is the issue with fuel again.

Head SW in the hopes of finding the other carrier? Quite a long shot with little prospect of success unless the US CV throws itself on KB's sword. He can at least order his oilers to proceed towards Kawjalein and meet them somwhere south of Midway.

That leaves option (3) which is really not an option. Nagumo will lose face if he returns to Japan without seeking a decisive battle with the US fleet and PH untouched. So what if he sank a carrier. So he will attack. My guess would be PH with a pre-dawn strike, hoping to catch many planes of the ground. Losses are bound to be heavy but the Japanese have never called off a strike simply because losses might be heavy. Plus the IJN fleet is likely to survive relatively unscathed. There is no reason to believe that the US Army air forces are going to be any more effective than they were at Midway. Of course, Nagumo doesn't know that but they pretty much had only contempt for the US air forces anyways.

My guess? He goes for option (1). He attacks Pearl. With any luck the repair and fuel facilities are heavily damaged, maybe even destroyed. US air power is sure to take a beating and Japanese air losses will probably be heavy but it just may force the US fleet to relocate to the West Coast temporarily or to some other, less capable location.

My guess is as good as yours. No one knows what Nagumo would have done. It would have been a difficult decision regardless. The bigger question is given a Japanese attack 24 hours ahed of schedule, how does that effect the events in the Far East? Do we respond any better? Surely the Brits will but who knows about MacArthur.

Chez




ny59giants -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 4:34:50 PM)

I am currenlt re-reading "At Dawn We Slept" by Prange and happen to be in the first week of December. [;)]
I will quote from the author on what Nagumo's intentions were.
"At 0925 on December 3 Nagumo signaled his force, expressing clearly his anxiety and sense of lurking danger:
1. It has already been ordered to go to war on 8 December, but so critical has become the situation in the Far East that one can hardly predict war would not explode by that time. So far no new information on Hawaii area received and also no indication of out task Task Force being detected. But since the enemey intention is naturally beyond prediction, strict attention will be directed to meet any unexpected encounter with an enemy.
2. It is intended that this force will operate as scheduled even if war break out before 8 December...
At 1040 on December 4, local time - henceforth all times pertaining to the task force are local - Nagumo further instructed: " When an enemy or Third Power's warship or merchant ship is sighted, her communication equipment will be destroyed if and when necessary to protect secrecy of our intention, and, in case of emergency, she will be sunk." Nagumo's signal should dispose of any idea that if his task force were spotted, he would have abandoned Operation Hawaii, despite Kusaka's and Genda's remarks at Hitokappu Bay. At X-3 day the moment to recall the First Air Fleet for any reason short of a sudden diplomatic victory in Washington had passed."

From this time forward the amount of planes placed on a alert status on all the CV's increased.



Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 5:41:52 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

You know exactly what advantages the game will give you, exactly where the US Fleet starts, where the US CV's were. Nagumo knew none of this. He knew he had charge of a number of his nations irreplacable assets..., and that he was several thousand miles from support or safety.


My "what if" has nothing to do with WitP and the locations of US forces.

The premise is: What if Nagumo was presented with a present in the form of a US CV on Dec 6, 41? What would he have done?

The question is HOW would this happen? The two US CV's were a good deal South and West of Oahu; while Nagumo was coming down from due north of the island. This can only be a "what if" is someone was doing something totally stupid and against orders.

I think he would have attacked it and most likely sunk it. Then he has a choice. (1) Continue with the PH attack mission -or- (2) change his plans and attempt to engage any US ships that have sortied -or- (3) retire.

I'm sure that would have been what he tried to do too. But the chance of it happening was nil. Nagumo's course was determined specifically to avoid this kind of thing. His goal was SUPRISE.

(1) PH is alerted and the US fleet has most likely sortied. Is PH still a worthwhile target? Worthwhile in terms of damage inflicted versus losses to aircrews or damage to ships? In the Japanese mind, probably not the best choice. They want an engagement with the fleet, hopefully sink the remaining carrier. They know Saratoga is on the West Coast. They know that 2 carriers have been operating out of Pearl. Now one is sunk. Where is the other? Do they search for it or go after the BBs that have left port? What about option (2)?

And HOW does Nagumo KNOW that the Pacific Fleet has left PH? It isn't like he has satelite photography available. His first means of knowing would be when Fuchida & company arrived and found 100 fighters on CAP and no targets below. And as far as I can tell, the Japs had no idea where Saratoga was.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/11/2006 9:25:22 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

You know exactly what advantages the game will give you, exactly where the US Fleet starts, where the US CV's were. Nagumo knew none of this. He knew he had charge of a number of his nations irreplacable assets..., and that he was several thousand miles from support or safety.


My "what if" has nothing to do with WitP and the locations of US forces.

The premise is: What if Nagumo was presented with a present in the form of a US CV on Dec 6, 41? What would he have done?

The question is HOW would this happen? The two US CV's were a good deal South and West of Oahu; while Nagumo was coming down from due north of the island. This can only be a "what if" is someone was doing something totally stupid and against orders.

I think he would have attacked it and most likely sunk it. Then he has a choice. (1) Continue with the PH attack mission -or- (2) change his plans and attempt to engage any US ships that have sortied -or- (3) retire.

I'm sure that would have been what he tried to do too. But the chance of it happening was nil. Nagumo's course was determined specifically to avoid this kind of thing. His goal was SUPRISE.

(1) PH is alerted and the US fleet has most likely sortied. Is PH still a worthwhile target? Worthwhile in terms of damage inflicted versus losses to aircrews or damage to ships? In the Japanese mind, probably not the best choice. They want an engagement with the fleet, hopefully sink the remaining carrier. They know Saratoga is on the West Coast. They know that 2 carriers have been operating out of Pearl. Now one is sunk. Where is the other? Do they search for it or go after the BBs that have left port? What about option (2)?

And HOW does Nagumo KNOW that the Pacific Fleet has left PH? It isn't like he has satelite photography available. His first means of knowing would be when Fuchida & company arrived and found 100 fighters on CAP and no targets below. And as far as I can tell, the Japs had no idea where Saratoga was.




Obviously there is something you don't understand about "what if" scenarios. The original hypothesis was, "What if a US carrier was positioned in KB's path?" You need to be a little more flexible in your thinking if you are to evaluate potentialities.

And yes, the Japanese knew that Saratoga was on the West Coast. They knew that she had left drydock in Bremerton and was scheduled to arrive in San Diego to pick up her airwing. Not that hard to figure out. Especially when you consider the Japanese consulate in San Diego had a panoramic view of San Diego harbor and North Island. As for the other 2 carriers the Japanese knew only that they were not in port and assumed operating somewhere in the CentPac.

As far as knowing whether the US fleet had sailed or not, what would a prudent US commander do? Leave his ships bottled up in harbor? Come on, think about it! The Japanese would have assumed they had sortied. If they hadn't, all the better for the Japanese. Scout planes would probably reconned the harbor and its highly doubtful that that many ships could leave harbor without being spotted by at least 1 sub.

Chez



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